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The Dragon and the Bear: Inside China & Russia in the Eighties

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post-World War II events, is that it may generate future such conferences and additional exchanges of ideas. From similar books and conferences international historians may gain a deeper understanding of the nature and causes of conflicts between all the nations involved, as different national perspectives and documents are brought to bear.

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Short, Philip. *The Dragon and the Bear: Inside China & Russia in the Eighties.* New York: Morrow, 1982, 489pp. $19.95

In early cold war days, the State Department tried to leaven its Moscow and Nanjing embassies with a Chinese specialist and a Soviet specialist, respectively. The first Soviet expert in China was mugged by the McCarthyites, while the Asian specialist in Moscow was put to work on the embassy's housekeeping chores. The experiment died shortly thereafter for "budgetary reasons." They order things differently at the British Broadcasting Corporation. Peter Short was the BBC's man in Moscow and then in Beijing, serving as bureau chief for six years. From this experience comes *The Dragon and the Bear.*

Mr. Short has no illusions about either country, but he does conclude, "Ultimately, the future of the West depends on its will to resist Soviet expansion." Given this, he hopes "the West and China independently pursue policies of détente backed by military strength . . . . " Before this conclusion is reached, the book has piled up evidence relentlessly to damn both systems: "Where Stalin sacrificed the welfare of the Soviet people on the altar of state ambition, Mao, in the last twenty years of his life, subordinated material interests of the Chinese people to the working out of his ideas." But if this is the view of the top, Mr. Short does not scant the realities of every-day life for the Soviet and Chinese citizen. Examples and anecdotes abound, usually footuoted in the Chinese case to the official Xinhua news agency or to one of the Beijing newspapers. In the Soviet case, the cruelties, stupidities and just plain dreariness of life are well enough known to the West and need no sourcing.

If anything, the author gives the Chinese somewhat the better of it, although his book will give no comfort to the now dwindling ranks of Mao sycophants in the West. He sees Russians as politically passive, the Chinese active (not all recent observers would agree with this last). He finds China better able to cope with change. Political reform is seen as the key to economic change: "Because of this overwhelming political aversion to reform, the Soviet Union, thirty years after Stalin's death, faces economic problems identical to those of China five years after Mao's death."

And what policy recommendations for the West, besides détente and military power? The Taiwan problem needs some resolution, not because failure to do so might lead to

Sino-Soviet rapprochement, but because its festering may make China see the United States as an unreliable strategic partner; Deng Ziaoping has said that, should Sino-American "relations retrogress to those prior to 1972, China will not collapse . . . . "

For the Soviet Union, Mr. Short's prescription is astringent—"the stick of encirclement must be attached to the carrot of compromise and coexistence." Economic strategies toward the USSR must be more coherent and not attempt to walk a middle path between maintaining strain in the Soviet economy (the hawkish view) or alleviating them in the hope of increasing interdependence (the Kissinger line of the seventies). The author scorns gestures of the Olympic boycott ilk, but he does point out that even with Argentinian grain, the embargo left the USSR five million tons short of animal feed and that a total Western embargo would have caused a 25 million ton shortfall.

Mr. Short's indictment (for that is what the book is) is impressive. The descriptions of daily life in the two countries are grim enough, but Mr. Short finds the realities of political power in the two communist parties even grimmer. He gives no comfort, but he is eminently readable and persuasively authoritative.

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Suvorov, Viktor. *Inside the Soviet Army*. New York: Macmillan, 1982. 296pp. $15.95

Viktor Suvorov is a pseudonym of a junior Soviet Army officer, who before his recent defection to the West, had served in the Soviet Army for fifteen years. He commanded a motorized-rifle company during the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Later he graduated from the elite Frunze Military Academy and, as he claims, became an officer with the General Staff.

The author sets out by examining the Soviet military leadership. The Supreme Command (Stavka) includes several leading Politburo members and marshals. The intermediate links between the Stavka and fronts in wartime will be three High Commands of Strategic Direction: the Western, headquartered in East Germany; the South-Western, headquartered in Kiev; and the Far Eastern, headquartered in Chita. The author provides the details about which forces will be subordinated to each Strategic Direction in case of war, and provides a description of organization of the five services of the Soviet armed forces as well as of the airborne troops and military intelligence. A special section is devoted to the role of a system of deception measures, which is very important, according to Viktor Suvorov, in overall Soviet defense policies.

The next chapter deals with organization, equipment and tasks of a division, an army and a front. One especially interesting chapter examines the Soviet mobilization system. The author offers his own estimates of strength of divisions in II and III categories and they are considerably