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They "sensed that they had an unwritten contract with the Navy and their officers."

by
Hugh Nott*

Mason, Theodore. *Battleship Sailor*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982. 271pp. $14.95

More than forty years ago, on 7 December 1941, high above the explosions and flames convulsing Battleship Row in Pearl Harbor, 19-year-old Radioman Third Class Ted Mason had a ringside seat for the stunning event that would commit himself and his entire generation of Americans to four years of savage war. From his battle station in the maintop of the USS *California*, helplessly exposed to the strafing runs of attacking Japanese aircraft, the young sailor watched the tragic debacle he had not known would, or could, happen. The boyish Mason was luckier than many of his *California* shipmates who were sealed in the main radio spaces below armored hatches, deliberately designed to be inoperable from below when Condition Zed was set. Several of his closest friends and his admired chief radioman supervisor, awarded a posthumous Medal of Honor, did not survive.

This vividly recalled account, four decades later, mixes recrimination with anguish and serves to remind us that the young Navy enlisted men who lived and died that momentous Sunday morning may have felt as much outrage against their leaders, who had not planned, as against the Japanese, who had. In a somewhat vague but personal and collective way, Mason and his battleship colleagues had sensed that they had an unwritten contract with the Navy and their officers. In exchange for their obedience, loyalty, and second-class shipboard citizenship, subject to stern regulations and sometimes harsh discipline, they believed their more privileged

Captain Nott died on 2 January. This review is the last of the many contributions he made to the Naval War College.

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seniors would take care of them. They considered themselves well-trained which, to certain standards, they were. They thought their ponderous battlewagons to be invincible and they assumed their Navy leadership was wise and ready. Abruptly, in two terrible hours, the carefree younger sailors discovered what their older, more experienced petty officers must have known. Their combat readiness was a sham—masked hy spit and polish. Many ready-service ammunition boxes were locked, thick paint burned like giant torches, air defense capabilities were nonexistent in port, and there was no early warning system or prudent offshore reconnaissance. Pearl Harbor had been regarded as safe and secure when it was neither.

Amid the towering columns of oily smoke and the spectacular fireworks of exploding magazines, the young radioman felt shattered and betrayed. Obviously more articulate and perhaps more perceptive than his fellow sailors, he clearly understood that the "old Navy" he had known only briefly was disappearing forever.

This is not a bitter, vindictive, or even particularly introspective book, however. The author, now a successful California journalist and writer, has opted for a nostalgic approach and, oddly, *Battleship Sailor* thereby becomes an important book.

It is important precisely because of the view through a young sailor's eyes, a view rarely contemplated by the endless historians and analysts who have recounted the events leading up to 7 December 1941. Unabashedly frank and delightfully fresh, Mason re-creates the world of the youthful pre-war sailors, swaggering along the waterfront streets of Pacific Fleet liberty ports. Everything is here—the gaudy bars and fleshpots, the sailors' girls, the amusement parks that once served as pick-up spots. The laughing white-hats, with their "look after your huddy" camaraderie, recognized they were different from civilians and they savored the difference.

The photographs from 1940 and 1941, highlighting the text, are delicious and so are the captions. One picture, for example, is of the notorious Shanghai Red Cafe in San Pedro, lahelled as a famous trouble spot. That, of course, was a principal attraction. The sailors who craved trouble after weeks of shipboard regimentation knew where they could find it. In San Francisco, Seattle, and Long Beach, "The Fleet's In" were words to conjure with, and author Mason recalls this magic with verve, taste, and compassion.

Battleship Sailor is that rarity—the personal but thoughtful reminiscences of a young and reasonably typical sailor, evoking the color and flavor of that pre-war era. Inevitably, despite its different autohiographical genre, the book will be compared to *From Here to Eternity*, if only because of the similar enlisted slants and 1941 Hawaii scenes. Actually, the two books have far more in common than Hotel Street bars, flower-scented evenings, brawling servicemen, and officer-enlisted caste systems.

James Jones' soldiers *thought* and so do Ted Mason's sailors. More pointedly, so do today's enlisted men and their judgments are profound.

Without any question, Theodore Mason has gotten behind the carefully shaped white hats cuffed back on sailors' heads to expose the first artful wave of hair. *Battleship Sailor* is recommended professional reading for every naval officer who wants to understand the men who put their lives in his hands.

Winslow, W.G. *The Fleet the Gods Forgot: The U.S. Asiatic Fleet in World War II.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982. 327pp. $21.95

Captain Winslow's book documents the demise of the Asiatic Fleet at the onset of World War II. It is a history of inglorious tactical failures and planning shortfalls dramatically contrasted with accounts of personal courage, determination, and heroic achievements by men fighting against overwhelming odds.

The Fleet the Gods Forgot, unlike most World War II histories, is not a single story chronologically following the progress of a battle plan towards its objective. It is a collection of accounts about various units of this ill-fated fleet which, though undeniably interrelated, are each disrinctly different, not separate facets of a more complex battle plan. This is because the Asiatic Fleet could not afford to exercise tactical options after the commencement of hostilities. It was reduced to reacting to Japanese initiatives and trying to execute a less than organized withdrawal to safer waters. Consequently, there was no overall battle plan for this story to follow.

Part I, Operations, provides a thumbnail sketch of the fleet, the tactical environment, the numerous commanders and pretenders to command, the allied forces in the theater, and a brief description of the performance of each component by ship type and air units. Part II, Battle Reports, is a collection of sixteen separate stories which detail heroism and adventure unparalleled by fiction.

The most salient quality of this book is its relevance to today's situation in the Western Pacific. The number of parallels is so remarkable it is alarming. The overage and overcommitted Asiatic Fleet operated in waters now patrolled by the Seventh Fleet. While the average age of Seventh Fleet ships today is considerably less than that of Admiral Hart's ships in 1941, today's technology brings on obsolescence more rapidly. The expansion of Seventh Fleet operations to include a continuing presence in the Indian Ocean since late 1979 has left current assets stretched to near the limit of material and logistic endurance. Recognizing the additional commitments which would befall the Asiatic Fleet if the world situation continued to deteriorate Admiral Richardson, Commander-in-Chief, US Fleet in 1940, scheduled a substantial reinforcement including an aircraft carrier, three cruisers, and numerous lesser vessels. By May of 1941, however, the reinforcement was reduced to the addition of twenty-three fleet submarines. Today the need to reconstitute our naval strength is well recognized. The shipbuilding program being championed by Secretary Lehman will go a long way to ease the burden of the Seventh Fleet—*if* this ambitious program can be completed.

The problems of the Asiatic Fleet went far beyond having too few ships and their struggle to maintain an acceptable material condition. The command and control organization was inadequate for the rigors of war. The surface combatants were under a task force commander who was unable to amass a force in one place adequate to confront the enemy, the submarines were directed from the fleet commander's headquarters, and the patrol squadrons were separately controlled by their own unit commander. To make matters worse, if they were to understand what other friendly units were doing these subordinate commanders had to illegally copy and decode each other's message traffic. After the opening of hostilities, reorganization of the fleet and attempts at

integration with allied forces generated much confusion concerning who was in command of the various fleet units. The same ships were assigned concurrently to the command of more than one admiral, leading to enormous problems. Additionally, the staffs were not prepared to coordinate the efforts of widely separate units. Information was obtained but not passed to ships in need of it. Orders were prepared but not transmitted until after they were to have been executed.

There are many lessons here which are still unlearned. Today, aircraft carriers and surface combatants in the Seventh Fleet are assigned to the operational command of the Battle Force Commander, CTF 70. The surface combatants are concurrently administratively assigned to CTF 75, Commander Surface Combatant Force, who assumes operational command when the ships are not tasked to a carrier battle group. These transitions are clear and unambiguous in most cases. Submarines remain under the operational control of Commander Submarine Force, CTF 74, with the fleet commander's headquarters. Patrol aircraft tasking is coordinated through the Patrol Wing Commander, CTF 72. Additionally, logistics force requirements are controlled through the Service Force Commander, CTF 73, and amphibious forces through their own commander, CTF 76. Each of these separate operational forces has its own very heavy load of message traffic. The originaror of any message must consciously decide to address his traffic to other commanders or they will be unaware of his intentions.

The Asiatic Fleet's patrol squadrons of PBY Catalinas were plagued by slow speed and inadequate defense against fighter aircraft. Likewise our current P-3 Orion aircraft, though formidable adversaries for submarines and surface ships, are completely vulnerable to other aircraft.

In July of 1941 the Japanese moved into French Indochina and established naval bases at Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City), Tourane (now Da Nang), and Camranh Bay. This allowed them to maintain and support forces which could strike without warning at any point in or around the South China Sea, including Singapore and Manila (where the Asiatic Fleet was based). Today, the major operating base and repair facility for the Seventh Fleet is at Subic Bay, less than 100 miles from Manila. Here, perhaps the lessons of history have not been ignored. Unfortunately, however, we were not the student. The Soviets are currently operating surface ships, submarines, and land based naval aircraft from Vietnamese bases enjoying all the same advantages once held by the Japanese.

Captain Winslow's work is more than an accurate and important assessment of what went wrong in the Asiatic Fleet. The Battle Reports section includes exciting accounts of desperate operations, personal sacrifice, and thrilling escapes. The evacuation of General MacArthur from the Philippines in Lieutenant (later Rear Admiral) John Bulkeley's PT boats is well known but the less noted escape of Lieutenant Commander (later Rear Admiral) John Morrill with sixteen of his men after the fall of Corregidor is an epic adventure. The much discussed mission of the *Lanikai* has portrayed President Roosevelt trying to find an excuse to declare war. The mission was actually carried out by the armed yacht *Isabel* under Lieutenant J. W. Payne. The story of this hapless little vessel extends long after her surveillance mission and includes the confirmed sinking of a Japanese submarine using

only resourcefulness and a makeshift depth charge rack.

The Fleet the Gods Forgot weaves these many stories into an enlightening account of the operations and accomplishments of the units of the Asiatic Fleet, a fleet which, though it vanished in the opening moments of combat in the Southwest Pacific has been succeeded by today's Seventh Fleet.

JOHN N. PETRIE
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy

Prange, Gordon W. *Miracle at Midway*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982. 469pp. $19.95

There is a necessary "history" to this history. The late Gordon Prange (1910-1980), professor of history at the University of Maryland, reportedly devoted some thirty years of research to the subject of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and its related subjects. In 1969 part of his researches were published as "Tora! Tora! Tora!," a series in the *Reader's Digest*; in somewhat revised form this was published as a book in Japan but not in the United States; and in 1970 it formed the basis of a movie of the same title.

After Prange's death his former students Goldstein and Dillon, acting as his "literary executors," published *At Dawn We Slept; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor*. This book would have been a sensation in 1951 but by 1981 there was litrle in it which remained "untold."

The current *Miracle At Midway* is a nominal sequel to the basic *At Dawn We Slept*, and reportedly the first of a series of sequels to be mined from Prange's research files and a collection of uncompleted typescripts. Toward this end, Prange Enterprises, Inc., had been created to exploit these materials.

Those who have read *At Dawn We Slept* and expect a product of similar quality in *Miracle At Midway* will be progressively disappointed, perplexed, angered, and ultimately disgusted by this miserable potboiler. It is impossible to believe that the two books were writteu by the same person. Whereas the former is a carefully structured and soberly written history of the Pearl Harbor drama, the latter is in a word: dreadful.

It should be enough to point out that at its outset this book fails to establish with any clarity the US Navy's perception of the Japanese threat to Midway as it was gradually pieced together by radio intercepts and cryptanalysis. This is related in marvelous detail in W.J. Holmes' *Double Edged Secrets: US Naval Intelligence Operations In The Pacific During World War II* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979), and this is a title which does *not* appear among the Prange book's references.

With this vital point badly bungled, the text blunders forth to the battle, dragging the reader through a maze of minor errors, major omissions, outrageous demonstrations of ignorance about the characteristics of ships, airplanes and the maritime environment as a whole, all of which is planted in a quagmire of mangled rhetoric.

In sum: this is a badly cobbled attempt to make sense out of a very complex naval operation. The text is badly organized, jerky, disjointed, and otherwise badly written. It is filled wirh clumsy solecisms and ridiculous figures of speech which quickly become irksome; the authors do not know how to permit facts to speak for themselves and hyperbolic rhetoric is repeatedly used to create drum rolls followed by a clash of cymbals; and the text is badly flawed by frequent use of "cute" slangy expressions which are reminiscent of an

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amateur stand-up night club comedian with a very small repertoire. Indeed, too many pages of the book are like an unfinished television script: the text clearly pauses at points where it would seem that canned laughter or applause should be inserted.

Aside from its vexing literary qualities, the book's six wretched maps and the total absence of intelligible diagrams are an insult to any reader's intelligence. One example may suffice: Japan's Midway operation included a number of diversionary sorties, one being a relatively complex operation in Alaskan waters which resulted in the seizure of the islands of Attu and Kiska. There is no map of Alaska or the Aleutian islands. Badly written, the hook is also mindlessly edited. Indeed, the "miracle" of this book is that it got published in its present form.

The person interested in the Battle of Midway will do well to obtain a copy of Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiyas' (translated and edited by Clarke H. Kawakami and Roger Pineau) *Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1955). Although published more than a quarter of a century ago it has been updated and is still available at a current price of $14.95. It will stand forever as a primary source and a "classic" account of the subject, and it is infinitely superior to this hodgepodge of confused verbiage which has been slapped together under the name of Gordon Prange.

RICHARD K. SMITH
Washington, D.C.

Mosley, Leonard. *Marshall: Hero for Our Times*. New York: Hearst Books, 1982. 570pp. $18.50

It is an unfortunate fact that American military figures of the Second World War, on the whole, have not had much said about them that has been both well written and widely read. As so many were reticent professionals who avoided publicity, most Americans are uninformed about our great captains and about their achievements. The public knows far more about American civilian celebrities whose life stories sell books and movies but whose lives have contributed little to our nation's destiny.

There are three exceptions to this thesis: Eisenhower, MacArthur, and Patton. Ike had a wonderfully photogenic face, war correspondents liked him, and he commanded the allied forces that smashed Hitler. He was in every way a hero to Americans, and his popularity carried him to the presidency. MacArthur shamelessly exploited his command position and his flair for drama to manipulate public opinion in his behalf. Patton was simply irrepressible—profane, boisterous, bold, and a winner who made exciting newspaper copy. Halsey was his naval equivalent.

Presiding over these generals and their colleagues (and the entire US Army) was George C. Marshall. Not only did he reign as Chief of Staff during the war, but he also served as Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense in the postwar Truman administrations. Given such positions of influence and responsibility, Marshall deserves not one biography but many. Forrest C. Pogue undertook the only major work years ago and so far has published three volumes, the last in 1973 which took Marshall through victory in Europe. We still await Pogue's sequel covering Marshall's subsequent service.

Meanwhile, a self-proclaimed "anecdotal biography" written by Leonard Mosley has appeared that spans Marshall's life in one volume containing 524 pages of text. The author is a journalist

who writes books in great quantity, some 17 of them in the past 23 years. (Most are biographies of such diverse people as Lindbergh, Hirohito, Goering, and Haile Selassie.) This prodigious production rate averages one book each 16 months, hardly enough time for adequate research, much less time to have it written, edited, produced, and published.

Such biographies are usually hastily contrived, and that unfortunately is the case with *Marshall: Hero for Our Times*. The dust jacket, as a point of departure, seems to be shrilling a lurid novel: "Critics are raving about MARSHALL—a book of drama, love, tears, and action [the jacket blurbs quote authors who should have known better] . . . . It tells the awful truth about his wedding night [Marshall's first wife allegedly was too frail to consummate their marriage, or so says the author with boring repetitiveness] . . . . He had wit, persuasion, and charm—a great deal of charm, as a number of famous and beautiful women discovered [Marshall, like most men, enjoyed the company of attractive, intelligent women]." All of this could have been said briefly once, but the author is so intent on vulgar insinuations that the important aspects of Marshall's life are passed over.

As Marshall was deliberately reticent about his thoughts and feelings, especially towards others, the author resorts to speculation and to fabricating episodes to suit his story line. This literary device is most evident in the author's version of the Marshall-MacArthur rivalry. For example, in an early chapter dealing with the First World War, he writes, "*If* Marshall had any particular feelings about MacArthur when he joined the staff at Chaumont, they *could have been* only admiration for his soldiery skills and *perhaps* envy at the opportunities to lead men in battle which MacArthur had been given and he had been denied." (Reviewer's italics.) Such attempts at mind reading are distressingly self-evident. What the author is admitting to is a lack of evidence as to how Marshall regarded MacArthur beyond his public statements that MacArthur was a good general.

Given all this, the book's greatest defect is that it says so little about what Marshall did that was important in his service to the nation. How, for example, did Marshall even become Chief of Staff? His prewar record seems undistinguishable from most other colonels toiling in the same period. In the early 1930s, he organized a regional Civilian Conservation Corps and then commanded the Illinois National Guard. His promotion to brigadier general in 1936 coincided with the departure of MacArthur as Chief of Staff, who presumably had begrudged Marshall. After two years of remote duty in Vancouver, Washington, he came to Washington, D.C. as Chief of War Plans and soon became Deputy Chief of Staff. His greatest achievement, the author suggests, was his direction of Pershing's funeral arrangements.

Upon the retirement of Malin Craig, Roosevelt elevated Brigadier General Marshall to the office of Chief of Staff on 1 September 1939. What had Marshall done to deserve such a dramatic promotion—from colonel to four-star general in three years? The author alludes to cronyism and political intrigue as the path to career advancement for Marshall and others. How unfair. Perhaps, to a degree, that was the way the Army worked in the years just before the war. But certainly Marshall must have contributed significantly as a professional soldier, and that achievement and not careerism led to his ascendancy. Marshall's talents as an organizer, teacher,

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strategist, planner, thinker—in other words, the personal traits it took to be a great military leader—remain untold in this book.

Marshall's colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the men with whom he made the grand strategy that won the war, are also misrepresented and misunderstood. The JCS Chairman, William D. Leahy, is vaguely described as "the fourth member of the JCS." Ernest J. King is misidentified as the "Navy Chief of Staff" (sic) and also as "Commander in Chief of U.S. Navy Operations" (sic). The author's careless disregard as to who did what is intensely irritating to those who value accuracy. King, so says the author, commanded a flotilla of destroyers in the First World War (he commanded a division of submarines after the war); the Bureau of Aeronautics is identified as the "Air Division Command"; and the author's assertion that King had made carrier landings on the USS *Lexington* is fabrication. Such inaccuracies, while not major in themselves, are nevertheless typical of the author's sloppy research. (The author in this same passage managed to distort King's womanizing into an innuendo against naval officers and their wives that was so demeaning that this reviewer was tempted to relegate the book to the circular file then and there.)

The author begs the question of Marshall's role in history by simply quoting accolades from others as prima facie evidence that Marshall was a great man. Hence there is every reason to believe that the author is unsure of what Marshall actually did. The result is a shallow biography of superficial anecdotes devoid of either interpretation or analysis. The writing style matches the contents: the text is burdened both with slang (the Japanese are described as "bayonet-waving bullies" with "greedy eyes") and absurd metaphors (bad news from the Middle East "came limping in," and American advisors in North Africa "were as useful in solving the problems of the French in Algiers as goldfish in a bowl of piranhas").

Enough. This is a wretched book, steeped in trivialities, its veracity discredited, hastily slapped together to exploit Marshall's name for uncritical public consumption. The pity is that gullible readers will swallow it whole. Military biography is cursed with journalists who write what they think the public will buy and who have only the dimmest awareness of the people they write about. Public understanding of the military profession has become a hopeless proposition.

THOMAS B. BUELL
Wayzata, Minnesota

Editors Note: The George C. Marshall Research Foundation is in the process of publishing *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*. The first volume, "*The Soldierly Spirit*," *December 1880-June 1939*, edited by Larry I. Bland and Sharon R. Ritenour was published by the Johns Hopkins University Press in 1981.

Coffey, Thomas M. *HAP: The Story of the U.S. Air Force and the Man Who Built it, General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold.* New York: Viking Press, 1982. 416pp. $19.95

As the book's jacket claims that it is the definitive biography of General Henry H. Arnold (it is the only one, aside from Arnold's autobiography, *Global Mission*), the author's qualifications are therefore significant. Thomas Coffey was once himself a pilot in the force Arnold commanded. Since the war, he has made an impressive career as a journalist, a drama and movie critic, and a writer of television scripts and books. Of course, the fact that the book is well written and readable and that the author

himself was once qualified in Arnold's vocation do not mean that Coffey is not capable of producing a *scholarly* biography. Nor do they mean that he is.

The nature of Coffey's book is conditioned by his selection of sources. His bibliography is impressive enough. He conducted many interviews himself and used many others done by the Albert Simpson Historical Research Center and Columbia University. As Coffey builds conflict into the story by setting up the Navy as the domestic nemesis of Arnold and his air arm, it is significant that nowhere do we find any mention of interviews with the Navy survivors or any significant documentation arising from sources favorable to that side of the budgetary battles of the interwar period. Though most of the primary source collections of the Library of Congress, the Air Force Academy Library, and the Albert Simpson Center (among others) are listed in the bibliography, the footnotes make me think that Coffey was much more reliant on the memories of his interviewees and on the secondary sources than he was on the collections. One suspects that he dipped into the latter here and there, and relied on published works for the reconstruction of the main part of the story. Had he done more with the documentary collections it might have resulted in a better balanced book (even without inputs from Navy sources or foreign archives). As it is, he depends much too heavily on the recollections of family members and old friends speaking long, long after the events they describe.

Further, the documentation style itself deprives the book of the label "definitive biography." When Coffey does cite a letter from one of the actors to another, for example, he seldom gives its location. A letter from Spaatz to Arnold, without a date or location given, could be found almost anywhere among 115,000 items in the Spaatz Collection, somewhere in the Arnold Collection, among the Eaker papers (as he was a close friend of both), or maybe even in the National Archives. Consequently, Coffey's research cannot be duplicated in many of its dimensions and its utility to historians is therefore severely limited. Finally, two of the classical sources on the subject are conspicuous by their absence from the footnotes though one does appear in the bibliography: first, the *United States Strategic Bombing Survey* and, second, W.F. Craven and James L. Cate, *The Army Air Forces in World War II*. In many, many cases Coffey is satisfied to cite the suspect recollections of primary actors when he could just as well have buttressed their testimony with the USSBS or Craven and Cate. If then, the biography of General Arnold cannot be classified as a scholarly one, could it possibly have some other utility?

The story of Hap Arnold might well be worthwhile for the popular market as entertainment or inspiration or general information—provided it did not do violence to the truth as it *would* appear in a "definitive" biography. Here Coffey comes closer to the mark. His writing style is lively and readable. He gives the work the appearance of impartiality by highlighting some of the defects of his hero—his irascibility, his failure to take care of his body, his neglect of his family in favor of his career, his ruthlessness, the apparent failure of his nerve early in his flying career, and the seemingly temporary alienations between Arnold and his wife. Thus, Coffey *does* deal with the warts and it is hard to say whether he does so effectively because the judgment in the end must be a subjective one. For the general reader there is enough gossip, adventure and conflict to make the story move—perhaps the conflict is overdone,

however, for Arnold (as Coffey admits) was no Mitchell. If the entertainment value is there, does the interpretation square with the main lines of airpower history as it is now understood—or are the variances satisfactorily explained?

Though Coffey clearly does accept uncritically the standard Air Corps assumption that those who did not wear wings were generally old "fogeys" and reactionaries, for the most part he avoids the controversial issues of the history of interwar and Second World War airpower. Notwithstanding the jacket's assertion that this is "The Story of the U.S. Air Force and the Man Who Built it," it is much more the story of the man than it is a tale of the air arm. Though Coffey has most of his facts about airpower history straight, all of it is fairly well known already and if the reader's goal is to enhance his knowledge in that field, he would do better to look elsewhere.

If the reader is interested in the study of military leadership, *HAP* is of some worth. Though it relies very heavily on Arnold's own *Global Missions* and the testimony of his three sons, there is enough to constitute an impressionistic portrait of his character. He was irascible. He was impatient. He was ambitious, perhaps excessively so—if one is to believe the testimony of some of his rivals. He was not the world's most impressive family man. But perhaps he *was* the sort of leader that was required by *that* particular crisis. The World War One air mobilization was a dismal failure—and Arnold, then a colonel in Washington, was on the scene to observe all the mistakes that were made then. Twenty years later, armed with that knowledge, a driving and impatient character, and possessed with enough ruthlessness to do what needed to be done, Arnold may well have been the man for the hour. Dwight Eisenhower in his diaries wondered whether Arnold's closest chum, General Carl Spaatz, had enough toughness for air leadership—but there was no question in Arnold's case. It seems clear from the evidence offered by Coffey that Arnold cannot have been a very nice man to work for, but that he got the job done. The organization of the Army's air arm for World War Two *was* far superior to that of the earlier war. He was the organizer; fortunately he had some lieutenants who were possessed with entirely different personalities much better suited for the employment of the instruments that Arnold built.

HAP is not a major contribution to the history of airpower; it is an interesting case study in one possible style of leadership that proved successful in an emergency setting where the main problem was quickly organizing and building a force to fight a major war. In short, taken with a grain of salt, *HAP* can provide an entertaining evening of reading but it is *not* a definitive work.

DR. DAVID R. METS
Troy State University, Florida Region

Bloodworth, Dennis. *The Messiah and the Mandarins: Mao Tse-tung and the Ironies of Power.* New York: Atheneum, 1982. 331pp. $15.95

Statesmen and literary figures are subject to constant reevaluation by posterity. The process begins immediately after their deaths and, in the case of giants, goes on for centuries. Usually, these ratings are at their highest in the immediate years following their demise. Then, there is a decline followed by almost cyclical fluctuations. In the case of Mao, this has not been true. Almost simultaneously at his death in 1976, the revisionists took over in obvious reaction

to the feckless adulation that had been Mao's in the years of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Even before Mao's death, revisionists in Beijing and, of course, Moscow were hard at work; revisionism took longer to reach the West—some felt in the seventies that there were more Maoists in Cambridge (Massachusetts and England) than in Beijing.

Moscow's first try at Mao's reputation came before his death. In 1973, *The Vladimirov Diary* appeared, purporting to be the diary of a *Tass* correspondent and Comintern agent in Yenan from 1942 to 1945. The diary described Mao as crude, lazy, and a coward. The book was later published in New York by Doubleday despite a warning from retired Foreign Service Officer John Service, who had been in Yenan for part of the time, that the diary might not be authentic.

No such question seems to have been brought against the report of another Soviet agent, a German, Otto Braun. His book appeared originally in East Germany in 1973 (American edition is 1982), *A Comintern Agent in China*. Braun served with the Chinese Communist Party from 1932 to 1939, and he is frank to say that his memoirs "are a weapon in the political struggle against Maoism which ought to help unmask the Maoist distortions of history."

The posthumous attack on Mao has sparked internecine warfare among China watchers, some of whom have found their pre-1976 words of praise for Mao to sound a bit awkward today. Leading the charge against the friends of Mao has been Pierre Rykmans, a Belgian arr historian of long residence in China who writes under the name of Simon Leys. He first published *The Emperor's New Clothes* in Europe in 1971 (no English translation appeared until 1977, which tells something of Maoist strength among US and UK China watchers) because of his "dismay and horror" that the media in the West were keeping the public ignorant of the truth of the madness of the Cultural Revolution (at about that time, I was assured by a young Swedish socialist that "all countries" should have a Cultural Revolution in their futures). Later (1974 in France, 1977 in the United States), Leys published *Chinese Shadows* which wounded yet more of his fellow watchers. But it was in an article in *The Times Literary Supplement* of 6 March 1981, that Leys moved in for the kill. Under the title "All Change among the China-watchers," Leys strafed Ross Terrill's biography, *Mao,* torpedoed Han Su Yin (she "seldom lets her intelligence, experience and information interfere with her writing," particularly in her two-volume biography of Mao, *Wind in the Tower* and *The Morning Deluge)* and bombed Edward Friedman for his 1980 discovery that there had indeed been atrocities committed by the Red Guards ten or so years previously. Mr. Friedman, a staffer of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, incautiously counter-attacked in the 12 June *TLS,* forgetting that on his flank were words on Mao that he had written in the seventies: "Mao by the example of his struggle communicates the vigour of hope, the vitality of possibility, the vision of justice. Mao's message to the 20th century is elegantly simple: what should be can be." (in *Mao Tse-tung in the Scales of History,* edited by Dick Wilson, 1977.)

These battles of the lamp now have a new contender in the lists, Dennis Bloodworth. He has been the London *Observer's* man in the Far East for over 25 years. By himself or with his wife, Ching Ping, he has written five books on Asian affairs that have been marked by accuracy, common sense, and good humor. This volume is not a straight

biography of Mao nor a book on the China scene today. Rather it is an attempt to show "an extraordinary paradox, matching the magnitude of Mao's achievement against the enormity of his errors."

Bloodworth follows the course of the Chinese revolution (a revolution that begins at the latest in 1912), but keeps the focus on Mao. Throughout Bloodworth insists on the "Chineseness" of Mao, a view that would seem risky in describing a man who professed himself to be first and foremost a Marxist-Leninist. Bloodworth helps make his point though by repeated references to two traditional Chinese books that had the greatest of impact on Mao. The first is *Water Margin* (the English translation by Pearl Buck is called *All Men Are Brothers*). This is a 14th-century Chinese Robin Hood tale that has long been a model of Chinese rebellion against the ills of society. The second book is *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms* (English translation by C.H. Bewitt-Taylor, published in Tokyo in 1959), a swashbuckling story of strategy and war set in the third century, but written in the 13th century when China had been conquered by the Mongols.

Mao referred to these books continually throughout his long life. He would use allusions and illustrations from them to admonish, exhort, instruct, and pacify his associates and enemies. This practice is common in China where literary, scholarly, or theatrical references are used by public figures in daily intercourse (one imagines Secretary James Watt invoking Birnham Wood or Dunsinane in explaining a new forest policy). What is important in Mao's case is that rebels are glorified in these books—rebels and guerrillas. One of the earliest of Western commentators on China, Thomas Taylor Meadows, wrote in 1856 that the Chinese were the most rebellious and least revolutionary people in the world. This difference is set forth very clearly in Albert Camus' *The Rebel*—the rebel is struggling against concrete injustice, the revolutionary against the total system that includes the injustice. Meadows saw the Chinese as only the former, Mao certainly thought himself the latter. But having beaten the system as a revolutionary, did he then revert to rebel and try to hamstring, by the Cultural Revolution, the very system he had played such a vital role in founding? Bloodworth concludes "he was a very *Chinese* hero" who "was the right man at the right moment, but if he was not born before his time, he did not die before it either."

The definitive work on Mao may be as much as a century away, but for the here-and-now, Bloodworth has given us a study that should stand alongside Stuart Schram's *Mao Tse-tung* (first published in 1966) and Benjamin Schwartz's *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (first issued in 1951) in delineating the line between Mao, the Communist, and Mao, the Chinese. In so doing, Bloodworth has given us a good antidote to the fatuous nonsense of Mao worship that the trendy boys of the academic world were trying to feed us in the sixties and seventies.

J. K. HOLLOWAY
Naval War College

Cadoux, C. John. *The Early Christian Attitude to War*. Somers, Conn.: Seabury Press, 1982. 304pp. $7.95

This book is a Golden Oldie. Subtitled "A Contribution to the History of Christian Ethics," it was first published in 1919 by its author, late MacKennal Professor of Church History, Oxford, in the wake of the first World War. Its reprinting today helps to meet the rising

demand for reputable scholarly material on the morality of war, a demand heightened by growing public anxiety over the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Cadoux's book will be of particular interest to those today who believe that there is too much attention given to moral questions raised by particular weapon systems, however fearsome, and not enough to what lies behind them—the moral and physical evil entailed by war itself.

In preparing his book, Cadoux dug through all the writings of the Fathers of the early Church as well as the New Testament, collecting every significant passage bearing directly or indirectly on the question as to whether it is right or wrong for professing Christians to engage in or to support war. Cadoux terminates his investigation with the Emperor Constantine's adoption of Christianity as a lawful religion, following his vision of the Cross before the battle of the Milvian Bridge (312 A.D.). Thus Augustine, who was born only 17 years after Constantine's death, is excluded by this limitation, and thereby his distinction between the Order of Grace and the Order of Necessity which laid the foundations of later Christian just war theory.

Cadoux believes that the textual evidence comes down heavily on the side of the proposition that the authoritative voices of the early Church considered war, offensive and defensive (and this includes military service), as contrary both to the spirit and the letter of Christian teaching. His method is scrupulously fair. He reproduces nearly all the major relevant texts, suppresses none unfavorable to his thesis, and lets the reader judge their purport with only modest (though firm) commentary by way of personal interpretation. From an inductive standpoint, his case is strong where the pre-Constantinian Fathers are concerned. There was fairly general agreement among the early Fathers (Lactantius, Tertullian, and Origen prominent among them) that participation in wars by Christians was contradictory to the premises of the Christian religion as set forth in the New Testament—although as early as the reign of Marcus Aurelius (161-180 A.D.) Christians in small numbers were entering military service.

Cadoux's argument is less convincing when he deals with the New Testament writings themselves, particularly with the words and attitude of Jesus and his apostle Paul. A rereading of the New Testament can do little more than indicate that Jesus was noncommittal on the subject of war. His kingdom was not of this earth, as his apparent unconcern with the historical events of his time confirm. Of his disciples, that is, those in his immediate circle, he expected and exacted obedience. This we must assume included literal obedience to the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount in which peacemakers were blessed and those who would be his disciples urged to turn the other cheek. As for this world, one must make the best of it while it lasts, make prudent use of one's gifts, whether in money or taleut, and pay one's taxes to constituted authority. Paul's letters confirm his Master's position with unequivocal emphasis on the need to respect civil authority which is "from God." Paul neither asserts nor denies that participation in war is forbidden to the followers of Christ. One reason for this may be that Jews were exempt from Roman military service, and the earliest Christians were considered Jewish sectaries. Thus the question of military participation did not arise, since Rome could get all the legionaries she needed by voluntary enlistment elsewhere.

Cadoux argues that the nonviolence and nonresistance teaching of Jesus entails though it does not explicitly state that war is morally evil and that no true Christian should have anything to do with it. The Augustinian-Lutheran tradition later replied in effect, "Of course! If the world consisted of true Christians, good people! But it does not. Therefore in certain circumstances the State has the right to secure its *bene esse* hy force, including military force, and to exact military service of its members." The Thomist position, though more circumspect, is not dissimilar.

No one can dispute Cadoux's perception that a crucial shift in Christian teaching on war occurred after Constantine made Christianity his religion. He draws from this fact the conclusion that Christianity therehy lost an important part of its original doctrine of peace. But the premise of this argument cuts two ways. Early Christians set themselves apart; they held no political power and thus felt little responsibility for the welfare and security of the State, an earthly entity they believed would soon disappear. Paul was shrewd enough to see the danger in this and admonished the Christian communities concerning their duties to civil authority. But once Christians came into political power, they inherited the responsibility of securing the welfare of the State which at times required the use of force, including military force. That this force was all too often sadly misused in centuries to come no one would deny. But that the proper use of this force is inherently iniquitous, therefore interdicted to professing Christians, is harder to prove.

They are on firmer ground today who maintain that the ethical question lies not so much in the fact of war *per se*, hut in the purposes for which it is waged and the means used to achieve those ends—means which even the dullest of just war theorists remind us must not he disproportionate to whatever good may be intended.

J.G. BRENNAN
Naval War College

Brayton, Ahhott A. and Landwehr, Stephana J. *The Politics of War and Peace: A Survey of Thought*. Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1981. 294pp. $20.50 paper $11.50

At a time when the nation is critically examining its defense policies and organization, a review of the politics of war and peace can be most helpful. Authors Brayton and Landwehr selected carefully from 3,500 years of writing on peace, war, politics, and ethics, seeking important changes in the conduct of war. Each writer is allowed to speak for himself in order that readers have access to original sources in making their own judgments. A brief introduction and assessment of each writer's historical significance precedes the selection.

To frame the prohlem, General Andrew Goodpaster asks in the foreword, "What, for example, are the desires and needs—within and among men, within and among nations—that give rise to war? What is the essential nature of war? Of peace? Under what conditions and within what limits can war be justified? How do the men and institutions engaged in war, or held ready for war, relate to the society and the nation to which they belong? What goals and *whose* goals can war serve? What goals *should* it serve? How far could these goals be better served by peace, and in what ways could this be accomplished? What shared values on a worldwide scale . . . fall under the shadow of the threat of war, and how can that threat be contained, while the

values themselves are preserved and protected?"

Modern society, the beneficiary of many intellectual and technological gifts, seems no more capable than the ancients of achieving a jusr peace. Plato and the other early philosophers logically presumed most war to be evil. They developed criteria to illusrrate the differences between the just and the unjust war in the belief that war should serve as a political instrument only when justice demanded it.

Medieval philosophers tried to distinguish between the civilian and the soldier and to place limitations on war within two emerging schools of thought.

The first school contrasted the contractual and the organic views of the state. The contractual notion, conducive to democratic values, expected all citizens to perform a wartime role; in the organic state all citizens must serve as their inherent duty, especially during war. Both groups helped shape the notion of a mass national army which in time supplanted the small professional or mercenary armies.

The second school of thought examined the growth of technology in the medieval era and the vastly increased firepower and lethality of war. Both schools shaped the modern era of massive force, total war, and the risk of extermination.

The modern era added other views at both extremes of war and peace, some extremist with sweeping concepts and goals, others reducing the issues to shallow slogans, both unreasonable and unworkable and, in the authors' view, sometimes contributing to the outbreak of war.

Peace through the ages was and has been preserved by constant striving for and maintenance of a balance of power between sovereignties. Yet military professionals often forget the importance of striving for peace to preserve the balance; some are mere technicians who resist intellectual inquiry and ignore the vital lessons of history. Some academic counterparts see war as the ultimate injustice, whatever the result. Understanding the causes of war requires time, study, experience, common sense, and a knowledge of the past which created the present. Such is the path to wisdom and compassion so vital for mankind's advance beyond barbarism and toward a better civilization.

The survey of thought from ancient to modern times is quite well done. The selections are short, pithy, well integrated, and offer excellent source material for further study. Several noted philosophers are included whose works are not often considered in relation to the politics of war and peace. Their inclusion, however, magnifies the major flaw, the absence of prominent military strategists and philosophers, particularly of the current era. *The Politics of War and Peace* should include thoughts of war as well as peace. The Clausewitz selection is from a poor translation and not well chosen. But where is Mahan or Mackinder, Beaufre or Brodie, Howard or Liddell Hart, Millis or Kissinger, or (to include our home-grown scholars) Eccles and Wylie? If the quote of General Goodpaster above suggests anything, surely these thinkers have much to offer and their absence is strange indeed.

PAUL R. SCHRATZ
Annapolis, Maryland

Alger, John I. *The Quest for Victory; the History of the Principles of War.* Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982. 318pp. $29.95

The very nature of war is at stake in the subtitle of this book. Common sense

and Clausewitz combine to tell us that war is essentially two-sided, interactive, dialectical: there is, obviously, more than one side to it, and both sides will have their mistakes, omissions, blunders, and strategies.

Why, then, have intelligent military men persisted for decades in the gross blunder of calling "principles of war" what are, at best, selected principles of strategy? No one seems to know; therefore we speculate boldly but tentatively.

The misnomer of "principles of war" articulates, enshrines, and seeks to legitimate the solipsism or self-centeredness of the American way of war, which is well known to be long on applications of materiel and short on sophisticated foreign policy. To be fair, one must recognize that self-centeredness is the path of least resistance, for it is difficult to think through in a practical way the process of strategic interaction and to base one's own strategy on the unpredictable dialectic which defines the course of any real war. It is easier to get on with the options, especially those involving physical rather than moral assets, available to one's side. Moreover, the so-called principles of war appeal to the adherents of Jomini. For these "principles" exclude the national and coalition war aims which dictate the selection of major strategic objectives; they also ignore the pervasively political domestic processes unleashed in every conflict of any significance and duration. So the principles do tacitly and by omission what Jomini was forthright enough to say in so many words: "apart from the intimate bonds which tie war to politics during preparations for war, almost all campaigns will include military efforts undertaken to satisfy political views which are, often, very important but, often, very short on rationality and which, strategically speaking, lead to serious errors rather than useful operations." (Jomini, *Précis de l'art de guerre*, 1838, page 204.) On page 40 of his *Précis*, Jomini anticipates General Upton's anti-Clausewitzian and unpolitical notion of war: once war has been decided on, it must, no doubt, be waged according to the rules of the art ("la guerre une fois décidée, sans doute il faut la faire selon les principes de l'art"). Colonel Alger's book neither quotes nor mentions these important Jominian positions.

In short, the persistent misnaming of some principles of depoliticized and heavily "material" strategy as "the principles of war" sums up the congenital outlook of the military in an insular and continental giant. The summary is the quintessence of American strategic ethnocentrism. The summary may well be a threat to national security, for solipsistic miseducation of officers increases the probability of myopia, rigidity, loss of initiative, and traumatic awakenings.

Speculations of this type are absent from Colonel Alger's book. Yet he himself points to their importance. In his concluding chapter he writes that "to understand the 'principles of war,' their history must be known. The forces that ordained and inspired their development and the acceptance of their content and format are perhaps more significant than their metamorphic chronology, but these forces are far more difficult to identify" (p. 175). Indeed they are, which is why the reviewer has ventured to speculate where Colonel Alger feared to tread. He and others are invited to do better than these speculations.

Alger, in any case, has given us a considerable data base, though his translations of German book titles are

not to be trusted. His book begins with a chapter on the maxims of war before Napoleon. Here he misses the essential and revealing context of the pre-Napoleonic maxims. From Giles of Rome in the bigh Middle Ages to Frederick the Great, these maxims and reflections were a standard element of absolutist political science expressed in mirrors for princes and political testaments. Written from the ruler's perspective and meant to be useful, these writings necessarily sacrificed rigor, science, and universality for immediacy and specificity. *Kriegstheorie*, a genuine theory of war for the ages, had to wait for Clausewitz.

For the era since Napoleon, Alger gives a chronology, history, and reference work. Leaving aside bibliography and index, fully a fourth of the book is reference material. It ranges from a list of book titles of the genre in question to extracts ranging from Machiavelli to FM 100-1 (1978), telling us all, perhaps more than all, that we care to know.

The book certainly fills a lacuna; especially for the era since J.F.C. Fuller (here cut down to size) it provides a useful overview.

JOHN TASHJEAN
Arlington, Virginia

International Institute for Strategic Studies. *The Military Balance 1982-1983*. London: 1982. 141pp. $14

Each year the prestigious London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies publishes their *Military Balance*. This study is considered a primary source for most of the academic world and by the press. The 1982-1983 edition has just recently appeared and has some significant material of interest to Navy officers.

IISS now credits the Soviet Union's submarine force with a MIRV capability on both the SS-N-6 and the SS-N-8 submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Previously, a MIRV capability for the SS-N-6 was only documented in one table of DOD's *Soviet Military Power* (while it was referred to as a MRV capable missile in the text).

In addition to the obvious strategic significance of this possible new missile capability, tbe MIRVing of the SS-N-6 and SS-N-8 has a dramatic impact on arms control. Under SALT II, any launcher which has heen tested or developed for a MIRV missile means that all such launchers are considered MIRVed.

Using IISS data, the Soviets would now appear to have 1,700 MIRV missile launchers. This means that they would be some 500 in excess of the SALT II limits if the SS-N-6 and SS-N-8 are in fact MIRVed. Naturally there will be those who can argue that the MIRVing of these two missiles is debatable.

Less debatable is the overall tabulation of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. According to the *Military Balance*, the Soviets now have some 2,498 total vehicles which are accountable under SALT II. According to that Treaty, which has not been ratified, the USSR was to have reduced its total to 2,250 by the end of 1981. It is obvious that they have not and that the assertion of this noncompliance made by former President Jimmy Carter in his book *Keeping Faith* is correct.

It is difficult to ascertain how much credibility to place in the *Military Balance*. For example, the B-1A aircraft is SALT II accountable yet is not listed in IISS data for the United States. *Jane's Fighting Ships* and *Combat Fleets of the World* both credit the USSR with GOLF IV and V submarines, whose launchers would be SALT I and II accountable, yet these submarines and their launchers do not appear in the *Military Balance*.

There are internal inconsistencies also. The SS-NX-20 submarine-launched missile is listed in the front of the facts section but does not appear in the analysis section where the overall superpower strategic nuclear balance is tabulated. Under the section on the East-West Conventional Balance, IISS assumes that all but 53 nonstrategic submarines would be available for a Nato conflict. In the facts section, they state that the Pacific Fleet contains 95 such submarines.

Their analysis of the Nato scenario makes many interesting assumptions besides the numbers of submarines. They state that ships available to the Soviet Union for a Nato conflict would be any assigned to the Northern, Baltic, or Black Sea Fleets. By taking the totals from the fact section and subtracting those earmarked for a Nato conflict, IISS is assuming that the Soviet Pacific Fleet would draw down to 15 cruise missile subs, 38 attack subs, 7 cruisers, and 17 destroyers.

The IISS *Military Balance* will undoubtedly remain a major source for the academic world and the press. Those who choose to use it for primary documentation should be very careful to check for internal inconsistencies in addition to cross-checking data with other available material.

JAMES JOHN TRITTEN
Commander, US Navy
University of Southern California

Recent Books

Selected Accessions of the Naval War College Library

Annotated by
Doris Baginski, George Scheck
Mary Ann Varoutsos, and Jane Viti

Brook-Shepherd, Gordon. *November 1918*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1981. 461pp. $19.95
In this panoramic view of the last hundred days of the First World War, Brook-Shepherd shows how the battlefields of Italy, Palestine, the Balkans, and the Western Front affected its resolution. The military positions of the principal combatants are linked to both the peacemaking process and the collapse of three empires. Drawing upon personal reminiscences, letters, diaries, memoirs, and archives, the author tells much of the story in the words of participants from all sides. They range from soldiers in the frontline trenches to diplomats and statesmen in the drawing rooms of Europe and America. Since few studies have concentrated on the final phase of the war, his approach provides an interesting overview of the culmination of the global struggle.