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"Who Dares Wins: the Special Air Service, 1950 to the Falklands," and "SBS: The Invisible Raiders"

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as most un-Italian; with some British students of fascist Italy, for whom wit and sarcasm pass for scholarly inquiry; with those political scientists whose passion for such abstractions as "totalitarianism" has caused them to stuff Mussolini into ill-fitting analytical pigeonholes; and finally, with Italian Marxists, who peer at Mussolini through Leninist lenses and see the errand boy of faceless, capitalist big shots.

In 1939 and 1940, Knox contends, in North Africa and in the attack on Greece, Mussolini demonstrated that his goals were not so different from those of his brutal and convenient friend to the north. Piggybacking on the successes of a resurgent Germany, Mussolini in 1940, launched his long-pondered assault on the Mediterranean position of the Western imperial powers. *Il Duce's* expansionist urge, Knox argues, was no less dynamic than Hitler's quest for *lebensraum*; and like the German dictator's attack on Poland in 1939, Mussolini's decision for war in 1940 derived from his own vision, not from domestic social or political pressures: he wasn't pushed, he jumped.

Thus Knox convincingly differs with the fashionable "social imperialism" thesis, which argues that modern states as disparate as Great Britain, the United States and Argentina go to war principally as a means of allaying domestic unrest. If Mussolini's ambitions for Italy and himself ended in disaster, it was not for want of trying. For instance, the Italian Navy entered the war with

113 submarines, the largest such force in the world, save the Soviet Union's.

Knox doesn't attempt to make Mussolini's regime an Italian version of Nazi Germany. The vital distinction between them was that Hitler sought world mastery; Mussolini was content with an Italian nationalist utopia.

This is not only an important book. Written with verve and wit, it is also delightful to read. "Hitler's foreign policy and military subordinates," Knox says, "rushed about like eager spaniels, each bearing the Führer a bone." A rather startling characterization for the likes of Ribbentrop and Jodl, but very apt indeed.

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Geraghty, Tony. *Who Dares Wins the Special Air Service, 1950 to the Falklands*. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1983. 320pp. £11.95

Ladd, James D. *SBS: The Invisible Raiders*. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1982. 283pp. £10.95

The origins and accomplishments of the Special Air Service and Special Boat Service are obscure and often the subject of violent polemics by both supporters and detractors. Supporters feel that these two organizations are useful silent servants of the state. Detractors assert that they are rogue elephants and a collection of neofascist thugs. Supporters argue that the SAS and SBS are vitally necessary to undertake missions unsuited to the capabilities of regular

forces while opponents believe that these elite formations in fact accomplish little and are more trouble than they are worth.

Tony Geraghty's history of the SAS and James D. Ladd's study of the SBS are popular histories. Both authors admire their subjects and do not seriously question the *raison d'être* of these special formations. Moreover, there are numerous gaps in the narrative. For example neither author provides much coherent data concerning special operations in Northern Ireland, and Ladd's work is especially difficult to read because of its poor writing style and overly episodic treatment of the subject matter.

Both books on the other hand are useful. They do provide information on the origins of the SAS and SBS. They offer concise descriptions of many SAS and SBS operations and describe in some detail current methods of recruitment and training. They do not, of course, answer the broader questions concerning the proper roles and ultimate value of such forces but they do at least provide some hard evidence for an informed judgment.

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Rings, Werner. *Life with the Enemy: Collaboration and Resistance in Hitler's Europe 1939-1945*. New York: Doubleday, 1982. 351pp. \$17.95

Why a book on collaboration? Because even if collaboration is an issue often skirted, it happened. It is

easy to write on the romance of resistance, but collaboration with the enemy normally is buried because of memories of betrayal and shame brought about by fellow countrymen. Werner Rings tries to explain what happened after the Germans conquered Europe in World War II.

The German occupation of Europe brought out the best and the worst of each nation's population. The question, "do I collaborate or resist?" was easily answered by a lot of people, as can be seen by the decisions to collaborate made by many in Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, France, Poland, and the other countries. Indeed, at first there was a general readiness to collaborate.

Rings paints superb pictures of opportunists, such as Quisling, the Norwegian; Mussert, the Dutchman; Degrelle, the Belgian; and others who attempted vainly to convince the Germans that they indeed embraced the goals of Nazism and the ideals embodied by the Party.

According to Rings, there were four types of collaboration. The first, the neutral or "I conform" type, arose from an acceptance by the individual that because of circumstances he could not change things. In the second type, or "unconditional collaboration," the individual totally accepted the enemy's principles and ideals. The third type, "conditioned collaboration," occurred when the individual only endorsed *some* Nazi principles and cooperated accordingly. The fourth type of collaboration was "tactical." Here an individual collaborated despite his hatred