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Power in Soviet Policy Over the Next Ten Years

by

John D. Scanlan

In evaluating the role that power will play in Soviet policy over the next ten years one should keep in mind that we are dealing with a dynamic and continually expanding Soviet Russian empire which since 1917 has justified its expansion both to itself and to the world in Marxist-Leninist terms. Marx declared that the communists would gain their ends by peaceful means, but if they could not, they would achieve them by force of arms. Lenin was fascinated by Clausewitz, studied him carefully and quoted him frequently, and worked out a number of variations on Clausewitz's basic theme of war being the continuation of policy by other means.¹ Lenin's heirs have all claimed to be Leninists and we have no reason to doubt them.

I do not mean to suggest that war is the goal of the Soviet leadership. What I do mean to suggest is that history should have taught us that the Soviet Union is willing to use whatever power it possesses—political, economic, or military—to further its interests. Unfortunately, in recent years that all too often has included the use of force or the threat of force to intimidate those who are reluctant to adjust their interests to those of the Soviets'.

The Succession Issue. Before examining how the Soviets have employed their power in recent years or how they are likely to employ it over the next decade, it would be useful to take a look at the current and future Soviet leadership. It is, of course, the Soviet leadership that reflects the internal dynamics of the Soviet system at any given time as it drives the ambitions of empire in accordance with Marxist-Leninist theology.

An overworked, but nevertheless accurate characterization of the current Soviet leadership is that of a gerontocracy. The Soviet leadership is old, both in absolute terms and in comparison with earlier Soviet leaders. Lenin and Stalin were both in their late forties when they became leaders of the Soviet state. Khrushchev and Brezhnev were in their late fifties while Andropov was 68. His chief rivals for Brezhnev's mantle all were over 70, but, when talking about

¹ A lecture given at the Naval War College annual Current Strategy Forum.

Andropov's rivals in the succession derby, it should be noted that Andropov did not figure in the speculation about the succession until mid-1982.

The Soviet state does not provide for an established order of succession. In its one-party hierarchical system, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, which at Brezhnev's death had 12 full voting members, is the supreme policy body of the land and decides the leadership succession. In his excellent study "The Soviet Leadership in Transition," Professor Jerry Hough of Duke University pointed out that as of mid-1980 no man below the age of 70 held a post that seemed to provide a good base for the succession. He observed that it is next to impossible to determine succession by anyone with as little information as is available in the West. He discussed several possible candidates, but made no mention of Andropov.²

Paul Cook, the dean of the State Department's analysts on Soviet affairs, wrote in mid-1982 that Brezhnev's successor would almost certainly be one of the other 12 full members of the Politburo, and noted that their average age was 69. Cook identified four prime candidates. Andropov was first on his carefully alphabetized list, along with Chernenko, then 70 years old and thought to be Brezhnev's favorite, Kirilenko, 75 years old who but for age and health might have led the speculation, and Grishin, 67 years old and head of the important Moscow party organization.³

How and why did Andropov suddenly move into the magic circle within striking distance of the brass ring? Most observers believe that the death of the long-time party ideologist Suslov in January 1982 provided the opening for Andropov to leave his job as head of the KGB and move into Suslov's Central Committee Secretariat position. Andropov's support for this move seems to have come from some in the Soviet power hierarchy who were becoming concerned about the excessive corruption on the part of many of those closest to Brezhnev that was beginning to come to light. We do not know why Andropov was selected for this role by these kingmakers. He is said to be an extremely intelligent, well-informed and an able administrator. The jobs he has held for the last 25 years made him clearly very knowledgeable about both internal and international issues. He probably became the compromise candidate of those who did not want any more Brezhnevism without Brezhnev, which they believed they would get with Chernenko. Suslov's death provided the opportunity to bring Andropov into the party Secretariat and avoided the embarrassment of moving him directly from KGB chief to party chief and national leader.

Thus, Andropov's move to the top was sudden and unexpected and he undoubtedly is beholden to those who got him there—probably first and foremost among whom is Minister of Defense Ustinov. At 75, Ustinov is the most venerable member of the Soviet military-industrial leadership, having been in charge of Soviet defense industry in the government or the party from 1941-1976 and Minister of Defense since 1976.

As I have pointed out, Andropov is by far the oldest man to assume Soviet leadership. At various times, including just recently, he has been reported to have some serious health problems. Life insurance companies would probably give him about five years in the job, which means that he must move quickly to consolidate his position if he wishes to leave his mark upon Soviet history. It also means that at the present time he is much more the Chairman of the Board than the unchallenged dictator.

The passing of the older members of the gerontocracy in the near term is predictable. Indeed, the Politburo's oldest member, the old Latvian revolutionary Pel'she, recently died at the age of 81 and has not been replaced. Tikhonov, who replaced Kosygin in 1979 as Premier is 78, and, as I have noted, Ustinov is 75. Andropov will want to move his own people into the Politburo to replace those who die off but, as Paul Cook notes, "the infusion of fresh blood is likely to be closely controlled by the surviving elders." And recently we saw this prediction vindicated when a Central Committee plenum did not fill the two vacancies in the Politburo. The only changes made were to move Leningrad party chief Romanov into the Central Committee Secretariat and to add a candidate member to the Politburo, a regional party leader from Krasnodar named Vorotnikov. Cook also suggests that Brezhnev's successor's age will mitigate against his ruling for more than a few years and we can expect another succession this decade. Acknowledging that it becomes more difficult to crystal ball the next succession, Cook nevertheless believes that Andropov's successor is probably already either a member of the Politburo or the Secretariat and almost assuredly a member of the Central Committee.⁴

Since conformity is the key to success in the Soviet system, the long overdue generational change is likely to come slowly and there exists little possibility for radical change in policies over the next ten years. All of this suggests that while the style of leadership may change—with little effort, Andropov has already managed to look more dynamic than his predecessor—systemic innovations are unlikely for the next five to ten years. Any reigning Soviet leader will be limited in his ability to go much beyond responding to the interests represented by his Politburo colleagues who put him in office.

The Soviet Economy: Problems and Prospects. Recently there has been a lot of glib speculation about the impending collapse of the Soviet economy. I have always been troubled by such speculation. It seems to me to be a contradiction in terms to measure the performance of a centrally directed communist command economy as if it responded to internal and external pressures somewhat the way a market economy would. How do you measure a collapsed communist economy? I have never seen any definition of that. If there ever were such a thing as a collapsed communist economy it is the current Polish economy. Yet the Polish economy maintains more or less full

employment, essential economic functions of society are continuing and no one is likely to starve, although there will be serious shortages of most of the consumer items that lend quality to life. In macro-economic terms the Soviet economy is in infinitely better shape than the Polish economy. But it is certainly not prospering according to our standards and like the Polish economy, even more so in some respects, it is unable to satisfy consumer demands for a more qualitative standard of living.

"How do you measure a collapsed communist economy? If there were such a thing . . . it is the current Polish economy . . . yet the . . . essential economic functions of society are continuing."

Professor Robert Campbell of Indiana University put it well recently by describing the Soviet economy as being "perpetually in crisis, wasteful and inefficient in the use of resources, bureaucratically musclebound in efforts to innovate technologically and institutionally, and scandalously callous and inept in meeting the Soviet population's consumption wants. Nevertheless, by devoting a significant share of the economy's output to investment, Soviet leaders have continually expanded the nation's productive capacity, and the Soviet Union today has achieved an aggregate output that makes it a major economic power and a military superpower."⁵

Nonetheless, the rapid rate of increase in Soviet industrial capacity has slowed down in recent years and most likely will continue to decline. Very simply stated, the Soviet practice of throwing resources at problems, always an inefficient approach even when you are as rich in resources as the Soviets are, has clearly reached the point of sharply diminishing returns. The geographically well located and easily extractable Soviet resources have been expended at a rapid rate for the past 60 years. The development of geographically more remote resources is extremely expensive in terms of needed infrastructure and less profitable when exploited because of distance from internal and external markets. At the same time, the Soviet population has become much better educated and informed, which is leading to rising expectations for more and better consumer goods than the Soviet economy is able to deliver as now managed.

Finally, the terms of international trade are not likely to be nearly as favorable for the Soviet Union in the 1980s as they were in the 1970s. The Soviets' main export earners are petroleum, gas, gold, and other minerals. The Soviets gained billions from windfall profits on export earnings during the 1970s but world demand and prices on all of these commodities are down and likely to stay down. Moreover, the Soviets benefited from subsidized interest on foreign loans for investment purposes in the 1970s. They are now being forced to pay closer to market rates for loans and foreign lenders are more cautious about making new loans to the Soviets. The huge East

European debt, while not a direct burden on the Soviets—who in my view are not going to help pay off that debt—nevertheless is an added economic strain on the Soviet empire.

Massive Soviet imports of grain have been and are likely to continue to be a huge drain on Soviet hard currency earnings. Impressive results in agriculture could probably be achieved by abandoning bureaucratic control in favor of providing incentives and there is some talk of reform along these lines. In a recent interview with *The New York Times* a Soviet Deputy Minister of Agriculture described a system of collective production contracts with farm brigades of 5 to 25 workers who perform the labor on state land with state-provided seed, fertilizer and machinery and are assured a contract price for an established norm and specified payment for production beyond the norm.⁶ This may help marginally, but my guess is that it will not be enough to resolve Soviet agricultural problems and huge imports will continue to be necessary for the foreseeable future.

What effect will this have on Soviet military power and Soviet willingness to use its power in the international arena? Some observers of the Soviet economic scene believe that domestic economic pressures and the negative trend for the Soviets in the international terms of trade will force the Soviet leadership to devote more attention to domestic problems with a concomitant retrenchment in foreign adventurism. I disagree. The post-Brezhnev Soviet leadership is already devoting more attention to domestic problems, but without yet giving any indications of having systemic changes in mind. Moreover, there is no indication, and I do not expect any, that this will force them to withdraw from the international stage in any significant manner. This would not be in keeping with their own self-image of a confident superpower. Nor would it be in keeping with historical Russian expansionism, the Soviet Marxist-Leninist view of a revolutionary world, or the contemporary extended Soviet view of its security requirements.

External Factors: Opportunities and Risks. The overriding external consideration for the Soviet leadership is its relationship with the other superpower, and more importantly its perception of US objectives, intentions, and resolve at any given point. As Harry Gelman of the Rand Corporation put it in his excellent analysis of how the Politburo manages its America problem: “the Soviet leaders have a consistent world-view centered on the expectation of lasting struggle with the main antagonist.” Gelman says the Soviets pursue this struggle with an “attitude of pugnacious righteousness” and regard “the continued reduction of U.S. influence in the world as a requirement for Soviet continued advance.” They seek “not merely to match, but to supplant the U.S. presence.” At the same time the Soviets are skillful in assessing the risks inherent in any contemplated action and it is clear that the renewed US assertiveness of the past three years has made them both wary and defensive.

But while assessing the risks, the Soviet leadership is driven by a "Leninist compulsion to pursue potential gains to the limits of prudence." I agree with Gelman's conclusion that the Soviet leadership is not likely to be seriously deterred by its internal problems over the next decade from seeking to improve its presence and influence anywhere it can at US expense.⁸ US actions and Soviet perceptions of US resolve are thus likely to be the main deterrent to Soviet adventurism for the remainder of this decade.

The United States and the Soviet Union are the only nations whose global foreign policies and divergent interests bring them into competition in virtually every corner of the world. This global strategic competition is sharpened by an incompatibility of fundamental values and contrasting notions of the proper relationship among individuals, government, and society. Taken together, these factors ensure that the United States and the Soviet Union for the foreseeable future will see themselves as adversaries whose competition must be managed peacefully if disaster is to be avoided.

For the Soviets, management of this problem means first and foremost to seek to foment and exploit divisions in the Western alliance. In a 1982 study on Western Europe as seen from the Soviet perspective, Angela Stent of Georgetown University identified five major areas of interest for the USSR insofar as Europe is concerned: "(1) the determination that Germany must never again become a military threat and the resolve to maintain the current division of that country; (2) the encouragement and deepening of fissures within the Atlantic Alliance, especially those between West Germany and the United States; (3) a commitment to keep Western Europe fragmented, since once united it could resist Soviet pressures much more effectively and could exert unhealthy influence on the Soviets' satellites in Eastern Europe; (4) the nurturing of the Soviets' links with Western European communism; and (5) the continuation of Moscow's growing economic relations with Western Europe, in order to prop up its faltering economy and earn hard currency in payment for Soviet exports of raw materials."⁹

All of these Soviet interests in Western Europe obviously clash in one or more ways with our own interests. And as if to emphasize that point, a major theme of current Soviet propaganda—whether talking about Nato increased defense spending, IMF deployment, or East-West trade—is to present Western Europe as an unwilling accomplice of the United States. That theme will be played hard in the years ahead. As Harvard Sovietologist Adam Ulam writes in a recent issue of *Problems of Communism*, the Soviet Union's immediate goal is to preserve a kind of ambivalence in West European attitudes that results in Western Europe being allied with the United States but unwilling to synchronize its policies with the United States, except on issues directly affecting Europe's military security. Ulam concludes that preventing European political unity must remain the cardinal objective of Kremlin politics.¹⁰ And in the same issue of *Problems of Communism*, the

Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Maj. Gen. William Odom makes a good case for his view that Andropov is pursuing somewhat more aggressively than Brezhnev a policy of trying to split Europe from the United States.¹¹ Hugh Seton-Watson, the dean of British Sovietologists, carried this thought to its ultimate conclusion in a 1 May review of Ulam's recent book on Soviet foreign policy. Seton-Watson characterized the Soviet goal for Western Europe as "first Finlandization, then Czechoslovakization." He observed that although "this today happily seems a remote prospect it is probably top priority for Soviet foreign policy makers and is being pursued with relentless patience." The means is "systematic exploitation of Western Europe's economic difficulties, anti-nuclear hysteria, and frictions between individual Western countries."¹²

The other major external consideration for the Soviets is Sino-Soviet and Sino-US relations, or as Harry Gelman presents it in a 1982 Rand Corporation study of the problem: Sino-Soviet-US interaction.¹³ Since 1969 the specter of a Sino-US rapprochement has haunted the Soviet leadership. During the early 1970s Brezhnev issued repeated private warnings to American leaders not to enter into a military alliance with China. He also made repeated unsuccessful attempts to entice the United States into a security relationship directed against the PRC. In the late 1970s the Soviets again displayed great public nervousness about possible US arms supplies to China. The growth in the Sino-US relationship has tapered off since 1981 because of new prominence given to Taiwan by both sides. At the same time Chinese-Soviet relations have been somewhat normalized, particularly in the economic and cultural areas. Yet there has been no movement by either side on any of the basic issues at the heart of the crisis, and it seems unlikely that Sino-Soviet rapprochement is in the cards any time soon. The Soviets have made no move toward significant reductions in their military force levels on the Chinese border, which more than doubled in the early 1970s to approximately 50 divisions. Soviet bases in Vietnam, the invasion of Afghanistan, increased Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and Soviet reinforcements of the Kurile Islands all have contributed to a Chinese sense of insecurity by being ringed by superior Soviet military forces. None of this is likely to change in the next few years.

For 16 months in 1980-81 Poland presented the Soviet Union with the greatest threat to its perceived security interests in Eastern Europe since World War II. One would think that a more self-confident, a more visionary Soviet leadership would see its long-range interests enhanced by the establishment of a more viable social compact between the government and the governed in Poland, as long as the dominant role of the Communist Party and membership in the Warsaw Pact remained assured. Such an outcome was probably possible for the first half of the Solidarity period. But the Soviets displayed extreme nervousness from the outset and clearly placed heavy and

increasing pressure on the Polish leadership from the fall of 1980 onward to get that Solidarity genie back into the bottle any way they could. The Soviets wanted desperately to avoid having to invade Poland. They were willing to rattle their sabers around Poland's frontiers, as they did very noisily on three occasions, beginning in November 1980; but it was for purposes of massive intimidation, not a prelude to invasion. An invasion of Poland would have required a force at least double the 350,000 Soviet troops used against Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the odds were high that heavy fighting and large numbers of casualties on both sides would result. The Polish military, the second largest in the Warsaw Pact, would become a liability rather than an asset. And an invasion of Poland would have achieved that which Ulam says is the cardinal thing the Soviets seek to prevent: West European unity.¹⁴ So although the Soviets were not happy with the collapse of the Polish party and the advent of Jaruzelski's military government, they were greatly relieved that Jaruzelski spared them the agony of a direct intervention by force. At the same time, they recognize that Poland is far from pacified and that all of Eastern Europe remains potentially unstable and volatile. They do not know where it will happen next or what direction it will take. But history certainly tells them that another East European uprising will come sooner or later because the Soviet imposed system has not been able to satisfy either the national or material expectations of the East European peoples. In many ways Eastern Europe remains a costly liability to the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet leadership has repeatedly demonstrated that it considers the area an extension of its immediate geographic security and will accept the risks of empire in order to maintain its unquestioned hegemony over the area.

One other external factor deserves special treatment. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan shocked most of the world and even provoked oblique criticism from a Warsaw Pact ally, President Ceausescu of Rumania. We will probably never be privy to the minutes of the Politburo debate that preceded the decision or have any authoritative information on how the venture has been regarded at various times by the Soviet leadership. Suffice it to say that the Soviets know they have a tiger by the tail and that they probably underestimated the extent of the staying power of the Afghan resistance and the probable cost in Soviet casualties. On the other hand, I am doubtful that they feel under any great pressure, either internal or external, to withdraw from Afghanistan.

The Vietnam analogy is badly overdrawn. The war is not being fought on nightly television news programs in Soviet homes. For that matter, very little visual news and not that much more printed news is coming out of Afghanistan. The news that is available from other than official Afghan and Soviet sources is not available to Soviet citizens except via foreign broadcasting to the Soviet Union. International criticism of the Soviet war against the Afghan people has fallen off sharply, even on the part of Muslim

countries, to a level which the Soviets can easily live. At the same time, the United Nations mediation efforts have reportedly reached a make or break point. UN Under Secretary General Diego Cordovoz is said to have worked out most of the provisions for a comprehensive agreement which would provide for a phased Soviet withdrawal. A sticking point said still to be worked out is the length of the phased withdrawal period. The Soviets are said to want 18 months, while the Pakistanis are insisting on six.

I suspect that another sticking point will be to find a face-saving formula acceptable to the Soviet military. They will insist on a settlement which in their view will enable them to justify to themselves, to the Soviet people, and to the world at large in both military and nationalistic terms the price they have paid. It strikes me that such a settlement would have to look like a Soviet victory—leave the Babrak Karmal government in place, at least at the outset; leave the Soviets in control of the pace of withdrawal with built-in periodic veto checkpoints, leave in place some kind of a substantial Soviet military assistance group; and award the Soviets broad reentry rights subject largely to future Soviet interpretation. I doubt whether the Soviets feel under any pressure to settle for much less at this point and I question whether the other parties to an agreement—especially the key Afghan resistance leaders—would endorse that much of a Soviet victory. Therefore, I find myself skeptical of a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan any time soon.

The Past as Prologue: Soviet Uses of Power for the Past Decade. It is fashionable, and always has been, to be hopeful about modifying Soviet international behavior. While I like to be hopeful about the future, 27 years of dealing with the Soviets has taught me to be neither an optimist nor a pessimist, but rather a cautious realist.

As we look ahead, we should review the past, or else, as George Santayana said, we might be condemned to repeat it. Another reason to review past Soviet behavior from time to time is to make sure that we do not become lulled into inadvertently accepting the Soviet version of the past. For the Soviets, with their infinite patience and their persistent propaganda, are only too mindful of Big Brother's dictum in George Orwell's *1984* to the effect that: "Who controls the past controls the future. Who controls the present controls the past."

First the record of the Soviet buildup of its military power: the thing to remember about the Soviet military buildup of the past 20 years is that it has been across the board. Most of the publicity has been given to the naval buildup because it represented a dramatic switch from a long tradition of a coastal defense navy to a first-rate blue-water navy capable of challenging the number one naval power in many areas with long-range force projection capability and a web of far-flung bases in Southeast Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and the Middle East. Each of the Soviet military forces has been a

proportional beneficiary of the increase in defense spending. The army, for example, has grown from 145 to 190 divisions. The regional strategic forces have deployed more than 350 highly accurate SS-20 MIRVed missiles (1050 warheads) targeted on Western Europe. Since 1972 the USSR has deployed 10 variants of three new ICBMs, most of which are now MIRVed with a capability of 10 warheads each. And the Soviet air defense forces have been improved dramatically.

In general and across the board, every element of the Soviet military and armaments has been relentlessly and qualitatively improved. More importantly, there were two key developments which gave the Soviets the confidence to employ this sharply increased military power to their political advantage. The first was the Soviet consciousness dating from the early 1970s that they had achieved rough nuclear parity with the United States. The second was that by developing a first-class blue-water navy and a significant airlift capability, the Soviets no longer had to limit themselves to contiguous power projection. They now had the ability to employ distant power projection and, thereby, advance their interests virtually anywhere in the world where they saw an opportunity to do so.

As a result, in the 1970s we saw the Soviets move boldly with their own arms and advisers, and with Cuban and Vietnamese expeditionary forces into Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen, Mozambique, and Kampuchea. They obtained and developed bases in Vietnam, Libya, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Syria, and Cuba. Even Yugoslavia's Tito became openly alarmed and in 1979, during the last year of his life, told a succession of visiting statesmen about his concern at the increasingly strident boldness with which the Soviets were intervening with force or the threat of force far beyond their boundaries to tip the scales in their favor in local conflicts. And Tito's concern was expressed *before* the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, the boldest display by the Soviets of the use of force since the end of World War II. It should be remembered that all of this occurred at a time when détente was nominally in place and when the Soviet leaders were outdoing everyone else in the frequency and fervency with which they paid lip service to détente.

What Lies Ahead? If we needed any further evidence that internal reforms or conciliatory moves in foreign policy do not appear to be on the minds of Soviet leaders, we certainly got it at the June 1983 plenary session of the Central Committee of the Soviet Party and at the session of the Supreme Soviet that followed. In the speeches of Andropov, Chernenko, and Gromyko there was no hint of either an internal or an external thaw. Quite the contrary. As *The New York Times* put it, speeches by Andropov and Chernenko "suggested that the Andropov era may do more to reinforce the coercive aspects of Soviet life than to reinvigorate the Soviet system."¹⁵ On

the foreign policy side, Gromyko presented a stridently unyielding defense of Soviet positions coupled with an acrimonious attack on the United States.

Commenting on this in *The New York Times* on 17 June, Flora Lewis suggested that the Soviet system appears to be frozen into a stalemate among dug-in bureaucratic interest groups and that the Soviet military may have become less subject to higher policy controls.¹⁶ I think it more likely that in the present leadership constellation in the Soviet Union, the Soviet military-industrial complex enjoys an unusually strong voice in policy decisions and implementation because it seems clear that Defense Minister Ustinov, for over 40 years a director of the Soviet military-industrial complex, was a key figure in Andropov's ascendancy. Columbia Sovietologist Seweryn Bialer has observed that it is only partly in jest that one says: "while the United States may have a military-industrial complex, the Soviet Union is a military-industrial complex." He adds that "policy orientation characterized by an almost automatic first priority responsiveness to defense-heavy industrial needs seems almost to be a component part of Soviet political culture."¹⁷ Bialer states further that when analyzing the Soviet domestic and imperial situation at the beginning of the 1980s and its probable impact on foreign policy, and projecting its development for the rest of the decade, he "is drawn inescapably to the conclusion that we will witness the external expansion of an internally declining power."¹⁸ And at a recent conference on Soviet foreign policy at Columbia University, Bialer observed that the current Soviet foreign policy trend is one that tries to maximize its goals by use of the most dangerous means—*military means*.¹⁹

If it is so clear to leading Sovietologists and other informed observers that the Soviets are not likely to hesitate in using their power to achieve their aims as long as they assess the risks as tolerable, and if these same observers see a strong upward trend in bold Soviet power projection, why is it so difficult in the West to achieve broad political consensus on the nature of the problem and on policies to deal with it?

In an article in *Problems of Communism* in 1981, Oxford University Professor Max Beloff noted that "after 60 years the structure of Soviet society, the elaboration of Soviet ideology, and the Soviet style in politics are firmly established and serious scholarly studies of the Soviet phenomenon and its military aspects are widely available. Yet when some alternative and more agreeable view commends itself, Western political leaders make light of what we know of the Soviet leaders' assessment of how the Soviet belief system is to be defended and extended." Beloff adds that "the facts are not obscure and no particular effort is made by Soviet leaders to conceal them." He concludes that "it would appear to be the Soviet leadership's calculation that so great is the fear of modern weapons that nations will prefer to surrender their political independence rather than face the implications of trying to maintain the balance."²⁰

With regard to future Soviet intentions, Beloff concludes that "it is clearly hard to avoid feeling that further gains by the Soviet Union, if not in territory then at least in influence, are likely." He adds that "in almost every part of the world, the fact of Soviet military power is having its effect. Even though in many areas Soviet interests might best be served by peace, a military imbalance on this scale must be a constant source of concern."²¹

Seton-Watson sounded a similar alarm in his 1 May article when he said: "the Soviet leaders are in no hurry, and unlike the fascist dictators of the 1930s they have no romantic preference for war. They have accepted reverses when they have had to, substantial in Egypt and still bigger in China. They are not starry-eyed revolutionaries planning some apocalyptic upheaval, nor world conquerors in the mold of Genghis Khan. They are a very conservative group of elderly bureaucrats concerned for their privilege and power, and they are served not only by able generals and admirals who are professionals of a conventional type, but also by skilled diplomats capable of operating on the same intellectual wave length as Western diplomats with no less subtlety and charm. But none of this changes the direction of the march or the will to pursue it."²²

And finally, Malcolm Toon, our own distinguished former Ambassador to Moscow, who served three times in the Soviet Union and has a reputation for direct talk and calling a spade a spade, told the *Honolulu Advertiser* in an interview on 31 May that "we should always bear in mind that the Soviet leaders do not wish us well . . . They would do us in tomorrow if they thought they could get away with it, even with acceptable damage to themselves." Toon observed that as the United States tries to coexist with the Russians, it must maintain the national will and the resources—including nuclear weapons—to back up that resolve. He does not believe one-sided nuclear disarmament is a realistic alternative.²³

Secretary of State George Shultz told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "a peaceful world order does not require that we and the Soviet Union agree on all the fundamentals of morals or politics. It does require, however, that Moscow's behavior be subject to the restraint appropriate to living together on this planet in the nuclear age." Secretary Shultz said that "we have spelled out our requirements and our hopes for a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union." But "while we can define their alternatives, we cannot decipher their intentions. To a degree unequaled anywhere else, Russia in this respect remains a secret."²⁴

"Her history, of which this secrecy is such an integral part, provides no basis for expecting a dramatic change. And yet it also teaches that gradual change is possible. For our part, we seek to encourage change by a firm but flexible U.S. strategy, resting on a broad consensus, that we can sustain over the long term whether the Soviet Union changes or not."²⁵

As I said earlier, lengthy experience in dealing with the Soviets long ago

made me a cautious realist. Realistically, I see no evidence to suggest that the Soviets are likely any time soon to modify their international objectives or to restrain their appetite for using their power to further their interests whenever they perceive an attractive opportunity. The best way we can restrain them is to pursue our own interests with consistency and firm resolve in ways that make the opportunities appear far less attractive to the Soviets.

Notes

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