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Soviet Policy and Practice toward Third World Conflicts

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news media representatives who cover the Pentagon, and why. But perhaps that omission is an inevitable consequence of an active-duty officer writing about influential persons with whom he continues to have frequent contact. Nevertheless, this is a first-class piece of research and writing and should be read by every military officer who wants to better understand and appreciate the influence of military reporting, and military reporters, on their professions.

JAMES E. WENTZ
Captain, US Navy
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Hosmer, Tephem T. and Wolfe, Thomas W. *Soviet Policy and Practice toward Third World Conflicts*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983. 318pp. \$23.95

In assessing the behavior of the Soviet Union in the developing world, several generally discernible patterns can be analyzed. In *Soviet Policy and Practice toward Third World Conflicts*, Hosmer and Wolfe have outlined some of the overall strategy that seems to be at the heart of Soviet expansionism since the Second World War. Given the current Soviet/Cuban involvement in the Caribbean and Central American regions, the book is a particularly timely study of the USSR's policy and attitude toward the Third World.

The work is very tersely and concisely written, and probably originated as a Rand Corporation study, as both the authors have worked in that organization. It

contains a number of simple maps, an excellent bibliography, and extensive notation. As such, it functions well as a basic outline of Soviet adventurism since WWII, and could be quite useful as a guide to more in-depth research. It was obviously written to provide the reader with an overview of major trends, and it succeeds admirably in that capacity. In the first part of the text, the overall Soviet involvement in the developing world is traced from an economic, political, and military standpoint. The second section is concerned with more specific analysis of military action in the Third World, including particular emphasis on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a possible paradigm-shift to an even more adventurous policy. The book concludes by offering some thoughts on future trends in Soviet involvement as well as possible US responses to such maneuvers. It is well-organized and cleanly written throughout, setting out factually and impartially the Soviet record in the developing countries. The authors refrain from discussing US response along the complicated road from 1945 to the present, as that would have been beyond the scope of their work.

The most convincing section of the book is contained in the final two chapters, where Hosmer and Wolfe discuss possible future trends in the Third World and propose several US responses. The authors convincingly point out factors that suggest increased Soviet adventurism (improvements in Soviet power projec-

tion capabilities, changes in the balance of power, experience and infrastructure, cooperative intervention with surrogates, rising radicalism and instability in the Third World, and the validation of Soviet Great-Power credentials). The factors that might tend to diminish Soviet Third World involvement are also covered well, including economic constraints, US policies and actions, and diverging interests, among others. Overall, the authors believe that Soviet policy will continue to be aggressively opportunistic—willing to take advantage of situations that arise, but not part of some master plan for world domination. This is a thesis supported both by historical fact and current information.

In terms of US response, the authors offer a four-point prescription:

- Demonstrate US interests early and convincingly.
- Maintain credibility of possible US escalation.
- Recognize limitations of linkage.
- Emphasize crisis management and anticipatory involvement.

Clearly, these are all sound judgments. The more interesting and difficult question, however, is one upon which Hosmer and Wolfe do not touch: How does a government *convince the public* to endorse such demanding and possibly dangerous policies, particularly in the post-Vietnam period? This is at the heart of the current controversy surrounding US responses to external force

involvement in Central America. The answer, of course, is informing the public of the seriousness of the threat and the need for strong response by the United States. *Soviet Policy and Practice toward Third World Conflicts* is one such effort to bring such information before the public. By illustrating the complexities of Soviet policy and attitudes, Hosmer and Wolfe have made a significant contribution to the continuing debate over the meaning and response to Soviet adventurism in the developing world.

JAMES STAVRIDIS

Lieutenant Commander, US Navy

Markey, Edward J. *Nuclear Peril*. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1983. 183pp. \$14.95

In *Nuclear Peril*, Congressman Edward J. Markey (D., Mass.), an opponent of both nuclear energy and nuclear weapons, inadvertently reveals a remarkable degree of political opportunism. A critic of nuclear energy during the late 1970s when the Three Mile Island incident made such criticism fashionable, an advocate of non-proliferation in the early 1980s when India's Tarapur and Iraq's Osirak made that an attractive issue once again, and a promoter of a nuclear freeze when public interest was mounting, Markey has always focused on the particular nuclear issue receiving public attention and appears to have the most political potency.

Perhaps to demonstrate consistency, but more likely to demonstrate leadership in the nuclear area,