

1983

The Warsaw Part: Political Purpose and Military Means

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Recommended Citation

Zakheim, Dov S. (1983) "The Warsaw Part: Political Purpose and Military Means," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 36 : No. 3 , Article 31.

Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss3/31>

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published in January 1968 in support of his arguments that the Soviets view a protracted conventional campaign as improbable. Without doubt, at the time the Soviets did not focus on the possibilities of a protracted conventional war. Many analysts would argue, however, that they do so today. Similarly, Miller argues that the Soviets expect to launch a preemptive nuclear strike, on the basis of a comment by A.A. Sidorenko published some years ago. Brezhnev's no-first-use offer has, of course, overtaken Miller's argument, at least at its face value.

The point of these criticisms is not to devalue Miller's effort. His research is indeed painstaking, even if the book suffers from a variety of minor factual errors and some poor proofreading. Furthermore, Miller's arguments are plausible, and are supportable on the basis of analyses that go beyond his methodology. Most readers will recognize the limitations to Miller's methodology, as the author himself acknowledges. Thus, for the general reader willing to plunge into heavily academic prose, and for the specialist seeking a well-organized discussion of the Soviet military/political psyche, Miller's book, in the genre of the seminal works by Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., and Amoretta M. Hoerber, is indeed required reading.

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Clawson, Robert W. and Kaplan, Lawrence S., eds. *The Warsaw Pact: Political Purpose and Military Means*. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1982. 297pp. \$19.95 paper \$9.95

This collection of conference papers, produced under the auspices of Kent

State University's Center for Nato Studies, goes some distance toward achieving its ambitious goal: to close the "scholarly publication gap" that exists between works on the Warsaw Pact and those dealing with Nato. It could have succeeded with a somewhat shorter volume, however; one that was both more readable and less repetitious.

The Warsaw Pact is organized as an encyclopedia of the Warsaw Pact. Its major sections address "The Principal Political Relationships," "NATO and the Warsaw Pact," "The Forces," "The Weapons," and "Doctrine and Capabilities." The initial section subjects the reader to the same litany of dates and key events three times over, in Andrzej Korbonski's essay pretentiously entitled "The Warsaw Treaty After Twenty-Five Years: An Entangling Alliance or an Empty Shell?," Jorg K. Hoensch's "The Warsaw Pact and the Northern Member States," and Edgar O'Ballance's "The Three Southern Members of the Warsaw Pact."

O'Ballance has produced the most cogent of the three pieces. It is relatively free of unsupported assertions, which particularly plague the Hoensch essay, and provides valuable insights into the neutralist tendencies of the southern tier states. Sloppiness even creeps into O'Ballance's work, however. For example, there was no June 1973 Middle East War. The war in question was fought in June 1967. More troubling is the reference to participation of under-strength Hungarian forces and an "ineffectual" Bulgarian contingent in the crushing of Czechoslovakia. Hoensch asserts that "the Pact command could . . . pride itself on the mainly satisfactory coordination of the five participant forces during the . . . the intervention against a deviant Pact member."

The section on Nato and the Warsaw

Pact includes two essays that in many respects cover the same ground as those of the earlier section. Even more overlaps appear in the following sections on Forces, Weapons and Doctrine.

James T. Reitz's piece on "The Soviet Armed Forces: Perceptions Over Twenty Years," opens the Forces section. It fails to address changes in the nomenclature of the aviation forces that are reported later in the volume, totally ignores command, control and communications, and likewise overlooks support forces. Thomas Cason's article on "The East European Military Forces" is more instructive. It too ignores C³, however, and is uncertain about some of its facts (are there nineteen Soviet divisions in the GDR, or twenty, as Hoensch asserts).

James Carlton's essay on "Soviet and Warsaw Pact Major Battlefield Weapons" generally provides a good overview of its subject matter. It would have been an even better piece had it included a discussion of the Soviet weapons system development process, something that Bill Sweetman incorporates into his excellent study of Warsaw Pact air power.

In marked contrast to Sweetman's essay is that by Louis J. Andolino on "Warsaw Pact Sea Power Assets." Readers of the *Naval War College Review* will note some fundamental oversights, errors, and omissions in Andolino's essay. There is no discussion of Soviet or Pact mine warfare capability. There is an outdated evaluation of the shifting and erratic nature of Soviet shipbuilding

programs that is more appropriate to 1970, the date at which the source for Andolino's assertion was published. There is no reference to the need to maintain SALT I limits when evaluating reasons for the recent slight decline in Soviet SSBNs. There are also minor irritants—Udaloy, for example, is spelled Udalov.

Commander Steve Kime's analysis of Warsaw Pact navies in the section on Doctrine and Capabilities is far more thoughtful, and should have sufficed (perhaps with some expansion) for the editors' purposes. On the other hand, co-editor Robert Clawson's two essays on Pact ground and air forces (the former co-authored with John Binder) stand well on their own in the Doctrine section, though again one wonders why so many facts need to be repeated several times over in the various essays on Pact forces.

Finally there is John Erickson's discussion of "Military Management and Modernization within the Warsaw Pact," which further confirms the author's reputation as one of the leading observers and analysts of current Soviet military developments. The editors could have done well to have highlighted this piece, possibly by having it open the Forces or Weapons section, possibly too, by having eliminated some of the more repetitive and less enlightening portions of this most uneven volume.

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