

1983

The Puzzle Palace

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Recommended Citation

Thomas, G.Guy (1983) "The Puzzle Palace," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 36 : No. 2 , Article 21.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss2/21>

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as a technique to achieve a special purpose than it is a chronicle of dive bomber types and operations spread across a timeline of 1920-1960. The author makes an effort to transcend the parochialism of "nuts & bolts" but it is not successful. The scene is filled with airplanes; superficial technology befogs technique; form tends to obscure function. The result is an interesting package of quasi-vignettes which fail to attain focus.

The author is English, has performed intensive research in British archives, and most interesting is his illumination of the British Air Ministry's iron-headed resistance to the dive bomber and the guerrilla war waged against it within Britain's aviation bureaucracy. The Air Marshals preferred to devote resources to building aerial battleships for the waging of war against cities to an instrument that would clear the way for the advance of ground forces—those "lesser breeds without the Law." However, the author fails to perceive this same ideology of a "Chosen People" acting according to the Holy Writ of "Air-power" at work within the US Army Air Forces.

Although there were ephemeral "firsts" during World War I the US Navy and Marines are duly credited with developing dive bombing. But the account given here is rather thin, superficial, and not without errors. The late Felix Stump (1894-1968; Naval Academy class of 1917) would be surprised to know that he made vice admiral as early as 1926.

The book's most serious flaw is typical of most books which treat with such a romantic machine as the military airplane: there is no substantial discussion of the ordnance used. Here is a book about dive bombing which is all about dive bombers which does practically nothing to

enlighten the reader about the bomb. And this is one case in which we know that the egg came before the chicken; it was the limitations of the contemporary bomb and the unsatisfactory results of other forms of bombing which inspired the diving delivery.

The text is served by some thirty photos but there are no maps and a book which treats with this subject cries out for them. This is a nice book; it is filled with useful information, all documented by way of providing further references, and it has undisputed utility for anyone interested in the subject. But the reader is left to the labor of pulling together these diverse data to determine what their sum may be worth, and on this point it falls short of being the good book it should have been.

RICHARD K. SMITH
Washington, D.C.

Bamford, James. *The Puzzle Palace: A Report on NSA, America's Most Secret Agency*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982. 465pp. \$16.95

Within the past year there has been a rash of "docudramas" on TV which have drawn mixed reviews. These shows are the TV equivalent of the historical novel. They provide a fictionalized version of a famous person's life or a historical event, combining enough fiction with fact to keep the viewers' attention for the time allotted. This format, which leaves it to the viewer to sort out the facts from the fiction, has drawn substantial criticism, especially from the persons depicted in the shows.

Mr. Bamford's book is very reminiscent of those shows. It is interesting but one strongly suspects it bears only passing resemblance to the truth. The one advantage the author enjoys over the TV docudramas' writers is NSA's strict policy of "No comment." Indeed NSA's

public refutation of the obvious (and not so obvious) gross distortions contained in various recurring open source reports, including this book, would most assuredly open up a whole new series of questions that would, inevitably and ultimately, lead right back to the NSA "No comment" response required to safeguard vital national secrets. Thus NSA's "No comment" policy makes eminent sense. By neither confirming nor denying anything NSA gives no assistance whatsoever to foreign intelligence operations; operations that, it must be safe to assume, are targeted against "the United States' most secret intelligence agency."

Although Mr. Bamford does not mention it either in the book or on the flyleaf, some of the reviews have indicated that he served as a clerk with an organization associated with NSA. It appears that Mr. Bamford noted every wild rumor he ever heard while having at least partial access to NSA's secrets and, years later, decided to cash in on them by writing a book. Internal evidence within the book supports that theory. Even a cursory investigation of open source information shows that some of the systems he highlights have been out of service for almost ten years. Additionally, some of what he says is, as any freshman electrical engineering student knows, technically impossible or at least highly inaccurate.

With those thoughts in mind, I am embarrassed for our national press. Hailed in the media as a "great revelation," closer examination reveals that very few of the alleged "facts" are new. Such publications as *The Village Voice*, *The Berkeley Barb*, *Rolling Stone* and *Ramparts* have, for years, been printing exposes of America's intelligence organizations and operations. These are filled with many of the same unverified suppositions and

unverifiable "facts." What is new about this book is Mr. Bamford's contention that NSA conducts technical surveillance on many Americans and will soon be able to commence spying on ALL Americans, if it is not already doing so. He is not sure it is being done now but he has little faith in our legal system, especially as it pertains to NSA, and is not hopeful for individual privacy. Much of what he says is conjecture; however, it is conjecture that, if not read carefully, will be taken as statements of fact. That conjecture paints NSA as the most efficient organization in the US government, if not the world. (Although given the civil libertarian tone Mr. Bamford employs he would be quick to say NSA is most inefficient.) However, NSA would have to be that efficient to do all of the things Mr. Bamford says it does. Common sense indicates that it would take many times more than the 50,000 plus personnel NASA is reported to employ to "spy" on every American, much less every Russian, Chinese, etc., etc., worldwide. Indeed, technology might give someone the capability to eavesdrop on all telephone calls worldwide but it still would require people to process the information collected. Even rough "back of the envelope" calculations show the size of that problem. This does not even take into account the fact that it is illegal for any US government agency to spy on Americans except in a very few, very narrowly defined exceptions requiring very high level approval. Admiral Stansfield Turner, former Director, Central Intelligence Agency, recently outlined many of those strictures most clearly in his article "Intelligence: The Right Rules" which appeared in the Fall 1982 issue of *Foreign Policy*.

The book may, in fact, serve one useful purpose. As a former ranking member of NSA put it: "His (Bamford's

story) is so full of 'almost' facts that it can help to serve as 'disinformation.' I truly believe it may serve an unintended but psuedo-useful purpose—namely, to further confuse the concepts of what NSA really does and how the intelligence community really interacts. If some of this concerns the Russians and others who are our opponents, it will be great!"

The book is interesting reading, especially, if one is a fan of high-tech spy novels; but it clearly should be placed in the historical fiction section of the library. Indeed, one suspects that, given the pace of technological progress, even the accurate portions of the book are significantly out-of-date.

G. GUY THOMAS

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Shusterich, Kurt Michael. *Resource Management and the Oceans: The Political Economy of Deep Seabed Mining*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. 344pp. \$22.50

This book is timely. Deep seabed resources, principally the manganese nodules on the ocean floor, are at the heart of the decision of the US Government not to sign, much less to submit for ratification to Congress, the new Law of the Sea Treaty. This decision may mean as much for North-South relations in the next decades as the choice of the United States not to join the League of Nations meant for international relations in the decades between the World Wars. *Resource Management and the Oceans* begins to help us understand and perhaps doubt the reasons for the United States' refusal to adhere to the Law of the Sea Treaty.

The central contribution of the book is the third of its seven chapters, entitled "Mining the Deep Seabed: A Complex and Innovative Industry."

What stands out here first is how

uncertain are the prospects for deep seabed mining, regardless of any Treaty provisions. Shusterich writes: "The greatest difficulties in ocean mining appear to lie in the pronounced economic uncertainties of prices in the next ten to thirty years, the uncertainty of energy costs involved, and the unknown capital equipment and construction costs in six to ten years." Shusterich paints a picture of an American seabed mining industry, not only beset by price and cost problems, but uncertain of securing bank financing, possibly needing government support, perhaps even government acting as a joint venturer, and, in any case, retrenching while companies from other nations expand. That the United States has endangered so much (e.g., limits on territorial seas and transit through straits) for such a doubtful cause (seabed mining) is the book's poignant lesson.

The rest of the book contributes only a little information not already easily available. Chapters one, two, and seven have largely to do with US Government policy making towards ocean issues. Shusterich acknowledges the "excellent historical account of the United Nations Law of the Sea Conferences and their interaction with United States foreign policy" in Ann L. Hollick's *United States Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea* (1981), a work I was fortunate to review for this journal a year and a half ago. Indeed, the Hollick book renders new scholarship difficult; here, at least, hers, not Shusterich's, is the better account of US policy development.

Chapters four, five, and six concern international political and economic aspects of the Law of the Sea negotiations and present some "precedents for other global commons" (e.g., Antarctica and Outer Space). While competent, this