

1983

Resource Management and the Oceans: The Political Economy of Deep Seabed Mining

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Recommended Citation

Janis, M.W. (1983) "Resource Management and the Oceans: The Political Economy of Deep Seabed Mining," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 36 : No. 2 , Article 22.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss2/22>

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story) is so full of 'almost' facts that it can help to serve as 'disinformation.' I truly believe it may serve an unintended but psuedo-useful purpose—namely, to further confuse the concepts of what NSA really does and how the intelligence community really interacts. If some of this concerns the Russians and others who are our opponents, it will be great!"

The book is interesting reading, especially, if one is a fan of high-tech spy novels; but it clearly should be placed in the historical fiction section of the library. Indeed, one suspects that, given the pace of technological progress, even the accurate portions of the book are significantly out-of-date.

G. GUY THOMAS
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Shusterich, Kurt Michael. *Resource Management and the Oceans: The Political Economy of Deep Seabed Mining*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. 344pp. \$22.50

This book is timely. Deep seabed resources, principally the manganese nodules on the ocean floor, are at the heart of the decision of the US Government not to sign, much less to submit for ratification to Congress, the new Law of the Sea Treaty. This decision may mean as much for North-South relations in the next decades as the choice of the United States not to join the League of Nations meant for international relations in the decades between the World Wars. *Resource Management and the Oceans* begins to help us understand and perhaps doubt the reasons for the United States' refusal to adhere to the Law of the Sea Treaty.

The central contribution of the book is the third of its seven chapters, entitled "Mining the Deep Seabed: A Complex and Innovative Industry."

What stands out here first is how

uncertain are the prospects for deep seabed mining, regardless of any Treaty provisions. Shusterich writes: "The greatest difficulties in ocean mining appear to lie in the pronounced economic uncertainties of prices in the next ten to thirty years, the uncertainty of energy costs involved, and the unknown capital equipment and construction costs in six to ten years." Shusterich paints a picture of an American seabed mining industry, not only beset by price and cost problems, but uncertain of securing bank financing, possibly needing government support, perhaps even government acting as a joint venturer, and, in any case, retrenching while companies from other nations expand. That the United States has endangered so much (e.g., limits on territorial seas and transit through straits) for such a doubtful cause (seabed mining) is the book's poignant lesson.

The rest of the book contributes only a little information not already easily available. Chapters one, two, and seven have largely to do with US Government policy making towards ocean issues. Shusterich acknowledges the "excellent historical account of the United Nations Law of the Sea Conferences and their interaction with United States foreign policy" in Ann L. Hollick's *United States Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea* (1981), a work I was fortunate to review for this journal a year and a half ago. Indeed, the Hollick book renders new scholarship difficult; here, at least, hers, not Shusterich's, is the better account of US policy development.

Chapters four, five, and six concern international political and economic aspects of the Law of the Sea negotiations and present some "precedents for other global commons" (e.g., Antarctica and Outer Space). While competent, this

part of the book relies heavily on secondary sources. It is probably too academic for an introduction to the subject, but not sufficiently original for most advanced readers.

The other side of the coin is, as discussed above, Shusterich's treatment of the problems and prospects of the ocean mining industry. This is the important aspect of his book. It makes interesting, if not optimistic, reading about that section of our ocean interests that has, apparently, undercut the rest.

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Quandt, William B. *Saudi Arabia in the 1980s, Foreign Policy, Security, and Oil*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1981. 190pp. \$22.95 paper \$8.95

Drawing upon his experience as a member of the President's National Security Council staff responsible for Middle East affairs, William B. Quandt has written a useful primer on Saudi-American relations. The book has all the virtues of a well-written government briefing paper prepared for senior policy-makers—it is succinct, objective, and concentrates on those factors most likely to affect the bilateral relationship in the near future. In short, it is the perfect compact volume to pack into your attaché case if you suddenly find yourself appointed to negotiate with the Saudis and have to become an instant expert.

Now a senior fellow in the Brookings Institution Foreign Policy Studies program, Quandt has largely avoided the temptation to include in this work the inside information he was privy to as a result of his presence on the National Security Council staff, although there is a tantalizing mention of the reported role of the French in helping to recapture the Mecca mosque from Muslim

extremists in November 1979. Predictions, recommendations, and conclusions are frequently included without the additional supporting material one might find in a more scholarly type work. Nonetheless, it is difficult to dispute the author's choice of material or his findings. His footnotes and selective bibliography point the way for readers interested in additional study.

Saudi Arabia in the 1980s is divided into three parts dealing, respectively, with the threat to the Kingdom from abroad, with the manner in which the Saudi domestic system copes with the threat and, lastly, with the American connection. Each is so well done that it is unfair to attempt to characterize one as better than the others. Among the interesting material Quandt draws to the attention of the reader is Saudi Arabia's seemingly deliberate decision not to increase its oil production capacity from the current 10.5 million barrels per day to 14 to 16 million barrels in order to avoid the unwelcome pressure which it fears would come from the West seeking to use it to break the OPEC monopoly and from its OPEC partners demanding ironclad guarantees that this would not happen.

As befits the Kingdom's status as the source of vitally needed oil for the West, the author devotes considerable attention to the question of Saudi Arabia's stability. He discounts the likelihood during the present decade of a threat to national unity arising from a succession crisis or from the large community of foreign workers, estimated at almost 2 million. A military coup by disgruntled officers, he views as a serious threat to the regime, but as far from inevitable.

For Americans accustomed to viewing the Camp David Peace Accords between Egypt and Israel as a major triumph, Quandt performs a useful service by depicting them as they appeared to Saudi