

1983

## Soviet Strategic Power and Doctrine

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### Recommended Citation

Zakheim, Dov S. (1983) "Soviet Strategic Power and Doctrine," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 36 : No. 3 , Article 30.  
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss3/30>

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*War and Peace*, a collection of eight articles dealing with the Soviet view of conflict. This book illuminates Soviet perceptions of several relevant political and military issues based on examinations of Soviet sources, and to demonstrate, from the Soviet view, how their military and political policies interrelate.

All of the contributors are established experts on the subject. John Dziak's lead essay focuses on military doctrine. Dziak shows that doctrine is the Party's guide for the military's strategic structure and future direction. Reiterating his view that the Soviet Union is a totally integrated political-military system, Dziak sees doctrine and the resulting force structure as the implementation of the Party's method for pursuing its political objectives.

Dziak's chapter provides a framework for the remainder of the book, which focuses on Soviet perceptions of seven specific issues: the laws of war; the origins of the cold war; war in the nuclear age; Soviet military capabilities; military strategies and forces; peaceful coexistence; and the emergence of multipolarity in international affairs. All of the articles are comprehensive and well written, providing the reader with a good introduction to Soviet perceptions of several major issues.

Two articles are truly noteworthy. The first, by William and Harriet Scott, assesses Soviet perceptions of American military strategy and strength. The Scotts note that Soviet perceptions change in order to continue to accurately reflect US strategy and military strength. The Scotts are the only contributors who explicitly address the Soviet Navy. In discussing the postulations contained in Admiral Gorshkov's *Sea Power of the State*, they emphasize that, although he views US strategy and

forces from a somewhat different perspective than other Soviet leaders, this is merely a difference in emphasis; there are no basic differences between Gorshkov's views and those of other Soviet military leaders. This important observation conflicts with the view commonly held in the US Navy that there is a significant divergence of views between Gorshkov and his counterparts.

Colonel Vernon's excellent article traces the concept of "peaceful coexistence" from its inception and concludes that there is considerable consistency in Soviet policy. He believes that for the USSR, peaceful coexistence is a currently operative but not necessarily permanent concept. Vernon warns that it is essential for the West to maintain the balance of power so that the Soviets do not achieve a "position of strength." The implications of this for the US Navy are obvious.

As both editor and contributor, Vernon has provided us with valuable insight into the Soviet view of several major military and foreign policy issues. A concise, readable, and comprehensive volume, *Soviet Perceptions of War and Peace* is a valuable aid for understanding current Soviet military and naval strategy.

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Miller, Mark E. *Soviet Strategic Power and Doctrine: The Quest for Superiority.*

Washington, D.C.: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1982. 298pp.  
\$14.95, paper \$9.95

Deciphering Soviet political/military intentions, and matching those intentions to the raw military capabilities that the USSR commands, is a most hazardous undertaking. Compounding the difficulty of access to information is the paucity of analysts who are not only able

to read, understand, and interpret Soviet Russian language military literature, but can present their findings in readable form to the wider Western security community. To be sure, scanning Soviet literature for hints of doctrinal change, or strategic assumptions, will not unlock all the doors to that closed society that is our foremost adversary. Nevertheless, an analysis of the literature that is primarily geared to internal Soviet military audiences reduces the risk that our interpretations of the USSR's intentions, and the mindset of its leadership, will be far off the mark.

Mark E. Miller's *Soviet Strategic Power and Doctrine: The Quest for Superiority* represents a major contribution to the study of Soviet military literature. Miller's thesis is straightforward: "the fundamental problem confronting the United States in its military competition with the Soviet Union is as much one of contending strategic philosophies as of opposing military assets." Miller argues that Westerners have discounted the importance of strategic doctrine in shaping force development, primarily because the United States in particular has relied more on resources than on strategy to win its wars. He contends that the Soviets, on the other hand, espouse a nuclear warfighting and war winning strategy that is reflected in their writings. He argues that Soviet requirements have remained constant for two decades, while deployed forces have "correlated" to an even greater degree with those requirements. At the same time the weapons acquisition system and the formulation of doctrine have been under firm political control.

Miller guides his readers through a postwar history of Soviet doctrine and force development in order to support his case. He provides a most useful

discussion of the Soviet weapons acquisition process, as well as a trenchant critique of the SALT II Treaty. But he does not entirely succeed in convincing the reader of the validity of his central thesis.

Miller's major problem is that at critical junctures he is forced to rely on speculation, rather than documentation to prove his case. For example, Miller argues that the USSR's overall political/military strategy in the late 1960s sought to delay the resurgence of American power, to acquire the benefits of Western technology, and by means of détente, to drive a wedge between the United States and its allies and ensure the West's neutrality in a Sino-Soviet struggle, thereby thwarting the Nixon Grand Design. Unfortunately, there is a marked absence of evidence to support Miller's arguments.

Similarly, Miller's discussion of Soviet objectives in SALT I argues, without any sources, that limitations on ballistic missile defenses were "uppermost in the minds of the Soviets." His explanation for this critically important assertion is far too tentative, and is laced with the use of the terms "may" and "probably." Again, Miller's argument that the Soviet notion of deterrence has not embraced notions of mutual restraint is essentially an unsupported assertion. Indeed, his statement that the Soviets "have had little use . . . for shoring up deterrence . . . [such] as improving communications," flies in the face of the existence of a Moscow-Washington hot line, and its frequent use, as well as of agreements such as that regarding incidents at sea.

Almost as troublesome is Miller's reliance upon antiquated citations to prove a particular point. For example, Miller cites a general officer's comment

published in January 1968 in support of his arguments that the Soviets view a protracted conventional campaign as improbable. Without doubt, at the time the Soviets did not focus on the possibilities of a protracted conventional war. Many analysts would argue, however, that they do so today. Similarly, Miller argues that the Soviets expect to launch a preemptive nuclear strike, on the basis of a comment by A.A. Sidorenko published some years ago. Brezhnev's no-first-use offer has, of course, overtaken Miller's argument, at least at its face value.

The point of these criticisms is not to devalue Miller's effort. His research is indeed painstaking, even if the book suffers from a variety of minor factual errors and some poor proofreading. Furthermore, Miller's arguments are plausible, and are supportable on the basis of analyses that go beyond his methodology. Most readers will recognize the limitations to Miller's methodology, as the author himself acknowledges. Thus, for the general reader willing to plunge into heavily academic prose, and for the specialist seeking a well-organized discussion of the Soviet military/political psyche, Miller's book, in the genre of the seminal works by Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., and Amoretta M. Hoerber, is indeed required reading.

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Clawson, Robert W. and Kaplan, Lawrence S., eds. *The Warsaw Pact: Political Purpose and Military Means*. Wilmington, Del.: Scharlarly Resources, 1982. 297pp. \$19.95 paper \$9.95

This collection of conference papers, produced under the auspices of Kent

State University's Center for Nato Studies, goes some distance toward achieving its ambitious goal: to close the "scholarly publication gap" that exists between works on the Warsaw Pact and those dealing with Nato. It could have succeeded with a somewhat shorter volume, however; one that was both more readable and less repetitious.

*The Warsaw Pact* is organized as an encyclopedia of the Warsaw Pact. Its major sections address "The Principal Political Relationships," "NATO and the Warsaw Pact," "The Forces," "The Weapons," and "Doctrine and Capabilities." The initial section subjects the reader to the same litany of dates and key events three times over, in Andrzej Korbonski's essay pretentiously entitled "The Warsaw Treaty After Twenty-Five Years: An Entangling Alliance or an Empty Shell?," Jorg K. Hoensch's "The Warsaw Pact and the Northern Member States," and Edgar O'Ballance's "The Three Southern Members of the Warsaw Pact."

O'Ballance has produced the most cogent of the three pieces. It is relatively free of unsupported assertions, which particularly plague the Hoensch essay, and provides valuable insights into the neutralist tendencies of the southern tier states. Sloppiness even creeps into O'Ballance's work, however. For example, there was no June 1973 Middle East War. The war in question was fought in June 1967. More troubling is the reference to participation of under-strength Hungarian forces and an "ineffectual" Bulgarian contingent in the crushing of Czechoslovakia. Hoensch asserts that "the Pact command could . . . pride itself on the mainly satisfactory coordination of the five participant forces during the . . . the intervention against a deviant Pact member."

The section on Nato and the Warsaw