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## The Yankee Mariner and Seapower: America's Challenge of Ocean Space

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signature suppression, except with respect to DDG-51 and some pre-WWII designs, though these have been continual considerations.

It would have been good for the general reader to have been reminded that ship procurement is but one aspect of ship cost. The costs of operations and maintenance and those of manning equal or exceed those of procurement. Thus every ship is bought three times or more. This provides another perspective on such features as ease of maintenance, equipment reliability, manning, and full economy. In this regard, the author notes that the low efficiency of gas turbines was a consideration in earlier ship design. The great improvement in the FT4 and particularly in the LM2500 (*Spruance*, *Perry*, and *Ticonderoga* classes) is not noted, though this was one of the major factors in their selection, once distillate fuel became standard in the Navy.

Overall, though the book seems to promise more than it delivers, it is an excellent reference work, topnotch for selected reading, and the only reasonable historical source or indoctrination medium for a line officer thrust into destroyer modification, procurement or design.

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Bartell, Joyce J., ed. *The Yankee Mariner and Seapower: America's Challenge of Ocean Space*. Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1982. 299pp. \$20.00

Was there ever a Yankee Mariner? If so, is he still with us? And what are his prospects for the future? These questions are the focus of this guide to the United States as a sea-faring nation. The book is about American sea power, as defined in the foreword by Dr. Don Walsh, of *Trieste* fame, as "the sum total of all uses made of the oceans: their living and non-living resources, the energy wrested from them, their use as avenues of transport, their value and potential for recreation, as well as the vital role they play in national defense." Walsh's is a theme much in vogue these days, sounded perhaps most forcefully by Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov in his book, *The Sea Power of the State*, and highlighted by the perhaps concluded negotiations at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea.

This book, like certain other recent  
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efforts, has several objectives. First, it seeks to provide a history of the American experience with the sea. Second, it intends a tour d'horizon as to the total impact American sea power has had in the past and should have in the future. And, finally, it attempts to offer an understanding of the importance of the oceans for the future of the United States. The editor and authors make a valiant attempt, but fall short of covering these fields as completely as they desired.

This result is predestined by the nature of the book itself. It is a collection of papers presented at a conference held at the University of Southern California in March 1981, sponsored by the Center for the Study of the American Experience, the Annenberg School of Communications. Some of the monographs trace the development of the United States as a sea power from the historical point of view, while others describe specific ocean uses and the US prospects for future developments in those areas. The denouement is

an uneven collection of "voices," some attempting an unbiased, objective analysis, others, unabashedly protagonistic of a special ocean interest.

Certain chapters are noteworthy for what they could have been. For example, Ann Hollick's "Politics in American Uses of the Sea, 1970-1980," attempts too much in too short a space. She provides a nice overview of complex, sometimes byzantine, domestic and international processes, but let me urge you to turn to her book, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea* (Princeton, 1981) for a truly masterful and comprehensive analysis of American oceans politics.

Similarly, Mike McGwire's piece on "The Superpowers at Sea: Two Studies in Sea Power," is actually "One Study in Sea Power"—an analysis of the post-World War II Soviet naval buildup and the use of the sea in Soviet foreign policy. Out of 23 pages, he devotes only four, perhaps five, pages to the United States (relying on the preceding paper by John B. Hattendorf, "Some Concepts in American Naval Strategic Thought, 1940-1970," and the subsequent one by Richard T. Ackley, "National Defense at Sea: The United States Navy," to provide more detail), despite his original intentions. And, again, one should turn to his other, recent writings, e.g., "The Rationale for the Development of Soviet Seapower" (*USNI Proceedings, Naval Review Issue*, May 1980), for a more detailed and complete study of the topic he emphasizes here.

Yet these shortcomings are not the responsibilities of the authors; blame should be directed at the framework for the book—a conference of specialists. It invites fragmentary, disjointed scholarship, while the scope of the conference—the "sum total" of the American experience with the sea—is unachievable

except superficially. The conference, chaired by Dr. Walsh, a retired Navy Captain who now is Director of the Institute for Marine and Coastal Studies, brought together 14 experts from diverse areas of marine affairs, each with his or her own special interest in America's uses of the seas: fisheries and living resources, ocean mining, gas and oil from the sea, renewable ocean energy technologies, the merchant marine, seaports and trade flows, international oceans politics, and naval power. Taken together, their contributions provide an elegant analogy of what Dr. Walsh describes as the fiction of a unified national ocean policy for the use of the oceans. Those who wrote the papers themselves speak of a disunity of interests, and of competition and conflict among distinct goals.

Nevertheless, the editor must be praised for achieving a sense of oneness which is apparent in even a first reading. She seems to have devoted a great deal of effort to making the book flow easily from one chapter to another, to providing allusions in one contributor's paper to conclusions in another's, and generally to making the book hang together well. It therefore avoids completely the fate of so many similar undertakings, the appearance (and reality) of being slapped together, hurriedly, to meet some arbitrary deadline, without a thought of unification. In this strength alone I can recommend the book to the general reader interested in marine affairs. However, because of the superficial treatment of certain topics, those knowledgeable of the oceans or America's maritime roles will likely find too little in it.

This being said, Dr. Walsh ties it all together in the concluding chapter, "The Yankee Mariner in the Next Two Decades," and thereby deals with the three objectives posed at the beginning.

He suggests a way to eliminate the fiction of a national US policy for the oceans, arguing that to have sea power we must have marine science, marine technology and ocean engineering, economic viability, and public policy and ocean politics—the last being the harmonious accommodation of diverse interests for the greater public good.

The first three are largely achievable in the present public context. The fourth, however, remains elusive and, unless this country achieves it on a unified, national level, we will find effective uses of the sea impossible. Rather, the United States will continue in what Walsh views as its decline as a first-rate sea power.

Dr. Walsh calls for us to begin planning the development of a national ocean policy framework and an executive mechanism—a Cabinet-level Department of the Oceans, perhaps?—to ensure that present policy decisions are carried out swiftly by the responsible agencies of government and that inter-agency conflicts are resolved quickly and fairly.

Given the fragmented nature of US decision making for the oceans; the separations of that policy-making process at the local, state, national, and international levels of government; and the diverse forms in which ocean interests are manifested; it is a gargantuan task. Nevertheless, as a long-time student of US and international marine policies, this reviewer concurs with the goal. Reaching it will be an interesting, but certainly tortuous, process.

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Pearce, Frank. *Last Call for HMS Edinburgh*. New York: Atheneum, 1982. 199pp. \$14.95

"It's going to be a bad trip, sir, this is Russian gold dripping with blood." This

somewhat melodramatic statement, attributed to a crewman of HMS *Edinburgh*, a modified *Southampton* class cruiser assigned to the Arctic convoys, holds promise of intrigue, adventure and suspense. However, the anticipation generated by such a quotation is not completely fulfilled in this occasionally disorganized account of convoy action in the Arctic. Perhaps it is fitting, for combat conditions on the Murmansk run, although heroic in the ultimate sense of this overused word, were hardly pleasant or intriguing. Drudgery, boredom, fear, intense physical discomfort and a sense of hopelessness are the stark realities which faced Allied and German seamen and which are vividly described by the author. After a slow, somewhat laborious beginning Pearce adequately depicts the conditions which obstructed allied efforts to push convoys through to the beleaguered Soviets.

The author's personal connection with the story was as a crewmember in HMS *Trinidad*, which was lost in the series of engagements described in the book. That action is emphasized to such an extent that it would seem that Pearce might more appropriately have entitled his work *Last Call for HMS Trinidad*. Despite his disclaimer in the epilogue that this work was completed before the location of the *Edinburgh* wreck in 1981, it appears that the book was rushed to print to capitalize on the popular interest created by the recovery of a portion of the gold lost with *Edinburgh* when she went down to U-boat and surface attack.

Nevertheless, Pearce generates considerable interest through his description of the ordeal and conditions facing convoy survivors as they awaited transportation home from the Murmansk area. Pearce suggests that the often presented argument that Russian treatment of these survivors was an insidious Soviet plot to