

1984

Book Reviews

The U.S. Naval War College

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

Recommended Citation

War College, The U.S. Naval (1984) "Book Reviews," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 37 : No. 1 , Article 11.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol37/iss1/11>

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

PROFESSIONAL READING

“If an officer has time or inclination to read only one survey of great ideas, men and books relevant to the naval service, this for now should be that one.”

by

Thomas H. Etzold*

Till, Geoffrey. *Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982. 274 pp. \$35

This book contains authoritative assessments of important individuals and issues: Mahan, Corbett, Richmond, Gorshkov, American thinking on modern naval strategy, and changing political and legal environments for navies. Sensibly, Mr. Till, a faculty member of the Royal Naval College (Greenwich), has augmented his own expertise with that of John Hattendorf, Richard Hill, Barry Hunt, Peter Nailor, Bryan Ranft, Stephen Roskill, and Craig Symonds. These contributors and topics augment the author's principal concerns—principles of seapower, a review of classical literature and thought on maritime matters, the “sources and elements” of maritime power, the concept of command of the sea, and evolving technology's effects on principles and concepts.

Till and company assert the continuing importance of battle in the thinking of the American and Soviet navies; emphasize the revolutionary influence of air power on naval warfare; and endorse Mahan's belief that technological advance, by reducing the level of uncertainty in operations, “actually made strategic theory more, not less, possible.” The author and his colleagues endorse presence and deterrence functions of naval and maritime forces,

*Dr. Thomas H. Etzold is Special Assistant for the Director, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College.

quoting, among others, John Stuart Mill to the effect that “our diplomacy stands for nothing when we have not a fleet to back it.” On this they also cite Stansfield Turner (who seems to be the *only* really modern American authority whose ideas appear meritorious to the author): “I think that we who exercise naval presence do not know enough about how to fit the action to the situation: how to be sure that the force we bring to bear, when told to help in some situation, is in fact the one most appropriate to the circumstances.”

Further, Till and his associates implicitly favor forward maritime posture and operations. Equally important, they support the view that, as Rear Adm. R.C. Brown said at the Naval War College in 1949, there is a need for “brilliant strategists, not of land power, not of sea power, and not of air power, but able, broad-gauged individuals who can view the whole picture of *military* strategy.” In short, they recognize the enduring importance of combined arms approaches to warfare, not only as tactics but as strategy. As for the influence of nuclear weapons, the author says little more than that they have made some portions of the maritime forces more vulnerable while making other portions more important than ever.

In its canvassing of classical literature and ideas, this book shows a truth. There are few if any really new ideas. Trying to find a truly new idea in modern naval thought and circumstances is much like the quest for the Holy Grail, which occupied the Knights of the Round Table and others who in the Middle Ages found themselves irrelevant or unoccupied. It is, ironically, possible that military science and humanism have little in common save their shared belief in progress. Yet, in this or in any competent review of naval theory and literature, one cannot be struck by the durability of a few crucial questions: what great states need from the sea; what they need from maritime forces (not at all the same question); the role of battle in the exercise of maritime power; what to do—and what can be done—with inferior maritime forces; the relationship between sea and land (and now air) campaigns; the effects of law and other constraints on the exercise of maritime power.

Till notes interestingly, Matthew Sutcliffe’s 1593 summary of the uses of maritime forces:

“The use of the Navy is great in peace, greater in wars. Thereby traffic and intercourse betwixt friends is maintained, victuals that go to the enemy are stopped, our wants of victuals, arms, munitions, and other necessaries are supplied; the enemy’s coast is spoiled, our own defended, the coast towns of the enemy’s country that live upon the sea are brought to great extremities, our own maintained . . . [without it] the trade of merchandise cannot be maintained . . . [nor] the sea towns of the enemy be besieged, nor can be understand the enemy’s proceedings, nor help or well defend our friends or ourselves.”

It is not at all clear, after reading this overview of late 19th and early 20th century literature, that the naval profession today has as good a grasp of these questions and their possible answers as did their predecessors. Two generations ago and, indeed, ten, naval thinkers may have understood their business better than they did their circumstances. Today's officers and thinkers sometimes seem to know their circumstances better than their heritage.

Despite its misleading title, Geoffrey Till's book should be part of every naval officer's library. This volume admirably and economically sets the context for the enduring debates concerning the objectives and methods of naval warfare, though not in terms particularly specific to the nuclear age. If an officer has time or inclination to read only one survey of great ideas, men, and books relevant to the naval service, this for now should be that one.

Heikal, Mohamed. *Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat*. New York: Random House, 1983. 290pp. \$17.95

As the former editor of the powerful Cairo daily *Al Ahram*, cabinet minister, and close confidant to President Sadat, Mohamed Hassanein Heikal had an unusual opportunity in his latest book, *Autumn of Fury*, to write the background story about the events leading up to Sadat's assassination. His previous efforts such as *Road to Ramadan* and *The Sphinx and the Commissar* demonstrated his insider knowledge and astute observations of Middle East politics. But those who expect the same quality of effort as in his previous works will be disappointed.

The emphasis of *Autumn of Fury* is on the interesting contention that the plot against Sadat was far different from those which killed President Kennedy and his brother Robert and

attempted to kill the Pope and President Reagan. Instead of being the actions of a single crazed individual, Heikal argues that Sadat's death was the logical result of mainstream movements within Egyptian society.

To support this thesis, Heikal presents a historical overview of the role of the Moslem Brotherhood and the Coptic church from their origins to their involvement in present-day Egyptian affairs. Heikal has a great deal of personal interest in the activity of these groups in the fall of 1981. At that time, shortly before the assassination, Sadat had to resort to massive arrests of Christian and Muslim extremists as well as prominent members of the political opposition. Among those arrested was Heikal, supposedly because he had taken funds from the Coptic Pope Shenouda III to organize an anti-Sadat press campaign. Despite his imprisonment, Heikal disavows

any attempt to get even through his book. Unfortunately, his obvious bitterness spills over into a spiteful attack aimed at destroying Sadat's reputation. In fact, *Autumn of Fury* was considered to be so potentially disruptive by the Egyptian government that it has been banned in Egypt.

Heikal leaves few areas of Sadat's life unscathed. He dwells at length on Sadat's black Sudanese mother and how she left him a life-long racial inferiority complex. Heikal's deep resentment of Sadat's humble beginnings and lack of high-level education is readily apparent, and he presents Sadat as a comic figure dwarfed by Nasser during their early days in the Free Officers Movement. Laid bare also is the post-1973 corruption brought about by the *infitah* or "open door" economic policy which Sadat used to lure Western businesses and return to a free market system. Many of Sadat's associates and family, particularly Osman Ahmed Osman, Egypt's richest and most flamboyant "fat cat," are alleged to have gained hundreds of millions of dollars at government expense.

While his personal vendetta may disappoint some of his old readers, he does provide some useful insight into the inner workings of Moslem fundamentalist groups such as the *Takfir wal Hijira* (Repentance and Holy Flight) which assassinated Sadat. He points out that this group's objective was to disrupt Sadat's efforts towards normalization of relations with Israel and the Western-

ization of Egyptian culture. Details on a fundamentalist group such as the *Takfir wal Hijira* are hard to obtain and *Autumn of Fury* provides a very useful backdrop.

Another area which will be of interest to readers is the charge that Sadat squandered Egypt's strategic position and advantage by signing the Camp David agreement. This, he claims, neutralized Egypt militarily, isolated it politically from the rest of the Arab world, and turned the once-powerful country into a mere vassal of the United States. However, Heikal feels that under President Mubarak the Egyptians are slowly feeling their way back to their former leadership role in the Middle East.

Autumn of Fury is a flawed book, but it has an important message. It is not vintage Heikal but worth reading because it provides an opportunity to learn how an influential Egyptian, albeit outside the government, views the harsh realities of Sadat's rule and the future of our relations with Egypt.

E.V. BADOLATO
Colonel, US Marine Corps

Leiken, Robert S. *Soviet Strategy in Latin America*. New York: Praeger, 1982. 124pp. \$6.95

Author Robert Leiken's *Soviet Strategy in Latin America* is a most timely and authoritative book on one of the world's hot spots. Leiken provides a scholarly and realistic view of Soviet activity in Latin America, with emphasis on Central America and the Caribbean, since the 1959 Cuban Revolution.

Unlike most authors, active politicians and military leaders, Leiken does not emphasize Soviet military might and nuclear weapons inventory. Rather, he concentrates almost exclusively on Soviet diplomatic, economic and commercial "offenses" starting with the USSR's opening venture—to win the hearts and minds and nations in the Third World—in Angola in 1975. He reviews the tremendous growth of Soviet trade with Latin America from \$68 million in 1960 to over \$900 million in 1977.

His discussion and viewpoint of Soviet-Cuban relations provides a refreshing analysis of this sometimes rocky friendship. He reminds readers, or enlightens them to the fact that Andropov's and Castro's brands of communism are not a homogeneous ideological mix. Soviet participation in Cuba's total import/export market is now 70 percent, up from 48 percent in 1975, plus Cuba's total reliance on Soviet military aid almost guarantees active Cuban support for Soviet adventures and interests in Latin America.

Leiken recognizes the widely differing cultural, ethnic, social, political and economic history of Central American, Caribbean and the littoral states in northern South America. While he does not discuss all of the nations and islands in the region, he succinctly relates the enormous strategic role the region commands in both the Atlantic-Pacific and north-south trade routes.

The strongest point of the work is

the author's relatively unbiased but detailed examination of the USSR and Cuban actions in Central and South America with his major emphasis on the three most potentially explosive nations—Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua—especially since the beginning of the Sandinista revolution. The growing presence and influence of the Soviet Union in the United States' backyard is thoroughly covered.

Leiken's treatise has been meticulously researched and profusely footnoted. Lack of an index somewhat diminishes the book's value as a research tool, however, the relative brevity of the book and a detailed table of contents offsets this one weakness.

As stated in the book's foreword by former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, William D. Rogers, "Leiken has contributed importantly to the general understanding of Central American events and Soviet designs. And his timing could hardly have been better."

JAMES G. HEYDENREICH
East Lyme, Conn.

Rubin, Barry. *The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict*. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1981. 298pp. \$22, paper \$10.95

Barry Rubin, whose earlier book treating US policy in Iran (*Paved with Good Intentions*) may be familiar to many readers, has now turned his attention to the struggle for Palestine. Using archival, as well as standard historical sources Rubin

presents a well-researched and intelligently written account of the Arab states' handling of the issue of Palestine from the end of the nineteenth century through the war of 1948. Rubin also treats the unsuccessful attempts of Jordan's King Abdullah to reach a rapprochement with the nascent state of Israel, attempts which abruptly ended when Abdullah was assassinated in 1951.

In an important sense, the struggle for Palestine was not a struggle against the Jewish settlers of the Yishuv, but was a struggle between and within the Arab states. Rubin clearly establishes that Arab decision-making regarding Palestine was fundamentally skewed on two levels. Within the Arab states, the emotive appeal of the issue of the fate of a mandatory Palestine was so keen, that even those Arab politicians inclined to compromise were forced to adopt tough positions. At the level of state-to-state relations, Arab leaders were so suspicious (with some cause) of the intentions of other Arab states, that they often adopted intransigent positions in order to prevent Palestine from falling under the control of their rivals.

The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict is a story of missed opportunities, flawed policy coordination and—as the results of the 1948 war indicate—an overly optimistic evaluation of Arab military capability and competence by the Arab states. Only on 17 April 1948, were the Arabs ready to accept a compromise solution taking account of Zionist aspirations and capabilities. But, by that

time the opportunity was past and events continued on the “slippery road to war.”

AUGUSTUS R. NORTON
Major, US Army
US Military Academy

Headrick, Daniel R. *The Tools of Empire. Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century.* New York, Oxford University Press, 1981. 221pp. \$17.95

The great theories of modern imperialism are well known. Putative political and economic motives, the search for capital investment, national grandeur or outposts of defense, the ideology of national competition and social Darwinism, anxiety that the world was closing, local interests and the political weaknesses of indigenous population—all these “causes” are much debated. Far too little attention is paid to the question of how technology shaped the development of empire. With this study Headrick puts its role at the center of the stage. It is a fine introduction to the subject; a reliable, informative interpretation and his lucidity makes his book a pleasure to read.

The history of imperialism is the history of warfare, and Headrick confirms the truth of Belloc's lines that, “Whatever happens we have got the Maxim gun, and they have not.” In an astonishing opening chapter Headrick shows how, in the early years of nineteenth century expansion, the East India Company, collaborating with pioneers of British industrialization—against the

advice and high-seas focus of the sail-driven Royal Navy—secretly commissioned shallow draft steam gunboats to win command of the coast of China and the rivers of Asia. Such foresight into the power of iron and steam led to victories in the Opium War, and the wars against Burma and Vietnam, opening inland Asia to European influence. In instances where there was a favorable arms gap and river steamers could penetrate, the European derived decisive benefit from their technical superiority. In situations less advantageous, such as in Algeria and India, and where the Europeans had to fight on more or less equal footing on land without riverine support and in the midst of enemy territory, conquest was long in coming, costly, and difficult—an important distinction Headrick is careful to draw.

There was a paradox to imperial warfare and its lessons were misunderstood at home. It was not realized that the new weapons were in essence defensive. The offensive strategy and defensive tactics that brought victory over poorly armed foes in, say, Africa, would not apply to warfare in Europe. The effect of modern infantry weapons on industrialized armies was the opposite of what it had been overseas. The first world war showed that the offensive could become suicidal as the new firearms, highly effective defensively, made rapid victory impossible.

Yet imperialism was more than war and the tools of empire were more than arms. Europeans had to

live safely in tropical regions. West Africa was impenetrable until the use of quinine ended the devastation wrought by malaria. Only then could steamers and gunboats be sent up the Niger; only then could the advantages of rapid firing arms come into their own. As technology interacted with politics, so too was there an inner logic to the use of the new inventions.

Empire was more than conquest. The colonies had to be administered, and tied to the metropolises. A maritime empire required secure lines of communication. A modern overseas empire was impossible without the revolution in communications, the technological wonders of steam transportation on sea and on land, and the swift information transfers made possible by the submarine cable. In a valuable commentary Headrick shows how these innovations lowered the cost, in both financial and human terms, of penetrating, conquering, and exploiting the new territories. It was this very capacity of the new technologies to permit an empire “on the cheap” that made imperialism acceptable to the peoples and governments of Europe.

More than just governments participated. Steam driven shipping made it easy, and progressively less expensive, to transport bulk goods from the ends of the earth. Technology, economics, politics, and naval strength were constantly intertwined. The opening of the Red Sea route to steam traffic, and then the Suez Canal, gave the British presence a new position in Asia, and

hence thrust it into true world power. The origins and purpose of modern sea-land lanes of communication, and the significance of protecting navies, are established in these times—for Americans as well as Europeans.

Through these networks were established new global thalassocracies. Imperialism gave birth to the modern world, a new era in world history. It laid the foundation of a new global civilization based on Western technology. Today it is that *technology*, not the ideas of capitalism, Christianity, or liberalism, that is the legacy of the European conquests.

GEORGE W. BAER
Naval War College

Holm, Jeanne. *Women in the Military: The Unfinished Revolution*. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982. 398 pp. \$16.95.

As the subtitle of this book makes clear, General Jeanne Holm has spent her thirty-three years in the Air Force fighting more than one battle. An unflagging champion of the rights of women in the military, General Holm traces the contributions of women to the Armed Services from the legendary "Molly Pitcher" to the present. *Women in the Military* examines the role of women in post-World War II strategy, the relationship between the All Volunteer Army (AVA) and women, the effect of the ERA on the military, and the role of the different branches of government in shaping military policy on this controversial subject. It sympathetically catalogs the prob-

lems faced by women, in particular: promotions, admission to the service academies, and family policy.

Although the book is informative on these and many other issues, I do not find Holm's argument compelling. This is largely because, having made up her mind about the justice of her cause, she avoids serious discussion of the complex questions involved. Let me give four examples. Although she acknowledges that the military is not a democratic institution, she seems not to have reflected upon the limits of the military to enshrine democratic values. She makes no distinction between the fight for women's rights in the civilian and military spheres; nor does she distinguish between the claims made on behalf of black male soldiers and women soldiers. Both seem to be legitimate *civil* rights issues for her. Thus she dismisses without comment her opponents' objections that the military is not the proper institution for carrying out controversial social policy.

Similarly, she attacks the "mind set" and "deep hang ups" of those who maintain that "war is a man's business" without considering whether this "cult of masculinity" might play a useful role in battle. It is true that much of military life has nothing to do with battle, but it seems equally true that the virtues necessary to victory in battle are not those we wish to encourage in our civilian lives. General Holm seems oblivious to this tension. She acknowledges only those instances where the presence of women does

seem to improve morale. She says nothing about the argument that in certain combat situations women might lower morale by imposing greater responsibilities on men or, even worse, boost the morale of the enemy by making him fight harder against women.

Although she concedes that there are problems with the AVA as well as the draft, she declines to discuss the political and moral issues of an all volunteer force which recruits from the most disadvantaged groups in society, leaving white middle class educated males to pursue their careers. Instead, she focuses on the opportunity the AVA provides to women, competing against male high school dropouts and mental incompetents. Because she sees no problems with such a force, she finds in back of the army's recent decision to limit women recruits a "hidden agenda" to bring back the male draft.

Finally, General Holm skirts the central question of women in combat. Throughout the book, she observes that the full integration of women in the military cannot take place until the combat issue is resolved. From her testimony on abolishing Section 6051 restricting women in combat, I take it she favors women in combat, but she refuses to discuss the issue. Perhaps this is because she does not wish to alienate those who would agree with her on the smaller issues. But she rightly points out that all these policy questions, e.g. promotion, retirement, admission to the service academies, turn on the question of combat. On the issue of the service academies, the

general is especially disingenuous. She points out that at West Point, the admission of women necessitated that only (sic) the physical training part of the curriculum be changed. Women carry lighter rifles, and are pitted only against women in pugil stick training. If we could sign a treaty with the Soviets insuring that American women fight only Soviet women, the general's expectations of fairness and equity would be realized.

General Holm's democratic principles seem to extend even to her writing, where she makes nouns do the work of verbs and draws on a formidable arsenal of slang expressions and clichés.

In the end, this is a disappointing book. *Women in the Military* deals with a serious subject, but not in a serious way.

JEAN YARBROUGH
Associate Professor Political Science
Loyola University of Chicago

Bonds, Ray, ed. *The Vietnam War: The Illustrated History of the Conflict in Southeast Asia—Updated Edition*. New York: Crown Publications, 1983. 256pp. \$19.95

Crace, Max D. and McJunkin, James N. *Visions of Vietnam*. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1983. 248pp. \$25

Mason, Robert C. *Chickenhawk*. New York: Viking Press, 1983. 339pp. \$17.75

As the administration struggles with the vagaries of public opinion in making critical foreign policy decisions about Central America, the

vision of America's Vietnam experience dangles before them like a shadow in the wind. The daily press constantly recalls the "lessons" of Southeast Asia, and dozens of books continue to be published each year, each with its particular rationale or memory of the war. The study of Vietnam is in many ways like theology—everyone is aware of it, most people have strong opinions about it, and virtually nobody has bothered to learn the facts about America's longest and most controversial war. The recent release of three new works on Vietnam continues the general tradition of literature on the war in that they are radically different treatments of the conflict, each of which has a specific point to make.

The first, and by far the best, of the group is a general history of the conflict called simply, *The Vietnam War*. The subtitle is "The Illustrated History of the Conflict in Southeast Asia," and the book lives up to the billing with superb maps, photographs, charts, drawings, and illustrations. The text is divided into two dozen excellent, brief essays by a distinguished collection of authors. The essays range chronologically from the French era to the fall of Saigon and the continuing brutal conflict in the region today. Also included are highly useful sections that give a thorough chronology of key events, brief biographies of all the major actors in the war, and a list of US MIAs of 1983. As a reference work, *The Vietnam War* is the best single volume yet in print on the conflict. Of particular note are the maps (many of which are topographic

in character), the illustrations of the weapons and techniques of warfare developed in Vietnam, and the striking photography.

The writing is conservative in tone and argument, and falls into the category of "new scholarship" on Vietnam that is emerging in reaction to the long orgy of self-flagellation that marked the earlier (1973-1978) writing. The best use for the work is as a reference volume on the war, to be read and studied for its factual, unemotional, unbiased reporting on many aspects of the conflict. It is a perfect companion piece to Harry G. Summers' recent minor classic, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (see review in *NWC Review*, March-April, 1983, p. 81). While it is possible to point to minor criticisms in some of the individual essays, the overall value of the work is immense. General Westmoreland's introductory essay alone is worth the price of admission. All in all, *The Vietnam War* is a work of tremendous value to those interested in understanding the facts in America's Vietnam experience.

The second recently released book, *Visions of Vietnam*, is an effort by two young artists, photographer James McJunkin and artist Max Crace, to capture the war with their artistry. Both served in Vietnam, Crace as an Air Force artist and McJunkin as an Army correspondent—the book is a compilation of their work in-country.

The volume has over 80 photographs and 30 line drawings, and is divided into three sections, "The War Machine" (the military equipment

and operations), "The Civilians" (portraits of the Vietnamese), and "The Grunts" (the combat soldiers). There are brief captions associated with each photo and drawing, and the book is well-layed out and sharply printed, although the left page is always blank, evidently for dramatic effect.

Unfortunately, *Visions of Vietnam* fails to capture the essence of the war. The photos are unremarkable and not especially dramatic and the artwork, while serviceable, is not memorable. Perhaps the nightly coverage of the war spoiled us for books such as *Visions*, giving readers a sense that the war was more dramatic than the pictures and art in this volume would indicate. The volume contains all the clichés of the war (men on tanks, prostitutes and pimps in Saigon, patrols through the jungle, destitute peasants) but does little to go beyond the surface that is already too familiar from newspapers and television broadcasts. One is left, sadly, with the feeling that it has all been said before.

The final recent book on the war is the memoir of a year's combat tour in country by a helicopter pilot, Robert Mason. The book is an intensely personal look at combat that is realistically and dramatically written. It describes the helo air war in Vietnam in the same biting prose that James Webb and Phil Caputo used in telling the story of the ground soldiers in *Fields of Fire* and *A Rumor of War* respectively. As a combat memoir, *Chickenhawk* is fairly good, accurate, and occasionally powerful writing.

By far the most haunting portion of

the book, however, deals with the author's return to the United States and his life from 1966 to the present. In a few short pages of epilogue, Mason manages to capture the horror of post-Vietnam trauma that afflicted some veterans. For a man who had survived the dangerous air war over the jungles in Vietnam, it seems sadly ironic that alcohol, drugs, and severe stress disorders were ultimately crippling. Robert Mason is today appealing a conviction for drug-related charges, and claims "No one is more shocked than I." These are the final words in a sadly troubled memoir written by a man who could have done better. One is left with a sense that having survived the war in Vietnam, Mason had little left over to deal with the demands of life after combat. While Mason's experiences are not typical of the vast majority of Vietnam veterans, they are sadly indicative of the problems many suffered. At least America seems gradually to be coming to terms with the war in Vietnam. Robert Mason, it would seem, has yet to come home.

JAMES STAVRIDIS
Lieutenant Commander, US Navy

Borowski, Harry R. *A Hollow Threat: Strategic Air Power and Containment before Korea*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982. 242pp. \$27.50

Long before World War II ended, it was apparent to US leaders that our ally, the Soviet Union, would be the biggest threat to the postwar world. While the West demobilized its military forces, the Soviets did no such thing. The pressing question then, was

how to deter any potential Soviet plans for expansion on European territory.

Many believed that the only viable deterrent available after 1945 was the atomic bomb. The delivery vehicle to be employed was the large strategic bombers of the Army Air Forces, which recently emerged from the successes of Germany and Japan. Lieut. Colonel Harry Borowski states that while historians generally have credited America's strategic air arm with singlehandedly holding the Soviets at bay during the late 1940s, they were mistaken because at the time that air arm was incapable of carrying nuclear weapons to Soviet soil.

The wartime chief of the Army Air Forces (AAF), General H.H. Arnold, believed the three postwar priorities of his service were autonomy, continued research and development, and a strong air arm capable of strategic bombing. AAF leaders felt that the demonstrated ability to carry out the strategic bombing mission was essential in order to achieve autonomy. Impinging on these priorities were demobilization and President Truman's comparatively small postwar defense budgets that placed severe constraints on continued R&D efforts.

Nonetheless, the separate air force was established in 1947, with strategic bombing vested solely in the Strategic Air Command. Unfortunately, creation of the command did not insure that capability. Under General George Kenney's leadership, SAC struggled during its first two years of operation. Grave personnel and tech-

nical problems, as well as uncertain national policies on the use of atomic weapons, compounded the difficulties in producing a viable atomic capability.

The author holds that it was the US airlift, not US atomic power, that prevented the Berlin blockade from spreading into further Soviet action. Despite repeated intelligence estimates of the Soviet intentions to initiate another war, it was only with the naming of SAC's second commander, General Curtis LeMay, that the Air Force began to develop a true atomic capability. But even that failed to defer the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950.

Making excellent use of National archives and Strategic Air Command historical documents as well as oral history material covering the period, Lieut. Colonel Borowski provides an interesting look at the development of US atomic development between 1945 and 1950. Yet, though he establishes his case for the "hollow threat," he leaves with an unanswered question: what actually deterred the Soviets from taking more aggressive action during those years?

RON RIGHTMYER
Captain, US Air Force
Mountain Home AFB, Idaho

Ferencz, Benjamin B. *Enforcing International Law: A Way to World Peace. A Documentary History and Analysis.* Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1983. 2 vols. 891 pp. \$90 the set.

In 1975 Benjamin Ferencz brought forth *Defining International Aggression: The Search for World Peace, A Documentary History and Analysis* (Oceana, 2

vols.), two volumes of discussion and documents presenting the historical evolution of the attempts of the international community to define the term "aggression," attempts which culminated in the 1974 Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations. 1980 saw the publication of *An International Criminal Court: A Step Toward World Peace, A Documentary History and Analysis* (Oceana, 2 vols.), two volumes of discussion and documents presenting the historical evolution of the attempts, still unsuccessful, to establish an international criminal court in which individuals could be tried for aggressive acts, acts disturbing world peace. Now, in 1983, there has appeared *Enforcing International Law: A Way to World Peace, A Documentary History and Analysis*, two volumes of discussion and documents presenting the historical evolution of methods recommended or adopted over the centuries to encourage or to compel nations to abide by the norms of conduct prescribed for states. This set of volumes completes the Ferencz trilogy, his contribution to the efforts to make the twentieth-century world a safer place in which to live, one where the scourge of war will be the exception rather than the rule.

Volume I begins with a 79-page essay, followed by 35 documents which cover such diverse sources as the classical writers on international law (Ayala, Belli, Grotius, Vattel, etc.) in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to the discussions in the Council of the League of Nations in the late 1930s on the Treaty of

Locarno, the Spanish Civil War, and other activities of the League of that period. Volume II begins with a 72-page essay, followed by 42 documents which cover the period from the 1944-1945 proposals for a new international organization, the United Nations, to the 1975 Final Act of Helsinki. Thus we have the record of four centuries of efforts by publicists and governments to control the use of war as a means of settling international disputes by searching for viable methods of enforcing international law short of war—efforts which, unfortunately, have been largely unsuccessful.

There are, and there always will be, states which abide by the rules of law in their international relations and states which, when it suits their interests, do not. When the larger, more powerful, nations are not united in their desire to prevent war, when one of them is solely interested in world domination, when it encourages and supports armed conflict wherever found, when it demonstrates that it does not consider its activities restricted by the accepted rules of international law and relations, when it enters into treaties with no intention of complying with any restrictions therein contained which would limit its unpeaceful activities, then the objective of preventing recourse to armed conflict as a means of settling international disputes is a chimera which law-abiding states should by all means pursue—but from a position of strength, not weakness.

While Ferencz's trilogy in general,

and *Enforcing International Law* in particular, unquestionably is successful in its objective of demonstrating that for centuries mankind has sought ways and means of enforcing the law between nations without the use of the ultimate enforcer, war, regrettably, it even more clearly demonstrates that up to this point in history mankind has had minimal success in this area. This is not to say that works such as those of Benjamin Ferencz, works which demonstrate the need to exert every possible effort to secure the peaceful enforcement of international law, are merely a spinning of wheels. On the contrary, they are absolutely essential if the enforcement of international law is eventually to be moved *in toto* from the battlefield to the conference table or the court room. We are indeed fortunate to have a Benjamin Ferencz to highlight the problems and to point the way.

HOWARD S. LEVIE
Professor Emeritus of Law
Saint Louis University Law School

Kendall, Lane C. *The Business of Shipping*. 4th ed. Centreville, Md.: Cornell Maritime Press, 1983. 485pp. \$18.50

During this period of enhanced interest in seafight, strategic mobility and the plight of the US merchant marine, Lane Kendall's work provides a timely primer for those who would like to know more about this multifaceted industry. Now in its fourth rendition—the original was published ten years ago—*The Business of Shipping* is more than an update of previous editions.

Kendall includes new chapters on containerization, the phenomenon which has turned the ocean cargo business upside down. He examines this revolution in detail. Revolution it is: it grows by leaps and bounds as more ports add specialized cranes and as larger ships join the fleet, each ship carrying more cargo, thereby displacing smaller ships on a ratio of 1:3 or more. He has updated and revised other chapters and cites recent examples in illustrations of developments. He even refers to the Falkland Islands hostilities and their impact on shipping.

Other welcome changes are an easier to read typeset and the grouping of all footnotes and references in a separate Notes section immediately preceding the Index, which facilitates cross-referencing.

Fortunately for the reader, Mr. Kendall has retained his chapters on Tramp Shipping and Chartering virtually unchanged. His lucid treatment of these fascinating operations should be of interest to even the casual reader. His description of the Baltic Exchange and the determination of charter parties is particularly interesting.

Entertaining, easy reading and informative; lacking, perhaps, only in a chapter on issues of maritime labor, this book certainly meets the author's hope expressed in the preface that the reader "... gain greater understanding of a worthwhile way of life"

R.E. BLOUIN
Naval War College

Smith, Peter C. and Dominy, John R.
Cruisers in Action 1939-1945.
 Annapolis, Md.: US Naval Institute Press, 1983. 320pp. \$19.95

Every US naval officer knows that World War II was fought from 7 December 1941, through victories over Japan and Germany, into 1945 and that navies fought two different wars—one of convoy escort in the Atlantic and the other, totally different, with fast carrier task forces and amphibious operations in the Pacific. All of us who are certain about this simplistic categorization of a long and trying period would profit by reading portions of this anecdotal book. The cruisers of the Royal Navy fought a much longer and more tactically demanding war usually without air cover, often outnumbered and at the extremities of all theaters. They escorted convoys, struck at shore installations, hounded the *Altmark* and *Graf Spee* to ground, extracted riches and royalty from threatened coasts and attempted to provide AA defense for forces ashore when air superiority belonged to the enemy. One cannot but admire those warships and the men who served in them, especially during the dark uncertain days of 1940-43.

There are familiar battles such as the pursuit of the *Bismarck* by the battleships *King George V* and *Rodney* and the cruisers *Sheffield*, *Norfolk*,

and *Dorsetshire* which delivered the coup de grace. Of more interest I found those battles where His Majesty's cruisers were on the thin cutting edge of naval strategy—off Narvik, off Java and in the eastern Mediterranean. There was limited commonality of weapons systems and shortages of everything, especially AA ammunition and time. But much was expected of these ubiquitous ships and much was delivered by them.

Smith and Dominy have provided some intriguing reading for the vicarious naval adventurer and sufficient detail and appendixes to give the researcher who may have overlooked some of these battles a point of departure. The book is unpretentious in the extreme and prone to understatement. As the authors admit in the introduction, "This is not a technical history; such books are already prolific, and easily available To detail the individual histories of each ship and to describe every action . . . would have been a mammoth work, and publishing economics force us to compromise." The book also is a eulogy for "these lovely ships, now alas, but a fading memory."

DAVID G. CLARK
 Captain, US Navy
 Naval War College