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Book Reviews

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PROFESSIONAL READING

The Navy has a long history of official and quasi-official support of literature and the arts, some good and some bad. It has every reason to be as proud of *Red October* as it was of *Victory at Sea*, WWII combat artists' paintings, Michener's *Tales of the South Pacific* and the like.

Captain Stephen P. Reinertsen, US Navy Reserve (Ret.)

Clancy, Thomas L., Jr. *The Hunt for Red October.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1984. 387pp. $14.95

Seafarer and author Peter Freuchen, concluding his epic *Book of the Seven Seas*, reflects " . . . sailors have time to make up yarns and people on shore often like to believe them." Of late, a nautical yarn sweeping the land reveals a flip side to Freuchen's observation: nowadays people on shore also have time to make up yarns and sailors often like to believe them. If not to believe, at least to rush to the nearest bookshop and buy them.

How about a sea story with over 155,000 copies sold in a few months—now in its seventh printing—fifth on *Time*'s national best-seller list and first on Washington, DC and San Francisco lists—the Pentagon bookstore can't keep it in stock—acclaimed by President Reagan—paperback and foreign rights sold for princely sums—movie and TV negotiations underway?

Written by an insurance broker who's never before been in print, much less been to sea, and published by a small scholarly group out of their second-floor carrels over the Naval Academy Museum? With no agent, no Madison Avenue publisher hype?

Captain Reinertsen, back from overseas and US travels collecting tall tales, is writing an anecdotal history of the Navy/Lockheed P2(V) Neptune aircraft.

What's going on here, has fiction become stranger than truth?

For *The Hunt for Red October* author Tom Clancy and the Naval Institute Press, indeed it has. If not stranger than truth, certainly more wondrous. Consider: In 1983, the Institute Press rattled hardly any cages with a policy turnabout: they would publish their first work of fiction, if only they could find one "wet" enough. While somewhere the founding fathers may have winced, the decision wasn't exactly precipitous—it took 110 years.

Meanwhile, some miles south of Annapolis along Route 260 just west of Chesapeake Bay, 35-year-old Tom Clancy and his wife Wanda were prospering, serving about 1,000 southern Maryland clients from the O.F. Bowen Insurance Agency at Owings in Calvert County. Days, Clancy's beat-up old electric typewriter continued to underwrite insurance policies, while nights were given over to something new: hair-raising confrontations between Soviet and US missile-laden "boomers" and nuclear attack boats, playing deadly cat-and-mouse games—for keeps—all the underseas Atlantic a chessboard, with neither Washington nor Moscow blinking first—or at Armageddon.

Clancy's typewriter got little rest. For this improbable task landlubber Clancy didn't start quite from scratch. For tactical background, he had enjoyed a $9.95 naval-engagement wargame (Harpoon) on his home computer. Then there was the 1975 real-world story of the attempted defection of the Soviet frigate *Storozhevoy* to Sweden, which Clancy had mulled over for years and was the original inspiration for *Red October*, plus a long-smoldering urge to do some serious writing.

Of practical help were his English degree from Loyola College in Baltimore, tips from some client friends—ex-USN submariners—at a nearby nuclear power plant, and every unclassified technical and tactical book he could get his hands on. He was not a total stranger at the Institute Press offices; earlier they had paid him $35 for a *Proceedings* brief on MX missiles, and they kindly loaned him *Guide to the Soviet Navy* and *Combat Fleets of the World*. Not long after the Institute Press' decision to publish fiction, Clancy's first draft dropped in over the transom, and the rest is still making publishing history.

The novel's good-guy protagonists are Jack (Armstrong?) Ryan, the all-American CIA agent with ties to the White House and moles in the Kremlin, and straight-arrow senior Captain Marko Ramius, skipper of the Red October, the latest and finest missile boat in the Soviet submarine service. It seems that Ramius' beloved wife has been done in by the bumbling Moscow medics, and the brooding Ramius decides to get even by conning Red October, with her unique supersilent, supersecret propulsion gear, on a zigzag course 4,500 miles westward under the Atlantic—bound for Norfolk.

To stop him, the Soviets throw everything they have into, onto and over the Atlantic; contrariwise, the Americans go all out to help him escape.

Peacetime rules of engagement, while still operative, tend to get bent by contact area commanders. Time and again, the White House and the Kremlin go to the brink—tension mounting—then back off to await the next contact.

Clancy freely admits he wants the good guys to triumph. While we live in a world infinitely shaded in grays, it is pleasant to be led through simpler labyrinths, however illusory, wherein the righteous ultimately win and villians get their just deserts. This is reading for fun, whopping good fun. According to our Commander in Chief, upon inviting the Clancys to lunch at the White House, "The perfect yarn . . . non-put-downable." It would be terribly unfair to the few of you who may not yet have read it to reveal more of the plot—so I shall not.

However, to qualify for the "Professional Reading" section of the *Naval War College Review*, a book review should deliver at least one solemn professional observation, in this instance a hypothesis: Should the portrayal of a sub skipper crippled by a veto-wielding "political observer" and a surly crew of poorly trained enlisted draftees even approach reality in the USSR submarine service, then we may all breathe a bit easier. Alas, viewed from an entire career retrospective in ASW, I fear Clancy's Red October crew is only good fiction.

While we're waxing solemn, a tiny few of the old guard on both coasts have groused about the Naval Institute Press going "commercial" in electing to publish fiction. Had *Red October* not been a success, I doubt we would have heard from them.

In rebuttal, let us here call up what the founders had in mind: "The advancement of professional *literary*, and scientific knowledge in the naval and maritime services, and the advancement of the knowledge of sea power." (Emphasis is mine.)

The Navy has a long history of official and quasi-official support of literature and the arts, some good and some bad. It has every reason to be as proud of *Red October* as it was of *Victory at Sea*, WWII combat artists' paintings, Michener's *Tales of the South Pacific* and the like. Contrast last year's nighttime soap bomb, NAS Emerald Groupie or whatever, which must have had some kind of Navy cooperation, with the squeaky-clean, on-its-own-merits success of *Red October*.

The Institute Press is taking all this steady as she goes. Says the marketing director regarding alleged "profit." "The income has to go for other projects. The *Proceedings* of the U.S. Naval Institute has to be subsidized by the book program . . . . And our various membership activities benefit by the book sales. But there's no profit." While they have no immediate plans to publish another novel, they will " . . . publish occasional fiction that meets our standards."

For a collegiate press noted for naval academia tomes, *The Bluejackets Manual* and Dutton's *Navigation and Piloting*—their average press run is 3,000-

5,000 copies—they may be forgiven a few Cheshire cat grins above the Museum these days.

I read the book prior to learning of Clancy's background; the dust jacket and introductory pages were silent on the subject. Curious, I mailed copies to two friends, both ex-USN nuc boat skippers. Their telephoned reactions were nearly identical: after bawling me out for losing a night's sleep, they suspected, as had I, that Clancy could only have emerged dripping wet from the underseas USN to write with such technical acumen. While they both had some reservations about the plausibility of the underseas tactics and scenarios, they brushed these aside and pronounced the book a fascinating read.

Red October probably will not give either Coleridge's *The Ancient Mariner* or Herman Melville's *Moby Dick* a run for the all-time maritime literary sweepstakes; it matters not. Among contemporary writers, however, this reviewer ranks *Red October* as standing tall among Edward L. Beach's *Run Silent, Run Deep* and successor submarine novels, and Herman Wouk's *The Caine Mutiny*. In my opinion, the early Michener tales rank a cut above Clancy's first, in sensitivity, lucidity and character development. While these are tall trees for a first-time author to stand among, Clancy has earned it. "I didn't get kissed by the muse," he told *Time* magazine, "It was hard work."

With aplomb, Clancy has proved that he can write a great adventure yarn. The old electric typewriter has been replaced with a Macintosh computer wordprocessor, and all systems are go. The report is we will be reading more of Jack Ryan, the all-American CIA agent; also, Clancy is collaborating with Larry Bond, a naval analyst, on a book tentatively to be called *Sunset*.

We await with pleasure. Our hearty congratulations to Tom Clancy and the Naval Institute Press for *The Hunt for Red October*!

Blechman, Barry, ed. *Rethinking U.S. Strategic Posture: A Report From the Aspen Consortium on Arms Control and Security Issues*. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Press, 1982. 320pp. $28

Bracken, Paul. *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983. 252pp. $19.95

Brodie, Bernard, Michael Intriligator, Roman Kolkiewicz, eds. *National Security and International Stability*. Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1983. 441pp. $30

Huntington, Samuel, ed. *The Strategic Imperative: New Policies for American Security*. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1982. 360pp.

Dyson, Freeman. *Weapons and Hope*. New York: Harper and Row, 1984. 320pp. $17.26

Garvey, Gerald. *Strategy and the Defense Dilemma: Nuclear Policies and Alliance Politics*. Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1984. 136pp. $24.50

Jervis, Robert. *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984. 204pp. $19.95

Wieseltier, Leon. *Nuclear War, Nuclear Peace*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1983. 109pp. $7.95 paper $2.95

Woolsey, James. ed. *Nuclear Arms: Ethics, Strategy and Politics*. San Francisco: ICS Press, 1984. $22.95

Books on nuclear strategy "droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven upon the place beneath." Unlike Will Shakespeare's quality of mercy, however, few nuclear texts are twice bless'd; the rain is likely to be radioactive, and it is highly questionable that it is heaven sent. Much of the recent downpour, perhaps the best, is included herein.

A small virtue of Barry Blechman's conference report is that it heads the list alphabetically. Of far greater significance, the contributors carry prestigious reputations in their fields and offer a middle of the road view of current strategic issues from the perspective of both strategy and arms control. A collective effort worked out in conference, the purpose was "to devise an integrated policy for strategic nuclear forces" in both "weapons programs necessary for an adequate military and political balance . . . and, if so, how negotiations could enhance U.S. security." The chapters follow a natural progression—a perspective overview, US and Soviet views on nuclear war, East-West control and the nuclear balance, technology, the future of arms control, and concluding views on an effective strategic posture. The style is nontechnical, jargon free and offers excellent endnotes, but the text is hardly for the beginner.

Paul Bracken offers in *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces* a thorough analysis of US nuclear

strategy which follows nicely Walter Slocombe's essay on the subject in Blechman. Rich with illustrations, Bracken carefully traces the development of nuclear war planning and the command structure from 1949 to 1982. Discussion of the Strategic Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) development and gradual loss of Presidential authority therein is outstanding. The founding of NORAD in 1957 was a major step to integrate vertically America's nnclear weapons with a specialized intelligence and warning management center. It is important that warning of a nuclear attack was not to depend on a civilian group such as the CIA but instead on a military organization much more tightly coupled to the direct control of atomic weapons. The political leadership was gradually constrained by this command arrangement. Today the SIOP changes constantly but no President has ever been briefed more than once, never updated, nor given an alternate procedure if the custodian of the "football"—Presidential codes—becomes a casualty on the way to the President. Recent disclosures by President Reagan indicate that he, and perhaps no postwar American President, really clearly understand what alternatives the planners seek in the event of nuclear war. Therefore, it follows that as nuclear strategy increases in complexity, the ability of the Commander in Chief to carry it out continues to decline. This highly readable text, informed and authoritative, offers vital knowledge for the strategist, the planner and the decision maker at all levels.

Bernard Brodie, Michael Intriligator and Roman Kolkiewicz in *National Security and International Stability* offer another interesting and valuable reader on the development of nuclear and conventional strategy since World War II. Again the editors have chosen outstanding contributors: Bernard Brodie and Michael Howard on the falsity of American nuclear theory; Desmond Ball, Edward Luttwak, Robert Jervis, and George Quester on nuclear strategy; Klaus Knorr, Peter Paret, Alexander George, Thomas Schelling and others on conventional and revolutionary war. Excellent case studies on Korea, Vietnam and the H-bomb, ABM and MIRV decisions flesh out a solid framework for analysis. The intriguing question as to how Bernard Brodie, who died in 1978, could have edited a book published in 1983, is hardly a mystery. Brodie, dean of American strategists, was the prime mover in the project but didn't live to see it through.

The BIK editors (Brodie, Intriligator and Kolkiewicz) see their work as a reassessment of "the golden age" of strategic thought of the 1950s and 1960s. First, by moving away from the economic conflict model; and secondly, by the bureaucratization of strategic art and science by scholars whose dual loyalty to government and academe tended toward both "irrelevant policy advice and poor scholarship." Significantly, the three editors are all former RAND scholars who turned to UCLA to

form the Center for International and Strategic Affairs.

Sam Huntington's *Strategic Imperative*, by contrast, is an Eastern establishment product of the Harvard Center for International Affairs, with which eight of the nine contributors are associated. He also focuses on strategic renewal, the evolution of current doctrine, and a goal of security not in numbers alone but "founded on insight, skill, creativity, and the ability to outwit opponents." Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) receives its share of criticism; a strong case is made for greater reliance on nonnuclear deterrence and a conventional retaliatory strategy for Nato. *Strategic Imperative* is neither as comprehensive nor coherent as the Blechman and Brodie books but the analysis is first-rate. Huntington is convinced of a high probability that the United States will go to war sometime in the 1980s, and his conclusions are argued with great vigor.

Freeman Dyson's *Weapons and Hope* is a change of pace. A theoretical physicist, World War II operations analyst with the British Bomber Command, and Defense consultant, his book concerns the great human problems of war and peace. In four parts, "Questions" frames an agenda for a fruitful nuclear debate, "Tools" relates the weapons and their public perception, "People" relates cultural patterns and the diverse history of various countries and "Concepts" examines seven alternative strategic doctrines. Rich with historical illustrations showing a deep knowledge of war and the human condition, Dyson favors a defense-oriented strategy based less on nuclear arms and more on further development of high-precision nonnuclear missiles that would gradually make nuclear weapons obsolete in a posture of "parity plus damage-limiting"—live and let live.

An unexpected dividend in the Dyson book is the chapter on "Generals" and military professionalism in Germany. General Alfred Jodl, Hitler's chief of staff, was tried at Nuremberg and hanged for war crimes; General Hermann Balck was set free. The distinction between the two in part was, roughly speaking, between strategy and tactics. Both were true professionals in the Prussian tradition. Jodl was condemned for waging war aggressively at the strategic level; Balck was forgiven for waging war aggressively at the tactical level. It was a sin for a soldier to plan campaigns for the overthrow and destruction of peaceful neighbors but no sin for a soldier in such a campaign to be master of his trade.

Dyson draws a further distinction between the German soldierly virtue or *Soldatentum*—soldiering as a quasi-religious belief of the Prussian generals, and professionalism. When transferred to England, similar virtues are perceived by the British as belonging to sailors rather than soldiers. Since the means of naval warfare were limited, the ends of maritime war were also, hence sea wars were limited. No similar limitation on the means kept land warfare

from escalating into worldwide conquest and genocide.

Dyson is alternately amusing, intriguing or iconoclastic. *Freedom and Hope*, serialized in the *New Yorker*, is highly recommended for the military professional and as general reading at all levels.

Gerald Garvey offers a challenging reexamination of American strategies in Europe and Asia. He recommends decoupling strategic nuclear forces from overseas theaters in favor of a battlefield nuclear option and for a link of international economic policies to overseas security. As a framework for further research it is excellent.

Another refreshing but devastating assessment of American nuclear policy is Robert Jervis's *Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy*. He believes that "no strategy can provide the kind of protection that was possible in the past," and the "mutual vulnerability" of the superpowers drastically alters the new relationship between force and foreign policy, "the ways force and the threat of force can be used to reach foreign policy goals." Jervis, professor of political science at Columbia, sees current US nuclear strategy as complicated by a lack of empirical evidence, the growth of high technology, the influence of beliefs and doctrine in shaping rather than mirroring reality, and the commitments the United States has made to its allies. Primarily, nuclear strategy is based on a historical military response which is now irrational, contradictory and obsolete. The paramount role of nuclear weapons is their significance as tools to influence behavior of the United States and USSR in other areas of the world where vital interests of both sides may be challenged. This extremely important book should serve as a guide for anyone interested in future directions of US policy and the role of nuclear weapons therein.

Leon Wieseltier offers a distinct change of pace if not of direction. Claiming to be no military strategist, no political expert, no student of science of any sort, he is merely a citizen who writes. He is also a clear thinker who cuts up the unilateral disarmers E.P. Thompson and Jonathan Schell at one extreme with the same relish as the nuclear hawks—Richard Pipes, Colin Gray, Eugene Rostow, Caspar Weinberger at the other. Sharing the general belief that nuclear war cannot be won, he develops the view that protracted limited nuclear war espoused in the Carter PD 59 and current Defense Guidance, is nonsense. Believing that neither side can achieve nuclear superiority, he places our last hope to avoid a nuclear catastrophe in reliance on deterrence and of regulated reduction of armaments. Deterrence is not peace nor is it a strategy, but a condition of crisis. Teaching nothing about the manner in which nuclear weapons can be employed, it is a device to make their employment unnecessary.

Wieseltier, literary editor of the *New Republic*, also offers a succinct discussion of Soviet doctrine, its principal beliefs, its differences from

US doctrine, and the major fallacies on both sides. He offers a particularly interesting discussion of the effect of deploying US missiles to Europe. Are we reassuring Europeans there will be no nuclear war limited to their continent? If so, would American weapons launched from Europe limit Soviet retaliation only to European targets? It would be unwise to expect a devastated Soviet state to be content to leave the American heartland untouched, whatever the consequences to Europe. If the United States intends to limit a nuclear war to Europe, putting missiles in Europe that can reach the Soviet Union is the last thing we should consider. Such missiles should not be used but will prevent their Soviet counterparts from being used. They make possible retaliation without escalation, hence they deter.

Last for consideration is R. James Woolsey's volume of essays on the ethics, strategy and politics of the nuclear debate. Contributors include some of the nation's leading experts on the nuclear problem—policymakers, journalists and distinguished scholars writing from perspectives running the gamut from energy policy to outer space. The high esteem of editor Woolsey, former Under Secretary of the Navy, is a major attraction. Yet the reviewer found the essays in general to be shallow, transitory and lacking historical depth. Charles Krautenhammer's essay on nuclear morality is interesting and useful, yet better studies are available. Walter Slocombe, Colin Gray and Hans Mark speak of arms control prospects and problems and make an excellent case for the pre-1985 Reagan view of the impossibility of reaching agreement with the Soviets, whatever the necessity of gaining control of the arms race. Here as in the space program, the discussion is technological rather than strategic. Senator Sam Nunn's article on military strategy, for example, limits the role of the Navy to "sinking the Soviet fleet," primarily by submarines and aircraft; "even if we must paint some air force planes navy blue and gold, we must insist that our naval strategy be based on full utilization of land-based air." He shows no appreciation of the Navy role on the Nato northern and southern flanks nor a support role on the central front.

Perhaps most disappointing is "Understanding the U.S. Strategic Arsenal" by General Brent Scowcroft. His views on Douhet doctrines of strategic bombing, or on antisubmarine warfare sound propagandistic, a far cry from what he learned from us at the National War College. Finally, the Woolsey concluding chapter, "The Politics of Vulnerability, 1980-1983," offers an excellent insider's view of the national security process in the Reagan administration, but it is limited largely to the problem of MX missile basing. Woolsey participated on both the Townes Committee and the Scowcroft Commission on the MX and is thoroughly qualified to speak in this area. But the chapter heading calls for far more than is offered, leaving the reader to find a framework for concensus on

issues of strategic modernization, arms control, the role of allies, control of terrorism, and military dangers from space.

This book, in common with most edited volumes, has the virtue of bringing wide experience to an issue, but multiple contributions tend to be uneven in style and treatment, and lean toward breadth of scope rather than depth of analysis. A single author gains integrity of analysis but it may be at risk of a polemic or special pleading.

The reopened talks with the Soviets in the second Reagan administration will stimulate public discussion of many facets of nuclear arms raised in recent literature. Both the professional and the amateur will find herein a wide choice appealing to the most discriminating taste or political leaning.

PAUL SCHRATZ
Arnold, Maryland

Gregor, A. James and Chang, Maria Hsia. *The Iron Triangle: A U.S. Security Policy for Northeast Asia.* Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1984. 160pp. $23.95, paper $9.95

Positing that "the present China policy of the United States does little to mitigate the security threat presented by the strengthening of Soviet forces in East Asia," authors Gregor and Chang argue that a review of US foreign policy aims in this sensitive region should be made.

The Iron Triangle consists of the three non-socialist nations of Northeast Asia—Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of Taiwan. The vital triangle's linchpin is Japan, and the ROK and ROC are essential anchors to Japan's defense perimeter. With this in mind and in the face of increasing overtures, particularly in military matters to the PRC by the United States, the authors suggest that, "Washington will have to decide just how intimate its relations with Peking are to be. If the United States expects to foster more intensive military collaboration with Communist China, or to develop more complex economic and political ties, then it will probably have to sacrifice Taiwan. It would seem that policymakers in Washington are very close to that juncture when they will be obliged to undertake a hardheaded 'cost-benefit' analysis of US relations with the People's Republic of China."

The results of such an analysis would probably reveal that the United States has already received whatever benefits—strategic advantages—it has any reason to expect from the People's Republic of China. Strong arguments are made that China has more reason to concern itself about its "U.S. connection" than does the United States about any "China connection." This said, it becomes evident that the United States has, "the freedom to act with considerable discretion to protect its own security interests without paying disabling costs . . . ." One action espoused is the provision to Taipei of the military assets necessary for secure defense of the Republic of China. Gregor and Chang feel that, "not only would a

secure Taiwan help stabilize the entire Northeast, but its upgraded military assets might be incorporated into an integrated anti-Soviet defense of the region." For it is the Soviet's military capability, after all, that is the single most important factor in the complex security environment of Northeast Asia.

Given the recent pilgrimages to the PRC by US Government officials, suggestions that US Foreign Policy planners should reexamine and reinforce our ties with Taiwan may not be fashionable, but they are clearly germane. *The Iron Triangle* seeks to present the view that in Northeast Asia the US security partners are Japan, the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China (Taiwan). Also, "However much the People's Republic may be discomfited by the reality of the present circumstances, it is upon the defense capabilities of those nations that its ultimate security rests."

The Iron Triangle is carefully written and thoroughly researched. It is not polemical towards pro-PRC thought, but rather argues for a more balanced approach in our two China policy, feeling that the present US policy towards China is uneven and in fact may be undermining the very stability we seek to achieve in the region. Six tightly written chapters centering on security—"The Security Threat-The Soviet Union," "The Security of Japan," etc.—are well documented, but without expense to a readable style. An excellent bibliography is also provided.

Northeast Asia will play an increasingly critical role in the global strategy of the superpowers throughout the remainder of this century and into the next. The interests of four of the world's major powers—Japan, the United States, the PRC and the Soviet Union—intersect in Northeast Asia. *The Iron Triangle* offers the reader cogent thoughts on how to formulate a regional security policy that will protect the integrity and security of Northeast Asia while advancing US economic, strategic and moral issues. The authors' views may be controversial, but that controversiality is their greatest value. The "China debate" is far from over and *The Iron Triangle* offers ammunition or information depending on the reader's point of view. In either case, the work is a professional study of a complex problem.

R.S. CLOWARD
Captain, US Navy

Kennedy, Paul. *Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945: Eight Studies*. London and Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1983. 254pp. $24.95

One of the major writers in the area of naval history today is Professor Paul Kennedy of Yale. This small book, comprising eight of his essays, should be required reading for all who think about strategy. Where other naval historians have only paid lip service to the notion, Kennedy has in fact enlarged his studies of navies to embrace economic, diplomatic and imperial history and analyses equally. From his specialized work on the decline of the British Empire in the

face of Germany in one arms race and two world wars, he is moving toward a comparative examination of why other empires have failed as well. America, take note!

The long-term success of the British Empire can be largely explained, in Kennedy's words, by "the political culture of most of the British elite—the dislike of extremes, the appeal to reasoned argument, the belief in the rationality of politics and the necessity to compromise." In his brilliant opening essay, "The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy, 1865-1939," for example, he demonstrates that the pre-Munich British view of appeasement was positive, respectable and natural for a small island nation, and that the policy succeeded for 75 years.

Based on morality, economics and the global and domestic situations, Britain's appeasement policy was, in his view, "a policy of settling international quarrels by admitting and satisfying grievances through rational negotiation and compromise, thereby avoiding the resort to armed conflict which would be expensive, bloody, and possibly very dangerous." He shows that this policy succeeded by the extremely gradual demise of the Empire, in which its subject peoples retained the British sense of law and justice even as they sought independence, and also welcomed a continued place in the metamorphosis which became the Commonwealth. The essay "Why Did the British Empire Last So Long?" details this change and lays stress on the minimum of force utilized by Britain not only in its colonies but in the international arena. Pushed to the wall, however, Britain chose war in 1914 and again in 1939, when reluctantly it abandoned appeasement. The decline may have been inexorable, but it was at least reasoned and even controlled.

In many ways, "Strategy *versus* Finance in Twentieth-century Britain" is the most important essay, showing how well the British realized economics to be the fourth arm of defense. Thus arose the irreconcilable contradiction at the turn of the century when Britain still endorsed free trade in the midst of rising closed neo-mercantilistic imperial systems. Another paradox, in the 1920s, was the yielding of the aristocracy to a more representative democracy based on social and economic reforms which created costs that could only be met by cutbacks in defense spending.

"Arms-races and the Causes of War, 1850-1945" argues persuasively that arms races do not necessarily lead to war, nor are all wars caused by them. Many such races have been controlled and are not an "inevitable upward spiral" to war, a good case in point being the American-Japanese naval arms race which culminated in the Washington Conference of 1921. Kennedy's plain talk, rooted in superb syntheses of historical facts and statistics, warns us that arms negotiators are too mesmerized by the tools of war to the total exclusion of the *equally* important political, ideological, racial, economic and territorial factors of arms races.

Kennedy's special interest, the

Anglo-German naval arms race of 1898-1914, is treated in two essays dealing with its strategic aspects, and on Admirals Fisher and Tirpitz. He makes good use of newly released documents to show how poor a strategist Tirpitz was. Having misinterpreted Mahan, Tirpitz did not appreciate the need to control trade routes rather than "the sea" in general. He reveals how Tirpitz actually believed he could build a larger fleet of capital ships than Britain's—a fallacy which befell Napoleon, too, and which gives one pause over the current Soviet foray into carrier construction.

Juxtaposing Mahan and Mackinder, Kennedy argues in favor of the latter's continental theory that control of the European Heartland is superior to Mahan's claims for maritime supremacy in the twentieth century. This essay is the most arguable one in the book, for it confuses the basic agricultural character of central Russia with industrial resources. He sees overland transport as superior to over-water movement and air power to naval blockade and amphibious operations. But he is primarily a Europeanist who ignores the strategic mix of seaborne air power, naval blockade, and seaborne assault which decided the war in the Pacific. In his essay on Japanese strategy in that conflict, Kennedy fails to see Japan as a continental power even though he blames the army for the ultimate defeat and even concludes that the above naval mix brought Japan to her knees.

Much of Kennedy's book has many obvious inferences for the United States today, though some are buried between the lines. One key to the British imperial success, however, deserves imitation by American policymakers: Kennedy quotes a British statesman who in 1907 admired British national policy for being harmonized "with the general desires and ideals common to mankind, and more particularly . . . is closely identified with the primary and vital interests of the majority . . . of the other nations."

CLARK G. REYNOLDS
Charleston, South Carolina

Macmillan, Harold. *War Diaries: Politics and War in the Mediterranean.* New York: St. Martin's Press. 1984. 804pp. $29.95

From January 1943 until May 1945 Harold Macmillan was the British Minister Resident in the Mediterranean, first at Algiers and later in Italy and Greece. In the American order of things he would have been called Political Adviser, but with a difference and it is that difference that makes these diaries fascinating to read 40 years later. For Macmillan was a political animal beholden directly to Churchill and, at times, to the Conservative Party. As such he had far more power than any American political adviser would, as his American opposite number, Robert Murphy, would have been the first to admit. The British were amazed constantly during World War II (and appalled in Korea) at the wide latitude for independent decision given American theater commanders. British army commanders as distinguished as Sir

Henry Maitland Wilson (Supreme Allied Commander in the Med) and General Sir Harold Alexander (Commander Eighth Army) found themselves tethered by Macmillan. Appeals over his head to Churchill were fruitless. The difference in the American and British approaches is clearly in the difference between Presidential and Parliamentary governments. If a political leader has to face questions in the Commons almost daily, with the threat of a no-confidence vote always present, then military actions and decisions must be politically sound.

These diaries (as distinct from Macmillan's book on the period, *The Blast of War*) are highly personal and remarkably revealing.

We have Macmillan, the classicist, visiting ruins, recalling long-gone Roman victories, comparing a Churchill-Roosevelt meeting to one of East and West emperors—it was Macmillan, after all, who prophesied (rather condescendingly) that the British would be the Greeks of the postwar world guiding the stronger but not very bright American Romans.

Then, there is Macmillan, the publisher. The diaries are filled with entries such as: "Stayed in bed all day, reading Richardson's *Pamela.*" His reading is wide: Austen and Trollope (of course) Johnson, Gibbon, Dickens, Kipling and just about anything he could get hold of: "I have found a most delicious book called *Stanley's Eastern Churches* (1862) . . . fascinating . . . admirably printed."

Next, we have Macmillan, the ablutionist. Churchill once said of Scandinavians that they were "always whoring after the sun." His lieutenant in the Med couldn't stay away from the water. Over one stretch the diaries record fourteen swims in eight pages (he calls them "bathing").

We also have Macmillan, the eccentric dresser. To his wife (the daughter of the Duke of Devonshire), "I wonder if you could send out to me an old pair of grey flannel trousers (with stripes) . . . very old and dirty . . . ."

Finally, Macmillan, the insouciant, (this was the Macmillan that infuriated Labor MPs) in the last entry of the diaries: "The Cabinet appointments are out and I am to be Secretary of State for Air. How odd!"

But as one reads through this book, replete with names half-forgotten (all identified properly by a first-rate editor) and battles half-remembered, the overall impressions aside from an instinctive liking of the author even when it is putting down the Americans—and not always accurately—is the dominance of politics both domestic and foreign. One sees in these diaries the prime minister-to-be. Perhaps not the "Supermac" of Tory propaganda but certainly a man who knew how to exercise power in the British system. It didn't always work that well in the international arena, but "after all, old boy, they are foreigners, ain't they?"

J.K. HOLLOWAY
Naval War College

Ethell, Jeffrey and Price, Alfred. *Air War: South Atlantic*. London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1983. 227pp. $17.95

What an outstanding book!

For a definitive, day-by-day, sortie-by-sortie account of the air portion of the Falklands War, this is the book.

For a pilot's eye view of each Falklands aerial engagement and victory—or loss—this is the book.

For some keen insights into the level of risks accepted by Prime Minister Thatcher in sending the Falklands Task Force south under the able command of Rear Admiral John Woodward, this is the book.

For an anatomy of the colossal Argentine failure to mass their airpower effectively—as well as their naval power—this is the book.

For a detailed, documented correction of the official UK and Argentine Government records on aircraft losses and reasons for each loss, this is the book.

To appreciate this book fully it is necessary to appreciate the authors. Ethell and Price have become as disciplined, knowledgeable and savvy in researching, documenting, and reporting this most recent air war as they have been in presenting historical works on the air aspects of WW II. Their credentials are first-rate.

Ethell is first of all a pilot, instilled with the love of flying and taught by his US Air Force fighter pilot dad who had Jeff flying before he could drive a car. A multirated commercial and instructor pilot with thousands of hours to his credit, Ethell is also a reporter of note with over 2,000 hours in high performance USN and USAF aircraft. He has written numerous magazine articles as well as a recent book, *F-15 Eagle*, that deals with today's fighter pilots and their planes. Ethell's extensive research for the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum was brought about by or contributed to some of his other works of note: *Komet*, *Escort To Berlin*, *P-38 Lightning At War*, and, with Alfred Price, *The German Jets in Combat*, and *Target Berlin*. He speaks fluent Spanish and thus was able to conduct first-hand interviews with the Argentine pilots who survived the war.

Price served 15 years in the RAF, including aircrewman on the lone Vulcan bomber that conducted the first air attack on Port Stanley airfield on 1 May 1982 flying 7,860 miles. It involved 10 aerial tankers and 6 in-flight refuelings to drop 21 1000-pound bombs on the runway (only one of which actually hit the runway!). While accumulating over 4,000 hours as an air officer, Price specialized in electronic warfare, aircraft weapons and air combat tactics. He is now a full-time author with over 20 books on aviation subjects published over the years, including *Battle of Britain* and the *Battle Over the Reich*. He is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society.

The exceptional accounts in *Air War* validate the ample qualifications of the authors. While the conflict took place in 1982, except for a couple of Exocet missiles, the Argentines fought with technology and tactics of the late 1940s and 1950s.

The Harrier attack-cum-fighter, while more modern, is not a high performance fighter and was outnumbered in theater about 12 to 1. The weather was typical Antarctic—unbelievable. Lack of refuelers, airbases and radar warning applied to both sides, with a normal Harrier fighter combat air patrol lasting 10 minutes on station. The individual courage and performance by pilots of both sides was simply superb.

Lists of British innovations and lessons learned have been published elsewhere, but Ethell and Price give the flavor of the cockpit of a Vulcan bomber or Harrier packing a just-installed Shrike antiradar missile, installation of Blue Eric ECM pods on the Harriers in just two weeks from discussion of the initial idea, and RAF GR-3 Harriers being modified for sea duty to "fill some deck spots."

What is astonishing is the lack of such a list of innovations, or even adjustments, by the Argentinians. With a 12:1 advantage in theater, the Argentinians flew at about one-fourth the British sortie rate, and committed their forces piecemeal in 3 to 6 plane attacks. On 1 May the Argentines launched 56 sorties from the mainland, piecemeal, and lost 4 (or 7 percent). On 21 May, which was the UK D-day for the San Carlos amphibious operation, the Argentinians launched about 50 sorties in the same piecemeal manner and lost 10 (or about 20 percent). UK losses on 21 May were 1 ship sunk, 4 damaged (probably survived because Argentine 1,000-pound bombs didn't explode), and there were no aircraft losses.

Think of it—with 3 weeks to learn from the fiasco of 1 May—what if the Argentinians on 21 May had launched a simultaneous strike of 50 fighters from the mainland, armed with 1,000-pound bombs that worked, and were supported by the 30-odd light attack aircraft based in the Falklands? The obvious conclusion is that Prime Minister Thatcher's risks in the Falklands were enormous. Admiral Woodward's handling of his task force was superb, and the performance by the handful of Harrier pilots was outstanding under the most trying conditions, as was the individual performance of Argentine pilots. The key to the UK victory, however, was the failure of the Argentine Air Force high command to exercise its airpower to the maximum—or even half maximum—potential.

This is an exciting book you'll want to read through, with supporting details in 12 appendixes.

MYRL ALLINDER
Colonel, US Marine Corps

Chesneau, Roger. *Aircraft Carriers of the World, 1914 to the Present.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1984. 288pp. $27.95

Humble, Richard. *United States Fleet Carriers of World War II.* New York: Sterling, 1984. 160pp. $17.95

This book by Roger Chesneau, produced in England, is the first comprehensive attempt to chronicle all of the world's military aircraft-carrying ships built between 1914 and 1984. In order to limit this effort to

reasonable proportions, an aircraft carrier has been defined as "a sea going warship, the primary responsibility of which is the direct operation of heavier-than-air craft . . . and the provision . . . of such facilities as are required for their sustained operation." The definition excludes seaplane tenders and hybrids such as Japan's World War II *Ise* class battleship-carriers. This results in some grey area decisions which eliminate the Italian *Doria* and *Vittorio Veneto* classes but include the similar Soviet *Moskva* class and the French *Jeanne d'Arc*. The degree of aircraft mission dominance in the ship's design seems to be the key. As it is, the author covers an impressive number of ships.

The book is divided into two sections. The first, being the briefer of the two, presents a summary history of the evolution of the aircraft carrier, amply illustrated. The author covers the development of the carrier's various physical components such as the flight deck, catapults, arresting systems, hangars, ordnance and, of course, the carrier aircraft themselves. These are summary, not equipment-specific, but do include some good graphics such as the dramatic growth in carrier aircraft speed. The aircraft have been the real drivers in determining carrier size as the former has grown in size, complexity and performance. The first *Enterprise* (CV 6) at 22,000 tons was less than one-fourth the size of the present 95,000-ton *Nimitz* class, although each could carry just under 100 aircraft. The author supplements this design-oriented discussion with a brief review of the changing role of the carrier during the period of its existence, a dynamic condition peaked by World War II. Like most British books on the subject, the point is made that the WW II British carriers' armored flight decks and hangars made them more impervious to bomb damage (and thus capable of more rapid repair) than their US contemporaries (1941 *Illustrious/ Implacable* class vs the 1942 *Essex* class). The point is well taken but one wonders which choice the US carrier commanders in the Pacific would have made since the British ships carried less than half the aircraft complement of their US equivalents. Numbers of aircraft in the air were what finally counted. This issue became moot when the postwar US carriers incorporated the best of both design philosophies, growing still larger in the process.

The second section, eighty percent of the book, lives up to its title. It is a compendium of all carriers, ship class by ship class, in all navies, from 1914 to the present. These are listed alphabetically by country and chronologically by class. Each of the latter is given a brief introduction, is described statistically, its design development is provided and the individual service history summarized for each ship in the class. There is at least one good photograph, well sized, of each class and in many cases a starboard profile drawing is provided, occasionally accompanied by a plan or flight deck layout. Unfortunately these drawings range from poor to inaccurate, regrettable

for a book of this scope. The last twenty years have seen a marked improvement in combatant ship profile drawings in the world's naval annuals, particularly when one considers the low point of those in *Jane's Fighting Ships* during the fifties and sixties. *Aircraft Carriers* unfortunately takes a step backward in this department. The photographs, on the other hand, are presented in large format and are of reasonable quality considering the paper used. Many of the photos are familiar but many more are new, particularly those covering the many less-well-known classes of escort and light carriers. A number of the photographs are not dated, a serious deficiency for the naval historian.

In summary, the book makes the point that the British led the way into the carrier age and that while some fourteen nations have operated carriers of one form or another, only England, Japan and the United States have really committed significant resources to this unique form of naval warfare. Today only the United States remains active on a major scale. This book is well worth owning as a reference by anyone interested in aircraft carriers. It may disappoint those more technically or professionally oriented. It would be invaluable with improved profiles, more specific design histories, dated photographs and better paper.

Another British product, *United States Fleet Carriers of World War II* by Richard Humble—one of a continuing series on US naval combatant types during WW II—is an excellent operations summary of the history of US aircraft carrier development and their use from 1911 until the end of World War II. Humble starts with the Navy's first shipborne launching of Eugene Ely in his Curtiss Pusher from USS *Birmingham* in November 1910. He covers the development of the Navy's first carrier, the *Langley* (CV-1), a converted auxiliary—it was all that Congress would allow as the four twin island 35,000-ton carriers the Navy had requested were denied. This led the Navy to convert two of its cancelled six battle cruisers to carriers. Although oversized at the time, they were large enough to accommodate the rapid development and growth of carrier aircraft through World War II. Humble criticizes these two ships, *Lexington* (CV-2) and *Saratoga* (CV-3), for their impractical and incompatible eight-inch gun battery—which was eventually removed *(Lexington)* or replaced with 5-inch 38-caliber dual-purpose guns *(Saratoga)*. He makes the correct point that these two carriers were key to the US Navy's carrier aviation development between the wars.

The early thirties saw the design and construction of the *Ranger* (CV-4), the first US carrier designed and built from the keel up—a frugal 14,500-ton ship limited by treaties and available funding. It was a design, nevertheless, that set the stage for the basic makeup of all future World War II US carriers. She, in turn, was followed by the three ships of the 20,000-ton *Yorktown* (CV-5) class, the Navy's first successful carrier design

in terms of speed, capacity and size. These three were to share much of the closely contested Pacific action. Two were lost during the first two years of the war.

The book's chronology of Japanese naval advances in the western Pacific after Pearl Harbor and the US Navy's efforts to counter with its carriers is well told. Much of the story is extracted from sources on both sides of the conflict, undoubtedly secondary in nature. The carrier engagements of Coral Sea and Midway are described. These battles and those that followed between the world's two foremost carrier navies reduced the carrier forces after Santa Cruz in late 1942 to essentially one surviving operational fleet carrier each—the US *Enterprise* and the Japanese *Zuikaku*.

However, starting in 1943 the vastly superior industrial potential of the United States transformed the nature of the Pacific struggle. This occurred with the arrival of the numerous *Essex* class fleet carriers supplemented by the smaller *Independence* class CVLs, combined initially as the Fifth Fleet under Vice Admiral Spruance. The action chronology then increasingly becomes a tale of the overwhelming might and individual platform superiority of the US naval forces and the losses of the desperately determined Japanese. The author questions the efforts of the kamikazes in 1945 which diverted scarce Japanese resources. One interesting point made repeatedly is the Japanese commanders often operated on the basis of grossly exaggerated yet sincere estimates of the damage done to the rival US carrier forces. By the end of 1944, after the battles of the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf which saw the Japanese carriers and aircraft decimated, the American fleet carrier reigned supreme. Victory was merely a matter of time.

This book is amply illustrated with photographs, most of which would be of decent quality if they were not so poorly reproduced. The early carriers are well covered pictorially, the latter ones suffering only from being so numerous in number. There is no biographical data on the author. Presumably he is English since he shows a partiality for the British Fleet's part in this story. His writing, in any case, is superb and he does an excellent job of summarizing the story of carrier-to-carrier combat. This is a form of warfare never seen before and unlikely ever to be seen again.

The book is good reading for historically oriented carrier buffs, or anyone else who wants to understand the decisive combat of the naval war in the South and Western Pacific.

RICHARD F. CROSS III
Alexandria, Virginia

Kilduff, Peter. *Douglas A-4 Skyhawk.* London, England: Osprey Air Combat, 1983. 200pp. $19.95

Anderton, David. *Republic F-105 Thunderchief.* London, England: Osprey Air Combat, 1983. 198pp. $19.95

The A-4 Skyhawk was designed in the middle of the Korean War in an attempt to reverse the weight/cost

growth trend of attack aircraft. It served with distinction in the Vietnam War, bore the brunt of the Argentine fighting in the Falklands War, and is being remanufactured today to fulfill the first-line needs of such nations as Kuwait, Malaysia, and Indonesia. It was in "active" production for 23 years and served with the Blue Angels and the Top Gun Aggressor Squadron. This is a very impressive record for a "cheap" attack aircraft not intended for fighter use.

Peter Kilduff, well respected for a long list of books on naval aviation, tells the interesting story of this plane and of the people connected with it. From the insights of Ed Heineman (its designer) to the citation of Captain Michael J. Estocin (who won the Medal of Honor in a Skyhawk), Kilduff intertwines people with the technology to present the A-4 as a story, not simply an engineering discussion. Furthermore, Kilduff supports his story with over 160 photographs that are not the run of the mill often seen in all the other books on jet-age naval aviation. Eight pages of the photos are in full color, with clarity and attention to reproductive quality that speak well for this publisher. Unfortunately, for reasons of economy, the photo credits have been edited out. This decreases the value of the book for those who keep aircraft books as permanent reference works, but is only a minor irritant to the general reader. A further irritant is an emasculated index of only two and one-half pages. The index is so incomplete that it is often difficult to relate one incident to another when the author refers to earlier points. What appears clear is that the author assumed a good index would be included.

In summary, even considering the poor index and the missing photo credits, Kilduff's book is one that persons interested in modern jet aircraft—particularly naval aviation—will enjoy and will not only read, but reread.

The F-105 was a plane plagued by ill luck, yet remembered with affection by many. Designed and redesigned to the shifting USAF perceptions of the early fifties, it reached operational service only to find its intended role (tactical nuclear strikes) unrealistic in an Air Force about to become embroiled in the Vietnam War. The F-105, derisively called the "Thud," went on to perform the majority of the war's strikes into North Vietnam. It was one of the ironies of the conflict that America's best fighter-bomber had been procured in such parsimonious quantities that it was eventually withdrawn from the war—there were not enough Thuds left to fight with! (The Thud's offspring, the A-10, was also underprocured. The Air Force had again undervalued the attack mission.)

David Anderton, whose books *The History of the U.S. Air Force* and *Superfortress At War* will be recalled fondly by many aviation readers, has written an absorbing tale of the F-105. It not only covers the F-105's Vietnam service, but also explains why the F-105 was the victim of changing defense strategies. The F-

105 was briefly a mount for the Thunderbirds, but was withdrawn from use after an in-flight failure at an air show in 1962. The F-105 soldiered on after 'Nam in electronic countermeasures ("Wild Weasel"—a chore it performed with distinction in South East Asia), and in Reserve and Guard fighter units. Although designed primarily for tactical nuclear strikes, the F-105 will be more remembered for a wide variety of other uses.

With such touches as copies of the citations of F-105 Medal of Honor winners and a foreword by Colonel Broughton (author of *Thud Ridge*), this well-illustrated volume will be appreciated by all former Thud drivers as well as the general military aviation enthusiast.

H. LARRY ELMAN
New England Air Museum

Wolk, Herman S. *Planning and Organizing the Postwar Air Force, 1943-1947*. Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1984. 359pp. $12

This book fills a significant gap in the literature of the history of airpower and does it in a competent way. The preponderance of work so far has concentrated on the combat and logistical achievements of our World War II armed forces, and that is natural enough. Yet, it was remarkable that the wartime military leadership, buried as it was in the problem of beating the Axis, nonetheless found the time and resources to plan for the postwar organization and technological development of the military services. To their everlasting credit, George C. Marshall and Henry H. Arnold were among the most prominent of those who kept one eye on the future even as the wartime alligators were nipping at their heels. Arnold's distinguished role in providing for postwar research and development is well enough known; but precious little has been done on the organizational planning that he and his lieutenants (like Lauris Norstad and Carl Spaatz) did during the last half of the war and in the first months of the peace that followed.

Herman S. Wolk is eminently qualified for the work. He has been at the center of airpower historical studies, in the Office of Air Force History, for many years. He has specialized in the early postwar period, particularly on the subjects of armed forces unification and the organization of airpower. Wolk is widely published in such defense journals as the *Air University Review* and *Air Force* magazine. Notwithstanding his long association with those journals and with the Air Force, he has been able to control any bias arising from that in order to paint a fairly balanced picture of the struggles among the services during the late forties.

Planning and Organizing is about the way in which an autonomous Air Force was achieved and the manner in which it was organized once separation had come. Wolk skillfully demonstrates the various factors that were affecting the decision makers involved, and gives plausible estimates of motivations in

some cases. The work, in fact, provides an interesting case study for students of national decision-making. Of course, the struggle for an independent air force had its genesis in the days of Billy Mitchell and before, but it had been kept in the background by Hap Arnold during the dark days of 1941 and 1942 when the first priority had to be the winning of the war. In any case, he knew that the best claim for an independent air force would arise from an impressive combat record and that support from George C. Marshall would be essential in the legislative battles that would follow the war. By the summer of 1943, though, it was becoming clear enough that the Allies were no longer in grave danger of being defeated. It was then that Marshall set some members of his staff to work on a plan for a postwar defense organization that would prevent a repetition of the unpreparedness of the US in 1917 and 1939. Arnold followed by assigning some members of his own staff to perform similar functions—all this being done quietly.

Wolk shows that by the end of the war, the Army Air Forces had its eyes firmly set on independence and on a force structure of 70 combat groups. Arnold retired to California soon after, and Carl Spaatz took over without changing any of the objectives. Despite many vicissitudes arising from conflicts with the US Navy and its supporters in Congress, the airmen never wavered in the pursuit of their *main* goals though many, many compromises were necessary in order to win them. Independence came in the summer of 1947, but the great demobilization, followed by the Truman economy campaign kept the flyers as far away as ever from the achievement of a force of 70 groups. Though the Navy was the main adversary in the struggle for independence, the force goals tended to bring the airmen into opposition with their great benefactor, General George C. Marshall.

Marshall's great dream was Universal Military Training (UMT). He thought it the only practical way in which to achieve preparedness in a democratic society. Of course, that flew in the face of many American traditions arising from our individualistic cast of mind and an antimilitary legacy dating all the way back to Cromwell and before. Moreover, it also flew in the face of practical politics in a society that did not want its sons drafted in peacetime and did not want to pay for it in any event. Of course, the airmen owed much to Marshall and to his successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and they had to walk gingerly in force structure matters. Yet, in the end, they did oppose their mentors on UMT, and the prestige of the air arm coming out of World War II was so high and the natural predilection of America to seek technological solutions was so strong, that there was a substantial leaning in Congress to base US security on airpower rather than on UMT.

So Marshall lost his dream. But that did not mean that the airmen won theirs. Though the President's Air

Policy Commission recommended a 70-group Air Force in the fall of 1947 and the Brewster Board supported the same notion in Congress soon after, the President's tight grip on the budget was not to be shaken—far from it, as the Air Force was kept far below its goal until after the outbreak of the Korean War.

Wolk's story is striking in that the institutions established then are largely intact today. The leaders in the first years of a new service have an impact far out of proportion to the length of their tenures. In the end, the airmen were more successful in the internal structuring of the Air Force than they were in establishing the desired role within the Department of Defense and winning the kinds of powers they thought essential for its Secretary. Too, though they achieved their minimum goal of an independent air force, Forrestal and his followers were formidable adversaries and salvaged a good bit out of the fight. The Navy won the greater part of the contested turf between the two institutions, and the Department of Defense that emerged in 1947 resembled the Navy model, much more than that of Spaatz, Norstad and company. It was a great day for the airmen. But as Hap Arnold remarked to Spaatz, the flyers had done most of the compromising necessary to win it.

This effort by Herman Wolk goes a long way in correcting the common misconception that official history is always bad history. In the field of the study of military airpower at least, the official work is generally of a much higher quality than that which is produced commercially. *Planning and Organizing* is well researched and written, and does a comprehensive and balanced job with its subject. It is definitive and shall not be superseded for a long time.

DR. DAVID R. METS
Niceville, Florida

Ropp, Theodore. *History and War.* Augusta, Ga.: The Hamburg Press, 1984. 81pp.

History and War—published by admiring former students—is a kind of *festschrift* honoring Theodore Ropp on his retirement after 43 years of teaching at Duke University. Rather than write articles of their own, the "authors" have thought fit to print Ropp's hitherto unpublished, major idea—the further development of Quincy Wright's notion of the cyclical nature of social violence and his application of Thomas Kuhn's paradigm from his *Structure of Scientific Revolution*.

Naval historian Clark G. Reynolds' introduction is a tribute, a memoir, and an explanation of Ropp, who for long served as America's most prominent teaching military historian. A list of the many doctoral dissertations which he directed is included at the end of the book. Not surprisingly it contains the names of several who have become well-known military historians in their own right. Ropp is the *master teacher*, the giant of ideas who disseminates them in and well beyond the classroom. Indeed, the world has been his classroom—the freshmen he loves to awaken, the

graduate student he thrills at jarring to intellectual action, the alumni he enjoys refreshing, colleagues at whom he pokes fun, generals and admirals he baffles, and anyone who cares to listen—and learn.

In one sense, the book has been published prematurely. Its forceful removal from its literary womb can be excused in this case, as a useful method of circulating an idea which has had an elephantine gestation. Although begun in 1959, it still needs more to be done to expand it.

Ropp's central idea is that there is a pattern of change in military history which occurs roughly every 60 years. Within that span there are phases which last approximately 15 years. Successively, the movement within the larger cycle alters from crisis to adaptation, then to solution, and back again to instability. Then the cycle repeats again and again.

In one section, Ropp has made an elaborate table of dates to illustrate his concept. Numerology, he calls it. For the Naval War College, it is interesting to note that some of this work seems to stem from the study he was pursuing as Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History at the college in 1962-63. Perhaps some of the War College students and staff from that time recall his preoccupation with the topic. Interestingly, eleven of them went on to reach flag rank and may well have adapted a bit of it to their own perception of their profession.

In his introduction, Reynolds points an accusing finger at the Navy, which was the only one of the services that never sent an officer, on orders and in uniform, to study with Ropp at Duke. However, the Navy felt his influence in other ways, but no doubt, it was the poorer for not selecting a few to mix in Ropp's wide-ranging seminar at Durham. The interaction of that group, through Ropp's teaching, was undoubtedly the most effective and stimulating way in which he chose to make his contribution.

More than any other published piece, *History and War* expresses the method, style, and influence of Theodore Ropp on his students. For those who never had the opportunity and for those who seek some sense of his widespread impact on American-trained students of military history, *History and War* is worth examination. More importantly, it will be worth reflecting with Ropp on the unfinished work which he has set for himself. As he described it: "There may be enough here to make the chronological framework of a history of modern military strategy, beginning with its definition for military educational purposes, during the Enlightenment. Its alternating triumphs and disasters in practice are, I suspect, due to the lack of military experimentation during the longer periods of relative tranquility . . . . Any regular periodization may make it easier for students to remember the milieu of a particular mind-set, and its social political, and economic adaptability."

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Naval War College

McEvedy, Colin. *The Penguin Atlas of Recent History: Europe Since 1815.* New York: Penguin Books, 1983. 95pp. $5.95

Humble, Richard, ed. *Naval Warfare: An Illustrated History.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. 304pp. $20.95

The Atlas of Recent History is the last in a series of four which detailed the gradual evolution of Europe from antiquity to the present. While the earlier volumes were larger in their geographical focus, including maps from around the world as well as the continent, *Europe Since 1815* is a purely European work. The *Atlas* includes nearly 50 maps which trace Europe from the end of the Napoleonic wars to the present. Professor McEvedy's lucid and witty commentary is included opposite each of the maps, and adds immeasurably to the volume's appeal.

McEvedy's commentaries are better than the maps they accompany. The latter are printed in only two colors (blue and grey); they are indifferently lettered and are poorly chosen to illustrate the more intricate twists and turns of European history. For example, the volume's first map is the continent in 1848, which seems an abrupt place to start an atlas that purports to cover events from 1815. The volume's basic concept is to show the same basic European map throughout, rather than using close-ups of particular areas of interest. While this does give a sense of continuity to the work, it makes it impossible to illustrate intelligently such important occurrences as the unification of Italy, the emergence of Greece, the Crimean War, and so forth. Also, the total fixation on Europe does not allow for the inclusion of events in other areas—such as the scramble for colonies in Africa, the race to divide China in the Pacific, and so on.

The author does include some interesting maps that illustrate the population shifts across Europe during the period of study. Additionally, the text accompanying the maps is a superb short summary of the history of Europe during the 1815-1980 period. As a quick textual and geographical review of events during those turbulent years, the *Atlas* succeeds. Taken in combination with a more complete accounting of events (such as a solid history text), the volume is useful as a rapid reference. Overall, *The Penguin Atlas of Recent History* allows the interested reader to follow Napoleon's important and deceptively simple dictum—Know the map!

It is generally agreed that war at sea has influenced the outcome of events ashore in a very direct fashion. In *Naval Warfare: An Illustrated History*, Richard Humble has provided a guide to the sea battles and sailors that shaped history.

The volume, printed by the well known nautical publishing house of St. Martin's, is beautifully illustrated with line etchings, famous paintings, photographs, and deck plans. Roughly half of the illustrations are in color, and the work is printed on heavy bond, giving the book a solid presentation.

Humble has divided the book into six sections, each of which is devoted to a particular technological era of war at sea. The range of the work is impressive, covering the ancient world, the age of the galleon, the ship-of-the-line, the age of steam and shell, and the modern (WWII and later) era. It includes coverage of the Falkland Islands campaign in the final section.

Within the six sections, Humble's method is to write brief treatments of important battles (Salamis, Sluys, Lepanto, Trafalgar, Dogger Bank, Tsushima, Pearl Harbor, Leyte Gulf, etc.). He also includes sections on broader campaigns and wars (the Venetian-Genoese Wars, the Dutch Wars, the War of 1812, the Battle of the Atlantic, etc.). In a particularly useful series of articles, Humble also provides biographical sketches of the great sea warriors and admirals, including Francis Drake, Richard Howe, Horatio Nelson, John Paul Jones, John Jellicoe, David Beatty, Raymond Spruance, Chester Nimitz, and many others. The short, concise pieces are packed with information, anecdotes, and informative asides. It makes it possible to pick the book up over a series of months and read at leisure without losing any larger theme.

It should be understood that the book is not a grand work of strategy. The author does little to describe the larger themes of seapower and their impact on world events. This is not the writing of A.T. Mahan; Humble rather acts as an informed publicist and provides a series of insightful vignettes on seapower and the men who shaped it.

While the volume lacks strategic content, it has readability, wit, and style. Unfortunately, it contains very few maps, and the bibliography and glossary are cursory at best. As a complement to other works of naval history (such as *Influence of Sea Power on History* and *Sea Power*), the book is a fine addition to any library.

JAMES STAVRIDIS
Lieutenant Commander, US Navy

Farwell, Byron. *The Gurkhas*. New York: Norton, 1984. 317pp. $17.95

The tale of the British Gurkhas has been told many times, but perhaps never quite so well as by Byron Farwell. With this book, the author adds a fit companion to his earlier classics, *Queen Victoria's Little Wars* and *Mr. Kipling's Army*.

Much of the appeal here lies in the paradoxes which the Gurkhas have always presented to Western minds. For example, how have the Gurkhas managed to acquire a reputation as peerless fighters while avoiding the brutish reputation associated with other mercenaries such as the French Foreign Legion? Then too, what is it that has enabled Gurkha regiments to maintain almost perfect discipline without resorting to punishments common among Western armies? Above all, how can one account for their loyalty and longstanding rapport with the British?

Farwell makes no claim to unraveling the paradoxes, but he does provide some significant clues. In the process he again demonstrates his skill at

culling anecdotes from the finest sources and integrating them into a polished narrative. "I never saw more steadiness or bravery exhibited in my life. Run they would not, and of death they seemed to have no fear, though their comrades were falling thick around them, for we were so near that every shot told . . . ." (Ensign John Shipp, 87th Foot)

The book opens with an account of the 1814 border war between Nepal and the Honorable East India Company. Seldom, it seems, have two antagonists emerged from a war with greater respect for each other's bravery. Indeed, their mutual sense of courage seems the key to British Gurkha rapport. At the war's end, Nepal granted the victorious British the right to recruit Gurkha mercenaries. Thus, as Farwell puts it, "the love affair between the British and the doughty little Mongolian hillmen had begun."

Over the next century, the Gurkhas added bit by bit to their reputation. Faced with the Indian mutiny, they proved their loyalty by pitching their tents alongside the British and by standing with them through the siege of Delhi. Later, their performance in Khyber Pass won them the undying friendship of the Gordon Highlanders. By the end of the Great War, the "Johnny Gurks" were perceived as not merely the equal of British troops, but as a corps d'elite within the British Army. Sir Ian Hamilton would maintain that he might have prevailed at Gallipoli had he had more Gurkhas. Predictably, Gurkha regiments were becoming more and more the choice of ambitious Sandhurst graduates. "The Gurkhas were transparently honest men, very brave sticklers for regulations—the very model of sturdy, honest and simple soldiers—and as front-line troops during the war they had given the Japanese army a really rough time." (Yuji, Japanese Officer)

Farwell laces his narrative with a good bit of intriguing material on Gurkha customs and characteristics. Unfortunately, most of it derives from non-Gurkha sources, the problem here being that no Gurkha has ever written a book about his experiences—no collection of Gurkha letters exists and no Nepalese records are available. Nevertheless, all sources are agreed on what seemed to be the chief Gurkha characteristic, their honesty. Whether used by a British field marshal or a Japanese officer, the word recurs again and again in descriptions of Gurkhas. Perhaps this passage by a former Gurkha officer provides a clue as to why Gurkhas have never been subjected to harsh discipline and why they have never been regarded in quite the same light as French Legionnaires. "In a world where grand and petty larceny are habitual, distortion of truth and self deceit commonplace, the honesty of the Gurkha seemed unique. The quality of Gurkha honesty went far beyond mere restraint from 'borrowing.' It was a quality of mind, of character, that permeated all their actions and reactions, a natural integrity, an inborn frankness. If you caught a Gurkha in the

wrong he would not deny his guilt or start to shift the blame elsewhere . . . . Probably their honesty, their honor, like their sense of ridiculous, was derived from an instinctive realism; they seemed able to see to the center of things. I have not met another people with so few illusions about themselves or the world around them, or who, looking at the world with this practical, objective, unromantic eye, found it funny. It was easy to command such people. It was a privilege to be allowed to do so." (*A Child At Arms*, by Patrick Davis).

The narrative also contains much fascinating regimental lore. Farwell is at his sparkling best when describing the peculiar traits and customs of British Imperial officers. Toward the end, one will almost imagine hearing strains from the Colonel Bogey March from "The Bridge on the River Kwai." On the sobering side, Farwell provides an excellent sketch of the convulsive last days of the British Raj, noting the bewilderment of the Gurkhas and the shame of their officers over the manner in which the Brigade was broken and divided with the independent Indian Army. Final chapters trace Gurkha activities around the world in a much-reduced British Empire—Borneo, Malaya, Belize, Hong Kong. While some readers will conclude that the Gurkhas are an anachronism, others will agree with the author that the Falklands War demonstrates that their services may yet be required.

In all, another fine book by Byron Farwell and one which deserves the attention of *Naval War College Review* readers. *Gentlemen, Aye Gurkali!* (The Gurkhas are upon you!)

JOHN S. PETERSON
Chicago, Illinois

Bonior, David E. et al. *The Vietnam Veteran: A History of Neglect*. New York: Praeger, 1984. 200pp. $21.95

Within the last few years it has been popular to write books about the Vietnam War. Vietnam was a different kind of war for the United States. It was America's longest war and it was also television's first war. Many would agree that we lost not only a war in Vietnam but many of the ideals which we had been taught as being characteristic of the American way of life. Vietnam changed the lives of many of us, especially those who served their country in a cause neither advocated nor accepted by many Americans.

This book describes the treatment given to veterans who served their country in an unpopular and unrewarding war. The assertion that the Vietnam veteran has been unfairly treated is the primary theme which permeates this book. The authors contend that much is owed to those who served but that little has been given since completion of their duty and sacrifice. The clear and explicit message is that this nation and its institutions owes the Vietnam veteran a debt comparable to what was given to the veterans of prior wars.

Vietnam Veteran is divided into three parts. Part 1, "The Rush to Forget," focuses on the part played

by television, newspapers, and films. "At the war's beginning the locally dominated newspaper community had been uncertain of their readers' interest in distant Vietnam. Once they had been convinced to give the war serious attention only a handful of reporters would ever actually write about the Vietnam battlefield."

Part 2, "Failed Leadership," concerns the various Presidential administrations and veterans' organizations. Ironically, the Federal Government spent billions in its conduct of the war, but was less willing to spend any suitable amount on the individuals who participated in the war. In addition, the generation gap between older veterans who participated in World War II and those who served during the Vietnam War became a factor in lessening the benefits to be received by the younger veterans. "The leadership of the older veterans organizations seemed untouched by the war and by the doubt it engendered."

Part 3 focuses on Congress and the Veterans' Administration. Neither is portrayed in a favorable light. Congress is described as not responding appropriately to the valid needs of Vietnam veterans and a variety of reasons is cited in explaining this assertion. Congress did not have among its body any substantial number of individuals who had served during the unpopular Vietnam War as it did after World War II, and seemed to be more receptive to veterans' organizations which represented a different and older type of veteran.

Although some individuals may not agree with the theme of this book, the authors support it with ample evidence. Sources used include several interviews with prominent individuals from the public as well as the private sector. Added pertinent information was secured from journals, periodicals, television tapes, and documents relating to media coverage. This book should appeal to a wide variety of readers. The style of writing is lucid and manages to hold the attention of the reader. Understandably, it will have a special interest to those who served in the military during the Vietnam War, as well as to their relatives and friends. Yet it should also appeal to anyone who has an interest in related policymaking on the highest levels in American society.

WILLIAM E. KELLY
Auburn University

Wright, Robert K., Jr. *The Continental Army*. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1983. 451pp. $15.00

While obviously not written with professional naval officers in mind, *The Continental Army*, the final volume in the trilogy on the American Revolution by the US Army's Center of Military History, will nonetheless appeal to those who are students of the War of American Independence. Appearing on the market at the end of the American Bicentennial, this well-researched, single-volume historical and reference work devoted to the American Continental Army is a fitting literary finale to the national celebration. As the title suggests, Dr.

Robert K. Wright, after devoting only a few pages of the introductory chapter to the Revolutionary Army's European and colonial heritage, focuses his study on the growth, from 1775 to 1783, of the professional military force upon which the outcome of the war with Great Britain ultimately depended.

The Continental Army is an institutional history; battles and events are only a part of the chronological framework upon which Dr. Wright hangs the developmental benchmarks of an army that matured from early defeats at Bunker Hill and Long Island to decisive victory at Yorktown. Dr. Wright's intent—skillfully realized—was to examine both the organization and doctrine of a force that, while raised out of necessity, was nonetheless at odds with a prevailing ideology that feared the excesses of a standing army and praised the virtues of the citizen soldier or militiaman. As he traces the development of the Army of the Continental Congress through the trying years of the Revolution, Dr. Wright offers insights that help to explain its unlikely success against one of the best of the European armies.

In Wright's mind the Continental Army had "achieved the status of a competent well-trained force" by July 1779. This resulted from organizational and doctrinal changes wrought by foreign volunteers who helped to "Europeanize" it and from the unique features of the American environment. First, the infantrymen depended upon marksmanship rather than the unaimed, massed fires of their adversaries. Second, in order to gain the maximum benefit from each musket, soldiers were arrayed in two rather than three ranks; this brought 640 muskets to bear against the 300 of the first two of three ranks used by the British. Third, the tactical mobility of the Continental Army, built around a superior system of land transportation, allowed Washington to avoid decisive defeats by escaping the pursuing British forces. Finally, General Knox's assignment of an artillery company to the direct support of each permanent infantry brigade promoted the advantages of combined arms tactics. The effectiveness of the artillery was further enhanced by the practice of firing at infantry targets rather than concentrating on counterbattery fires as British gunners did. Such insights lend credence to Wright's thesis that General Washington molded the Continental Army into "a tough professional fighting force" that played a decisive role in the final defeat of the British Army and in the achievement of American Independence.

Scholars, general readers, and genealogists alike will get their money's worth from *The Continental Army*. In addition to the well-written institutional history found in the first 186 pages, Dr. Wright has included footnotes, an extensive bibliography, ten pages of colored illustrations, and the lineages of the some 200 regiments and smaller units that made up the Continental Army at one time or another. Charts, maps, tables, and

black and white photographs add to the richness of the volume. In sum, the parts of *The Continental Army* comprise a first-class reference book no enthusiast of the American Revolution—sailor or not—can do without.

JAMES JOHNSON
Major, US Army

McPhee, John. *La Place de la Concorde Suisse.* New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1984. 150pp. $12.95

John McPhee, who has written sixteen books before this one and is a staff writer for *The New Yorker,* went to Switzerland to observe Swiss Army training. He was present for a "refresher" course among the high Alps of the Canton de Valais with the Eighth Battalion of the Fifth Regiment of the Tenth Mountain Division. The book's title is a geographical place name and has no association with the same name in Paris.

The book is written in journalistic style, presumably to "make it more interesting." It hops around from subject to subject and is interspersed with anecdotes, rather than laying out the subject and dealing with it in what an academic would consider systematic terms. I mention this as preparation for a potential reader of the book rather than as condemnation, although the book is a bit hard to follow so far as solid factual material is concerned. The author is simply not trying to describe the Swiss Army as a briefer would. Instead he paints word pictures of how its members *are.*

There is no information given as to whether the author had previous experience with things Swiss. If he has not had any, he has done a remarkable job of understanding a great deal about Swiss attitudes, the structure of their society, and the way they prepare for war. I believe he erred on some minor points, like not realizing that some form of military service continues even into old age in Switzerland. But the book is, in general, highly accurate.

As he says, the banker in Zurich is also the colonel of the regiment, and perhaps a member of the Swiss parliament as well. It is a tightly knit society on the elite level, which is the secret of much of Swiss efficiency. McPhee ably brings out Switzerland's massive and unremitting preparations for war, including the vast underground tunnels, the mined bridges (ready to blow), and the civil defense shelters all over the country. He describes vividly the extremely rapid mobilization techniques by which the Swiss changeover in a few hours from a peacetime to a wartime footing. When I lived in Geneva years ago I saw them mobilize in less than 90 minutes from the initial signal. Each soldier has his rifle, machine gun, or even mortar piece in the hall closet.

Switzerland has not fought a war for a long time—McPhee says nearly five hundred years. This bypasses such incidents as Napoleon passing through Switzerland, and, later, the Russians doing the same thing. But, as McPhee also says, they are and have been ready and willing in modern times to fight any invader who might attack them and they can

make any such attack extremely costly. No one can expect to occupy Switzerland like the Nazis in 1938-39 in Czechoslovakia, or the Soviets in the same country thirty years later. This book explains quite well why not.

FREDERICK H. HARTMANN
Naval War College

Wyden, Peter. *The Passionate War: The Narrative History of the Spanish Civil War*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983. 574pp. $19.95

Peter Wyden, a former correspondent for *Newsweek* and magazine editor, has written an anecdotal history of the Spanish Civil War. He provides detailed profiles of both Rebel and Republican leaders as well as some of the rank and file. He supplies reams of data on members of the International Brigades, and devotes much space to the careers and activities of reporters who covered the conflict. A reader interested in knowing what Ernest Hemingway, George Orwell or James Lardner among others did during the war will find it all in Wyden's book. Finally, the author makes it very clear just how vicious and brutal the war was and offers vivid descriptions of atrocities committed by both sides.

What is absent from *The Passionate War* is any sustained description or analysis of strategy or tactics. There are no orders of battle or discussions of major battles. The role of naval power is not even mentioned. Furthermore, aside from a few generalizations there is no analysis of the war's role in European diplomacy, and the author makes no effort to discuss the impact of the conflict on European and American public opinion.

Despite these shortcomings Wyden's book is still interesting and useful. It is well written and gives a good flavor of the times. A reader familiar with the work of Hugh Thomas, Gabriel Jackson and Stanley Payne will find Wyden's book an exciting and useful supplement.

STEVEN T. ROSS
Naval War College

McRae, Ronald. *Mind Wars*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. 183pp. $12.95

This interesting book's subtitle describes its contents, to wit, "the true story of government research into the military potential of psychic weapons." However, for those who know something about military applications of "psi" (extra sensory perceptions, of several kinds) this book may prove something of a disappointment because it does not penetrate the subject. This is surprising in a book introduced by Jack Anderson and written by one of his former "associates."

Ronald McRae describes himself as having served five years in the US Navy, and describes the US Navy as one of two leading US Government sponsors and consumers of psychic warfare research during the heyday of military psi research, i.e., from 1972 through 1982, mostly from 1973 to 1978.

Sifting through this book, readers

can see that the other principal government sponsor of military psi research was the CIA; not a surprise. Inasmuch as the Navy Department and the CIA rarely agree on anything, even with an admiral as CIA director, what is surprising is to find these two entities interested, at the same time and often in the same place, in something so imprecise and poorly understood as military parapsychology. Perhaps this is explained by the similar interests of these two organizations. The Navy investigated the use of psi for antisubmarine warfare and, to a lesser extent, antiair warfare. CIA pursued the use of psi for remote viewing, i.e., seeing otherwise denied or inaccessible "secrets" from afar, e.g., looking inside a Soviet command post from locations near Washington DC, a very useful espionage method if it works. McRae believes explicitly that it does not work, but offers no proof, perhaps because he offers no methodological insight into how it is supposed to work.

Navy interest in military psi seems more ominous and, in a sense, more disparate, *viz.*, can enemy submarines be identified and located at sea by extrasensory perception and can CV aviators' flight performance be altered adversely by enemy psychic influences? Now, indeed, this is worth a lot to know. But, if the contract prices which McRae cites the Navy having spent on psychic research during the 10-year period 1972-82 are anywhere nearly complete, then the Navy Department has not been at all serious. At most, *Mind Wars* accounts for $100,000, a pittance even to establish an epistemology for such an inexact science as psychic warfare remains today.

McRae also examines US Army interest in psychic warfare, though the direction and outcomes suggest something pretty far afield from the empiricism of ground warfare now or in the future. An Army authority believes that "Legionnaires' Disease" is caused by Soviet psychictronic (electronically enhanced psi) experiments. Submariners know that phosgene escaping from leaky air conditioners in closed spaces causes a malady remarkably similar to Legionnaires' Disease. The US Air Force is said by McRae to have funded psychic warfare research, too, though little else is revealed about Air Force interest, perhaps because the Air Force has a particular "far-out" cross to bear in the form of its UFO associations over several years.

Soviet research into psychic warfare is also treated in *Mind Wars*, mainly from the standpoint of CIA, DIA, and NSA analyses of and reporting on that intriguing subject. One is not surprised to learn that DIA assessed the USSR as leading the USA in military parapsychology. The Navy seems also interested in what the Russians are up to, though McRae is easily put off by Navy secrecy and issue-avoidance concerning both US and USSR state-of-the-art in psychic warfare. A more comprehensive treatment of the USSR's research in psychic warfare can be found in Martin Ebon's *Psychic Warfare: Threat or Illusion* (New York:

McGraw-Hill, 1983), which McRae cites.

This reviewer obtained a copy of *Mind Wars* from the Army's Center of Military History in Washington, DC and read it primarily for its discovery and surprise values. There were two: The first suggests a specific US military application of the psi factor to winning battles through electronics and maneuver rather than solely by attrition; the second suggests the true extent and scope of US DoD/intelligence community interest in psychic warfare, general interest inclusive and corroborative of the specifics, a consistency not made clear in *Mind Wars*.

JAMES T. WESTWOOD
Falls Church, Virginia

Hartigan, Richard Shelly. *Lieber's Code and the Law of War*. Chicago: Precedent, 1983. 157pp. $17.95

This small volume opens with an introduction which offers a somewhat sketchy biography of Francis Lieber: as a teenage member of Blucher's army in Belgium, seriously wounded at Namur; his studies in Germany and his political difficulties with the police; his attempt to aid the Greeks in their struggle for independence; his emigration to London and then to Boston; his almost quarter of a century as a Professor at South Carolina College (now the University of South Carolina); and his ultimate success in securing the long-sought-after position at Columbia College in New York. It then continues with its real subject matter, a discussion of some of his works and of his wartime correspondence with General Henry W. Halleck, while the latter was the "General in Chief" of the Union forces.

Just 122 years ago, on 24 April 1863, Lieber's code of land warfare, the first of its kind, was published by the Federal Government as General Orders No. 100, *Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field*. As the author of the most important biography of Lieber (quoted by the author of the book under review) has correctly stated, "it was an admixture of military sternness with basic humanitarianism." It thereafter served as a source for the draftsmen of the unratified 1874 Declaration of Brussels and of the ratified 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations. It also served to some extent as a source for the 1929 and 1949 Geneva Prisoners-of-War Conventions. Professor Hartigan has included this historic document in an appendix, making it much more easily available to the general public and to the researcher.

Although not as well known, Lieber's earlier monograph, entitled *Guerrilla Parties Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages of War*, is also worthy of the continued interest which it has received, particularly in this era of guerrillas, partisans, national liberation armies, and just plain terrorists—all of whom claim to be legal combatants and to be entitled to prisoner-of-war treatment when they are captured, no matter for whom they fight, what their cause may be, and how they conduct the conflict in which they

engage. This study, even more difficult to find in many libraries than the *Instructions*, is also included in an appendix. Finally, there is an appendix containing some 75 pages of selected correspondence and documents from the period of the Civil War, including many letters from and to Lieber, revealing the genesis of the *Instructions*.

Anyone interested in the history of war and of the law of war will find this little volume invaluable. This reviewer has placed it on his bookshelves next to the reprint of Professor (later Judge) Baxter's article on the same subject which appeared in a 1963 issue of the International Review of the Red Cross (for some unknown reason, not included in the bibliography), on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the *Instructions*, an article which has long served as one of the few major sources for information concerning Lieber and his Code.

HOWARD S. LEVIE
Newport, Rhode Island

Hughes, Wayne P., Jr., ed. *Military Modeling*. Alexandria, Va.: Military Operations Research Society, 1984. 385pp. $17.50

This recent contribution to the literature of operations research and systems analysis is a collection of 16 papers with the following stated aims:

- to describe the attributes of well-conceived military models (and their limitations);
- to show how models can contribute to the decision process; and
- to remind the reader how models can be misused and oversold.

It will probably find more of a market in the OR/SA community than with the "notional reader . . . the military or civilian professional who has a grasp of military operations and the defense decision process . . . ." This is regrettable, but probable, because the text has none of the glossy lights and whistles nor the "dots for tots" visual aids to make it easier reading for the busy decision maker.

To this reader the "Overview" supplied by Wayne Hughes and the *caveat emptor* chapter by John Battilega and Judith Grange were most thought provoking, with Bob Hallex's review of Navy Campaign analyses a little nostalgic. Other specialists may find their pleasure in the chapters on weapon procurement (John England), logistics (Drezner and Hillestad), nuclear exchange (J.J. Martin) or air battles (John Friel). Of interest to all will be the accompanying bibliographies covering the finest work published in the field.

A model is no more than a tool used to accomplish some specific task. The more specialized the tool the easier the task and the more pleasing the result. I can probably drive a nail with a saw or wrench, but neither the effort nor the result is satisfying. The cost effectiveness zealot could be convinced he only needs the one multipurpose hammer whether driving tacks, spikes or fenceposts, but he will suffer exhaustion and frustration for his

false economy. No matter the quantity and quality of tools in his truck, the carpenter cannot perform without a little of the architect's capacity to visualize the result in toto. *Military Modeling* reveals several instances of such problems encountered while working in and for a five-sided bureaucracy.

The term "systems analysis" has fallen into disuse, if not disrepute, because of (sometimes intentional) misuse of the results of modeling: trying to save time and money by using an existing tool rather than building or tailoring one. Yet today's military modelers and their models are still a valuable resource with important roles to play in decision-making. They must retain an architect's view of both the arts and sciences involved. As stated more eloquently by Captain Hughes in the conclusion to his erudite overview: "What Karl Weierstrass said of Nineteenth Century mathematicians is just as true of Twentieth Century modelers: 'a mathematician who is not at the same time a bit of a poet will never be a full mathematician.'"

Regrettably, we may recently have revoked the licenses of our military modelers while permitting poetic license in other related areas. This fine book should provide the state of a still burgeoning art and should not be the eulogy for one now being buried.

D.G. CLARK
Captain, US Navy

RECENT BOOKS

Selected Accessions of the Naval War College Library

Annotated by
George Scheck, Mary Ann Varoutsos, and Jane Viti

Blumenson, Martin. *Mark Clark*. New York: Congdon & Weed, 1984. 306pp. $17.95
The first full-length biography about General Mark Wayne Clark, this work attempts to paint a balanced portrait of a man who was the object of much praise and much scorn during his lifetime. Having risen to prominence in two widely misunderstood milirary operations (the Italian campaigns of World War II and the closing days of the Korean conflict), Clark remains the center of some controversy. Blumenson, who draws heavily on archival material and Clark's own diaries, endeavors to evaluate his place in American military history and to shed some light on