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Norman A. Graebner

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Coming to Terms with Reality

by
Norman A. Graebner

In large measure the American debate over national security has forged ahead in a policy vacuum. The core factor in any country's foreign relations is the body of interests that it pursues, not the means whereby it intends to protect them. No Washington administration would acknowledge any guide to national behavior except the nation's interests, and the more universal its proclaimed interests, the greater will be its demands for weapons, the more strident its threats of retaliation. When the fall of the Shah of Iran early in 1979 eliminated an essential bulwark of Middle Eastern stability, spokesmen of the Carter administration sought to close the gap with a customary reassertion of America's global concerns. "The United States," declared Defense Secretary Harold Brown, "is prepared to defend its vital interests with whatever means are appropriate, including military force where necessary, whether that's in the Middle East or elsewhere." Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979, President Jimmy Carter instructed the nation: "This in my opinion is the most serious threat to world peace since the Second World War . . . . It's a threat to an area of the world where the interests of our country and those interests of our allies are deeply embedded."[1] Such judgments of danger to the nation's far-flung interests compelled the Carter administration to move haltingly toward larger defense appropriations.

For the administration of Ronald Reagan the assessment of danger and the need for preparedness have been more pervading. Repeatedly that administration has reminded the world that the United States has global interests and is determined to defend them. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. declared before the American Bar Association in New Orleans on 11 August 1981, "We must indicate our willingness to reach fair agreements that speak to the legitimate interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States. But we must also be prepared to defend our interests in the absence of such agreements."[2] Similarly National Security Adviser William Clark informed a Georgetown University audience in May 1982, "Our interests are global and they conflict with those of the Soviet Union, a state which pursues

worldwide policies, most [of them] unfriendly to our own . . . of course, we have vital interests around the world, including maritime sea lanes of communication. The hard fact is that the military power of the Soviet Union is now able to threaten these vital interests as never before." Clark declared that the United States would not reject any options in advance which might be required to defend these vital interests. "To do so," he said, "is to invite aggression, undermine our credibility and place at risk all global objectives."[3]

In none of these statements, or in any others, did national spokesmen spell out what they regarded to be the vital interests of the United States. As a result the American people possess little knowledge of the nation's commitments abroad or what any President might ask them to defend. Perhaps the perennial effort to eliminate nothing from America's official concern had a reasonable purpose: to keep all potential aggressors, even in remote areas of the world, in doubt as to the country's intentions and thereby discourage unwanted assaults on the status quo everywhere. Unfortunately the effort to manage world affairs by globalizing the nation's interests discounted the myriad of elements that maintained world stability and kept both the American people and the major allies in doubt as well. Moreover, the world never took the global pretensions seriously. Year after year unwanted assaults on the status quo elicited no effective American response, demonstrating that the country's interests and power were far from universal. If these unanswered rejections of America's declared preferences rarely threatened the nation's interests, they damaged its self-image as a world leader and exposed the government to ubiquitous accusations of failure. The country would resolve the critical questions of strategy and command and secure the necessary internal and external support only when it defined with greater precision both its strategic interests and the challenges which it faced. Under relatively few conditions could the United States use force with the full support of the American people.

Earlier in its history the United States managed to delineate its external interests with remarkable accuracy. It was largely for this reason that the American people in 1900 could recall a century of unparalleled diplomatic success. What appeared essential for its security and well-being the nation had achieved both quickly and cheaply. The Republic had freed the Mississippi Valley of British and Spanish intrigue, and the Mediterranean of its piratical attacks on American seamen. It had relieved the French of Louisiana, the Spaniards of Florida, the British of Oregon, and the Russians of Alaska. It had driven the Mexicans out of Texas, New Mexico, and California. In the immediate past it had deprived Spain of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. On the occasion when the nation had gone to war, its measurable gains always seemed to exceed the price of victory. Never was this more true than for the gigantic Civil War itself. Despite that struggle's

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physical cost to North and South alike, few Americans in 1900 would have regarded the price of reforging the Union excessive. Thus no nation of modern times had achieved its purpose abroad more consistently, completely, and at less cost to its people.

To be sure America's early triumphs in diplomacy and war reflected a special measure of good fortune and embodied principles and modes of behavior that had underwritten successful international relations throughout history. No national purpose had ignored the essential element of means. The quality of American power and energy, when contrasted to the actual goals which the nation pursued, always placed the United States in a commanding position, diplomatically and militarily. The United States had not extracted its victories from a perennial struggle against powerful neighbors that might have prevented those successes entirely or compelled the country to pay an exorbitant price for them. When the nation moved beyond its private preserve to expand its landed empire through diplomacy or war, it faced, after 1815, opponents no more powerful than Spain and Mexico. By limiting its objectives to the North American continent where it possessed a total strategic advantage, the United States, in its conflicts with Britain and France, always benefited from the weakening effect of distance.

Still, the nation's almost unprecedented security, maintained at such limited cost, resulted equally from factors that lay outside the Western Hemisphere. Where its interests were predominant, the nation's strength took on precise character from the sheer size of the oceans. The Atlantic alone would have demanded an excess of power and productivity for any European country to establish a presence in the Western Hemisphere commensurate with that of the United States. What made the Atlantic an even greater barrier to European encroachment was the British navy. It was as much a defender of American interests in the Atlantic world as if the American people had paid for every ship in that navy. Behind the British navy lay the European equilibrium. Indeed, any successful military incursion by a continental power into the New World after 1815 would have comprised such a massive threat to the European balance that the European powers themselves would have resorted to war to terminate such a venture.

For decades an American commercial empire had stretched across the Pacific to China, but nothing in a changing Orient had challenged its peaceful expansion. Nor did its protection require any recognizable threats of reprisal. The nations of Asia remained too weak and backward to endanger any established American interests, either in the Pacific or in the Western Hemisphere. The Far Eastern balance, like that of Europe, served the economic and security interests of the United States admirably, and assured the success of policies that were otherwise politically and conceptually sound.

American success flowed from the character of the country's goals as much as from the varied sources of its power. All essential objectives of American

external policy in the nineteenth century, especially those that measured the nation's genuine gains abroad, were limited and precise. Every administration in Washington pursued only tangible goals consisting of territorial adjustment, monetary compensation, or defense and commercial arrangements. James K. Polk's remarkable achievements of the 1840s lay in the precision of his objectives more than in his possession of diplomatic and military advantages over Britain and Mexico. Polk's expansionist goals were specific, not general; they comprised Puget Sound and access to it through the Juan de Fuca Strait in the Northwest, and San Diego Bay in the Southwest.[4] Without exception, officials responsible for American external policy before 1898 refrained from committing the United States to the pursuit of political goals such as liberty, self-determination, or justice. Noted Americans on occasion insisted that the United States carry a special mission to humanity through the creation of a society at home that might be worthy of emulation rather than involvement in revolutionary causes abroad. For Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and Abraham Lincoln the United States was never more than an example-setter for the world. When revolutions in Europe or Latin America raised the appeal that the United States support the cause of liberty, conservative Americans always denied that the United States carried any special load of responsibility for the victims of oppression. Those editors and members of Congress who demanded such involvements were never in positions of power or responsibility. Nor did they succeed in framing policies which might achieve their alleged purpose abroad. In fact, they never tried; and their refusal to concern themselves with means measured their greater concern with popularity at home than with the cause of liberty abroad.

Tragically, in one long decade after 1900 United States leadership managed to uproot a thoroughly established diplomatic tradition without conveying to that generation of Americans the realization that anything significant had occurred at all. During the opening years of the new century the country assumed commitments, especially in the Far East and the Caribbean, unthinkable a generation earlier. Yet by 1914 none of those factors were present which had given the country its remarkable security and diplomatic success in the nineteenth century. The country's antagonists after 1900 were not to be characterized by Mexico and Spain. Two first-class powers, Germany and Japan, had mounted the world stage with the United States. Already Washington's declared preferences in Europe and the Far East had marked both countries as potential enemies. Not only did the United States move into the new century at odds with two of the strongest nations in the world, but also it had chosen to contest their purposes in the Eastern Hemisphere where its interests were seldom clear and where others could more easily bring their power to bear. No longer did the British navy and the traditional European equilibrium guarantee the United States its former protection in the Atlantic

world. These nineteenth-century elements of power, which had served the country well, had been assumed for so long that the American people were no longer conscious of their contribution to the country's security.

Soon the United States would carry the full burden of its policies, whether the policies squared with the nation's historic interests or not. The United States had entered the new century as a territorially satiated power, satisfied with its possessions and its status among the nations of the world. Enjoying a favored position at little cost to itself (and seemingly unmindful of its potentially costly commitments abroad) the nation began to discard its precise and limited approaches of the nineteenth century, conducted through diplomacy and power. Rather it sought those global conditions that would serve its peculiar interests in trade, investment and peace. The gradual dedication to the status quo completed the silent revolution which a decade of expanding interests had wrought in the country's external relations. To preserve its international position without expensive or dangerous foreign policies the United States required a new world order that would limit further change to peaceful processes, preferably through a system of contractual arrangements among nations.

In rejecting the older notions of power politics and the persistence of international conflict, the country's new leadership attached its hope for a stable and improving future, not to preponderant power, but to the general acceptance of a more rational behavior among the major governments of the world. Nineteenth-century rationalism had denied the essentially evil nature of society and had anticipated a rational world free of conflict, oppression, tyranny, and other irrational uses of power. American progress during that century, gained amid limitless opportunities and a minimum of conflict and coercion, substantiated the illusion that force was giving way to consensus in the resolution of human problems. World opinion, the expression of that consensus on the international scene, would soon replace power politics as the major force in affairs among nations. Of all human activity none appeared more irrational and appalling than war. The elimination of war, finally, would solidify the existing international order. This fundamental relationship between peace and the status quo encouraged American leaders to place the nation's interests in world stability on the altar of human reason.

Desiring nothing after 1900 except the perpetuation of their favored position, the American foreign policy elite, amply supported by much of the public, began to think less of precise, tangible interests to be sustained through diplomacy and force and to seek the defense of the nation's special status with appeals to abstract, reasoned objectives such as peace and peaceful change, order, justice, and self-determination. A world environment in which such purposes emerged triumphant would indeed serve the American interest admirably, for against such bulwarks of stability and the status quo nations could alter the established order of power, or even the world's territorial

arrangements, very little, if at all. Peace became the country's primary concern, not because Americans shared any special abhorrence of war, but because peace would demonstrate that the world had in reality accepted the territorial and political conditions which then prevailed. Since the nation after the Philippine annexation would enter every crisis without asking anything for itself, it could reasonably demand that other nations attach the same sanctity to established treaties and other international arrangements and change them through general agreement alone.

It was logical that the United States, as the world's major satisfied nation, would assume the lead in the twentieth-century advocacy of nonpower devices, such as arbitration and conciliation, as the only legitimate means for settling international disputes. President Taft emphasized his commitment to peaceful procedures in his inaugural of March 1909: "Our international policy is always to promote peace . . . . We favor every instrumentality, like that of the Hague Tribunal and arbitration treaties made with a view to its use in all international controversies, in order to maintain peace and to avoid war."[5] The Taft administration negotiated sweeping arbitration treaties with Britain and France. For such noted jurists as Taft and Elihu Root the final guarantee of world peace lay in a world court of such dignity and astuteness that the entire world would have absolute confidence in its judgments. Such an institution, if universally accepted, would guarantee the nation its international advantages without the necessity of war or extensive military preparations.

Such dedication to peaceful procedures universalized the nation's external objectives. Until the Spanish-American War the foreign policies of the United States were rendered solvent by ample power to cover limited, largely hemispheric goals. The reliance on physical power, always a limited entity, had confined rather than expanded American ambition. National interests, equally limited, were no less restrictive. By contrast, moral purposes embodied in the quest for universal peace and the expansion of democratic institutions, operating in a supposedly rational world, created limitless expectations among those who claimed the selfless obligation to serve mankind's interests in peace and stability. After 1910 the country's official phraseology embraced global, abstract objectives that no traditional power could achieve. At the same time, much of the country's foreign policy elite denied the necessity, even the legitimacy, of force in international affairs. The notion that the United States could achieve a world order based on an effective system of international law, to be enforced by predictable sanctions, made a powerful impact on the country's official outlook. It created that strange dichotomy between the advance of the United States to industrial greatness, between its determination to extend its pervasive economic influence into much of the external world, and the price which the country was prepared to pay to sustain even those specific international relationships which had once assured its favored position in world politics. Confronted after the turn of the century, both in Europe and in Asia,

by powers that identified their interests with change and accepted the legitimacy of force to achieve it, American leadership could escape its dilemma only by hasty improvisation, which succeeded often in protecting the nation's interests but seldom in establishing its precepts.

The widespread conviction that the United States should not and need not accept change in the world environment emanating from force found its ultimate rationale in the internationalism of Woodrow Wilson. Wilson's advocacy of a world of law and order, devoid of violence, identified the interests of humanity with the interests of the United States and other status quo powers. What gave his vision of universal peace its special appeal was his insistence that peace required, not the wielding of predominant power by governments which favored the status quo, but the limitation of change to general agreement and the rule of law. For Wilson it was essential that the United States reject the demands of aggressors under the central assumption that peace was indivisible and that any direct assault on the treaty structure, unless resisted, would encourage additional aggression and ultimately drive the treaty-abiding nations into war. Indeed, in a world governed by law neither the United States nor any other nation had the right to bargain with aggressors over changes in established treaties. The appealing notion so common in American thought was that only peaceful change was a morally acceptable burden to diplomacy, not with the traditional management of unwanted change, but with its total elimination. Nowhere in the Wilsonian approach to international affairs was there any need to define the interests of the United States in concrete terms or to prepare a strategy for their defense.

Isolationists in the 1920s argued fundamentally that Europe need not involve the United States in another continental conflict. Wilsonian internationalists insisted that the United States could not escape another European war and that it carried a moral obligation to lead the world toward the further institutionalization of the peace. Both isolationism and internationalism were strangers to the conservative tradition of American diplomacy. Both denied that the United States need concern itself with any specific political or military configuration in Europe or Asia. Whereas isolationism limited the nation's interests to the Western Hemisphere, internationalism assumed that American interests were universal—wherever mankind was oppressed or threatened with aggression. In practice the internationalists would control the world environment, not with the traditional devices of diplomacy or force, but by confronting aggressors with a combination of international law, signed agreements, and world opinion. Behind such undemanding assurances of success the American foreign policy consensus became almost unshakable. Internationalists offered their four major causes of the 1920s—membership in the League of Nations and the World Court, the Four and Nine Power pacts for the Far East, and the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact—as programs to maintain the status quo without

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cost or obligation. What mattered in world politics was not the creation of national policy but the limitation of change to peaceful means. Thus in the hands of the internationalists the concepts of peace and peaceful change became the bulwark of the status quo, for change limited to general agreement could alter the international order little if at all.

Official Washington became troubled by the Manchurian crisis of September 1931 and the subsequent Japanese conquest of Manchuria, but not for reasons concerning this nation's vital economic or security interests. What required protection in the crisis was the nation's profound interest in the Far Eastern peace structure embodied in the Nine Power Pact of 1922 and the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact of 1928. In signing these two documents Japan had joined other nations in agreeing to limit its ambitions to what it might achieve through peaceful means alone—to accept, in short, the Western concept of world order. Convinced that the Japanese gains at the expense of the Far Eastern treaty structure would lead to further aggressions if accepted, the administration of Herbert Hoover simply refused to recognize the new political and territorial arrangements in Manchuria which resulted from the Japanese resort to force. Predictably, Hoover's response to Japan's aggression had no effect on Japanese policy.

Franklin D. Roosevelt's response to the aggressions of Adolf Hitler against the Versailles settlement in Europe followed the identical pattern of inaction, nonrecognition, and appeals to the principle of peaceful change. Following Hitler's assault on the military provisions of the Versailles Treaty in March 1935, Roosevelt's Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, informed the press: "Everybody knows that the United States has always believed that treaties must constitute the foundations on which any stable peace structure must rest . . . . I believe that the moral influence of the United States and its people must always encourage living up to treaties."[6] Hull reminded the German ambassador late in March that Germany had an almost unprecedented opportunity to create conditions of peace and security in Europe by honoring its international agreements. Even as Roosevelt searched for the principles that would control Hitler he refused to negotiate any changes in the Versailles Treaty and chided British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain for attempting to do so.[7]

Washington repeated this response when the Japanese, following the Marco Polo Bridge incident of 7 July 1937, began their major assault on China. Nine days later Hull released a statement to the press. "We advocate," he said, "adjustment of problems in international relations by processes of peaceful negotiation and agreement. We advocate faithful observance of international agreements. Upholding the principle of the sanctity of treaties, we believe in modification of provisions of treaties . . . by orderly processes carried out in a spirit of mutual helpfulness and accommodation."[8] Unfortunately, these admonitions reduced the area of legitimate change in the Far East almost to the

vanishing point. At the same time Japan gave the United States undesirable choices, especially in its appeal for American help in extricating itself from its disastrous war in China. Ultimately the refusal of the United States to deal diplomatically with Japan's mounting dilemmas rendered war between the two countries almost inevitable. Roosevelt resisted the Pacific war to the end, but he and his advisers preferred war to the recognition of any successful assault on the treaty structure of the Far East. State Department officials admitted freely that Japan did not challenge any significant American economic or security interests in China, certainly none worth a war. But Japan did threaten the whole Far Eastern peace structure with force. This the United States would not condone and thus, by underwriting the status quo through the encouragement of Chinese intransigence, ultimately became itself another victim of attack. The war came with profound consequences for the future: the destruction of the Chinese government, the elimination of a Europe-based stability in the Far East, and the predictable involvement of the United States in an increasingly turbulent, unmanageable, and resistant Orient.

If appeals to peace and peaceful change had failed to maintain the American interest in the Versailles order, American officials hoped to reestablish that order through the wartime destruction of German and Japanese power. Any return to Versailles demanded above all the reconstruction of an independent Eastern Europe, but Washington discovered after Pearl Harbor that such purpose had little relationship to Western power. The more complete the Russian victory over Germany, the more unchallengeable the Soviet capacity to control the future of Eastern Europe and the more complete the destruction of Europe's Versailles order. Admitting after Russia's crucial triumph at Stalingrad early in 1943 that Slavic Europe had passed beyond Western control, the Roosevelt administration battled predictable Soviet encroachments with appeals to self-determination, reaffirmed in the Atlantic Charter of August 1941, as well as with the decision to postpone all territorial and political arrangements until the end of the war. In opposing the Soviet sphere of influence, American leaders hoped to avoid balance of power diplomacy and lay the foundation for the long-sought peaceful world order. In June 1944, the State Department reminded the British embassy that "any arrangement suggestive of spheres of influence cannot but militate against the establishment and effective functioning of such a broader system."[9]

America's response to the massive infringements on the Versailles order between 1931 and 1945 illustrated clearly that a status quo power can influence or modify the aggressive behavior of dissatisfied states only through active, direct diplomacy, aimed at some accommodation, or through force. Concessions to aggressors even on issues that did not touch American economic or security interests could indeed be repugnant, but the decision to avoid all compromise would in no way prevent the further erosion of the peace, the international treaty structure, or both. In the absence of forthright negotiations,

the drift in US relations with Germany, Japan, and Russia would terminate in either the ultimate acceptance of change, unmodified by mutual agreement, or war. The avoidance of a settlement with Russia led to the first alternative, with Germany and Japan to the second. In no case was the decision to reject compromise based on a clear calculation of national interest. Nor did it influence the behavior of the antagonists. The American refusal to recognize the burgeoning Russian hegemony in Eastern Europe had no more effect on the future of that region than Roosevelt's refusal to recognize that Japanese gains in China controlled the future of that country. The neglect of diplomacy simply removed American power from major world decisions.

World War II carried the United States into the world arena as the number one economic and military power. That power, operating in a world of destroyed economics and collapsing empires, did not assure the nation's success in coming to terms with the changes wrought by Germany's destruction. The refusal of the Soviet Union to accept America's vision of the postwar world merely extended the country's global commitments and perpetuated its wartime reliance on power. The war had shattered the historic European balance of power. In large measure the cold war policies of the United States from the Truman Doctrine to the formation of Nato two years later attempted to stabilize Europe by countering Russia's war-produced dominance on the continent. These limited policies, lying well within the nation's capabilities, were in large measure an assertion of the historic interest of the United States in the European equilibrium. The marvelous triumphs of American cold war policy in Europe measured what the nation's power would buy at a time when that power was excessive: the economic rehabilitation of western Europe, the promotion of international trade and investment, and the maintenance of a massive defense structure which underwrote the containment effort in Europe and played an essential role in Europe's postwar political development. Even as America's military power reinforced the division of Europe, its economic power, working through international agencies for trade and monetary stabilization, contributed to the world's unprecedented prosperity.

This limited assertion of national purpose did not long command the country's postwar outlook. Policies of judicious balance aimed largely at the economic and political stabilization of western Europe had no chance against the burgeoning fears of Soviet expansionism which dictated the need for alliances and military predominance. The Kremlin's repeated disregard for Western principles of self-determination, its defiance of Western purposes in the reconstruction of postwar Germany and Eastern Europe, and its pressures on Turkey and Iran for greater access to the oil and sea lanes of the Near East, convinced some American officials as early as 1945 that the West faced a new totalitarian threat, rendered as dangerous by its power and ideology as Nazi Germany itself. Ambassador Averell Harriman warned President Harry

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Truman in April 1945 that once the Soviet Union "had control of bordering areas, [it] would attempt to penetrate the next adjacent country." When the Soviets in October asked for a mandate to Libya, Secretary of State James Byrnes argued that the Soviets wanted to "facilitate their access right down to the Belgian Congo." In December Loy Henderson noted that the Soviets seemed determined to destroy Britain's historic position in the Middle East "so that Russian power can sweep unimpeded across Turkey through the Dardanelles into the Mediterranean, and across Iran and through the Persian Gulf into the Indian Ocean . . . . "[10] Similarly Dean Acheson, then acting Secretary of State, James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, and Robert Patterson, Secretary of War, issued a memorandum which warned: "If the Soviet Union succeeded in its objective of obtaining control over Turkey, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining control over Greece and over . . . the territory lying between the Mediterranean and India. When the Soviet Union has once obtained full mastery of this territory . . . it will be in a much stronger position to obtain its objectives in India and China."

In defending aid to Greece and Turkey Secretary of State George C. Marshall warned congressional leaders on 27 February 1947: "It is not alarmist to say that we are faced with the first crisis of a series which might extend Soviet domination to Europe, the Middle East and Asia."[11] Acheson told the same group that "a highly possible Soviet breakthrough might open the continents to Soviet penetration. Like apples in a barrel infected by a rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the east . . . Africa . . . Asia Minor and Egypt . . . Italy and France . . . . " Will Clayton submitted a memorandum on 5 March: "If Greece and then Turkey succumb, the whole Middle East will be lost. France may then capitulate to the communists. As France goes, so Western Europe and North Africa will go."[12] This pattern of interpretation established the Munich syndrome as the guiding principle for meeting the Soviet challenge. Unless the United States and other nations made clear to the Kremlin their determination to meet force with force the Soviet Union would gain command of the Middle East with consequences unacceptable to the United States. The dramatic language of the Truman Doctrine of March 1947 was designed to convince hesitant members of Congress of the necessity for new commitments to meet the challenge of Soviet aggressiveness. Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan required little convincing. As he explained in a letter of 12 March: "Greece must be helped or Greece sinks permanently into the communist order. Turkey inevitably follows. Then comes the chain reaction which might sweep from the Dardanelles to the China sea . . . . I do not know whether our new American policy can succeed in arresting these subversive trends (which ultimately represent a threat to us). I can only say that I think the adventure is worth trying as an alternative to another 'Munich' and perhaps to another war . . . . "[13]

These fears of Soviet expansion arose less from objective assessments of Soviet intentions and capabilities than from Russia's well-known historic interests in the Middle East and the presumed aggressive attributes of Soviet ideology and totalitarianism.

In time the country's official perceptions of danger became broader, if less precise. President Truman furthered this tendency when he failed to distinguish between Kremlin policy and the Communist-led assault on the government of Greece. Behind the burgeoning fears of the Truman years were the Leninist preachments of an expanding revolutionary communism. The concurrent notion that Moscow controlled the international Communist movement as an agency of Soviet expansionism implicated the Kremlin in every Communist-led revolution from Greece to Indochina. This central cold war assumption that the danger to Western security lay in international communism attributed to Russia the unprecedented capacity to expand without direct armed aggression and advance its power and influence in regions far beyond the reach of Russian armies. From such perceptions of a Moscow-directed Communist monolith flowed the logical conclusion that the Kremlin possessed sources of power sufficient to dominate much of the earth. It mattered little whether Soviet forces or even Soviet officials were present at all. The tendency to define the Soviet challenge in ideological terms discounted the danger of direct Russian aggression even as it universalized the American defense posture and established global objectives that no country could achieve.

Suddenly American officials recognized no limit to Soviet power and ambition. The National Security Council's study of the Soviet danger, NSC 7, dated 30 March 1948, emphasized the Soviet challenge's global dimensions. Declared NSC 7: "The ultimate objective of Soviet-directed world communism is the domination of the world. To this end, Soviet-directed world communism employs against its victims in opportunistic coordination the complementary instruments of Soviet aggressive pressure from without and military revolutionary subversion from within . . . . The Soviet Union is the source of power from which international communism chiefly derives its capability to threaten the existence of free nations. The United States is the only source of power capable of mobilizing successful opposition to the communist goal of world conquest."[14] NSC 7 argued that the Soviet Union, convinced that coexistence with the capitalist states was in the long run impossible, would attempt to achieve world domination by directing a variety of subversive activities toward other countries, through legal and illegal political and economic measures, perhaps ultimately by a resort to war—war waged either by the USSR and its satellites or by a combination of satellites alone. With its power to expand through both indirect aggression and internal subversion, the Soviet Union had time on its side. Already Soviet-directed world communism had achieved alarming successes in its drive toward world conquest.[15]

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The National Security Council's noted policy recommendation of April 1950, NSC 68, like its predecessors, defined the danger of Soviet imperialism in global, limitless terms. It observed that the USSR, "unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world." Dangers of such magnitude defied coexistence. Through its alleged control of China's Communist government, the Kremlin endangered the independence of all South and Southeast Asia. The Soviet assault on free institutions, warned NSC 68, was worldwide, and "in the context of the present polarization of power, a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere."[16] To meet the danger of Soviet expansionism the United States would establish a defense line around the perimeter of the Communist-controlled Eurasian land mass. NSC 68 assumed that the United States, with increased military power, could win the struggle against communism. Both Dean Acheson and his successor as Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, doubted that the USSR could withstand the pressure of US containment policies; both anticipated the gradual decline of Soviet power on the world scene.[17]

By the spring of 1950 American officials had completed their conceptualization of a Soviet-based Communist monolith, extending the Kremlin's power across Asia. When revolutionary China appeared to be achieving true national independence, Acheson told the Commonwealth Club of California, its leaders were forcing it into the Soviet orbit. "We now face the prospect," he admitted, "that the Communists may attempt to apply another familiar tactic and use China as a base for probing for other weak spots which they can move into and exploit." He warned Asians that they "must face the fact that today the major threat to their freedom and to their social and economic progress is the attempted penetration of Asia by Soviet-Communist imperialism and by the colonialism which it contains."[18] United States officials in Asia took up the new theme. Ambassador Loy Henderson agreed before the Indian Council of World Affairs at New Delhi in late March that the United States, with its long tradition of involvement in the Atlantic world, understood better the culture of Europe than that of Asia. Recent events in the Far East, however, had given the American people a new and enlarging interest in that region. "It should be borne in mind, in considering various policies of the United States in respect to Asia," he said, "that the United States does not pursue one set of policies with regard to the Americas and Europe and another with regard to Asia. The foreign policies of the United States by force of circumstances have become global in character."[19] Much of this expanding fear of Soviet aggression centered on Indochina where the French continued to fight for their empire against the Communist-led revolution of Ho Chi Minh. In Indochina no less than in China itself the danger to Western security lay in the further expansion of Soviet influence.

Within that context the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950 was merely another demonstration of Soviet-Communist aggression in Asia. China's entry into the Korean war in November 1950, in apparent defiance of its own interest, appeared as the final evidence of Russia's predominant influence in Peking. As Truman explained to the American people in January 1951, "Our men are fighting . . . because they know, as we do, that the aggression in Korea is part of the attempt of the Russian communist dictatorship to take over the world, step by step." John Foster Dulles, in his capacity as State Department adviser, brought the notion of Chinese subservience to Kremlin will to its ultimate rationale in a New York address of May 1951: "By the test of conception, birth, nurture, and obedience, the Mao Tse-tung regime [of China] is a creature of the Moscow Politburo, and it is in behalf of Moscow, not of China, that it is destroying the friendship of the Chinese people toward the United States."[20]

Whatever the dangers of war and destruction in the Soviet-American cold war confrontation, the United States was no more inclined than in the interwar years to define its interests in concrete, achievable terms or to accept diplomatically any of the wartime or postwar Communist-led changes emanating from the use of force. The Truman administration refused to recognize the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe as the price of a Russian triumph over Germany. Nor would it recognize the revolutionary regimes of China or Indochina, under the official assumption that both Mao Tse-tung and Ho Chi Minh were puppets of the Kremlin and thus, despite their successes, not national leaders meriting recognition.[21] At the same time the Truman administration developed no policies to undo what it refused to accept. With the accession of Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles to power in January 1953, the American rejection of the Communist gains in Eastern Europe, China, and Indochina became total. Toward both Eastern Europe and China Secretary Dulles embarked on a popular and promising verbal crusade of liberation. In Indochina the administration embraced the anti-Communist losers in the long Indochinese civil war and assumed that the Saigon regime, with ample American support and encouragement, could eliminate Ho's regime in North Vietnam and reunite the country under its leadership. Thus the Eisenhower administration not only accepted the goal of eliminating uncongenial elements of world politics but assured the American people that nothing would stand in the way of its success.

Maurice Duverger reminded the administration in *Le Monde,* on 27 April 1954, that like its predecessors, it was defying the basic rules of traditional diplomacy: "The entire diplomatic tradition of Europe rests on two unwritten principles: recognition of reality on the one hand, compromise on the other. If the devil himself should be installed at the head of a nation's government, his neighbors could adopt only two attitudes: either try to

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destroy him by war or negotiate with him a modus vivendi. The first attitude is military; the second is diplomatic; there is no third . . . . One can almost define the diplomacy of the United States as principles opposed to those which have just been set forth: on the one hand, refusal to recognize disagreeable situations, on the other hand a desire to obtain capitulation pure and simple."

The Eisenhower administration never acknowledged any vital interest, one meriting the resort to force, in liberating either Eastern Europe, China, or Indochina. Still in no case would it negotiate a modus vivendi. Its decisions for diplomatic rejection settled nothing; they merely permitted the issues raised by the three areas of controversy to drift toward resolutions of their own. Where the situation was stable, as in Eastern Europe and post-revolutionary China, the attitude of rejection was generally without meaning. Where the situation was dynamic, as in Indochina, the declared interests of the United States again narrowed the choice between unacceptable concessions and unwanted war. In its inflexible support for the Saigon government the Eisenhower administration never prepared to fight Hanoi, much less Russia or China, in its defense. Eventually the United States drifted into the Vietnam war, fought it, and left it without making the fundamental decision to destroy the enemy or come to terms with it.

Containment, in granting Europe a long period of remarkable recovery, encouraged the return of many historic tendencies which permitted some normalization of continental politics and diplomacy. Two factors circumscribed the Soviet-American cold war in Europe: the absence of vital interests in conflict and the fear of mutual extinction. But successive Washington administrations, in emphasizing the deterrent effect of nuclear arsenals as the foundation of peace, placed US security on the altar of power. Inasmuch as the Soviet danger never lent itself to tested, precise definition, the changes wrought in Europe by the first twenty years of containment conveyed convictions of security only to those Americans who had always regarded the USSR as fundamentally a status quo power, especially in its relationship to Europe. For those Americans who identified US purpose with the uprooting of Communist power as well as Communist ambition, the gains of twenty years had augmented Western security little if at all. Thus Europe's remarkable recovery did not, when measured by official American policy, rebuild the nation's confidence or reduce its military commitments abroad. The United States in the late sixties was generally more fearful and more widely extended militarily than it had been at mid-century. Containment's tragedy was its failure to eliminate fear as the most powerful force in US foreign policy. Fear stimulated the endless quest for security; at the same time the very imprecision of the factors that sustained its insecurity never permitted the nation to discover when it had achieved an adequate level of defense.

Perhaps the destructiveness of modern weapons underwrote the peace more effectively than did the conventional weapons of the past. But Europe's leading statesmen before 1914 also believed that the destructive power in their hands had rendered war impossible. They discovered too late that the juggling of great power could not prevent war when the clash of interests and prestige defied compromise or settlement. Thus the nature of weapons systems does not determine their use or nonuse. What brings them into play is the decisions of governments, decisions that leave other countries the choice between capitulation to unacceptable demands or war—essentially under conditions where time has ceased to offer any solutions. The American emphasis on being strong did not communicate very much about what the country could or need achieve with its vast destructive power. The United States could not recall the lost world of 1900, 1919, or even 1945 when the unmanageable forces for change unleashed by Germany's defeat scarcely seemed to exist at all. Modern weapons might on occasion deter certain forms of open aggression; they cannot readily undo change once stabilized by written or implied acceptance. Even as a deterrent they can be effective only where widely recognized interests demand their use. The destructiveness of nuclear weapons, casting doubts that any objectives could be worth a general war, compelled the superpowers to consider their demands and modes of behavior with great care, guarding their words and actions to avoid confrontations over issues where no genuine interests were engaged.

For the United States the costs of the cold war eventually spiraled beyond what most Americans regarded an adequate or essential return for their vast expenditures of money and effort. The consumption of some $1.5 trillion during the first quarter century of the cold war had purchased neither peace nor security, at least not on American terms. The United States had protected its narrowly defined national interests with remarkable success. It had prevented attacks on its own soil. With its allies it had managed to deter any Soviet action which might have compromised the independence of the industrialized countries and thus the global balance of power. The later invasion of Afghanistan in no measure threatened the integrity of Britain, Western Europe, Japan, or China, perhaps not even the oil regions of the Middle East. But twenty years of American cold war effort had eliminated neither Soviet power nor the Soviet hegemony from Eastern Europe. Nor had the West eliminated the Soviet adherence to Communist dogma. For Europeans and Americans who never anticipated victory over Soviet purpose in Europe, containment had been no failure. For them the decades of cold war, with the incredible economic and political progress of Western Europe, demonstrated that American security and well-being, as well as that of Western Europe itself, did not require the restoration of the Versailles order after all. As an end, containment had stabilized the division of Europe with a vengeance. As a means to an end—the negotiation of a new order in

Europe—it had failed simply because no Western military structure could undo the Soviet political and territorial gains which flowed from Hitler's collapse without war. That the United States had coexisted with a world that did not measure up to its precepts of self-determination with such perennial success and no little security, created doubts regarding the wisdom of the search for a more ideologically perfect order.

If Russia's capacity and determination to maintain its hegemony across East-Central Europe assured the frustration of American purpose, Soviet gains also remained largely elusive. The Kremlin required considerable effort to contain the nationalistic pressures against its rule; it could not transform, through ideological indoctrination or repression, the areas under its control into the unitary society that its dogma required. No portion of Eastern Europe could the Soviets integrate emotionally or spiritually into their empire. China challenged the unity of the Communist bloc even more than did the European satellites. Indeed, China had never entered the Soviet hegemony at all. By 1960 China had embarked on a career of open defiance of Soviet leadership in the Communist world. In time China and Russia would emerge as the world's most bitter antagonists.

That the United States had no major stake in the destruction of the Soviet empire in East-Central Europe, or the elimination of China's Peking regime, was demonstrated repeatedly through decades of carefully restrained behavior during moments of crisis behind the Iron and Bamboo curtains. Still as late as the 1960s the United States, because of the continued promise of liberation, refused to recognize, by formal agreement, either the Soviet preponderance in Eastern Europe or the government of China. Perhaps nothing would have demonstrated so clearly the limited choices confronting the great powers in Europe than a military clash along the Iron Curtain. Such a conflict could have been limited only by an unequivocal declaration for the continuance of the status quo as the object of the military involvement. But if a nation at war, fighting under the immediate threat of nuclear escalation, faced the simple alternative of announcing the limits of its intentions or inviting a thermonuclear attack, then it was not unreasonable to suggest that it regard negotiable in time of peace what it would of necessity regard negotiable in time of war or suffer general destruction. As Duff Cooper once observed, it would be interesting to collect historical instances of harm that has been done by the reluctance of men to accept readily what they knew they would of necessity accept in the end.

Such questions lay at the heart of the Nixon-Kissinger approach to Russia and China. Even a cursory examination of America's world relationships during the first quarter century of the cold war reveals the uniqueness of the Nixon-Kissinger record. Nothing illustrated better the collapse of the Acheson-Dulles assumptions of ultimate victory over Peking and Moscow than the summits of 1972, as those meetings, and the corresponding Nixon-

Kissinger efforts at détente, acknowledged the existence of Communist-led Russia, with its satellite empire, and China as permanent elements in world politics. Such recognition did not eliminate the ominous presence of Russian power in Europe, but it did eliminate a dangerous revisionism in American purpose and thereby reduced the consequences of the Russian victory over Germany as the major factor in the Soviet-American rivalry. Few Europeans in 1983 feared the outbreak of a war in Europe over issues purely European.

Containment of Communist power in Europe and China had sought massive changes in a fundamentally stable environment; elsewhere containment tended to oppose change in a fundamentally unstable environment. The United States, to be sure, had not resisted all revolutionary change in Asia and Africa. Indeed, the steady disintegration of the European empires where nationalism and not communism, and the driving force for change faced no opposition in Washington. After mid-century, local and regional conflicts outside Europe—between ethnic, religious and cultural factions, and between ideological or military rivals—managed to sustain a sufficiently high level of turmoil to capture the world's headlines. Fortunately, most of these conflicts offered no incentives for Soviet or American involvement. What mattered even in the Chinese and Indochinese revolutions was less their Communist ideology than the official American dogma that both movements were part of a global Communist conspiracy centering in the Kremlin and thus a special danger to the non-Communist world. If by definition every Communist-led assault on the status quo in Asia, Africa, and Latin America served the purpose of Soviet expansionism, then the country's broader interests, those concerned with its role as defender of the entire non-Communist world, demanded suppression of such assaults, whatever the cost. This globalized version of containment demanded that the United States not only underwrite friendly regimes everywhere and be prepared to defend them, but also seek to destabilize regimes declared to be hostile. Unfortunately, in its tendency to judge regimes by the test of moderation or radicalism, by their policies of nationalization or land reform, or their reliance on American or on Soviet aid, the United States often supported regimes that were fundamentally not supportable. It condoned the repression and mismanagement that unleashed the radicalism which the Kremlin and its friends exploited.

Early in the cold war the great powers defined their minimum interests in a divided Europe; that definition, in large measure, accounted for Europe's perennial peace. The task of determining ends with such precision elsewhere was exceedingly difficult; no wartime conquests delineated any recognizable spheres of influence. Because of their overwhelming military might and their persistent rivalry, the two superpowers sustained the notion of a bipolar world in which any radical assault on the status quo would of necessity

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engage their interests. In practice both the United States and the USSR, whatever the extent of their involvements, had difficulty in controlling the outcomes of Third World upheavals. The tendencies toward violence were exceedingly varied and complex, defying any precise calculations of interest in the success or failure of those struggling for power. Much of the Soviet-American rivalry outside Europe was over the nature of regimes or principles of self-determination rather than international aggression. This was true in China, Indochina, and Korea, the three areas of major cold war conflict in Asia after mid-century. In exploiting anti-racist and anti-imperialist revolutions, as well as political and economic troubles, the USSR often aggravated local and regional conflicts; nowhere did it create the conditions that generated the revolutionary pressures or the quest for Soviet arms. The fundamental impulses of nationalism, even where encouraged by the Kremlin, would not conform to Soviet purpose. The very nationalistic emotions and objectives that unleashed the postwar revolutions erected formidable barriers against external influences, whether emanating from the United States or the USSR. The Soviets gained little militarily or politically from the postwar revolutions that swept the Afro-Asian world. They withdrew under compulsion from countries which once seemed important to them—China, Egypt, and Somalia. It remained to be seen whether the Kremlin, through greater military power and selectivity, could create dependencies strong enough to avoid a repetition of its past failures.

Unfortunately, the notion of global confrontation could lead to clashes where perceptions of danger demanded a price far transcending the possible gains from direct involvement. Eventually the war in Vietnam demonstrated the difficulty in attempting to confront Soviet expansionism by opposing local or regional Communist-led assaults on the status quo. From beginning to end the war was a localized conflict to determine what Vietnamese would rule that country. It was the North Vietnamese, not the Russians or Chinese, that sent the costs of the Vietnamese war soaring to totally unanticipated levels. In the Paris peace talks after 1968 the United States sought a settlement with Hanoi, not with Moscow or Peking. The United States entered, fought, and left the war without dealing with the Kremlin at all. If the danger to all South and Southeast Asia centered in Moscow or Peking (or both), the United States would not resolve the challenge through negotiation with the North Vietnamese. If the power to dispose of the Vietnamese conflict lay in Hanoi, then where lay the Soviet expansionism in Asia which had motivated the initial American effort to contain Hanoi's influence? Clearly the United States never defined the issues in Vietnam with much accuracy. In that struggle the American commitment to resist communism in all of its forms reached the dead end. After Saigon's fall in 1975 the United States remained the world's leading

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power, but by then the troublesome issues that captured the headlines challenged few traditional American interests and thus defied the exertion of will or even the creation of genuine policy.

After Vietnam the central challenge to American policy continued to lie in Third World assertiveness and the country's limited influence in opposing it. American power had been effective only where the nation's interests were clear, historical, and widely perceived. If that power had little weight in the Third World, it was because American interests there lacked a precise historical definition. The United States could not prevent the creation of governments more anti-Western, nationalistic, self-centered, and resistant to external influence than the former pro-Western, often aristocratic, regimes which they replaced. The seventies brought such political upheavals to Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, and Nigeria. President Jimmy Carter met the challenge by acknowledging America's limited world role and, with that recognition, the diminution of the strategic importance of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. His assumption that the Third World countries had interests of their own and the will to pursue them reinforced his determination to avoid simple anti-Soviet postures to perpetuate the status quo. For him a world of triumphant nationalism offered American power no legitimate or necessary use. In deserting the old commitment to global containment the Carter administration accepted the growing Soviet presence in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia with general unconcern—if often to the dismay of those who accused it of assigning world primacy to the Soviet Union. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979 reversed the Carter administration's mood and rhetoric, but not its policies.

In changing the Carter approach to the Third World, the Reagan administration moved to exorcise the Vietnam syndrome and reassert the earlier cold war program of global containment.[22] From the outset the Reagan policies turned invariably on the assumption that Soviet expansionism underlay the world's unwanted turmoil. The added notion that the Soviet Union could extend its power and influence through Communist-supplied revolution quickly transformed Central America into another area of danger. Any American failure to stop the insurgency in Central America, warned Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, would compel an American withdrawal from Europe, Japan, and Korea, leaving the entire non-Western world to Soviet purposes.[23] Unfortunately, the Secretary never explained how Russia could unleash power in Central America sufficient to endanger the United States without an actual Soviet presence. Whatever the accuracy of those who saw the hand of the Kremlin in the revolutionary activities of Central America, the sources of revolution remained indigenous and historic. Thus the United States would never come to terms with its new challenges, any more than it did with those in Vietnam, merely by providing

military aid for favored regimes such as that of El Salvador. This aid guaranteed neither the uprooting of insurgency nor improvement in the country's internal economic and social conditions. Indeed, Washington's official preoccupation with the Soviet ties to Third World upheavals weakened its capacity to confront, or even recognize, the continuing problems that flowed from local sources of instability—poverty, inequality, political oppression, regional and racial tension, and impending economic collapse.

If the dangers of direct Soviet aggression in the regions around Russia's periphery were serious, the possibilities for effective coalition diplomacy seemed promising enough. Every country on the globe opposed Soviet military aggression. China, Japan, and the powers of Western Europe had interests in the troubled regions extending from the eastern Mediterranean to the China Sea at least equal to those of the United States. Alliances enable their members not only to maximize the means of policy at their disposal but also to create essential opportunities for mutual instruction. Coalition diplomacy rests primarily on agreements concerning interests and objectives. Alliances break down on questions of ends not of means. European leaders had long rejected the perceptions of danger that generated the global policies of the United States. Behind Europe's refusal to support the United States' policies in the Third World was the conviction that the unrest in Asia, Africa, and Central America resulted from innate pressures, not Soviet expansionism. Europe's peace had been the core of international stability, and Western Europe had no interest in becoming the battleground of a war over issues that concerned it remotely if at all. To protect Europe from a Soviet-American war begun elsewhere, Charles de Gaulle repeatedly demanded that Britain and France have some voice in determining US policies outside Europe. "If there is no agreement among the principal members of the Atlantic Alliance on matters other than Europe," he asked, "how can the Alliance be indefinitely maintained in Europe?"[24]

Countries whose economic and strategic importance transcends their powers of deterrence are always insecure, and the world is never free of nations, large and small, who seek to expand their influence through adventuristic policies. Such nations give their neighbors, or antagonists elsewhere, the choice of coming to terms with their ambitions through diplomacy or making preparations for the use of force. No adverse development in world politics is totally without significance, but to determine the stakes by the mere presence of an antagonist movement or the possibility that its success might produce unwanted consequences is an invitation to overinvolvement. Still, the United States had a major interest in minimizing aggression or unrest, especially in regions of economic and strategic significance. Such turbulence could affect access to primary raw materials, encourage the quest for external support, influence the ways in

which the major powers defined their interests, present the USSR with opportunities for exploitation, and possibly lead to the formulation of objectives that exceeded the country's power to achieve. This suggested that the United States might well act in situations where security interests remained ambiguous but where the general concern for stability and order could be extensive. The issue was not alone whether the United States should counter revolutionary pressures; rather, the challenge lay essentially in designing policies that would maximize the economic and social welfare of the people concerned. Indeed, what turned Central America into an area of turmoil was the tendency of American-backed regimes to neglect their countries' profound social and economic challenges and thus expose the entire Caribbean basin to the baunting spectre of radical revolution.[25] It is not strange that Congress, supported by much of the American public, was reluctant to grant economic and military aid to Central America's antirevolutionary elements.

To avoid overinvolvement yet protect essential interests, it appeared essential that the country separate that which was merely undesirable in the Third World from what was actually dangerous. Soviet aid or the aid of Russia's friends did not convert revolutionary movements into puppets or mere purveyors of Soviet influence. What determined the course of Third World upheavals was tbe aspirations and ambitions of the revolutionaries, not a concern for the interests of the superpowers. Insurgents pursued their own causes, not the causes of those whose weapons they used. Both the United States and the USSR were successful in the Third World only when they served the interests of those with whom they were allied. Most stable regimes have had no need or interest in US support. Those governments which demanded that support were generally so narrowly based that no reasonable amount of external aid could save them.

Notes

1. For Carter's statement on "Meet the Press," 20 January 1980, see *The New York Times*, 21 January 1980, p. A4.
2. Haig quoted in *ibid.*, 12 August 1981, p. A28.
3. White House Press Release: "Remarks of Judge William Clark, National Security Adviser to the President," 21 May 1981, p. 4.
4. For the national effort to define and achieve these interests along the Pacific coast see Norman A. Graebner, *Empire on the Pacific* (New York: Ronald Press, 1955), passim.
5. Taft's commitment to peaceful procedures reflected the growing peace movement in the United States, dominated by Andrew Carnegie, Elihu Root, Columbia University's Nicholas Murray Butler, and other noted lawyers and intellectuals.
6. For Hull's press conference of 22 March and his advice to the German ambassador see Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (London: Macmillan, 1948), v. I, pp. 243-244.
7. Roosevelt's bitter disagreement with Chamberlain over the wisdom and necessity of compromising with Mussolini and Hitler receives attention in Norman A. Graebner, *Roosevelt and the Search for a European Policy, 1937-1939* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).
8. Hull's statement of 16 July 1937 appears in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1937*, v. I (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1954), pp. 699-700.

9. Lynn Etheridge Davis, *The Cold War Begins: Soviet-American Conflict over Eastern Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 149.

10. Harriman, Byrnes, and Henderson are quoted in Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), pp. 85, 143, 152.

11. Marshall quoted in *ibid.*, p. 281.

12. Acheson quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 281-282.

13. Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. and Joe Alex Morris, eds., *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), p. 342.

14. Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), p. 165.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 165-167. These fears of Soviet expansionism and the American strategy for countering Russian policy were elaborated in NSC 20/1 of 18 August 1948. See *ibid.*, pp. 173-203.

16. For the quotations taken from NSC 68 see *ibid.*, pp. 385-389.

17. Townsend Hoopes, for example, notes Dulles' assumptions of an eventual Soviet retreat in *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), pp. 488-489.

18. Acheson's speech before the Commonwealth Club of California printed in Dean Acheson, "New Era in Asia," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, 1 April 1950, pp. 356-357.

19. *The Department of State Bulletin* 10 April 1950, p. 562.

20. Dulles quoted in *ibid.*, 28 May 1951, p. 844.

21. Upon his return from a trip to Indonesia in September 1951, Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, in a San Francisco press conference, advocated the recognition of the Peking regime. President Truman expressed his opposing views in a letter to Douglas, dated 13 September 1951: "I was somewhat embarrassed by your statement on Communist China. As long as I am President, if I can prevent it, that cut-throat organization will never be recognized by us as the Government of China and I am sorry that a Justice of the Supreme Court has been willing to champion the interest of a bunch of murderers by a public statement." See Robert H. Ferrell, ed., *Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman* (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), pp. 217-218.

22. Reagan's fears of Soviet power and expansionism underwrote his request for a military budget totalling $1.6 trillion in five years. Such enormous defense expenditures and resulting budget deficits led some to consider whether the United States could afford any longer "to defend half the world against the other half." For an argument that the United States terminate its effort at global defense and reduce its security interests accordingly see Earl C. Ravenal, "The Case for a Withdrawal of Our Forces," *The New York Times Magazine*, 6 March 1983, pp. 58-61, 75.

23. Weinberger quoted in *U.S. News & World Report*, 28 March 1983, p. 22.

24. DeGaulle quoted by Leslie Gelb in *The New York Times*, 26 July 1981, p. E-3.

25. No episode illustrated more forcefully the nature of US policy in the Caribbean and the costs of that policy to the people of Latin America than the overthrow of the Arbenz government of Guatemala in June 1954. For a detailed account of that overthrow see Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982).

Dr. Norman Graebner is the senior professor of American Foreign Relations at the University of Virginia.