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A General's Life: An Autobiography by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair

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start by the distance between opening US and Soviet positions, and by Soviet insistence that British and French systems be placed on the agenda. The distance began to narrow with the so-called "walk in the woods" arrangement (75 launchers each) in July 1982, but ultimately no agreement emerged. Sigal indicates that serious differences may continue this state, noting that equal ceilings on weapons may be difficult to achieve, given that Soviet weapons seem related to target requirements different from Nato's. Moreover, verification and monitoring problems remain formidable, particularly given the mobility characteristic of European-based nuclear systems and especially the short-range weapons which are virtually identical to conventional weapons.

British and French nuclear systems compound not only arms control negotiations, but also Western nuclear policy. Sigal points out that French doctrine not only implies first use, but also a limited ability to extend deterrence into Germany. And while British policy is more restrictive and closely tied to Nato, both European nuclear powers steadfastly refuse to have their weapons negotiated away from them by the United States.

Given the breadth of the topic, Sigal has covered it admirably. It is a one-sided treatment, as Sigal concentrates on the Nato side, and one will have to find the Soviet postures elsewhere. But it is a fair and comprehensive treatment and should be required reading for anyone desiring

a well-documented scholarly overview of Nato's nuclear posture and problems.

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Bradley, Omar N. and Blair, Clay. *A General's Life: An Autobiography by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983. 752pp. \$19.95

This autobiography, written in the first person by Clay Blair, author of *Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War Against Japan* and other books, takes Bradley from his youth in Missouri through his tenure as the first chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with an Afterword covering his subsequent activities. A studious boy, he "loved every minute" of his four years at West Point and graduated with the class of 1915. During the interwar years Bradley spent much of his time as an instructor at service schools, "not a bad way," he concluded, "to learn your profession thoroughly." At Ft. Benning Infantry School he met and favorably impressed George Catlett Marshall. "No man," says Bradley, "had a greater influence on me personally or professionally."

Ordered to duty on the General Staff in 1938, Bradley learned the politics of War Department management and the Washington scene, while acquiring administrative experience that prepared him for

future roles. Rearmament following the fall of France, brought rapid promotions and Marshall appointed him commandant of the Infantry School at Ft. Benning with the rank of brigadier general. Soon a major general, he reactivated the 82nd Division in 1942 and then commanded a National Guard division in need of improvement. Finally, in February 1943, he arrived in North Africa for his first taste of combat. Critical of the British "peripheral" strategy and Eisenhower's direction of the North African campaign, Bradley concludes that "Ike was a political general of rare and valuable gifts, but as his African record clearly demonstrates, he did not know how to manage a battlefield."

Holding several jobs in the North African and Sicily campaigns, Bradley points out mistakes and missed opportunities with critical assessments of several colleagues, including Generals Patton and Montgomery. Although sharing with Marshall and Eisenhower a distaste for this diversion from a cross Channel assault, Bradley came to believe that the North African venture served as an essential training ground for the American troops destined to land in France.

Sent to London to prepare for the long-delayed invasion of the continent, Bradley presents a detailed account of the planning, staffing, strategy, and tactics of the successive campaigns. Portraying much of the high command bickering, animosity, resentment, faultfinding, and blame among those in the higher echelons,

Bradley concentrates most of his ire on Montgomery and Eisenhower's failure to control the "megalo-maniac" British commander. He supports the decision to concentrate on bombing the French railway and bridge systems in preparation for the invasion, and credits the Navy with saving "our hides" at Omaha Beach by close in-shore bombardment as it did in Sicily. The decision to refrain from racing the Russians to Berlin is defended, as is the "broad front" strategy over the "single thrust" favored by Montgomery. Insights on the intra and inter-service squabbles over strategy and the allocation of resources, involving top military and political leaders of Britain and the United States, provide some of the most fascinating reading.

The war's end in Europe found President Truman faced with demobilization and a flood of ex-service personnel, many with problems to be handled by the Veteran's Administration. Notified by Marshall that the President wanted him to head the agency, Bradley was "devastated," though he accepted the post after being assured by Eisenhower that he would have a good chance of later becoming Chief of Staff of the Army. With full support from Truman and the Congress, Bradley made numerous changes in the organization to improve medical care and handle the complex demands imposed on the agency.

Appointed Army Chief of Staff in February 1948, Bradley struggled with the recently "unified" Defense Department, the austere military

budget, war plans, the overseas commitments of the Truman Doctrine and the North Atlantic Treaty, and the frequent crises that erupted during the cold war. Unification had created a four-headed monster with the services and the Secretary striving for strategic and budgetary dominance. Military capability to support containment was virtually nonexistent. As Bradley put it, "the Army of 1948 could not fight its way out of a paper bag."

Soon after he assumed the newly created position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Bradley was confronted with what he calls the "Navy's mutiny"—an attack on Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, the B-36 and the Air Force, and the whole concept of strategic bombing. Bradley is vitriolic in his account of this episode, in which he publicly labeled the insurgents "fancy Dans" and privately considered Chief of Naval Operations Louis Denfeld "an affable glad-handing Washington bureaucrat," with "no grasp at all of large-scale land warfare." Yet some progress was being made on formulating a military policy to cope with cold war demands by two papers known as National Security Council No. 20/4, distributed on 24 November 1948, and No. 68 in April 1950. These studies constituted a virtual blueprint for the expansion following the outbreak of war in Korea.

Bradley's previous frustrations seem miniscule compared with those he suffered during the Korean conflict. The conviction that ROK forces could defend against the North

Koreans proved mistaken. Douglas MacArthur, inflicted with "localitis," pursued an absurd strategy, gave wrong advice, and was insubordinate, while the Joint Chiefs failed to exercise proper control of the battlefield. Of primary concern was the possibility that the Korean attack signalled the first of numerous Soviet initiatives in other parts of the world that could lead to general war, contingencies that demanded a global approach to the allocation of military resources which were all too meager. As Bradley notes, "In those days we held the rather simplistic belief that *all* communist moves worldwide were dictated from Moscow by Stalin personally." Agonizing about what to do with MacArthur plagued the Washington hierarchy and is a constant theme during this chaotic period.

Bradley emerges from this book as a dedicated, strictly professional soldier, devoted to his country and his family, whose appeal was in startling contrast to the more flamboyant military heroes. Most revealing are his perspective and his unsparing judgments of other leaders, with whom he was associated, and the issues and events with which he was involved during these troubled years. Based on numerous taped interviews with Bradley and others, private papers, memoirs, government documents, and authoritative studies, this readable narrative presents a personal account of the man in his time. Ably assisted by his wife Joan, Blair has produced an admirable blending of autobiography

and biography that will remain a classic in its field.

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Hamilton, Nigel. *Master of the Battlefield: Monty's War Years 1942-1944*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983. 863pp. \$25.95

Nigel Hamilton's middle volume of his monumental three-volume biography of Montgomery covers the period 1942-1944, beginning with Alamein and ending with victory in the Battle of Normandy. It is of special interest to Americans because it was during this period that Monty was first thrown into close contact with Patton, Bradley, Eisenhower, and other Americans. In Normandy, Monty had serious disagreements with Ike and the others over basic strategic questions. This led to thriving controversies over what Monty did or did not say, and what he did or did not intend to do. In dealing with these controversies, Hamilton takes Monty's point of view. He agrees with Monty on every issue, indeed sometimes claiming more for Monty's genius than even Monty himself would claim. The one criticism Hamilton has of Monty is that Monty simply could not or would not adjust himself to his role, or take some pains to be aware of the pressures on his superior, Eisenhower.

What will be of most interest to serving officers, however, is not Hamilton's defense of Monty on this or that disagreement, but rather Hamilton's admirable discussions of

Monty on the subject of command. Monty had a fine mind, and he had used his powers of thought to concentrate on the problem of command. He had tested his ideas in battle, at almost every level of command. He knew what he was talking about, and can be read with great profit today by those put into command situations.

Although Eisenhower never benefited from it, in certain areas Monty did have broadness of mind. Far more than Patton or indeed most other fighting generals, Monty was sensitive to the problem of public morale. In the spring of 1944, for example, during the preparations for Overlord, Monty took the time to visit the factories where the war goods were being manufactured. He would make a speech, urging the workers to one last great effort, to give his boys the tools with which to win the war. Then he would break off and chat informally with the workers. He was tremendously popular, a man who cultivated his own image, vain, difficult—but a superb showman and politician as well as general. He really did do wonders for British morale. It is one of Hamilton's virtues that he brings this out.

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