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Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service

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missile defense. Yet, the question goes unanswered. This reader would have appreciated Dr. Payne making a distinction between "Space Strike Weapons" (the Soviet terminology) and SDI (as explained by the Reagan Administration); according to Payne's arguments, Soviet objection to SDI represents a contradiction to their historical pursuit of homeland defense.

Dr. Payne also makes a strong point that the regime of arms control has ignored sophisticated technical developments in Soviet offensive weapons. Specifically, he suggests that Soviet heavy ICBMs (SS-18 onward) have so changed the strategic environment that any further attempts at arms control will be futile until these prompt counterforce weapons are eliminated. Through verbiage, not laborious exchange calculations, Payne drives home his point that these prompt counterforce offensive weapons have the same net effect on strategic balance as does a ballistic missile defense; arms control advocates have ignored this essential equivalence, to their and our detriment. Payne challenges them to rethink arms control in the context of the present strategic environment and to integrate the concept of strategic defense with other aspects of national strategy. While offering several possible negotiated paths to pursue strategic defense—most of which concern modification or abrogation of the ABM Treaty—the recurring themes are those which he establishes earlier; mutual vulnerability ill serves the

United States and mutual invulnerability *ought* to benefit both the Soviets and the United States.

But, Dr. Payne offers no panacea; in fact, his pessimism is reflected by the following, "Suggesting that nuclear disarmament is the solution to the nuclear threat is like suggesting that widespread wealth is the solution to poverty." Yet, he is clearly optimistic on SDI. Throughout the book his theme is that SDI is technically feasible, "militarily" reasonable and morally appropriate as an alternative to the present state of affairs. The book is readable, even for one not studied in such weighty strategic matters, yet possesses sufficient detail to be useful to those actively involved in the public debate.

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Cohen, Eliot A. *Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985. 227pp. \$22.50

In his important study, *Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service*, Eliot Cohen explores why the United States alone, among the Great Powers of the 20th century, has failed to settle once and for all the kind of military service it will ask of its citizens during peacetime. Since World War II, the United States has either tried or seriously considered the following methods of meeting its manpower requirements: universal service (not limited to military ser-

vice, and eventually applying to women as well as men), universal military training (for all males, but where only training and not service is compulsory), selective service (compulsory service determined at the discretion of local draft boards), the lottery draft (service is compulsory, but determined by chance, not selection), and, for the last 14 years, an all-volunteer force (AVF).

The author rightly sees the AVF as a temporary "solution" prompted by short-range political and demographic factors, and based on mistaken "free market" assumptions about why men fight. For the fact is that despite increased financial incentives, the AVF has failed to attract qualified men in sufficient numbers, especially among the white, middle and upper classes. Consequently, it has increasingly been forced to rely on women and reservists to meet its manpower needs. Eventually, Cohen argues, the "instability" of the AVF will force America to choose between scaling back its commitments to those of a second-rate regional power (which to his credit Cohen never seriously considers) or reinstating some form of conscription. Cohen does not doubt the need for a draft: the only question is "what kind?"

Citizens and Soldiers seeks to elevate the level of this debate by offering practical proposals "from the broadest possible views." The great strength of this book is its statesman-like insistence that the "necessities" of great power politics be reconciled with the principles and traditions of liberal republicanism.

Dealing first with strategy, Cohen argues that the United States must prepare for two different kinds of war, each of which requires a different kind of army. When the engagement is limited, America needs a professional, long-service fighting force with sufficient "grit" to persevere in foreign territories for extended periods. But to prepare for all-out conflict, we need a mass army which exceeds the capabilities of a small professional force.

Turning next to ideology, Cohen argues that American political principles point in two contradictory directions. On the one hand, the American commitment to individual liberty suggests that our civic and military obligations should all be voluntary. On the other hand, our dedication to equality implies that the burdens of defense be borne equally, even if it means coercing unwilling citizens who might serve their country more effectively in some other capacity. *Citizens and Soldiers* tries to reconcile this tension *and*, at the same time, to satisfy America's defense requirements. The key to his solution lies in linking liberal voluntarism with the professional fighting force required for small-scale wars, and limiting republican egalitarianism to the universal burden sharing involved in preparing for all-out war. In his concluding chapter, Cohen endorses the notion of Universal Military Training (UMT), first advocated during the Truman Administration, as the form of conscription most consistent with America's liberal republican principles.

This provocative suggestion requires fuller treatment than it receives in *Citizens and Soldiers*. Although Cohen makes a convincing case that some form of UMT best satisfies America's ideological commitment, he is less convincing about its military effectiveness. Perhaps this is because it is to serve chiefly as a deterrent. But even if deterrence works, and full-scale conventional war is averted, can we be certain we will not need conscripts to augment our volunteer forces in more limited wars? Perhaps, as Cohen suggests, if American generals had had to rely exclusively on volunteers in Vietnam, they would have pursued a more intelligent strategy, but what about our other "small" war, Korea? Cohen's paradigm, though useful as a general framework, may be a bit too neat. Finally, I found puzzling the absence of any discussion of Soviet forces. For surely, Soviet military strength must be considered as one of the larger "necessities" which circumscribe American "choices" in foreign policy.

But these are minor quibbles. In any future debate over conscription, Cohen's masterful analysis will be indispensable to citizen and soldier alike.

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One would think that any book trying to trace the development of the American foreign policy apparatus from George Washington to Ronald Reagan which manages to misspell Henry Kissinger's name three times in two pages can't be all bad. But *Secrets of State* comes close. Barry Rubin (fellow, Council of Foreign Relations) aims to tell us how the foreign policy system has worked by taking a middle course between "dry diplomatic history" and journalism. His reliance upon the anecdotal and chronological, instead of the analytical and conceptual, gives him a steaming track closer to the Charybdis of Jack Anderson than the Scylla of Samuel Flagg Bemis (who is not very often "dry"). Fortunately, Mr. Rubin is a lively writer, and if some of the anecdotes seem apocryphal or hoary, they can be enjoyed.

The problem Mr. Rubin sets out for himself is real: How does the policy process work and why does the State Department of today usually fail to bring some order to the process. The problem is an old one. Can there be anyone concerned with foreign policy who doesn't know or vaguely remember the dictum: The Constitution is an open invitation to struggle for the privilege of conducting American foreign policy? From the beginning of the Republic until 1919 that struggle was usually between the President and the Senate. The game changed with Woodrow Wilson. He began the building of the imperial Presidency (Mr. Rubin includes two books by Arthur

Rubin, Barry. *Secrets of State*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. 335pp. \$25