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## NATO and the Atlantic Defense: Perceptions and Illusions,

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thought better to avoid those problems that would arise as a result of seeking to alter the ABM Treaty. Arms negotiations will always constitute only one dimension of the broader Soviet-American relationship, but will be bound to be affected by others. "Linkage" is also a problem for arms control negotiations within the Western alliance, where the stakes are now very high.

There is therefore a political imperative for the United States to continue the talks, making progress as circumstances permit; but it is essential to embed the Intermediate Nuclear Force talks, as soon as possible, in the broader context of negotiations about all strategic forces. The problem of the latter, unfortunately, is complicated by the "messy institutional infrastructure" of arms control and the increasingly complicated political setting. As a result, "it is not easy to define a coherent, constructive, and politically sustainable arms control policy."

Even so, it is argued that there is nothing to gain from terminating SALT II. Beyond that the Study Group believes that there might be room for less formal and less public arrangements when it comes to the long-term future of strategic arms control negotiations, while unilateral efforts could be taken in the defense field which would further the basic aims of arms control. General expectations about arms control should be lowered. Its future is not primarily hampered by "a lack of reasonable goals or of potentially effective means of accomplishing them." Basically, arms control is "to a large degree hostage to the state of US-Soviet relations."

Overall, this is a sophisticated contribution to the debate about the future of US strategic forces. It deserves to be read carefully and widely, and one looks forward to a similar venture into the

area of conventional weapons. To at least one set of European eyes, the contributors to this volume represent the acceptable face of present-day American strategic thinking.

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Feld, Werner J. and Wildgen, John K.  
*NATO and the Atlantic Defense: Perceptions and Illusions*. New York: Praeger, 1982. 171pp. \$19.95

What is one to make of a book that confesses in the "Acknowledgements," before one has even seen the table of contents, that "This text was written quickly: . . ."; that begins the last chapter, called "Policy Implications," by raising doubts" . . . with respect to the causality between perceptions, attitudes, behavior and policy actions" after leading us down the garden path from the analysis of perceptions and illusions in the first five chapters to the policy implications of the last chapter; that fills page after page with clearly superfluous charts, graphs and even an entire irrelevant chapter? One wonders why the authors wrote it and why we should read it. Where were the friendly colleagues who help authors through early drafts and the professional editors with their blue pencils?

The authors wrote a good article that was stretched into a bad book. The good article is the last and sixth chapter. It shows flashes of insight into some of the issues separating the United States from its European allies, but it is unfortunate that the best writing and most intelligent commentary concentrated in the last chapter highlight the bad writing, the lack of organization and the questionable methods of the rest of the book. Chapter six relies upon traditional analysis and

good prose to suggest that cultural continuity and a real feeling for the way Europeans see things continue to have great value for those of us concerned with Nato. The first five chapters of the book are a virtual parody of the scientific method producing an edifice whose superstructure is made of jello.

The book has defects. Shall I count the ways?

The first chapter announces that: "Through an analysis and evaluation of relevant public opinion data and by content analysis of selected newspapers in the United States, this book will attempt to shed light on this vast and sometimes contradictory array of perceptions, misconceptions, and illusions that have arisen in connection with Nato and the Atlantic defense"; but it fails in the attempt by placing clouds between the light source and the reader and by doing badly what Karl W. Deutsch does so well. Gobs of information are not evidence; collections of notions are not chapters; the concluding essay, quite a nice one, does not spring from what is not evidence. Further, by rushing to publication in 1982, for reasons unknown to readers, our authors fall into a trap of their own making in the first chapter and throughout the book: they project the early successes of the Reagan administration well into the 1980s, a gamble lost about the time the book went to press as the US Congress and the American people discovered that there were costs associated with administration programs and resistance began to set in.

Chapter 2 is called "The Public Image of NATO in the United States." One is never told why the authors chose seven particular newspapers for analysis rather than some other newspapers or some other number of them. Why did they use, for example, *The Houston Post* and *New Orleans Times-Picayune* and not the

*St. Louis Post Dispatch*, the *Wall Street Journal*, *The Christian Science Monitor* or *The Washington Post*? The three major newsmagazines are analyzed but only one of the three national television networks. Why? When our authors portray the tables derived from questionable samples, one wonders how representative of the United States four newspapers (*The New York Times*, *Chicago Tribune*, *New Orleans Times-Picayune*, and *Los Angeles Times*) might be. The most trusting soul begins to wonder early on if the deck is being stacked or if our authors know what they are about. Extensive use of the *New Orleans Times-Picayune* throughout the book may be a noble effort to bind town and gown (the authors teach at the University of New Orleans), but it doesn't charm a stranger to the delights of Bourbon Street.

The irrelevant Chapter 3 is as bland as kissing one's sister and as useful as a sixth toe. One reads twenty pages to discover: obscure Nato-produced films are difficult to distribute because no one wants to show them; when shown to a captive audience (the authors' classes) they have a marginal positive effect; how to fill a book with figures and graphs that advance neither human understanding nor the book's progress.

In Chapter 4 we learn that the American public sees Nato and defense as synonymous and is prepared to spend for defense for the first time since the Vietnam debacle for long-term ("Soviet expansionism") and short-term (Soviet installation of SS-20 missiles in Europe) reasons. The authors fail to point out that American aversion to defense spending wasn't caused exclusively by the unhappy US experience in Vietnam nor by disillusionment with détente. Watergate, Agnew's resignation, the oil crisis, ABSCAM, and memories of the loss of unmatched US military and economic

power enjoyed in the two decades after World War Two also contributed to a general frustration and failure of confidence in government. President Carter was elected to make us good; it is unclear whether President Reagan was elected to make us strong or to send Mr. Carter away. It remains to be seen that the desire of the American public to be Numero Uno is matched by the willingness to pay the price. Again, the rush to publication may cause our authors to wear egg on their faces.

There are some really funny lines in the book. Unfortunately they are not intended. Endnote 7 on page 89: "Carl von Clausewitz was a Prussian general who devoted a great deal of his fertile thoughts to the nature of war. See his book *On War* . . . ." One expects that persons prepared to read the book being reviewed would recognize the name of the German philosopher of war, but why did our authors assume that the reader wouldn't need some help with "the chi-square-based Cramer's V" which pops up on page 71?

"Eurodoves and Eurohawks" is the cutesy title of Chapter 5 that begins with an explication called "Some Technical Comments." One suspects that the methodological commentary serves the purpose of camouflaging personal opinion while doing a disservice to the English language. The meaning of "certainty" is stretched; the pseudo-scientific "unidirectionally" and "univocal" bang on one's ears; the reckless use of "Finlandization" makes precision difficult.

And so it goes.

Your reviewer is singularly unhappy with this book.

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Cornell, Alexander H. *International Collaboration in Weapons and Equipment Development and Production by the NATO Allies: Ten Years Later—and Beyond*. Hingham, Mass.: Kluwer Academic Publications, 1981. 233pp. \$54.50

Progress is being made but major problems are yet to be solved. That is the conclusion of author Alex Cornell as he revisits the Nato weapons development world ten years after his initial study of major system acquisitions by the Alliance. Both the review of his 1969 analysis and his current study of weapon and equipment collaboration focus on two basic hypotheses: 1) international weapons co-development and co-production is a viable concept of organization and management, and 2) the common institutions, agreements, structures and managerial techniques can be clearly identified, recorded and analyzed to assist further collaborative efforts.

The testing of these hypotheses is done empirically, reviewing three examples of joint effort studies in 1969 (long-range maritime patrol aircraft, the Hawk missile system and the F-104G aircraft) and comparing them with three current projects: the Nato Airborne Early Warning aircraft, the Roland missile system and the F-16 aircraft. Staying away from the more typical approach of arguing the relative merits of competing weapon systems, the author concentrates on the evolving organizational structures which demonstrate some success in coping with the multitude of complexities that inhibit transnational system acquisition. In particular, he underscores the vital role that the Nato organization plays in attempting to overcome the resistance and wastefulness of national self-interest. Although interoperability and standardization goals are woven throughout the book, they are not considered as ends in themselves but as