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Western Security: A Japanese Point of View

by
Yukio Satoh*

How to restructure the modality of cooperation for Western security acutely concerns Western industrialized democracies, including Japan. The shift of the US-Soviet military balance from one of American supremacy to one of ambiguous equilibrium, with its profound implications for the security perceptions of the United States and her allies, is the most fundamental though not the sole development arousing such concern. A growing sense of insecurity in the Western world stems from such other factors as: the destabilizing impact that situations in the Third World could have on Western security; and the prospective interactions between differing dimensions of Western defense, such as Western Europe and East Asia, that were hitherto dealt with separately. Yet, here too, the prospects in Western security planning are aggravated by the perceived deterioration of the US-Soviet military balance. This includes the apparent shortage of American military resources to deal with concurrent military crises, increased Soviet capability in real and relative terms to check American military operations in the protection of Western security interests, and the growth of the Soviet ability to project power to the strategically vital areas in the Third World.

Consequently, the priority of security cooperation within the Western alliance, the Atlantic Alliance and the Japanese-US alliance in particular, is rightly focused on improving Western defense against increased Soviet military might. Attempts to expand such cooperation are now under way in the form of studies on the security implications of East-West economic relations and on the steps to control the transfer of advanced technology to the Soviet Union. However, the progress of defense preparations is slow and cooperation in other areas is not readily forthcoming. Instead, the process of coordinating the policies of the Western nations is bringing to the surface differences of perception and preoccupation among the Western nations. Such differences are apparent in every major dimension of Western security; nuclear strategy, conventional defense, diplomacy (political and economic

*This paper reflects the personal views of the author and should not be construed as representing the policy or position of the Japanese foreign office or government.

relations with the Soviet Union), and the protection of Western interests in the Third World.

Nuclear Strategy. The shift of the US-Soviet strategic balance from one of American supremacy to one of perceived parity seems to be having a profound impact on American security perceptions. Although the state of strategic balance between the two superpowers cannot be articulated, the deteriorating trend is apparent. The expanded and improved Soviet nuclear forces now pose a greater than ever threat to American security. The increased vulnerability of the American strategic forces to a Soviet first-strike capability raises questions about the validity of the American concept of deterrence. The preoccupation of American strategic planning therefore has shifted to improving the survivability of the strategic forces. At the same time, it appears that debates on nuclear strategy within the American defense community have become polarized. Those who regard the Soviets as pursuing a goal of nuclear superiority over the United States began to advocate a capability to survive and to deny the Soviets victory in a protracted nuclear war. On the other hand, those who emphasized the need to get arms control negotiations back "on track" began to stress the importance of freezing the superpowers' possession of nuclear weapons, which are regarded as already exceeding the amount necessary for mutual deterrence. Furthermore, antinuclear sentiments began to grow in a fairly broad spectrum of public opinion. Policy elites can no longer claim the monopoly of strategic debates. It appears that Americans cannot agree on how to cope with what they perceive as a deteriorating strategic balance with the Soviet Union. How far the Scowcroft report will work as a catalysis for a new American consensus on nuclear strategy remains yet to be seen. This situation is having an unsettling impact not only on American policy on arms control but seemingly on American military planning in general. It also appears to be affecting overall American policy towards the Soviet Union.

The shift in the strategic balance between the two superpowers is a matter of deep concern for the American allies which rely on the umbrella of American nuclear deterrence. For the shift could imply that the United States would be more hesitant than before to risk a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union for the sake of her allies. The European request in the late 1970s for the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe to counter the SS-20 missiles was a reflection of such anxiety. Yet, at least ostensibly, the American allies are less sympathetic to US perceptions of a deteriorating strategic balance with the Soviet Union. In the midst of managing growing antinuclear sentiments at home and with little involvement in the making of US nuclear strategy, a conceptualized parity is less palatable—at least politically for leaders (let alone the public) of American allies—than little progress in arms control negotiations.

Antinuclear sentiment is more pronounced in Western Europe than in Japan, with significant implications for the alliance relations with the United States. The present antinuclear movements in Western Europe, involving a wide spectrum of public opinion, are affected by what the Europeans consider as American emphasis on nuclear war fighting as well as what they regard as an almost dogmatic anti-Soviet position of the United States. Many West Europeans are concerned over what they see as a saturation of nuclear weapons in Europe. The American concept of nuclear deterrence, which emphasizes the preparedness to fight a nuclear war when deterrence fails, is beginning to lose public acceptance in these countries. That nuclear weapons are widely regarded as morally unacceptable weapons is undercutting further the public acceptance of nuclear strategy. Against this background, the necessity to impress upon the public the need for deploying American nuclear weapons in Europe became a taxing and time-consuming task for the West European governments. Progress in nuclear arms control or, at least, what would be perceived by the Europeans as genuine enthusiasm on the part of the United States for arms control negotiations, is vitally important to West European governments as they try to persuade their publics.

Abhorrence of nuclear weapons in Japan stems from their experience of nuclear holocausts (Hiroshima and Nagasaki). The impact of public sentiment against nuclear weapons on the alliance with the United States is now less dramatic in Japan than in Western Europe. This is primarily because the question of introducing nuclear weapons into Japan is more or less foreclosed by the American respect for Japanese policy, which precludes the introduction of nuclear weapons into their territory. Moreover, nuclear strategy is not in the forefront of public debates regarding the security of the Western Pacific and that the Japanese generally consider a nuclear war between the two superpowers as only a remote possibility, the making of an American nuclear strategy is, therefore, a less acute problem within the Japan-US alliance. Yet, antinuclear sentiment in Japan will be reinforced by the influence of antinuclear movements in Western Europe and the United States.

How to restore public acceptance of the concept of nuclear deterrence is a particularly sensitive issue for the American allies and one for the United States itself. This is a difficult task as excessive information about the weapons would only add to the repugnance on the part of the public to nuclear strategy and, too little knowledge about the reality (particularly Soviet nuclear capability) can only undercut public support for deterrence. Moreover, while the already skeptical public and mass media demand more lucid nuclear policy, a certain degree of ambiguity is inevitable. The strategy itself by definition contains uncertainties and ambiguities. The public's confidence in its own government and the mutual trust between the United States and her allies are the key to restoring the support of any nuclear strategy.

Conventional Defense. The qualitative improvement of Soviet conventional weapons and the increase of her power projection capability in extended areas also pose a serious challenge to American military superiority in global terms. These developments are also making American military support of her allies more costly and more difficult. This has prompted the United States to increase conventional capability as well as to urge her allies to do the same.

It is evident that the American allies need to increase their self-defense capability for the preservation of their own security. Given the increase of the Soviet offensive capabilities and the limitations of American military resources available for the defense of her allies, Western Europe and Japan are now exposed to a greater-than-ever threat from Soviet military power. Furthermore, and as noted earlier, a perceived parity in the US-Soviet strategic balance is blurring the credibility of an American extended nuclear deterrence, an integral part of defense preparations for Western Europe and Japan. Increasing defense spending by major US allies has become a necessity in the name of equity, in meeting the security burdens of Western Europe and Japan.

But, their efforts to date still fall short of US expectations. Economic and financial difficulties are constraining European efforts, although the Europeans have expressed interest in strengthening conventional forces in order to raise the nuclear threshold. In Japan, public opinion prefers a modest rather than a rapid increase of defense spending and, unlike Western Europe, public support for greater conventional defense has yet to be solidified. Tight budget constraints also limit Japanese efforts.

These situations are a frustration for the United States, both for the Administration and Congress. In the past, the congressional pressure for greater defense efforts on the part of the allies was more pronounced in the case of Nato than the Japan-US alliance. Trade imbalances were a preoccupation of Congress in the case of Japan. Recently Congress has become increasingly interested in pressing Japan for greater defense efforts. Given the growing awareness on the part of the American lawmakers that Japan could do more for overall Western security, it is likely that the Congress will take Japan more fully into account as it addresses itself to the question of overall Western defense; particularly such questions as the standardization of weapon systems and the coordination of defense industries. How to manage the American congressional pressure will therefore become a matter of common concern between Western Europe and Japan.

On the other hand, alliance prospects vary between the United States and Japan, and Nato. Most fundamentally, a new Japanese-US consensus on the scope of Japanese defense posture is emerging with little controversy over the US strategy, while Nato is now faced with the problem related to its basic strategy (declining public support for American nuclear strategy). That Japan is to possess a defense posture capable of defending her own territory,

the seas and skies around Japan, and her sealanes to a distance of 1,000 miles is now becoming a mutually accepted midterm goal for Japan's defense buildup. How fast Japan can implement such a program is a problem. Besides, the Japanese-United States defense cooperation is technically less complicated than the one with which Nato is now coping. For example:

- The prospective conventional force structure of the United States, with its emphasis on larger naval forces, is reassuring to Japan. The American concept of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), which implies the possible scarcity of forces available for the defense of Western Europe or Japan, is less worrying to Japan than to Western Europe. Most of the ground forces to be earmarked for the RDF are the ones which would be otherwise primarily available for European defense. The protection of Western interests in the Gulf region, the alleged primary purpose of the RDF, meets Japanese security requirements.

- The standardization of weapon systems is less complex for Japan than is the case of Nato, although the issue is by its own nature difficult to manage. The Japanese Self Defense Force (SDF) is largely dependent upon American-designed weapon systems in the areas where foreign resources are required. The industrial coordination in the area of defense is presumably less problematic between Japan and the United States. Japan with its policy of not exporting arms, is not demanding "two-way traffic," which is a political issue in Nato. The recent Japanese decision to make available Japanese technology for American military use could facilitate future industrial coordination in the defense area.*

The problems for Japan are more political and psychological. Despite Prime Minister Nakasome's much talked about emphasis on stronger defense, Japanese political and public opinions remain skeptical of the wisdom of a rapid defense buildup. While the Japanese are concerned over the deteriorating trend of military balance in regional as well as global terms, they view the Soviet threat in a more narrow geographical perspective and see China as diverting a measure of Soviet strategic attention and resources away from the West. Furthermore, Japanese ambivalence regarding the defense buildup stems from a combination of reasons: such as pacifism prevailing in the public which strongly supports the war-renouncing constitution; a widely held skepticism of military establishment that caused such havoc in World War II and deprived the Japanese people of democracy and freedom; a strong abhorrence of nuclear weapons; a desire for political independence from the United States, the security ties which were once regarded as the symbol of Tokyo's political subjugation to Washington; and so on.**

*International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey, 1982-1983* (London: 1983), p. 105.

**For a more detailed discussion, please see *The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy* (London: IISS, 1983), pp. 31-35.

These sentiments regarding defense will remain persistent within the Japanese political and public opinion. It is only through a time-consuming process of consensus building that the Japanese government can ensure public support for a greater defense buildup. This particular style of decision-making in Japan emphasizes the need of complying with public opinion and contrasts sharply with the American decision-making process. In the United States, and in Europe as well, defense and strategic issues were largely left to the judgment of a limited circle of specialists and policy elites, while public opinion is particularly dominant in defense debates in Japan.*

Slow progress in Japan's defense efforts would have the prospect of further irritating the United States and this can be exacerbated by continuing trade imbalances. On the other hand, strong American pressure for more defense efforts would be counterproductive, particularly at the time when the public acceptance of Prime Minister Nakasome's emphasis on greater defense efforts remains yet to solidify.

Diplomatic Dimension. During the 1970s, the United States' attitude and behavior toward the Soviet Union have become more confrontal and aggressive. An indignation exists against the Soviets for "exploiting" détente as well as using the American preoccupation with Vietnam to build up militarily and exploit opportunities in the Third World. Given the Soviet Union's blatant pursuit of her policy objectives, as demonstrated by the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States is justified in sharply criticizing the Soviet Union. This American attitude has begun to affect their allies' relations with the Soviet Union as the United States stressed the need for concerted efforts to impress upon the Soviets the solidarity of the West. The United States is now attempting to regulate East-West economic relations and the transfer of advanced Western technology to the Soviet Union in order to check the further deterioration of the strategic balance.

Still, there exists a distinct dissimilarity in the attitude of Western Europe, Japan and the United States towards the Soviet Union and this situation has become recently more conspicuous in the case of the Atlantic Alliance. The Western European countries share with the United States a sense of indignation for the Soviets' behavior during the 1970s and the early 1980s. Yet, the West European countries cannot easily abandon the pursuit of détente. The compulsion for closer contacts with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is a built-in ingredient of political, economic and social life in Western Europe, particularly in West Germany. Underlying this need is the West European aspiration for closer relations with the other half of the divided Europe. The prevailing economic recession is making it even more

*For an insightful discussion on this subject see Larry A. Niksch, "Japanese Attitudes Toward Defense and Security Issues," *Naval War College Review*, July-August 1983, pp. 57-73.

difficult for the West European countries to depart from détente, from which economic opportunities are shared by east and west. More fundamentally the West Europeans consider that they can better cope with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe with a combination of "sticks" and "carrots," so they question the wisdom of an American policy which appears in the European eyes to be relying upon the big stick. The Europeans also consider that managing East-West relations requires a long-term approach, and accordingly they consider the Americans' departure from détente as short-sighted. They view the American policy of offering grain to the Soviet Union while forcing the Europeans to suspend the export of pipeline equipment as incoherent. Such American conduct undercuts European sympathy for American policy towards the Soviet Union.

The picture differs in Japan. The Japanese were more reluctant than Western Europe to take a confrontational attitude vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. A fairly wide spectrum of the Japanese public and political opinion supports economic and trade relations with the Soviet Union despite Soviet denial of Japanese claims over the islands off the northern coast of Japan and a long-held Japanese skepticism regarding the intentions of communist neighbors. But the increasingly antagonistic attitude of the Soviet Union toward Japan in recent years, particularly the steps to fortify a part of these Northern Territories in the absence of threat from Japan and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, changed the Japanese perceptions regarding the Soviet Union rather markedly. It created a political atmosphere in which defense efforts against the potential threat from the Soviet Union as well as participation in the western concerted political and economic actions against the Soviet Union could be accepted. Japan too benefited from détente, but the Japanese dependence upon trade with the Soviet Union is small and this makes it less difficult for Japan to restrain economic relations with the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the variances between the Japanese and the American attitudes toward the Soviet Union are now less conspicuous than in the case of the Atlantic Alliance. Nevertheless, the Japanese preference for normal relations with the Soviet Union remains unchanged and the Japanese grumble at what they perceive as a confrontal attitude by Washington.

Security of the Third World. The impact which situations in the Third World can have on the security of Western nations has been highlighted since the oil crisis of 1973. Western interests in the oil rich Gulf region have become more vulnerable since the fall of the pro-Western regime in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This is reflected in the US preoccupation for security of this area. In South East Asia, the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea renewed American attention to the security of the countries of ASEAN (the Association of South East Asian Nations). The American commitment to the defense of South Korea was reaffirmed as President

Reagan welcomed President Chun in Washington as the first head of state to be received in his presidency. The United States also emphasized the gravity of situations in Central America as a manifestation of the East-West confrontation. American preparations to protect the Western interests in the Third World were welcomed by her allies, which do not possess sufficient military means to protect their interests in such extended areas. Yet, at the same time, the diversification of American preoccupation aroused anxiety in her allies over a possible scarcity of American military resources available for their defense. The question became more acute in Europe, where American ground and air forces play a significant part in balancing the military forces of the Warsaw Pact.

Furthermore, the American allies are not in full support of the American approach toward the questions of the Third World. Neither the Europeans nor the Japanese are convinced of the wisdom of depending solely upon military means for ensuring regional security in the Third World. They consider that a combination of efforts, political as well as economic, is necessary to stabilize local situations. (The Japanese, unlike the Americans and the Europeans, even question the wisdom of large-scale military sales to the countries in troubled areas.) While the European countries and Japan possess nonmilitary resources and expertise with which they could contribute to regional stability in the Third World, the Americans appear to be less appreciative of such roles as her allies might expect.

Although these differences of perception regarding regional security in the Third World are not fully articulated, they contribute to the hampering of security cooperation among the Western nations with regard to the Third World. A different priority held by the Western nations regarding the importance of various areas in the Third World also makes such cooperation difficult. To define a Western approach toward regional stability in the Third World in such a way as to combine both military and nonmilitary elements is the key to organizing a division of labor for the preservation of Western interests in the Third World.

Changing Perceptions Regarding Alliance. Changing perceptions regarding the alliance by the United States and her allies are also affecting security cooperation between them. Since the late 1960s the American attitude has gradually changed from one of patronizing the allies to one of sharing the load. This reflects an awareness of the limitation of overall American power and the growth of the West European-Japanese economic capacity and political influence. In recent years, the American attitude has become increasingly egocentric, reflecting American irritation over a perceived less cooperative attitude on the part of her allies. Perhaps it is also the reflection of American domestic conditions: such as economic difficulties, which are making the already inward-looking American public even more

so; the decline of the Presidential authority in contrast with the growth of congressional power, which together make the American foreign policy more self-assertive and less coherent; and the so-called shift of political gravity from the East Coast to the Sun Belt.

On the other hand, the allies' perceptions regarding the United States also changed. Here again, the West European attitude is different from the Japanese. The Europeans, while generally self-assertive vis-à-vis the United States, have maintained a sense of solidarity with the United States since the last World War. But it now appears that the sense of solidarity with the United States has begun to wane. The problem of sustaining European unity and the Europeans' preoccupation with European issues, political as well as economic, are making the linkage between the European and American interests less conspicuous than before. Economic conflicts now cloud relations between the European capitals and Washington. European desire to establish political influence on the international scene prompts moves separate from American initiatives in international politics (the so-called European initiatives on the Middle East, for example). And more fundamentally, cynicism and distrust, and even certain anti-American sentiment has been expressed by a broad spectrum of public and political opinion in Europe. Skeptical attitudes towards the United States are particularly marked among the younger generation whose image of the United States is much prejudiced by Vietnam and Watergate. And the pacifism and antinuclear sentiments that prevail among a broad segment of European public opinion has been translated into skepticism or even into anti-American sentiment. What is perceived in Europe as the lack of a coherent foreign policy on the American part leads European intellectuals and politicians to question the wisdom of following American leadership. Such a phenomenon may not be a new experience in the history of the Atlantic Alliance, but the very fact that a fairly considerable number of Europeans tend to equate the Soviet Union and the United States as a potential cause for a nuclear holocaust symbolically underlines the seriousness of the present situation.

The Japanese too have become increasingly self-assertive. They are seeking political independence from the United States and they react emotionally against pressure from the United States. Overt American pressure on Japan on security issues is particularly counterproductive. Yet, knowing their lack of sufficient capability to defend themselves and their consequent heavy dependence upon American military protection, the Japanese are more diffident than the West Europeans in asserting themselves on security questions. Anti-American sentiment was once vocal in public criticism of Japan-US security arrangement, regarded as a symbol of postwar Japanese subjugation. But it has subsided and Japanese public opinion has shifted to positively support the alliance with the United States. A growing

self-confidence stemming from economic success, which visibly improved the Japanese position on the international scene, is perhaps helping the Japanese to become more pragmatic about dependence upon American military support. The Japanese pursuit of their own identity is more expressive in foreign policy, particularly towards Asia. But here the American need for Japanese cooperation in the area is more conspicuous so Japanese independent initiatives are welcomed by the United States rather than regarded as causes for conflict between the two countries. However, in the area of economic and trade policies conflicts of interest are causing political tension between Japan and the United States. This is a serious question as economic relations and defense commitment could be easily linked in the American politics. Crisis has been so far managed with the help of solid commitment by both governments to the importance of the partnership and, significantly, because the sustained growth of the Japanese economy enabled Japan to afford the adjustments necessary to meet the needs of both partners.

The situation could be different in the future. Japanese pursuit of a more self-reliant defense policy, the aspirations of the Japanese to identify themselves and their affinity with Asia, and their disposition for less confrontational relations with the Soviet Union might cause tension in the alliance politics between Washington and Tokyo. Such a development could receive added momentum should the Japanese lose confidence in American commitment to their security or in the wisdom of American foreign policy. Likewise, problematic economic relations, should they not be managed, could undercut American political support for security ties with Japan. It is a concern that these developments could occur simultaneously and, in affecting each other, exacerbate the picture. More defense efforts and work to improve the future prospects of the economic relations need to be exercised by Japan to avoid such an eventuality. It is equally important that the United States demonstrate more sensitivity to the domestic problems involved in such Japanese efforts.

The Europe-Japan Dimension. The present state of affairs between Western Europe and Japan, coupled with the added dimension of Western security, adds to the complications of restructuring security cooperation among the Western nations. Given the capability and influence of both Western Europe and Japan, the cooperation of these states could no doubt play a significant part in Western efforts to improve overall security. Unfortunately the present state of affairs between these actors does not facilitate a constructive dialogue on security cooperation.

Apart from problematical trade and economic issues, which are charging the relationship with misgivings and antipathy, there is a number of elements that can hinder cooperation between them. First, their knowledge of

each other remains limited (the Europeans are far less informed about Japan than vice versa) because of limited contacts and mutual political ignorance in the postwar period. Furthermore and for the most part, Western European countries and Japan do not hold each other in fair esteem. West European nations, although beginning to appreciate the Japanese position in international politics, remain skeptical of Japanese readiness to share political responsibilities and burdens on the international scene. The Japanese, for their part, generally appear to regard West European countries as economically ailing powers. This situation deprives Western Europe and Japan of incentives for mutual cooperation. Second, in the absence of a politically cohesive framework for cooperation and organized systems for consultation, like the ones in the Atlantic Alliance and the Japan-US partnership, the relationship between Western Europe and Japan lacks sufficient mechanisms and opportunities for policy coordination. Third, differences in foreign policy perspectives between Western Europe and Japan make it difficult to coordinate external policies. Apart from a basic interest in the maintenance of the Atlantic Alliance with the United States, the primary interests of West European nations are generally confined to Europe (both East and West), Africa and the Middle East. Similarly Japanese interests—although much framed by the US-Japan relationship—are mainly concentrated in Asia, i.e., the Pacific region, and the Middle East. Their perceptions are different as regards East-West relations: the West European countries are preoccupied with the management of their relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, while the Japanese are preoccupied with the management of relations with both China and the Soviet Union, with the emphasis on China. Fourth, the basically competitive nature of the economic dispositions of the West European countries and Japan makes it difficult to work out plans for mutual cooperation on security questions. The competitive demands for oil made it difficult for West European countries and Japan to coordinate policies towards the Gulf States, although the issue has become less conspicuous now under the influence of the glut of oil. Rivalry for trade opportunities could arouse mutual suspicion when engaged in planning for more controlled economic relations with the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, the commonality of Japanese and West European security interests is blurred by differences of perception regarding American preoccupation with potential conflicts of interest. American emphasis on the so-called "Swing Strategy" toward the end of the 1970s (although it has since been rejected) and the concept of the Rapid Deployment Force, both implying a possibility of diverting significant US forces in the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean or to Europe in the event of crisis there, aroused concern among the Japanese over a possible scarcity of US forces available for the defense of Japan. Underlying such concern is a Japanese belief that the United States would give the defense of Western Europe a higher priority

than Asia. Conversely, there is growing concern in Western Europe over a possible shift of American strategic priority away from Europe to Asia and the Middle East. A more recent concern has been expressed by a growing number of West European policy planners and intellectual circles* over a "gradual evolution of the United States away from a European-centered foreign policy to a more global approach, in which other regions (especially Asia and the Middle East) compete with Europe in US preoccupations." The Reagan administration, representing in European eyes the shift of power in American politics from the familiar East Coast to the unknown West, added to the causes of European concern over changing American priorities. The markedly contrary perceptions held by the West Europeans and the Japanese regarding American preoccupations could, if not properly attended to, arouse a sense of rivalry between the two major allies of the United States as they come to seek continued and assured American support for their security.

The perceptions of China in dealing with Soviet challenges is another important issue that could cause conflict between Western Europe and Japan. Indeed the existence of China, hostile to the Soviet Union, works favorably for the West because it diverts Soviet strategic resources away from the West. But the China "card" and its implications for the East-West military balance in the Asian and Pacific region is complex. Soviet suspicion, deepened by the normalization of US-China and Japan-China relations, seems to be one of the motivations for the Soviets to strengthen their military capability in East Asia. A rapid increase of Chinese military power, should it happen, would have disturbing implications for the security of South-East Asian countries. Moreover, it is questionable whether China would cooperate with the West beyond pursuing her interest in strengthening her position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Accordingly, many Japanese, despite their conviction of the importance of keeping China closer to the West, remain skeptical of the wisdom of providing large-scale Western military assistance to China, particularly in the context of easing the military balance in the European theater. So long as Western assistance to China's military capability remains modest, a difference of views between Japan and Western Europe (and the United States) will not appear. But should such military aid grow to the point of affecting the regional military balance conspicuously, differing views would surface. The possible reduction of political tension between Moscow and Beijing is now adding a further complication to the equation, underlying the need for a more tactful approach of the West towards China. Closer consultations within the Western industrialized nations, including the United States, are more important than ever.

* *Western Security*, a report prepared by the Directors of Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik. Council on Foreign Relations, Institut Français des Relations Internationales. Royal Institute of International Affairs, February 1981, p. 11.

Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) negotiation is an important issue requiring the management of varying security interests between Western Europe and Japan. The best of all worlds would be the abolition of the SS-20 missiles. But the question now is how to limit the SS-20 missiles by some sort of interim agreement, pending the attainment of the "zero" option, which is widely regarded as an ideal rather than a feasible objective. Given that the SS-20 missiles can be "transported" the implications for Western security of the specific location of the missiles is at best relative and perhaps irrelevant. In this context, the American attempt to establish global limits on the SS-20 missiles was endorsed by Western Europe and Japan. On the other hand, the Japanese are concerned that European governments, preoccupied with the management of their public opinion, might be content with a reduction in the number of the missiles capable of reaching Western Europe at the expense of the security interests of Asian countries. This concern was fully evident at the initial stage of the INF negotiations. It is now alleviated to some degree by the American and European assurance that they will not consent to any arrangement that would transfer the threat to Asia. Nevertheless, the Japanese remain concerned lest some European governments should seek to redistribute rather than reduce the SS-20 risk. Such an eventuality, if it were to occur, no doubt would force Japan to question how far her security interests coincide with those of other Western nations. Conflict between Japan and West European countries over this issue would only benefit the Soviet Union and undercut any sense of solidarity among Western industrialized democracies.

All in all, there exists a need for closer consultations between the West European countries and Japan to define and develop new terms and approaches to the security concerns common to Western Europe and Japan. On the other hand, linking Nato and the Japan-US security arrangements is not appropriate.

Besides the difference in the geographical area covered in the Nato and the Japan-US security arrangements, the Nato and the Japan-US security arrangements differ in form. Unlike Nato the Japan-US security arrangements are *not* "collective," because the Japanese constitution denies Japan the ability to share the burden of defending other countries. Nato confronts the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, while the Japanese-US security arrangements confront a more complex situation involving the Soviet Union, China and North Korea. Defending West European countries against the invasion on land is a primary task for Nato military planning; in the meantime, the American presence (particularly naval and air forces) in the Western Pacific and more recently in the Indian Ocean is a major feature of the Japan-US security arrangements. American nuclear weapons are not stored in Japan and the use of American nuclear weapons in defense perimeters is not a prospect. On the other hand, Nato now faces difficulties in

sustaining public acceptance of a deterrent strategy based on the effectiveness of American nuclear weapons deployed in Western Europe. Finally, the plurality of the member countries of Nato and their political and economic differences make the Atlantic Alliance more difficult to manage than the bilateral alliance system between Japan and the United States. All in all, to link the two security systems is neither feasible nor desirable. Such an attempt would not receive the support of public and political opinion in Western Europe or Japan. But it would prompt the Soviet Union and possibly China further to tighten their guards against the West. It might also disturb the countries of the Third World, which react skeptically against what they see as the "ganging-up" by major Western powers.

Given such differences of the security relationship between Western Europe and Japan, and also given the inchoate state of mutual understanding between them, consultations on security questions between the West European countries and Japan should be initiated with modest goals. Informing each other of respective defense and security priorities is a useful step to promote a sense of cooperation between Western Europe and Japan. Such an attempt is particularly significant in the light of Western European and Japanese dependency upon American military support, which involves a potential conflict of interest between them. Informing each other of their policies is important. Failure of Europeans to understand Japanese goals for common security detracts from any cooperative effort between Europe and Japan. For example, since 1979 Japan has been making financial contributions to Turkey almost at the same level with France; Japan has borne about 70 percent of the cost required to deepen and widen the Suez Canal, which consequently made it possible for a large American aircraft carrier to pass through the canal; Japan was the first country to increase economic aid to Pakistan in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; Japan facilitates the "home-porting" of an American aircraft carrier which patrols the Indian Ocean. She is also providing bases to the American Marine Corps, the only American amphibious force in the Western Pacific, which has as a mission sending forces aboard a vessel repositioned in the Indian Ocean; and most recently, the Japanese government agreed in principle to bear a part of the financial burden for the Western peace-keeping efforts in Lebanon. All these facts, which have significant bearing on Nato security planning, are not well known in Western Europe. The Japanese role for the regional stability of South East Asia is almost absent from a Western European perspective regarding its security.

Sharing information and its assessment regarding the Soviet Union (including Sino-Soviet relations), and other communist countries is another useful step for furthering Western European-Japanese cooperation. Coordinating policies, political as well as economic, towards these countries is important. Consultations over SS-20 missiles as well as the security implications of

East-West economic relations, now under way, need to be pursued more intensively and systematically.

Furthermore, in a broader context of security, coordinating the West European and the Japanese efforts to secure the stability of strategically vital areas in the Third World serves common security interests. Given the European and Japanese emphasis on this dimension, this is the area where Western Europe and Japan can provide contributions, possibly in a form of concerted efforts, to the enhancement of Western security. A combination of European expertise and Japanese finance and technology and vice versa, would add to the capacity of the West to respond to local requirements.

On the other hand, to specify final targets for Western European-Japanese security cooperation is premature, because much depends on how successfully they can manage their entire relationship, including economic and trade relations. At this stage, it suffices to define the purpose of Western Europe-Japan security cooperation as broadening the scope for a division of labor in pursuing Western security. Nevertheless, such consultation and exchange of views would help the countries involved towards a better understanding of each other's perceptions regarding international security (their commonality as well as distinction) and the mutualities of security interests. This would not promise a coherence of security policies of the countries involved but it would facilitate coordination of policies or, at least, help avoid unnecessary discord deriving from differences in perception or counterproductive competition.

Concluding Remarks. It would appear that, by the nature of the working relationships, the community of the Western industrialized democracies are ill-equipped to have a cohesive security policy. Yet, given the limitations of resources available for Western defense, it is imperative that they make a concerted cooperative effort to preserve their security against increased Soviet military power. For the Western nations, there is no apparent alternative. Managing the differences of perception and preoccupations among the Western nations in order to foster concerted security efforts is the question at issue.

Restoring mutual trust among the Western nations is no doubt the key to managing varying perceptions and preoccupations. To do so requires mutual commitments and the exercise of the spirit of mutual accommodation. A shift of power balance within the West itself needs to be properly reflected in these efforts. Further, it is vital that the United States continue its leadership role in the preservation of Western security. But, American leadership needs to be exercised in such a way as to induce positive cooperation from her allies. The coherence of American foreign policy is vital to this end. Careful and continuous consultations with her allies are also important and the obvious use of pressure can be damaging and counterproductive. Quiet

diplomacy instead of public arguments needs to be emphasized in this context.

The United States must provide allies ample time to digest questions at home. It must learn to accommodate as much as possible different perceptions on the part of her allies in order to make such consultations successful. The United States also needs to accept independent initiatives on the part of her allies in order to encourage their positive participation in the efforts for preserving Western security. America's allies, on their part, can and must facilitate such American behavior. Most important, they ought to reckon with the fact that, when allies behave as a neutral critic of American policy while depending on American military protection, they alienate and aggravate the American public. United States allies need to act in such a way as to convince the Americans of their determination to share responsibilities and burdens for Western security before trying to persuade the Americans to appreciate the allies' different perceptions and preoccupations.

Finally, that the Americans and Europeans would exercise sensitivity to Japanese perceptions and domestic constraints regarding security is critically important for ensuring constructive participation by the Japanese in tripartite endeavors for Western security. As this essay has tried to elaborate, Japanese security perceptions are markedly different from the Americans' and the Europeans'. Their style of decision-making is also different. And their domestic constraints, constitutional ones in particular, persist. Although Japan has become increasingly prepared to participate in the Western concerted efforts (as demonstrated, among other things, by Prime Minister Nakasome's positive participation in the making of the joint statement on international security at the Williamsburg Summit), more positive participation in Western security cooperation depends much upon how far the other members of the West, particularly the United States, would accommodate Japanese perceptions and conditions. To this end, the perceptions and conditions regarding Western security—which have been hitherto primarily framed by the interests of the Atlantic Alliance—needs to be broadened to have a truly global perspective.

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