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"While Summers does not appear to have it as a purpose to fix individual or corporate blame for our loss of the war, the villains of the war virtually jump off the page."

by
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Summers, Harry G., Jr. *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War.* Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982. 225pp. $12.95

Colonel Harry Summers has done us a great service. He has lucidly laid out the lessons of the Vietnam war and has given us good advice for the future.

For this reviewer it was bitter-sweet nostalgia: bitter for reliving the Vietnam deliberations in the "Tank" and NSC and the frustrating memory of lost opportunities; and sweet for recalling the heroic actions of American fighting men in the rivers, jungles, mountains, and deserts of Vietnam. Sweet, too, for being able to agree so fully with what is written so well in this book.

If there is any fault with this book, it is that Summers has relied almost exclusively, within the Armed Forces, on Army sources and advice. There are many in the other services who would have eagerly assisted and endorsed his efforts. I, for one, would like to be counted.

Summers masterfully amasses and arranges overwhelming evidence that—despite great tactical and logistical successes in moving millions of men half way around the world—the United States was always on the strategic defensive; that the United States never developed a real strategy for the war—only tactics, grand tactics, at best.

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In the context of the Vietnam experience, Summers reviews the teachings of Clausewitz—still valid today—and the Principles of War. The United States ignored or violated, at one time or another, every one: The Objective; The Offensive; Mass; Economy of Force; Maneuver; Unity of Command; Security; Surprise; and Simplicity. The North Vietnamese, on the other hand, followed those teachings and principles—and won.

While Summers does not appear to have it as a purpose to fix individual or corporate blame for our loss of the war, the villains of the war virtually jump off the page. President Johnson is documented as a man who had contempt for his military establishment. He made a conscious decision not to mobilize the American national will for fear it would jeopardize his "Great Society" programs. He did not seek a declaration of war which would have clarified and focused our political and military objectives. As a result we fought Vietnam in "cold blood"—without the enthusiasm and passion of earlier American wars: it was "Business as usual."

Congress also plays "villain"—albeit to a lesser degree—in that it abdicated its constitutional responsibility to declare war.

The DoD bureaucracy, preoccupied with the USSR, China, and management of the strategic deterrent, dominated US strategic thinking during the Vietnam war with Systems Analysis and PPBS—systems suitable for "preparing for war" but not for "war proper," using Clausewitzian terminology.

Summers, by comparison, exonerates the press, draft dodgers, and antiwar groups, showing that they operated quite predictably and comfortably in the political vacuum conveniently created for them by the President and the Congress. There was no "collapse" of the American national will, because it had never been mobilized—that which doesn't exist, doesn't collapse.

So much for "The Environment" as Summers calls it. What must be read by men in uniform is Part Two, "The Engagement," which analyzes the role of the military. The military side emerges every bit as guilty as the political side, not so much by commission, but by omission. It was the military, more than any other institution, that should have been acutely aware that the United States was in constant violation of Clausewitz's teachings and the Principles of War. But the JCS Chairman did not use his direct access to the President to insist on declaring war and mobilizing the national will. ComUSMACV resisted the experience-proven idea of a combined command. Our military leaders did not demand, under threat of resignation, that their own strategies be adopted. Instead, and intimidated by the bureaucracy, they let civilians dominate strategy. They accepted *political* tasking (nation building in the south) rather than insisting on military tasking against the real enemy in the north. They succumbed to the prevailing "wisdom" that nuclear weapons had changed things so much that Clausewitz, the lessons of history, and the Principles of War had become

largely irrelevant in the Vietnam situation. Summers details the agonizing process of how the Army's manuals evolved. Terms such as "victory" disappeared and in their place appeared "counterinsurgency," "limited objectives," "limited means," and such.

We lost our focus on the traditional primary objective: destroying the enemy's forces and his will to fight. We concentrated our efforts on the war's symptoms—the guerrilla in the south—rather than on the central threat—North Vietnam.

Summers points out that there was no "stab-in-the-back" attitude on the part of the military after Vietnam. Fairly, or unfairly, General Westmoreland shouldered much of the blame. This reviewer suggests that this reflects either a conscious or subconscious recognition on the part of the military as a whole that there was plenty of guilt to go around.

For the future, Summers warns that the military must regain the trust of its civilian leaders.

Colonel Summers has done us a great service. But will his advice be heeded? Chances not, because his book is but another articulate exposition of the lamentable fact that we are unwilling to learn from history. It shows once again what happens when another generation of leaders becomes convinced that their generation's problems are "different." It proves how unwise it is to place disproportionate emphasis on technological advances at the expense of a comprehensive consideration of human nature—the most important constant in international politics. Talleyrand's "Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose" is often quoted but seldom heeded.

Best, Geoffrey, *Honour Among Men and Nations*. The 1981 Joanne Goodman Lectures. Toronto:, University of Toronto Press, 1982. 108pp. $13.50 paper $7.50

According to the legendary Irishman, a lone woman could walk the length and breadth of Ireland in the old days without losing her honor even once. Historian Geoffrey Best (he is dean of the School of European Studies at the University of Sussex) adds, "Honour thy father and mother," "On my honour as a Scout," and "Love, honour, and obey," to illustrate the protean character of the word, its several uses having no common meaning. But, as Wittgenstein would say, are all related to one another in many different ways.

Best is concerned with the concept of military and national honor and in this small book, a write-up of his Goodman Lectures at Toronto, he traces the waxing and waning of the idea from the 18th century to the present. He notes the prominent place of honor among the ideals of the *ancien regime* where he sees it as the strictly guarded treasure of the warrior nobility, an absolute, an end in itself. With the rise of nationalism (which is Best's *bête noir*), the value of honor was kept alive by the elite military officer class in Europe who held themselves apart both from the common soldiery and from

the bourgeoisie whose utilitarian spirit and concern with profit prevented them from entertaining the concept.

Paradoxically, the nations themselves took up the idea of honor and declared themselves willing to go to war to defend it. Best finds so much historical hypocrisy here that he recalls one of Emerson's rare funny lines, "The louder he talked of honor, the faster we counted the spoons."

Dean Best is encouraged by what he sees as a post-World War II trend in revitalizing and broadening the concepr of wartime honor. He finds it in the renewed interest of nations in reconstructing the old international law of war. He notes the number of individual nations that now deny the legality of war crime defense pleas on the ground of superior orders. He cites the widening of the concept of wartime honor to include recognition of the heroism of civilians under bombardment and occupation. He does not despair of the oft-frustrated postwar attempts of nations to construct international bodies to settle disputes without war. He finds in certain general officers of the second world war men capable of envisioning a nonviolent and just international order. Not Clark, Patton, and MacArthur are Best's heroes, but Eisenhower, Ridgway, and Marshall. He quotes the British chiefs of staff's tribute to Marshall on VE-day with Pope's lines: "Friend to truth! of soul sincere, In action faithful, and in honour clear; Who broke no promise, served no private end, Who gained no title, and who lost no friend."

Best's thoughtful little book is not without its faults. One example: He sees in Alfred Thayer Mahan a spokesman for a generation of imperialists, chauvinists, pseudo-Darwinians, racists. But he cites a strange test to back it up—Mahan's words on the meaning of honor among men and nations: "Honor speaks for itself; neither man nor nation should consent to that which is before God a shame to do or to allow." Now if one does not object to the theological metaphor—and to Mahan it was not metaphor but literal truth—that is really not a bad summing up of what one means by military and national honor—or the lack of it.

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Gabriel, Richard A. *To Serve With Honor: A Treatise on Military Ethics and the Way of the Soldier*. Westport, Conn.: 1982. 243pp. $29.95

Brown, James and Michael J. Collins, eds. *Military Ethics and Professionalism: A Collection of Essays*. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1981. 98pp.

In the wake of Vietnam, the ethics of the American military professional has become an important subject of inquiry. Richard Gabriel's earlier *Crisis in Command* analyzed military performance in Vietnam; *Managers and Gladiators* treated the military bureaucrat. *To Serve With Honor* is a natural progression toward analyzing the fundamentally opposed business and military ethics in the belief that systems analysis, cost-effectiveness crireria, and statistical measurements of military value started a process of erosion of the military ethic almost impossible to check. Successful management and efficiency of the business ethos are inconsistent with the qualities of duty, sacrifice, and group dedication expected of the military leader.* The lamentable resulrs of the managerial

*Richard Nixon in *Leaders* makes much the same point, interestingly enough, distinguishing between managers (whose goal is "to do things right") and leaders (whose goal is "to do the right thing").

ascendancy are "the exponential growth of careerism in the military," loss of confidence by troops in their leadership, and the loss of the absolutely vital ingredient of combat success, unit integrity. "Crucial to the ability to bond units together under stress is the need for ethics . . . . A soldier without ethics, values and beliefs with which he can live in a moral sense will himself be destroyed by the horrors of the battlefield."

In his excellent foreword, Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale finds the most controversial section of Gabriel's book to be the proposed honor code for the military. The well-known "Duty, Honor, Country" at West Point is too vague; the military Code of Conduct aims primarily at the fighting man's responsibilities as a prisoner of war. Bureaucratic forces working against any notion of special military ethics and eroding its center are the "courting of power"—the enormous premium on promotion plus the "up-or-out" system; "careerism," which generates excessive ambition and loyalty conflicts; "excessive concern for image"—to look perfect rather than perform well, and the subsidiary "zero defect" mentality, efficiency report inflation, and indiscriminate individual citations for essentially routine performances of duty.

The Cadet Honor Code at the Point, much more rigid than the honor concept at the Naval Academy, operated to establish two standards of morality in the Army, one at West Point and another in the field. The Navy and Air Force have lesser problems here; they are "capital-intensive" rather than "labor-intensive" and are more responsive to business norms which may be disastrous for the Army. All the services share problems of drug and alcohol abuse, deserrions, and related offenses. But the breakdown of the Army in Vietnam, where almost 20 percent of the officers and noncoms killed were at the hands of our own men—1,016 officers and NCOs—would hardly be corrected by a code of ethics not already covered by the Ten Commandments. The missing element of comparison is the Marine Corps, which experienced no comparable problem.

In an earlier study,* Gabriel made a careful comparison of US Marine Corps and Army performance in Vietnam, reaching the following conclusions:

1. The Marines consistently refused to change traditional leadership practices and imitate the modern managerialism of the Army.

2. Marine Corps units fared consistently berrer than Army units in incidences of mutiny and combat refusals, stopping both before they affected unit cohesion.

3. Marine Corps units experienced more highly intense combat, suffering twice the statistical norm in casualty rates; 28 percent of all those killed in action, and 33.5 percent of those wounded were Marines.

4. The Marine Corps officer-enlisted ratio was far lower than the Army (1 to 14 vs. 1 to 8) and about the same as the German Army in World War II, the French in Indochina, and the Israelis today.

5. Marine Corps *unit* rotation early in the war (strongly favored by Gabriel) or *individual* rotation later in the war showed no difference in combat effectiveness.

6. Marine Corps officers stayed with their units, leaving only when killed or wounded; Army officers served only six months in the field, half the period of the enlisted men they commanded.

Gabriel concludes that "The unwillingness of the Corps to abandon such

*Major Richard A. Gabriel, USAR, "Professionalism Versus Managerialism in Vietnam," *Air University Review*, January-February 1981, pp. 77-85.

traditional gladiatorial practices in the face of creeping managerialism must be counted as one of the greater successes of the Marine Corps in Vietnam . . . . The Army had gradually abandoned many of its traditional leadership modes and disciplinary habits in conformity with the new bureaucratic order . . . . When that happened, the effectiveness of Army units dropped considerably while indicators of unit disintegration rose alarmingly."

Strangely, in *To Serve With Honor* Gabriel makes no direct or indirect reference to the US Marine Corps in any capacity. The omission, insofar as proving the need for a new code of ethics, may be fatal.

Why, in fact, did no general officer in Vietnam speak out against body counts, exaggerated sortie rates, and other false reporting of performance statistics aimed at pleasing superiors? Again, would a new code provide the corrective? Was it the failure of an ethical code that the German generals did not speak out against Hitler? Nobody would object to greater stress on moral integrity, courage, discipline, and other traditional battlefield virtues. The business or managerial ethos has little effect on performance below division level. Given its flaws, could we possibly be excusing serious leadership failure in the field by confusing principle with method?

James Brown and Michael Collins broaden the discussion of *Military Ethics and Professionalism* to cover three recent developments dramatically affecting the role of the professional soldier to which neither the military nor society has yet adjusted. In addition to Vietnam, the All-Volunteer Force and vastly increased numbers of women—mostly "liberated"—into a historically macho and male-dominated institution, have had consequences not even partially understood. All contributing authors share the thought that something has been lost or changed and that the present situation is unsatisfactory.

Sam Sarkesian's opening essay is useful but may put ethics on too high a level of abstraction for most readers. Thomas E. Kelly adds considerable survey material in a more practical approach toward bringing the widespread moral problem into sharper focus; Lewis Sorley finds overemphasis on statistical indicators to be less an ethical problem than a coverup for incompetence. Richard Gabriel, not wholly consistent with views expressed in his treatise on ethics above, pleads for a recapture of some aspects of the old professionalism, to rediscover successful military organizations of the past, rather than to develop new methods.

There is much of interest here, much material for wardroom and war college discussion. Is a new code of ethics really necessary; should it apply mainly to officers or to enlisted personnel as well? Perhaps a Civil War story may illustrate the latter point. When General "Uncle Billy" Sherman sternly rebuked a plundering soldier, he was told, "You can't expect all the cardinal virtues for $13 a month."

Gabriel's book, the first treatise on military ethics written by an American, and the Brown-Collins reader, both appear at a time of increasing exploration of the military officer and his moral obligation to society. Whatever the motivation, the subject merits our careful attention.

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Semmel, Bernard, ed. *Marxism and the Science of War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981. 302pp. $45 paper $17.95

This book is a collection of writings about war by key Marxist thinkers of the

past two centuries. There are selections from the works of such past giants as Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky, as well as more contemporary thinkers like Marshal Sokolovskii, Régis Debray and Admiral Gorshkov. In addition, the editor has written a very useful introductory essay which places the various selections in a broader context.

In the West, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the question of how Marxists view war: although the policy community has examined closely the writings of contemporary Soviet thinkers, it has paid scant attention to the writings of Engels, Trotsky and Lenin; and although the academic community has spawned thousands of works on the ideas of those founding fathers, it has had little interest in their views on war. Ironically, many of these well-known Marxists were deeply immersed in nitty gritty military questions. Engels, for example, wrote pieces on the history of the rifle and the development of infantry over time. Engels was so well-versed in military affairs that he was known to his friends on the left as "the general." Lenin and Trotsky also wrote extensively on military affairs; the latter's pieces provide some of the most interesting reading in this volume.

It is clear from this book that disagreement is widespread among the different authors concerning the central questions they are addressing. For example, Marx, Lenin, Mao and Régis Debray have very different views about the tactics of revolution. In the case of Engels, his views on the nature of warfare appear to have changed greatly over time; one can distinguish clearly between an "early" and a "late" Engels. Upon finishing this book, one cannot help but wonder if it is possible to speak of a Marxist view of war.

There is one point, however, on which almost all the authors agree: the importance of Clausewitz. Marx's comment that "the chap has a common sense that borders on brilliance" is shared by the others. What impressed them most about Clausewitz is his understanding of the intimate relationship between war and politics. Marxists agree wholeheartedly with Clausewitz's assertion that war is a continuation of politics by other means. Of course, there is little agreement over purely political matters.

Another key issue addressed in this book is whether or not, when focusing on questions of military strategy and tactics, it is possible to point to a specifically Marxist theory of war. This has been a contentious issue among Soviet policymakers since 1917. In the aftermath of the Revolution, military theorists like Michael Frunze and Marshal Tukhachevsky argued that Marxism dictated that the Soviets should *always* pursue offensive operations and that they should never engage in positional warfare. Instead, they should focus on guerrilla-like operations where a high premium is placed on maneuver. Trotsky took the opposite view. He claimed that "military affairs are very empirical, very practical affairs" and "cannot have any eternal laws." Trotsky's views were accepted by Lenin.

Today, there is much debate about whether war would be a continuation of politics if nuclear weapons were employed. Although many Marxists believe that nuclear weapons require a major modification of how one thinks about war and politics, it is clear that a number of Soviet thinkers believe that their ideology provides a way of incorporating nuclear weapons into their traditional view of the relationship between war and politics. In the words of one Soviet thinker, "Marxist-Leninist methodology makes it possible to solve the question of the interrelation between politics and

armed force in the possible nuclear war in a consistently scientific way." Not surprisingly, it is never made clear how that feat is accomplished. One hopes that in the Soviet Union today there are a large number of Trotsky-like figures whose more empirically based views will prevail in a future crisis.

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Bradford, Ernle. *The Battle for the West: Thermopylae*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980. 255pp. $12.95

From its title one might understandably infer that this is either just another "battle" book or a new popular account of the gallantry of Leonidas and his three hundred Spartans. Such, however, is not the case.

Ernle Bradford believes that European history cannot be understood correctly unless one recognizes the paramount influence of ancient history. Likewise, ancient history must be examined within the context of the cultural conflict between the Persian (Iranian) Empire and the Graeco-Roman world. Bradford defends the cultural superiority of the Greeks but he does not ignore the achievements of the Persians.

In *Battle for the West* Bradford narrates the key events of 481-479 BC and places in their proper perspective the motives and goals of the principal players in this historical drama and the resultant consequences for each. The critical land engagements at Thermopylae and Plataea are contrasted with those on the sea at Artemisium and Salamis. The Sicilian sideshow receives a chapter to itself to complete the canvas of Xerxes' two-pronged assault on the West. The military developments and political finagling are handled deftly by the author.

Xerxes, unlike his father Darius, was interested in far more than merely absorbing the Greek city-states into his imperial dominions. In tacit alliance with the Carthaginians, the campaign begun in 481 BC was the prelude to conquest of the Mediterranean basin. His objective was the same as would be that of Alexander the Great. And, given the resources available, the odds in Xerxes' favor were better than they ever were for Alexander.

The defense of the Pass of Thermopylae ("Hot Gates") is the pivotal event in the story. Bradford refutes those commentators who do not grasp the significance of the sacrifice of Leonidas and his men. Their deaths ignited a torch, not a funeral pyre. For a brief period thereafter the citizens of the various city-states developed a pride in themselves as Greeks that enabled them to unite as a single people against the Persian threat.

Bradford's sympathies throughout the book are decidedly with the Spartans, "those strange and remarkable people, whose virtues the West would do well to emulate in our time." He points out accurately that the Spartans have traditionally received bad press for the simple reason that they produced no literary figures of their own. The story of the Persian Wars remained the monopoly of Athenian poets, dramatists, and historians. Given the defeat of Athens by Sparta during the Peloponnesian War at the end of the fifth century BC, it behooves the student to weigh Athenian accounts very carefully indeed. Bradford suggests how "distasteful" it was for Athenian (and later) historians to have to acknowledge the fact that a Spartan admiral was in command at Salamis and a Spartan general was in command at Plataea—the decisive victories against the Persians.

Bradford is the product of an English

public school education. And there is no mistaking that fact as one peruses the contents of *Battle for the West*. Deliberately or inadvertently he has sprinkled asides throughout the book that not only focus the reader's attention on items of special importance but also reveal to the reader much about the intellectual makeup of Ernle Bradford.

The story of the Spartans at Thermopylae, for example, was a heroic one in the author's youth but since then it has diminished in grandeur, "perhaps because their military outlook and stubborn courage have made them unattractive to a hedonistic society." For Bradford the possession and display of courage is that which vouchsafes individual character and integrity. But for the Spartan attributes of courage and heroism Xerxes might have succeeded in his aims—and if that had happened where would the "modern humanitarians" be today?

Battle for the West provides a fascinating approach to the character of Spartans and Athenians, to the prospect of a Persian-Carthaginian hegemony over the lands of the Mediterranean, and to those sterling qualities that contributed to Greek victory and the succeeding golden ages of Hellenism and the Hellenistic world. It also affords the reader the opportunity to survey these events from the vantage of what is becoming an almost alien educational perspective. On both counts this is a book that merits high marks.

The events chronicled in *Battle for the West* took place almost 2,500 years ago. Yet, as Bradford demonstrates, their historical importance and exemplary value are timeless. This is a book to be relished not just once but at frequent intervals.

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Howarth, David. *The Voyage of the Armada: The Spanish Story*. New York: Viking Press, 1981. 256pp. $13.95

The defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 has long been recognized as a signal date in naval history. For some historians it has marked the first important naval battle between sailing men of war; for others, it was the battle which laid the foundation of the future British Empire by endowing England with the prestige Spain lost.

In the popular English language literature certainly this last aspect dominates. The heroic tale focuses on Sir Francis Drake, Lord Howard, Sir John Hawkins and Queen Elizabeth. The Duke of Medina Sidonia, the Spanish commander, remains a dull-headed landsman doomed to defeat by England's wily seadogs. With this popular image in mind, David Howarth's plan to examine the Spanish side of the story is a worthy one.

Howarth has written his volume with a wide audience in mind. His prose is lucid, graceful and witty, and he is able to explain in simple terms the complexities of 16th-century naval technology. Howarth narrates a fast paced and lively story which can seriously be recommended to young students and the general reader.

While admiring the clarity and effectiveness of the writing, the professional student of naval history will have some serious reservations concerning Howarth's interpretations and the extent of his source material. As a popular book, it is not footnoted, so the reader must divine the sources from the tone of the text, remarks in the preface and a "note on sources." From these it seems clear that Howarth has based his study on the printed sources and not attempted to do primary research. This is certainly a reasonable approach given the scope of material available.

In terms of published documents, the author has relied primarily on Duro, *La*

Armada Invencible (1885) and used in addition, Captain Cuellar's *Letter* (1895), Philip II's correspondence in J.L. Motley, *History of the Netherlands* (1860) and the additional letters edited by George Naish in *The Naval Miscellany* (Navy Records Society, 1952). The English documents have come largely from J.K. Laughton, *State Papers relating to The Defeat of the Armada* (Navy Records Society, 1894 reprinted 1981) and the *Calendar of State Papers relating to Ireland* (vol. iv, 1885). To these sources, he has added data deduced from the underwater archaeology on the Spanish wrecks off the Irish coast.

In terms of secondary works, Howarth has placed his story in the same, broad historical picture painted by Garrett Mattingly, *The Armada* (1959) and based the English perspective on Julian Corbett, *Drake and the Tudor Navy* (1898), although he disagrees with Corbett over some tactical points. Howarth's information on ordnance comes from Michael Lewis, *Armada Guns* (1942-43) while J.A. Froude, *The Spanish Story of the Armada* (1892) seems to have provided his basic focus.

The sources which Howarth has used are fine, as far as they go, but they tend to be the older sources and he has by no means exhausted the materials readily available in English. In terms of published documents, three series in the *Calendar of State Papers*, Domestic, Foreign and Venetian, provide extensive and valuable materials which could have illuminated the Spanish side further. In addition, P. Ubaldini's contemporary report, translated and published in 1590 is useful, while several stray documents are to be found in the publications of the Historical Manuscripts Commission, in particular, the *Salisbury MSS*, pt. iii, and the *15th Report*, pt. v. Most recently, however, Stephen Usherwood has illustrated both sides of the story with his well arranged and useful selection of documents, *The Great Enterprise* (Folio Society, 1978).

The most serious fault lies in Howarth's failure to consult recent scholarship relating to the reign of Philip II. Since the Spanish outlook is the basis of the study, Howarth could have made a much more valuable contribution by bringing together the new perspectives and making plain the results of detailed scholarship. Among the important publications which should have been used are I.A.A. Thompson on the appointment of Medina Sidonia and the workings of the Spanish Council of War (*English Historical Review*, 1967 and 1969). Geoffrey Parker's work on *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road* (1972), *Philip II* (1978), and *Spain and the Netherlands* (1979) would have put the Spanish issues in better perspective. Howarth's harsh view of Philip might have been greatly modified if he had read Peter Pierson, *Philip II of Spain* (1975) and dipped into some of the relevant studies mentioned in the excellent bibliographical essay at the end of that volume.

None of these suggestions would have been overtaxing or unrealistic for a popular writer to undertake and they do not presuppose that a writer of that sort should become an academic researcher. The absence of this additional work has created an inaccurate and curiously prejudiced picture of the Spanish side of the Armada story. It would seem that the author has produced exactly what he hoped to avoid, an English view of the Spanish, rather than a Spanish view of the Armada in 1588. This is most unfortunate since it could have easily been avoided by using recent publications in English.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
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Warner, Denis and Warner, Peggy with Sadao Seno. *The Sacred Warriors: Japan's Suicide Legions.* New York: Van Nostrand-Reinhold, 1982. 370pp. $24.95

Not to tell sea stories but in the tradition of the British boardroom one must declare an interest at the outset; the ship in which the reviewer was serving was sunk by a suicide plane off Okinawa in 1945 (in fact, the Warners manage to sink her twice in Appendix 1, which gives "the kamikaze scorecard"). Mr. Warner writes not from the light of the lamp alone; he was in HMS *Formidable* as an Australian war correspondent when she was hit twice at Okinawa (not Leyte Gulf, as the dust jacket says) and knocked out of the war. Warner describes his injuries and reactions modestly in the third person; he recovered quickly enough to fly in a Superfortress raid on Japan that summer. The Warners' collaborator, Commander Seno, JMSDF (Ret.), was graduated from the Japanese naval academy toward the end of the war and was assigned to midget submarines in the defense of the expected Kyushu invasion. Commander Seno's access to Japanese survivors of the suicide legions lends interest and vitality to the story.

The Sacred Warriors covers the range of Japanese suicide groups, civilians on Saipan, flyers, submariners, infantrymen, the crew of the *Yamato,* etc. The underlying philosophy for the fighting man was, of course, that of the samurai—death in battle was to be sought, to be welcomed. No samurai would allow himself to be taken prisoner. Yet, the samurai code was a class matter, and the samurai, as a class, had been abolished in the Meiji Restoration. This unwritten code of the samurai was, however, bureaucratized into a pamphlet, "Battle Ethics," compiled under the direction of General Hideki Tojo and distributed to all officers and men on 8 January 1941. The Warners quote from this: "A sublime sense of self-sacrifice must guide you . . . . Do not stay alive in dishonor . . . . Do not die in such a way as to leave a bad name behind you." Certainly, the diaries, letters and memories of fallen Japanese servicemen that the Warners quote show this "sense of self-sacrifice" to be overriding. What is left unsaid is the group aspect. Just as the success of the Japanese in group endeavors is said to have much to do with Japan's prowess in the economic world, so it is with death. Robert Jay Lifton in the preface to *Six Lives, Six Deaths: Portraits from Modern Japan* points "in life and death," to "the Japanese intellectual tradition of emphasizing individual integration into an immediate group rather than personal commitment to a transcendental value or religious or philosophical world view." Later, Lifton writes: "particularly striking in Japan . . . the phenomenon of collective suicide. Collec-tive suicide dramatically illustrates the precedence of group-centered values in death no less than in life . . . the experiences of the kamikaze pilots . . . certainly a form of collective suicide . . . ."

But the Warners have another explanation of the suicide legions that relies less on Japanese psychology than it does on the mordant observation of von Clausewitz: "War is an act of force. Each side, therefore, compels its opponent to follow suit: a reciprocal action is started which must lead, in theory, to extremes."

The Sacred Warriors shows the various ways both sides in the Pacific war moved to extremes until, "To both sides, the enemy seemed less than human." Japanese atrocities and brutalities to civilians and prisoners were well known. Less publicized attitudes and incidents on the other side are given by the Warners.

The commanding officer of the 37th Division ordered surrendering Japanese shot; Admiral Halsey's chief of staff saw concern over the sinking of Japanese hospital ships as "an unnecessary refinement to worry too much about"; the Commander, US Army Service Forces recommended germ warfare against the Japanese (in October 1944, the Vice Chief of the Japanese Navy General Staff asked for plans to launch bacteriological bombs from submarines against West Coast cities). The stage was surely set for the kamikazes and the atomic bombs.

The tactical effectiveness of the suicide weapons varied widely. Suicidal infantry charges were forlorn hopes; human bombs were not effective; the suicide submarines had some successes, but were not well enough developed technically; it was the kamikaze pilot that was the effective weapon. The Warners quote several admirals on the seriousness of the threat to naval operations. The gravest assessment was that of Admiral Nimitz who on 25 May 1945 suggested to Admiral King that the proposed invasion of Kyushu on 1 November be postponed "unless speed is considered so important that we are willing to accept less than the best preparedness and more than minimum casualties . . . ." Twenty-seven ships sunk and 225 hit in the first seven weeks of the Okinawa operation had to be a sobering factor in any commander's thinking about an amphibious assault on the Japanese home islands; the 1982 Falklands travail of the Royal Navy with Exocets was clearly foreshadowed by the suicide planes off Okinawa.

The book concludes with an appraisal of the chances for the Kyushu invasion. It is a rather overly pessimistic one. Eventual success was foreseen, but with a real possibility of Soviet occupation of a substantial part of the home islands (there is a novel on the Kyushu invasion, *Lighter than a Feather,* by David Westheimer, author of *Van Ryan's Express,* which also sees heavy casualties and eventual victory).

J. K. HOLLOWAY
Naval War College

Howarth, David. *Famous Sea Battles.* Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1981. 185pp. $22.50

To begin with the less than positive comments: This is a puzzling book. Its large format and beautifully reproduced artwork and photographs (including the jacket whose front is a painting of "The Battle of the Nile" and whose back is a photograph of the flight deck of HMS *Indomitable* in 1945) seem to mark it as one of what we have come to call coffee-table books. There is, however, much too much text for a display book. On the other hand the text thoroughly, accurately, objectively and, at times, compassionately describes the background, ships, weapons, actors, tactics, and results of the chosen sea battles—but does so with a very nearly complete lack of the scholarly apparatus we have come to expect of serious history. There are acknowledgements in respect of the sources of the artwork and there is an appendix but no footnotes, references, or bibliography. Some books, even others of naval history by the well-known David Howarth, provide some clue to their aim, purpose, and intended audience in their front matter—their foreword or preface or some sort of prologue. Not here. We move from cover to title page to table of contents then bang into the first battle.

With little exception, Howarth devotes one chaprer to each of the battles he considers "famous." Had his title been *The Most Famous . . .* or *The Most Important . . .* we might quibble with his

selections. As it is we must accept his choices—they *are* famous and if the English or Royal Navy figures large in most of them that fact reflects less the ethnocentric views of the author than the course of the naval history of the world, particularly since the mid-sixteenth century.

The book begins with the Battle of Actium in 31 BC. The opposing commanders were Antony and Cleopatra on one side and Gaius Octavius, soon to be Augustus Caesar, on the other. As with all the other battles, Howarth sets the scene so that there can be some understanding of the reason for the battle and why it was fought where it was fought. Geography is described sufficiently to permit understanding its importance (or lack of importance) to the battle. The personalities of the leading characters are outlined, frequently with anecdote, their plans and proposed tactics (when known) are traced, their ships and weapons described, and the story of the battle told in clear objective prose. In the preface to another of his books David Howarth, quoting Robert Louis Stevenson, has written, "there is only one way to be clever, and that is to be exact." Whatever the connection between them, Howarth is clever without being precious and exact without being staid.

The first chapter of *Famous Sea Battles* touches on a few other battles after Actium and ends with the 1571 Battle of Lepanto, the last great battle fought between fleets of galleys and the first in which the use of gunpowder was other than a haphazard isolated novelty.

The next famous battle is the Spanish Armada followed by The Four Days' Fight. Non-specialist Americans may not be familiar with this English-Dutch engagement of 1666 but perhaps they should be. One of the war's few positive results was the Dutch conceding an English claim to Manhattan.

The Nile, Trafalgar, Navarino, Tsushima follow in their order and then Coronel and the Falklands (the 1914 edition), Jutland, River Plate, and the sinking of the *Bismarck*. The US Navy finally enters in the book's last two chapters, Midway and Leyte Gulf. (I was disappointed not to find the battle between USS *Monitor* and CSS *Virginia* famous enough for inclusion.)

In a half-page Epilogue, looking at today's navies, Howarth permits himself the one statement in the book liable to disagreement by many of today's naval professionals. He says, ". . . the only practical use of the carriers in the future will be in simply existing, not in fighting . . . " Well, maybe.

I recommend *Famous Sea Battles* to all naval professionals, whether active or vicarious. Only obliquely could it be said to teach any currently useful lesson of strategy, tactics, management, or leadership so its value lies elsewhere. There is a connection, however metaphysical, between those whose battleground was the sea and those whose battleground is or may be the sea and this book of classic sea stories well limns that connection. Whether we call it connection or tradition, sense of service or something else, it is an unquantifiable but essential and civilizing element in the naval professional's makeup.

W. R. PETTYJOHN
Ingram, Texas

Burt, R.A. and Trotter, W.P., MC. *Battleships of the Grand Fleet, A Pictorial Review of the Royal Navy's Capital Ships in World War One*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1982. 96pp. $19.95

For the entire course of the first world war two enormous fleets, each centered

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on a long column of battleships and battle cruisers, lay at anchor at opposite corners of the North Sea. Although there were a few small actions involving the heavy ships of either side, or both, there was only one day in all 1,500 days the war lasted that the opposing fleets actually saw each other and exchanged fire.

It surely is curious that in a war in which millions of Europe's young men perished on the eastern and western fronts, tens of thousands of such men in vast fleets of large, heavily armed ships should live so pacifically, so drearily, and, on the whole, so safely almost without break from the war's first day till its last. People still debate the degree of influence those men and their ships had, or might have had, on the outcome of the war.

What were the characteristics of ships which could so catch the imaginations of admirals, politicians, and taxpayers that some would demand and others would eagerly provide them by divisions and squadrons? What did they look like?

In this book one finds out what many of them looked like, for R.A. Burt and W.P. Trotter provide over 150 photographs, many of which are excellent, of the 50 British dreadnought battleships and battle cruisers which formed the core of the Grand Fleet from 1914 through 1918. Most of the views are single-ship portraits and all but a few show the ships in the very dark gray worn at that time by British warships in home waters. There was nothing attractive about most of the 50, though many of the later ones, the *Tiger*, and those of the *Iron Duke*, *Queen Elizabeth*, and *Renown* classes had the majestic good looks and presented a sense of power such as must have lifted the spirits of all, except their foes, who saw them at sea. Even though we can know them now only in the form of photographs, for long ago they vanished from the face of the earth, we can be pleased by the appearance of such ships.

The authors provide the usual basic data on all these ships in tabular form, and caption their photographs knowledgeably and interestingly, while Mr. Burt provides the work with a short, roughly accurate essay on the dreadnoughts' origins, activities, and eventual passing.

One will not find in this book views of the great *Hood*, the last and largest of the World War One generation of British heavy ships, for she was not completed in time to serve with the Grand Fleet, or views of the dreadnoughts of any other nation, not even those American ships which served with that fleet in 1918. Neither will he find any pre-dreadnoughts, even though in the first part of the war a substantial number of those ships did serve in the Grand Fleet and all through the war they served in Britain's other fleets.

Still, for those who like big ships, and especially for those who like big ships with big guns, this is a book worth having.

FRANK UHLIG, JR.
Naval War College Review

Wettern, Desmond, *The Decline of British Seapower*. Boston, Mass.: Jane's, 1982. 400pp. $29.95

Hill, J.R. *The Royal Navy, Today and Tomorrow*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982. 332pp. $21.95

The Decline of British Seapower and *The Royal Navy, Today and Tomorrow*, are very different books, written for very different reasons. The first is a chronological account of the reduction in size and strength of the Navy which was second in size and power only to that of the United States in 1945. The second

book, heavily illustrated, is designed to "show off" the Royal Navy and its personnel to the British public. Strictly comparing the two would not be fair because they were written to achieve dissimilar goals. However, the merit of each makes clear the weakness of the other, and so it is not entirely inappropriate to discuss them in the same review.

Desmond Wettern has produced an extended "discussion" (I cannot say "history") of the fortunes of the Royal Navy since World War II. Sadly, however, his book lacks any organization other than a simple chronological one. Wettern, naval correspondent for *The Daily Telegraph,* has given us a year-by-year review of news stories on the Royal Navy. This is not to say that there is a dearth of interesting material in his book. It is to say what Wettern's editors should have said when they reviewed his manuscript—that such a book needs far tighter organization than any mere chronology can give it. Wettern marches his reader steadily from one year to the next from 1946 through 1970. The years 1971-82, in a chapter rather mysteriously entitled "Epilogue," are taken all at once, in one large gulp.

The same topics are covered again and again because the temporal sequence of the chapters does not allow the author to deal with all the material relevant to a particular topic (such as missile research and development) in one place. As a result, the whole book is confusing unless the reader outlines the continuing, pertinent issues which have affected the Royal Navy over the past 36 years.

And there has been no lack of issues: the proper role of fixed-wing aircraft at sea, the proper contribution of Nato defense, the decline of strength "East of Suez," and the proper balance to be struck between the costs of warships and their numbers—all are covered. These issues, and others, have beset the Royal Navy for nearly two generations. Together, these challenges have frustrated both Conservative and Labour governments and successive Lords of the Admiralty, and they have played havoc with the professional aspirations of the men and women who have made the Royal Navy their career.

Unfortunately, Wettern begins his chronology of decline with an inadequate understanding of Britain's defense problems. After 1945, British seapower declined primarily not from neglect, but because Britain's economy could not sustain both it and a commitment to the ground defense of Nato. Wettern does not seem to understand that a decline was inevitable.

When, in 1952, the British government agreed to maintain an army in Germany, the implication for the future was clear—no longer would Britain be able to afford the size of navy she had once possessed for the protection of her trade and her colonies. Since 1962, with the launching of the first of its SSBNs, Britain's navy has had three uncomplementary missions—(1) keeping open the sea lanes to England in the event of a war between Nato and the Warsaw Pact, (2) protecting British possessions overseas, and (3) maintaining Great Britain's nuclear deterrent. The wonder is not that the conventional surface forces have gradually lost their ability to maintain sufficient British presence in areas distant from the Channel. The wonder is that the realization this would happen was so long in coming.

Where a navy's share of the national wealth actually declines, as it has in Britain, not only must numbers of ships decrease, but spending on research and development must also lag—with potentially hazardous consequences. As

Britain has learned, the danger of reducing the size and diversity of one's fleet can lead others to challenge it, as the Argentines did last spring in the Falklands. This cost/numbers squeeze is not peculiar to the Royal Navy, but its postwar history illustrates how difficult a dilemma it is to overcome. One solution is the reduction of overseas commitments and hence the need for naval presence; another is the abandonment of an all-purpose navy in favor of a force more specialized; yet another is the use of nonnaval forces (such as land-based aviation) for naval missions.

The Royal Navy has tried all of these approaches, but with only qualified success. Given its worldwide commitments, from Hong Kong to Guyana, the British government needs a navy with a long and flexible reach. But Britain cannot afford to keep an army in Germany (to say nothing of another in Northern Ireland), maintain an independent SSBN force, and have a navy able to deter or successfully resist actions such as that by Argentina against the Falklands. Something must give.

Wettern shows us what the Royal Navy has given up; what he does not seem to understand is that *something* had to give, and that the basic problem facing the government and the Admiralty has been and continues to be that of giving away the least military capability in exchange for the greatest financial gain. Even the US Navy now faces this dilemma, and there is a great deal to be learned by critically examining the Royal Navy's experience. It is unfortunate that Wettern's book is so poorly organized that such lessons do not stand out. Only the more stubborn readers will persist long enough to overcome the lack of a topical outline.

Wettern's interest in and familiarity with the Royal Navy is clear to the reader from the author's tone and his comprehensive perspective. Little that happened in the Royal Navy in the years since 1945 is missed. Yet Wettern's book is not based on official documents other than the periodic White Papers presented to Parliament by successive governments. His is not an insider's or scholar's account of the attempts by the Royal Navy to carry out its duties in the face of multiple challenges—technological, financial and political. *The Decline of British Seapower* is also not Wettern's personal memoir of his experiences as a naval correspondent. One can only wish that it were.

Wettern has seen the Royal Navy in action over the course of a variety of campaigns and during scores of routine peacetime missions. Sadly, however, his personal impressions are submerged beneath what amounts to an extended, detailed report of the trials and tribulations of a navy forced to shift missions and shed its grand manner. As history, *The Decline of British Seapower* is poorly organized and incomplete. As journalism, the book fails because it tries too hard to be history.

The Royal Navy, Today and Tomorrow, is an attractive volume with many fine photographs and a short, well written text. Rear Adm. Hill has prepared what amounts to a public relations effort portraying in a positive way the capabilities and personnel of the Royal Navy. The heart of the book is its collection of photographs, many of which show officers and men engaged in the routine but demanding tasks which the peacetime navy of a maritime nation must perform—training, coastal patrol, survey work, lifesaving, maintenance, and housekeeping. The text endeavors to explain what the ships, aircraft, and bases are for, and what the missions of the Royal Navy are—or will be, in the

event of war. Some of the photographs are splendid.

The text, though short and perhaps—given the June 1981 White Paper on Britain's defense program—a bit too optimistic about the future of the surface forces, is nonetheless clear and informative. However, Admiral Hill does not deal candidly with the issues which force themselves on any reader who plows through *The Decline of British Seapower*. He can be forgiven for being over-optimistic. As Wettern's book shows, however, the issues which have dogged the Royal Navy since 1945 cannot be avoided or taken as "standard" ones for which a solution will inevitably be found.

THOMAS C. HONE
Arlington, Virginia

Moore, Captain John, RN, ed. *Jane's Naval Review*. London: Janes' Publishing Company Limited, 1982. 160pp.

This set of essays is the second in what should be a long and useful series of annual publications. As stated in the publisher's note, "The first compilation in this series, published in October 1981, was issued under the title *Jane's Naval Annual 1981-82*." No reason for the change is offered.

Those familiar with Captain John Moore's unique perspective on world politics and naval hardware will find much to enjoy in this thin, glossy and photo-filled book. In the articles he wrote and, to a lesser extent, in the rest that he edited, one finds the expected supranational idealism. The cover, a photograph of one Royal Navy frigate burning in Falkland Sound, acts as a headline for three of these 22 collected essays which deal with the Royal Navy's and Royal Marines' demanding tasks in the summer of 1982. Regrettably, the articles are superficial, reflecting the urgency with which they must have been rushed into print for this volume. Of most interest to readers who have studied the tactical interactions is an article entitled "Conflict and Commerce" by Andrew Ambrose. This lists the seventy-one merchant ships which took part in the Falklands campaign and describes some of the modifications made to major contributors.

There are three essays by US Navy authors, two of them previously published, one on "The Law of the Sea" by Secretary Lehman and the other "The Case for Big Carriers" by ex-CNO Admiral T.B. Hayward; the third is a thorough sitrep on the balance of power in the Mediterranean by Admiral W.J. Crowe, CinCSouth. Beyond these, the essays move about the world's oceans, examining navies by region. Others look at naval and possible future platforms in several warfare areas. The reader is given a pictorial and verbal survey of such topics as: "Coastguards of the World"; "Sea-Skimmer, Ship-Killer"; "Airships in theNaval Role"; "The Chinese Navy: The Race for Modernisation"; "Japan: A Naval Giant Stirs"; "French Naval Deployment in the 1980s"; "NATO's Destroyer and Frigate Programmes"; and so forth.

This is a glossy little sampler of material from volumes of Jane's publications and from other sources. There is not much original and little that is thought-provoking, but its convenient size, colorful cover, and editor's fame will probably make it an addition to many bookshelves or coffee tables this year.

D.G. CLARK
Captain, US Navy

Smith, Peter C. *The History of Dive Bombing*. Annapolis, Md.: Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1982. 253pp. $17.95

This is less a history of dive bombing

as a technique to achieve a special purpose than it is a chronicle of dive bomber types and operations spread across a timeline of 1920-1960. The author makes an effort to transcend the parochialism of "nuts & bolts" but it is not successful. The scene is filled with airplanes; superficial technology befogs technique; form tends to obscure function. The result is an interesting package of quasi-vignettes which fail to attain focus.

The author is English, has performed intensive research in British archives, and most interesting is his illumination of the British Air Ministry's iron-headed resistance to the dive bomber and the guerrilla war waged against it within Britain's aviation bureaucracy. The Air Marshals preferred to devote resources to building aerial battleships for the waging of war against cities to an instrument that would clear the way for the advance of ground forces—those "lesser breeds without the Law." However, the author fails to perceive this same ideology of a "Chosen People" acting according to the Holy Writ of "Airpower" at work within the US Army Air Forces.

Although there were ephemeral "firsts" during World War I the US Navy and Marines are duly credited with developing dive bombing. But the account given here is rather thin, superficial, and not without errors. The late Felix Stump (1894-1968; Naval Academy class of 1917) would be surprised to know that he made vice admiral as early as 1926.

The book's most serious flaw is typical of most books which treat with such a romantic machine as the military airplane: there is no substantial discussion of the ordnance used. Here is a book about dive *bombing* which is all about dive *bombers* which does practically nothing to enlighten the reader about the *bomb*. And this is one case in which we know that the egg came before the chicken; it was the limitations of the contemporary bomb and the unsatisfactory results of other forms of bombing which inspired the diving delivery.

The text is served by some thirty photos but there are no maps and a book which treats with this subject cries out for them. This is a nice book; it is filled with useful information, all documented by way of providing further references, and it has undisputed utility for anyone interested in the subject. But the reader is left to the labor of pulling together these diverse data to determine what their sum may be worth, and on this point it falls short of being the good book it should have been.

RICHARD K. SMITH
Washington, D.C.

Bamford, James. *The Puzzle Palace: A Report on NSA, America's Most Secret Agency*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982. 465pp. $16.95

Within the past year there has been a rash of "docudramas" on TV which have drawn mixed reviews. These shows are the TV equivalent of the historical novel. They provide a fictionalized version of a famous person's life or a historical event, combining enough fiction with fact to keep the viewers' attention for the time allotted. This format, which leaves it to the viewer to sort out the facts from the fiction, has drawn substantial criticism, especially from the persons depicted in the shows.

Mr. Bamford's book is very reminiscent of those shows. It is interesting but one strongly suspects it bears only passing resemblance to the truth. The one advantage the author enjoys over the TV docudramas' writers is NSA's strict policy of "No comment." Indeed NSA's

public refutation of the obvious (and not so obvious) gross distortions contained in various recurring open source reports, including this book, would most assuredly open up a whole new series of questions that would, inevitably and ultimately, lead right back to the NSA "No comment" response required to safeguard vital national secrets. Thus NSA's "No comment" policy makes eminent sense. By neither confirming nor denying anything NSA gives no assistance whatsoever to foreign intelligence operations; operations that, it must be safe to assume, are targeted against "the United States' most secret intelligence agency."

Although Mr. Bamford does not mention it either in the book or on the flyleaf, some of the reviews have indicated that he served as a clerk with an organization associated with NSA. It appears that Mr. Bamford noted every wild rumor he ever heard while having at least partial access to NSA's secrets and, years later, decided to cash in on them by writing a book. Internal evidence within the book supports that theory. Even a cursory investigation of open source information shows that some of the systems he highlights have been out of service for almost ten years. Additionally, some of what he says is, as any freshman electrical engineering student knows, technically impossible or at least highly inaccurate.

With those thoughts in mind, I am embarrassed for our national press. Hailed in the media as a "great revelation," closer examination reveals that very few of the alleged "facts" are new. Such publications as *The Village Voice, The Berkeley Barb, Rolling Stone* and *Ramparts* have, for years, been printing exposes of America's intelligence organizations and operations. These are filled with many of the same unverified suppositions and unverifiable "facts." What is new about this book is Mr. Bamford's contention that NSA conducts technical surveillance on many Americans and will soon be able to commence spying on *ALL* Americans, if it is not already doing so. He is not sure it is being done now but he has little faith in our legal system, especially as it pertains to NSA, and is not hopeful for individual privacy. Much of what he says is conjecture; however, it is conjecture that, if not read carefully, will be taken as statements of fact. That conjecture paints NSA as the most efficient organization in the US government, if not the world. (Although given the civil libertarian tone Mr. Bamford employs he would be quick to say NSA is most inefficient.) However, NSA would have to be that efficient to do all of the things Mr. Bamford says it does. Common sense indicates that it would take many times more than the 50,000 plus personnel NASA is reported to employ to "spy" on every American, much less every Russian, Chinese, etc., etc., worldwide. Indeed, technology might give someone the capability to eavesdrop on all telephone calls worldwide but it still would require people to process the information collected. Even rough "back of the envelope" calculations show the size of that problem. This does not even take into account the fact that it is illegal for any US government agency to spy on Americans except in a very few, very narrowly defined exceptions requiring very high level approval. Admiral Stansfield Turner, former Director, Central Intelligence Agency, recently outlined many of those strictures most clearly in his article "Intelligence: The Right Rules" which appeared in the Fall 1982 issue of *Foreign Policy*.

The book may, in fact, serve one useful purpose. As a former ranking member of NSA put it: "His (Bamford's

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story) is so full of 'almost' facts that it can help to serve as 'disinformation.' I truly believe it may serve an unintended but psuedo-useful purpose—namely, to further confuse the concepts of what NSA really does and how the intelligence community really interacts. If some of this concerns the Russians and others who are our opponents, it will be great!"

The book is interesting reading, especially, if one is a fan of high-tech spy novels; but it clearly should be placed in the historical fiction section of the library. Indeed, one suspects that, given the pace of technological progress, even the accurate portions of the book are significantly out-of-date.

G. GUY THOMAS
Lieutenant Commander, US Navy

Shusterich, Kurt Michael. *Resource Management and the Oceans: The Political Economy of Deep Seabed Mining.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. 344pp. $22.50

This book is timely. Deep seabed resources, principally the manganese nodules on the ocean floor, are at the heart of the decision of the US Government not to sign, much less to submit for ratification to Congress, the new Law of the Sea Treaty. This decision may mean as much for North-South relations in the next decades as the choice of the United States not to join the League of Nations meant for internarional relations in the decades between the World Wars. *Resource Management and the Oceans* begins to help us understand and perhaps doubt the reasons for the United States' refusal to adhere to the Law of the Sea Treaty.

The central contribution of the book is the third of its seven chapters, entitled "Mining the Deep Seabed: A Complex and Innovative Industry." What stands out here first is how uncertain are the prospects for deep seabed mining, regardless of any Treaty provisions. Shusterich writes: "The greatest difficulties in ocean mining appear to lie in the pronounced economic uncertainties of prices in the next ten to thirty years, the uncertainty of energy costs involved, and tho unknown capital equipment and construction costs in six to ten years." Shusterich paints a picture of an American seabed mining indusrry, not only beset by price and cost problems, but uncertain of securing bank financing, possibly needing government support, perhaps even government acting as a joint venturer, and, in any case, retrenching while companies from other nations expand. That the United States has endangered so much (e.g., limits on territorial seas and transit through straits) for such a doubtful cause (seabed mining) is the book's poignant lesson.

The rest of the book contributes only a little information not already easily available. Chapters one, two, and seven have largely to do with US Government policy making towards ocean issues. Shusterich acknowledges the "excellent historical account of the United Nations Law of the Sea Conferences and their interaction with United States foreign policy" in Ann L. Hollick's *United States Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea* (1981), a work I was fortunate to review for this journal a year and a half ago. Indeed, the Hollick book renders new scholarship difficult; here, at least, hers, not Shusterich's, is the better account of US policy development.

Chapters four, five, and six concern international political and economic aspects of the Law of the Sea negotiations and present some "precedents for other global commons" (e.g., Antarctica and Outer Space). While competent, this

part of the book relies heavily on secondary sources. It is probably too academic for an introduction to the subject, but not sufficiently original for most advanced readers.

The other side of the coin is, as discussed above, Shusterich's treatment of the problems and prospects of the ocean mining industry. This is the important aspect of his book. It makes interesting, if not optimistic, reading about that section of our ocean interests that has, apparently, undercut the rest.

M.W. JANIS
Cornell Law School

Quandt, William B. *Saudi Arabia in the 1980s, Foreign Policy, Security, and Oil.* Washington: Brookings Institution, 1981. 190pp. $22.95 paper $8.95

Drawing upon his experience as a member of the President's National Security Council staff responsible for Middle East affairs, William B. Quandt has written a useful primer on Saudi-American relations. The book has all the virtues of a well-written government briefing paper prepared for senior policy-makers—it is succinct, objective, and concentrates on those factors most likely to affect the bilateral relationship in the near future. In short, it is the perfect compact volume to pack into your attaché case if you suddenly find yourself appointed to negotiate with the Saudis and have to become an instant expert.

Now a senior fellow in the Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies program, Quandt has largely avoided the temptation to include in this work the inside information he was privy to as a result of his presence on the National Security Council staff, although there is a tantalizing mention of the reported role of the French in helping to recapture the Mecca mosque from Moslem extremists in November 1979. Predictions, recommendations, and conclusions are frequently included without the additional supporting material one might find in a more scholarly type work. Nonetheless, it is difficult to dispute the author's choice of material or his findings. His footnotes and selective bibliography point the way for readers interested in additional study.

Saudi Arabia in the 1980s is divided into three parts dealing, respectively, with the threat to the Kingdom from abroad, with the manner in which the Saudi domestic system copes with the threat and, lastly, with the American connection. Each is so well done that it is unfair to attempt to characterize one as better than the others. Among the interesting material Quandt draws to the attention of the reader is Saudi Arabia's seemingly deliberate decision not to increase its oil production capacity from the current 10.5 million barrels per day to 14 to 16 million barrels in order to avoid the unwelcome pressure which it fears would come from the West seeking to use it to break the OPEC monopoly and from its OPEC partners demanding ironclad guarantees that this would not happen.

As befits the Kingdom's status as the source of vitally needed oil for the West, the author devotes considerable attention to the question of Saudi Arabia's stability. He discounts the likelihood during the present decade of a threat to national unity arising from a succession crisis or from the large community of foreign workers, estimated at almost 2 million. A military coup by disgruntled officers, he views as a serious threat to the regime, but as far from inevitable.

For Americans accustomed to viewing the Camp David Peace Accords between Egypt and Israel as a major triumph, Quandt performs a useful service by depicting them as they appeared to Saudi

eyes . . . as an unwelcome development requiring that Riyadh choose between its commitments to the Arab states and its ties with Washington. Under the circumstances, there was little doubt that the Saudis would opt to disappoint the American government. Indeed, a clear thread running through the book is the limited ability either the United States or Saudi Arabia has to substantially influence the other's major policy decisions. Quandt stresses in his conclusions the importance for the United States to realize that despite their wealth the Saudis are really not a first-rate power and that Washington will fail if we attempt to press Riyadh to go beyond the consensus reached by the Arab nations on any important issue. Similarly, he emphasizes that Saudi Arabia's future will largely be determined by its relationship with the United States and that this fact can be ignored in America only at our peril.

In sum, this book is a useful contribution to the available literature on Saudi-American relations. While probably of modest value to the scholar, it would be of interest to the general reader as an introduction to the subject and of particular importance to policy-making officials and to those that advise them.

BENSON L. GRAYSON
Middle East Horizons

Plascov, Avi. *Security in the Persian Gulf: Modernization, Political Development and Stability*. Totowa, N.J.: Allenheld, Osmun, 1982. 183pp. $10

Avi Plascov's aim is to assess the nature and magnitude of domestic sources of couflict. Quite rightly, he both perceives Islam as forming the pillar of legitimacy within states of the Persian Gulf and places it as a potentially destabilizing force in the Gulf. It is only since the Iranian Revolution that the danger of instability to existing regimes through Islamic fundamentalist movements has gained momentum.

The introduction of modernization, which entails Westernization, threatens Islam's legitimacy, and this has led to fervent reactions. Events such as the Grand Mosque Incident (1979) in Saudi Arabia are protests against the secularization of the ruling dynasty.

The many growing pains of modernization in traditional societies circle around the relationship between the regime and its subjects. The course of changing a predominantly rural society into an urban industrial one causes extreme difficulty, especially for the masses, in reconciling spiritual fundamentalism with materialism.

To conclude, the author asks whether free economic enterprises can be both divorced from notions of Western political order and avoid being pushed towards revolutionary Marxism or reactionary Islam. He uses the example of Iran to warn the West that it could be forced to deal with hostility in the Gulf toward Western-implemented industrialization.

ALVIN J. COTTRELL
Washington, D.C.

Levie, Howard S. *Protection of War Victims: Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions*. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, v. III, 1980, 565pp., v. IV, 1981, 535pp. $45 apiece

Roberts, Adam, and Guelff, Richard, eds. *Documents on the Laws of War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. 498pp. $34.50 paper $17.95

The first books are the concluding volumes of Professor Levie's compilation of the negotiating record of the diplomatic conference which, meeting in Geneva from 1974 to 1977, produced two protocols additional to the Geneva

Conventions of 12 August 1949. Protocol I is an effort to update the law applicable in international armed conflicts, some of which has not been recast since the Hague conferences at the turn of the century. The reader need only consider the myriad technological advances that have occurred in that same time frame to recognize the extent to which the law has lagged behind; inasmuch as Protocol I does not address naval warfare, except as it directly impacts on land operations, the task is not complete. Protocol II addresses the issue of internal armed conflicts. Neither Protocol II nor the meetings of an ad hoc committee on conventional weapons are covered in Professor Levie's volumes; the future of the former appears limited, while the latter was superseded by a United Nations conference on conventional weapons, held in Geneva from 1978 to 1980, which produced a treaty of limited scope dealing with that subject. Volumes I and II of *Protection of War Victims* were reviewed in the November-December 1980 *Review*.

Howard Levie, former holder of the Charles Stockton Chair of International Law at the Naval War College, has taken the vast (17-volume) record of the negotiation history of Protocol I and arranged it in order by article, providing the future researcher inestimable time savings and substantially less grey hair as a result. Volumes I and II deal with the general provisions of Protocol I: the wounded, sick and shipwrecked; medical personnel and transportation; and the initial articles regarding prisoners of war. Volume III contains those articles considered to be at the heart of Protocol 1, dealing with general protection of the civilian population against the effects of hostilities. It also has the history of the controversial article on mercenaries, and new provisions for civil defense personnel and organizations. Volume IV reproduces the negotiating record for those provisions relating to the civilian population, journalists, and enforcement and implementation.

The 1977 Protocols were signed by the United States on 12 December 1977. The detailed military review necessary prior to a decision by the United States as to whether the President should seek the advice and consent of the Senate as to ratification was delayed until 1981 owing to the immediate commencement of the previously mentioned conventional weapons negotiations. Having had the responsibility for writing much of that review, I can speak from experience in saying that Professor Levie's four volumes are worth their weight in gold given the time savings they represent. They will be a great source to future students of this complex area of the law.

The volume produced by Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff was undertaken with the same philosophy as that which led to Professor Levie's effort; to simplify to the extent possible the confusing subject known as the law of war. Instead of reproducing all law of war treaties and related documents, they have selected only those they believe to be of continuing value. One may quarrel with the relevancy of some of the documents they have included; for example, the long-rejected 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare, or the 1978 International Committee of the Red Cross Fundamental Rules of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, neither of which is binding on the nations of the world. These are matters upon which reasonable men may disagree, however, and the volume generally represents a worthwhile compilation of the pertinent law of war documents.

Similar volumes exist, some of which

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are official and, therefore, free to a member of the armed services. But they are incomplete or combined with other international law materials, adding up to a cumbersome package. Other private volumes are more comprehensive, but also prohibitive in cost. Most contain treaties long out of date, and therefore of interest only to a few people; none are as up-to-date as Roberts & Guelff. In addition to the hardcover edition, Roberts & Guelff is available in an inexpensive softcover edition. Few A-18 pilots will wish to weight themselves down with it, but it should be indispensable to a judge advocate in deployed assignment.

With one exception. During the recent Falklands conflict, British and Argentine forces, with the able assistance of a representative of the international Committee of the Red Cross, were close to reaching an agreement on a neutralized zone for the civilians in Port Stanley, as provided for in the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Had the judge advocate who accompanied the British forces been relying on Roberts-Guelff to provide him with the form for a draft agreement, as is available in Annex I to the civilians convention, he would have been chagrined to find that the annexes to the 1949 Geneva Conventions were deleted from Roberts-Guelff to save costs. One hopes this decision will be reversed on printing of a second edition.

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Recent Books

Selected Accessions of the Naval War College Library

Annotated by

George Scheck, Mary Ann Varoutsos, and Jane Viti

Alexandersson, Gunnar. *The Baltic Straits*. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982. 132pp. $32.50
The United Nations Law of the Sea Conference has served to focus attention on several important narrows of the world's oceans. One of these, the Baltic Straits, has long played an important role in the history of Europe. Alexandersson describes the physical, economic, and political aspects of the Baltic, and traces its history in terms of its legal status and strategic importance to the world's trade and navies. Due to their strategic and economic importance, the Baltic Straits will continue as an area of contention, not only among the littoral states, but among the superpowers as well.

Ben-Horin, Yoav and Posen, Barry. *Israel's Strategic Doctrine*. R-2845-NA. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1981. 53pp. paper $7.50
Defined as a "central core of generally shared organizing ideas," strategic doctrine in the state of Israel is surveyed here. The report is based on earlier studies of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), the writings of Israeli civil and military decisionmakers, past Israeli practice, and the current force posture. The authors focus on conditioning factors such as geography, population, economic resources, and several other assets