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National Defense and the Congressional Role

by

Captain Brent Baker, US Navy

Domestically, the explosion of lawmaking and regulation-writing in the '70s has greatly complicated the development of a coherent defense posture. . . . the growth in Congressional staffs have an impact on the time available for the individual Chief to direct his Service.

General Edward C. Meyer, USA
Chief of Staff, US Army

The above opinion of the Army Chief of Staff was voiced in the wake of a renewed 1982 debate over reform within the American military establishment. Any person interested in such basic military policy and decision making reforms must have a clear understanding of the growing direct and in-direct role of Congress in shaping both defense strategy and choice of weapons systems.

This increased congressional defense involvement stems from several factors including: the explosive growth in congressional staffs in the 1970s, increased confusion and competition between various committees on defense issues which cross into several different committee areas of jurisdiction, and finally the fact that Congress chooses to focus its attention on only 25 percent of the federal budget which it considers "controllable"—and 75 percent of that involves tinkering with defense. The other 75 percent of the federal budget is involved with statutory entitlement and other programs.

Thus, in looking at the fiscal year 1983 federal budget, many members of Congress who do not normally concern themselves with defense issues have been drawn to defense reform by the nation's growing economic problems and the possibility that defense can take more budget cuts to help solve those problems.

For example, Senator Dave Durenberger (R-Minn.) was one of many Congressmen who presented their own FY 1983 Defense Budget. Durenberger is on the Finance and Governmental Affairs committees—not on the Armed Services Committee. In his 200-page budget alternative, "America's Defense: A Plan For the 1980s," he stated, "Every Senator, whether or not he is a member of the Armed Services Committee, must vote on the overall federal budget and on numerous amendments to the military authorizations and appropriations bills. Likewise, the advice and consent duties of the Senate involve every Senator in the ratification of treaties and other international undertakings. Finally, of course, the War Powers

provisions of the Constitution directly involve the Senate in decisions concerning the use of force."¹

In addition to individual member concern with the defense budget and military reform, members of the 97th Congress have gone beyond the traditional political party caucus or committee organization to join both partisan and bipartisan groups. For example, on 30 March 1982 the Republican coalition known as the "Gypsy Moths" and composed of so-called moderate Northeast and Midwest Republicans, issued its own FY 1983 Defense Budget.²

The best example of a bipartisan group is the Military Reform Caucus formed in late 1981. Headed by Gary Hart (D-Colo.) in the Senate and G. William Whitehurst (R-Va.) in the House, the Military Reform Caucus is aimed at not just budget line items, but at a broad and basic reform of the national security decision making system from the White House to the field or fleet command level. Most of the congressional agenda is geared to the annual budget line item debate, and it is not clear that those members of the Military Reform Caucus who want to concentrate on long range, basic changes to the national security system will be able to keep all the caucus members interested in this not very glamorous task in a congressional election year. If the nature of the FY 1982 budget debate is repeated this year, it will focus not on basic military reform but on budget line item disagreements among the congressional committees involved in defense issues, and it will involve heavy floor debate with numerous amendments adding or deleting specific budget line items.

In contrast to the usual congressional emphasis on the annual budget, rather than on long range defense initiatives, the 97th Congress attached to the FY 1982 Defense Appropriations Act a "Sense of Congress" resolution concerning the end of the century size of the Navy. Sponsored by Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-W Va.), the resolution now part of Public Law 97-114 states,

Sec. 791. It is the sense of Congress that— (1) A larger and stronger American Navy is needed as an essential ingredient of our Armed Forces, in order to fulfill its basic missions of (A) protecting the sea lanes to preserve the safety of the free world's commerce, (B) assuring continued access to raw materials essential to the well-being of the free world, (C) enhancing our capacity to project effective American forces into regions of the world where the vital interests of the United States must be protected, (D) engaging the Navy of the Soviet Union or any other potential adversary successfully, (E) continuing to serve as a viable leg of our strategic triad, and (F) providing visible evidence of American diplomatic, economic and military commitments throughout the world. (2) In order to conduct the numerous and growing missions of the modern American Navy, a goal of a naval inventory of approximately six hundred active ships of various types by the end of the century at the latest, is highly desirable, the exact figure to be flexible to accommodate new designs as the specific details of our naval missions evolve to meet various contingencies.

In the Navy's initial FY 1983 Budget hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, the former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, pointed to the sense of Congress statement on the goal of a 600-ship Navy and stated, "Thus, the issue before this body is not the need for Maritime Superiority, nor the size and capability of our Navy, but how best we can get from here to there."³

The way Congress gets from the "here" of the initial presentation of the President's Defense Budget to the "there" of the final signed Defense Authorization

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and Appropriation Acts is a complex process. Military reformers must review this basic congressional process as they consider national security changes.

The basic powers and duties of Congress, in relation to national security-defense matters, stem from Article I section 8, of the Constitution, which provides that Congress shall have the power to:

- Raise and support armies;
- Provide and maintain a navy;
- Make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces;
- Provide for calling forth the militia;
- Provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States;
- Exercise exclusive legislation . . . over all places purchased . . . for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings; and
- Make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.

It can be seen through the above constitutional powers, as well as through subsequent laws and congressional practices, that much more than just general oversight and the traditional "power of the purse strings" is involved in the defense area. In addition to changes in budget "line items" there are congressionally mandated reports, studies, hearings, and investigations which have a significant impact on the long and short range defense planning and operations. How much detail does Congress become involved in? The tables on pages 11 through 14 outline the range and nature of congressional involvement in defense issues.

Since the committee system is the key element in the congressional work flow pattern, it follows that the personalities and initiative of the committee members and their staffs are most important ingredients in shaping national defense policy. The Senate and House Armed Services committees have traditionally been the leaders and experts in military affairs. Beginning in 1959 and continuing through 1981, various laws and congressional committee rules (See Tables 1 and 2) have required the majority of defense budget items to come under the "authorization" jurisdiction of the Armed Services committees. Senator John G. Tower (R-Tex.) is the Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) and Representative Melvin Price (D-Ill.) is Chairman, House Armed Services Committee (HASC).

Public Law 93-155, enacted in 1973, required that an annual authorization must precede appropriations or expenditure of funds for the Armed Forces. Thus, the authorization committees (SASC and HASC) sponsor and shepherd through Congress the annual Defense Authorization Act, which is traditionally followed by the annual Defense Appropriations Act. The Appropriations Act is separately guided through Congress by the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC) and House Appropriations Committee (HAC). In theory, the SAC and HAC take their defense program guidance from the Armed Services committees. However, both SAC and HAC have their own defense subcommittees. In SAC, Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska) heads the defense subcommittee and in HAC the defense subcommittee is headed by Representative Joseph P. Addabbo (D-N.Y.).

Since passage of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 another committee in each house has entered into the defense dialogue. The Senate Budget Committee and House Budget Committee are responsible together for setting overall federal budget

ceiling guidance. The First or Second Concurrent Budget Resolutions limit overall defense spending. The House Budget Committee even has a staff called "National Security Program Task Force."

Before going into some specific examples of how the Appropriations and Budget committees are getting into more specific defense program issues (which until recently were left pretty much to the Armed Services committees) it is necessary to look again at the entire federal budget. Over the past 15 years the "uncontrollable" entitlement and other statutory programs portion of the federal budget has grown from 59 percent to 77 percent, while that portion of the budget Congress desires to "control" has been squeezed from 41 percent in fiscal year 1967 to 23 percent in fiscal year 1982. Moreover, 75 percent of the so-called "controllable" one fourth of the federal budget outlays is for defense.

Thus, it was predictable that the appropriations, budget, and other committees would begin to get into the details of defense issues.⁴ For example, in the debate over FY 1983 budget cuts, Senator Ernest F. Hollings (D-S.C.), the leading minority member of the Senate Budget Committee, proposed detailed defense cuts in February 1982 totaling \$19 billion.⁵ The Hollings budget reduction proposals included canceling the civil service and military pay raises and freeze federal spending at FY 1982 levels and allowing a three percent real defense increase in FY 1984.

Also Addabbo stated on 3 March 1982, "Five or ten billion dollars in defense disbursement cannot solve a \$91.5 billion deficit problem But it is clear that the defense budget for fiscal year 1983 leaves plenty of room for congressional action to direct spending more efficiently. And it is clear that whatever tax and spending policy Congress adopts to get us out of this economic mess, a responsible review of the defense budget request by Congress will require substantial reductions on its own merits."⁶ In the House floor debate on the FY 1981 Supplemental Appropriations Act, Representative Silvio O. Conte (R-Mass.), the ranking Republican on the HAC, described his committee's defense role saying, "We did not rubber stamp anything. We went over each request line item by line item cutting here and adjusting there."⁷

Several actions in the 97th Congress highlight the legislative tug-of-war between authorization (SASC and HASC) and appropriations (SAC and HAC) committees. In the Senate, the appropriations committee had deleted funds from the FY 1981 Supplemental Appropriations Act for reactivation of the battleship *New Jersey*, even though the SASC had authorized the funds. Senator John G. Tower (R-Tex.), SASC's Chairman, brought an amendment to the Senate floor overturning the SAC recommendation; it passed, restoring the battleship funds to the appropriations bill. On several other defense issues that same day, other members of SASC brought up amendments which passed, restoring previously authorized program funds which SAC had cut.

After unsuccessful attempts to defeat the SASC members' amendments, Senator Mark O. Hatfield (R-Ore.), the SAC Chairman, stated, "If this keeps up, I am going to suggest that the Armed Services Committee go to the conference with the House Appropriations [Sub-] Committee on Defense."⁸ As this floor debate indicated, the Armed Services Committee members can and have taken their disagreements with the appropriations committee bills to the "committee of the whole" in the House or to the full Senate membership for final floor resolution. While a few major defense

items may be adjusted by such floor amendment action, it is the various committee staffs that by making seemingly minor adjustments in bills, can affect many long-range defense programs.

It is a matter of concern for some people in both branches of government when the traditional congressional process of (1) authorization and (2) appropriations is not followed as it sometimes is not. For example, the FY 1981 Supplemental Appropriations Act passed the Congress in June. But, because that same year's Supplemental Defense Authorization Act was held up in the House, it was not passed by the House until August.

Representative William L. Dickinson (R-Ala.), the ranking Republican on the HASC, voiced his concern over the appropriations process getting ahead of the authorization action on the House floor, saying that in recent years, "I have been disturbed over instances of by-passing the authorization process when considering annual appropriations legislation on the floor, reportedly in the interest of expediency. . . . I trust this inclination to overlook the authorization process will be reversed with the onset of the fiscal year 1982 military appropriations legislation. We must return to the traditional but necessary order of handling Department of Defense annual authorization legislation on the floor if we expect the oversight process to function effectively"9

Still, as a result of many factors including the new administration's March 1981 budget changes and October 1981 budget revisions, congressional action on the FY 1982 DoD Budget never got on a traditional track and that year's Defense Authorization and Appropriations bills ran neck-and-neck in moving through Congress. In fact, the Appropriations Act differed from the Authorization Act in funding some programs including the TAKX (SL-7) acquisition and conversion program and procurement of KC-135s for the Marine Corps Reserve. The FY 1983 differences between Authorization and Appropriations bills are unclear as this article is written.

One of the most interesting FY 1982 DoD Authorization Act House floor debates involved yet another committee which became involved in disagreements with the Armed Services Committee. The House Government Operations Committee had serious disagreements with the House Armed Services Committee regarding multiyear weapon procurement policy and procurement of automatic data processing (ADP) equipment by DoD. In these two areas, Chairman Jack Brooks (D-Tex.) of the Government Operations Committee proposed floor amendments which would have restricted the HASC-sponsored version of the Authorization Act. While the Brooks' amendments lost on the floor, Chairman Brooks made clear his committee's "strong interest in and jurisdiction over how the Defense Department acquires weapons and services." He further stated, "Under the rules of the House, the Government Operations Committee is assigned jurisdiction over 'procurement.'"10 While Chairman Brooks wanted to see more direct congressional involvement in the details of defense multiyear contracting and ADP procurement, Representative W.C. "Dan" Daniel (D-Va.), a member of the HASC, responded to the Brooks' amendments saying, "Let me repeat what I have said before: this body and no committee of this body is qualified to micromanage DoD while at the same time exercising its oversight responsibilities."11

Edward N. Luttwak in an interesting analysis of the Congressional-Defense

interface stated, "Congressional oversight there must be, but as it operates Congress offers no rewards whatever for tactical or operational innovation or for the development of a better strategy, while it penalizes most severely any error in micro-management . . . the whole focus of the review to which the Pentagon's budget is subjected . . . is on the cost-accounting and legal details rather than on the purpose and meaning of our defense decisions."¹²

Congressional oversight has gotten deeply into details. Committees and subcommittees have extensive hearings, issue detailed reports, request reports, and commission investigations. Tables 3 and 4 outline some of the types of actions the Congress requires of the Defense Department and the Navy-Marine team. While not having the direct force of law, these congressional committee report requirements are not ignored by the executive branch. Also, committee reports often are used to clarify or spell out the "intent of Congress" and the views of influential committee members. This type of detailed involvement in defense affairs would be impossible without the large staffs which support committees and individual members.

In 1981 there were 24 committees in the House with 1,824 staff members, over four times the 1959 level of 19 committees with 398 staff members. Representative James M. Collins (R-Tex.) recently stated, "The committee staff are not selected on a merit basis. They are not under civil service. They are well paid. So the committee staff are highly motivated to create work for job justification. With the overstuffed committees, we see the personnel trying to find new ways of providing Government regulations, amending and expanding Government agencies. The more laws they write, the better they can justify their jobs."¹³

Presently, counting individual members' staffs, there are about 18,000 staffers on the hill. This figure does not include over 5,000 people working for the General Accounting Office and the 200 people at the Congressional Budget Office. Just as military staffs have grown with the complexities and specialization of modern warfare, so have the congressional staffs.

Senator Warren Rudman (R-N.H.) described the tight demands on his time going from one committee meeting to another and his need for staffers. He said, "Unfortunately, because of the system of hearings and other duties, you become heavily reliant on committee staffs and your staff. As a result, I think staffs, particularly committee staffs, play far too important a role in the running of the Senate."¹⁴ It is clear that executive branch officials spend a lot of time and effort responding to the legislative branch staffs. It is the congressional staffs which set the congressional defense agenda by planning the hearings and influencing what questions and issues will be focused upon.

There are two other factors. First, defense is a bipartisan issue and many congressional observers believe that a traditional party label no longer indicates reliably where a member of Congress will come out on defense issues. In the 97th Congress, the large influx of freshmen members, especially in the House, comes at the same time members seem to be joining weakly structured and informal alternate congressional interest or caucus groups.

Groups which seem to be gaining in influence are both partisan and bipartisan such as: the Conservative Democratic Forum or "Boll Weevils," the Republican "Gypsy Moths," the Military Reform Caucus, and regional groups such as the Northeast-

Midwest Coalition. These groups seem to be where more of the "action" is in the 97th Congress. Table 5 indicates the 56 members of the bipartisan Military Reform Caucus. This group is representative of the youth and lesser military experience of the 97th Congress. Of the 13 Senate members, three are freshmen, five of the ten entered the Senate in 1979, and all the others except one have entered the Senate since 1970. Looking at the 43 House members, 16 are freshmen and an additional 12 are only in their second terms. Only two served in Congress in the 1960s. Looking at previous military service experience, while eight of the 13 Senate members have had some military experience, 29 of the 43 House Military Reform Caucus members have had none.

Secondly, as is always the case, the defense mood of Congress follows the current political consensus of the American people. So far in 1981-1982 even with economic problems, there appears to be a fragile pro-defense American consensus. There are always differences in Congress in the judgment of how much and what kind of defense is enough. Congress appears to be ready in the FY 1983 defense debate to spend what is necessary to rearm America, but not to license waste in the name of national defense.

Representative Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.) has pointed out that preventing defense waste is a shared responsibility of Congress and the executive. He states, "Political interests in Congress are often the cause of military misspending. For purely political reasons Congress will sometimes direct the armed forces to buy a weapon or keep a base open even when military planners strenuously object. It has been estimated that \$5 billion could be cut from the defense budget if legislators stopped seeking unjustifiable outlays for the benefit of their own districts and states."¹⁵ Representative Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.), a member of the Military Reform Caucus, also looked at defense and alleged waste saying, "... much of the waste in the Defense Department is caused by congressional action. If the Congress is serious about removing waste, it should begin with those wasteful procedures it has created."¹⁶

In conclusion, it is clear that Congress is deeply involved in the formulation of national security policy. This involvement is not just due to basic laws but due to congressional rules and staff practices that have become part of the daily interface between the executive and legislative branches of government. It is also clear that since the major portion of the "controllable" federal budget involves the Department of Defense, more attention will be spent on defense, searching for the cure for our economic woes.

Many committees, informal congressional coalitions, and individual members of Congress will naturally become involved in the defense debate. This pressure will put new stress and demands on the Defense Department to provide more information to congressional members and their staffers who come to the defense debate from diverse backgrounds. True military reform may become confused with annual budget line item debates. The Armed Services committees will now come under more pressure from other congressional sources. On the floor or in committee, it is still the members themselves who must vote on defense. One hopes that those members will look at the long-range national defense needs, rather than only at the annual budget trimming exercises.

The words of the 50-year veteran of Congress, the late Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Representative Carl Vinson (D-Ga.) come to mind. A

new Congressman asked whether he should represent the interests of his district or of the country as a whole. Vinson replied, "If you don't represent the nation as a whole and have your horizons beyond the limits of your congressional district, we don't need you in Congress." He then quickly added, "By the same token, if you're not representing your district, you won't be in Congress long enough to make a difference."¹⁷ It is from these contradictory political facts of life that a consensus will arise on what kind of national defense the United States will have in the next century.

TABLE 1. Selected Laws Requiring Annual Defense Authorizations

Year	Law
1959	Public Law (PL) 86-149 required congressional authorization of appropriations for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels. This law was amended as follows:
1962	PL 87-436 required authorization for research, development, test, and evaluation associated with aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels.
1964	PL 88-174 required authorization for all DoD research, development, test and evaluation.
1965	PL 89-37 required authorization for procurement of tracked combat vehicles.
1967	PL 90-168 required authorization of the personnel strengths of each of the Selected Reserves of the Reserve components as a prior condition for appropriation of funds for the pay and allowances for the Reserve components.
1969	PL-91-121 required authorization of appropriations for procurement of other weapons for the use of US Armed Forces (essentially heavy, medium, and light artillery; anti-aircraft weapons; rifles; machineguns; mortars; small arms weapons; any crew-fired weapon using fixed ammunition).
1970	PL 91-441 required authorization for procurement of torpedoes and related support equipment and of average annual active-duty personnel strength for each component of the Armed Forces (amended by PL 92-436 to substitute an annual "end strength for active-duty personnel" requirement in lieu of an "average annual active-duty personnel strength").
1972	PL 92-436 required authorization of the average military training student loads for each component of the Armed Forces in following individual categories—recruit and specialized training, professional training in military and civilian institutions and officer acquisition training.
1973	PL 93-155 required authorization of the end strength for civilian employees for each component of DoD. It also modified title 10, United States Code and required that an annual authorization must precede appropriations or expenditures of funds for, the Armed Forces.
1980	PL 96-342 required authorization for operations and maintenance funds in DoD effective FY 1982.
1981	PL 97-86 required authorization for procurement of ammunition and other procurement by any armed force or by the activities and agencies of the DoD effective FY 1983.

TABLE 2*. House Armed Services Committee Jurisdiction

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- (1) Common defense generally.
 - (2) The Department of Defense.
 - (3) Ammunition depots; forts; arsenals; Service reservations and establishments.
 - (4) Conservation, development, and use of naval petroleum and oil shale reserves.
 - (5) Pay, promotion, retirement, and other benefits and privileges of members of the Armed Forces.**
 - (6) Scientific research and development in support of the armed services.
 - (7) Selective service.
 - (8) Size and composition of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines.
 - (9) Soldiers' and sailors' homes.
 - (10) Strategic and critical materials necessary for the common defense.
 - (11) Military applications of nuclear energy.
 - (12) Special Oversight Areas.***
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*Report Of The Committee on Armed Services For The 96th Congress, House Report No. 96-1555 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980). Under the House Rules, all bills, resolutions, and other matters relating to the above subjects shall be referred to the House Armed Services Committee.

**The Senate Armed Services Committee has jurisdiction and holds hearings and reports to the full Senate on all DoD civilian appointments and military promotions requiring the "advise and consent" of Congress.

***The House Armed Services Committee has special oversight functions with respect to international arms control and disarmament and military dependents' education. See footnote * House Report No. 96-1555.

TABLE 3. Summary of Selected Actions Required by Senate Armed Services Committee In Its Report on FY 1983 Defense Authorization and Supplemental Authorization For FY 1982*

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- A requirement that training-only ammunition and ordnance be presented as separate budget subactivities beginning with FY 1984.
 - An explanation by the Navy before funds are expended if a non-fixed price contract is used in FY 1983 for purchase of Trident I missiles.
 - A report from the Navy concerning notification and justification of the Navy's decision regarding the future of the SM-3 missile, to include a plan of action and milestones and a funding profile for the missile's development and that of rejected alternatives.
 - Directs the Navy proceed as rapidly as possible with procurement of the 5 inch semi-active laser-guided projectile (SAL-GP).
 - Expects the Navy to present a program to proceed with development of the phased array radar portion of the Mark-92 fire control system upgrade.
 - Restricts obligation of funds for the Submarine Advanced Combat System (SUBACS) until the Navy presents a program to proceed with development of the phased array radar portion of the Mark-92 fire control system upgrade.
 - Directs the Navy to restart the Vertical Launch (VL) Asroc program as soon as possible.

- Directs the Navy to proceed as rapidly as possible with the development of the Seafire electro-optical fire control system.

*Source, Report, Committee On Armed Services, United States Senate, "Department of Defense Authorization For Appropriations For Fiscal Year 1983 And Supplemental Authorizations For Appropriations For Fiscal Year 1982," Report 97-330 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 13 April 1982).

**TABLE 4. Senate Requirements in S. 2248, DoD Authorization Act, 1983
(As passed by Senate on 13 May 1982)**

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- No multiyear contract may be entered into for procurement of the following aircraft: C-2, EA-6B, A-6E or CH-53E until SecNav presents a justification report to the Armed Services committees and waits 30 days from the time the report is received by the Congress.
 - None of the funds authorized may be used for the purpose of consolidating any of the functions performed on the date of enactment of this Act by the Military Traffic Management Command of the Army, the Military Sealift Command of the Navy or the Military Airlift Command of the Air Force. The SecDef shall submit a report by 1 March 1983 on any such changes to these commands.
 - The SecDef shall submit a classified report to the Congress by 1 March 1983 on allied mutual defense burden sharing of Nato Allies and Japan.
 - Not later than 1 January 1983 the Secretary of the Army and the SecNav (for the Marine Corps) shall submit to the Armed Services committees a report on the extent to which "maneuver warfare" concepts are incorporated into policies and training.
 - SecDef shall submit a report on "unit cohesion" by 1 January 1983 to the Armed Services committees. "Unit Cohesion" is defined as any plan or program to keep military members in the same unit from the time they report to their first command to the time they leave the service.
 - Secretaries of the military departments shall conduct a survey of the extent to which military history is taught in schools and training programs, and report the results to the Armed Services committees by 1 January 1983.
 - No naval vessel or major component of a naval vessel may be constructed in a foreign shipyard. The President may authorize exceptions in the national security interest, but he must transmit notice to the Congress and no contract may be made until 30 days has expired from date of receipt of such notice.
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TABLE 5. 97th Congress Military Reform Caucus*

Senate**	House**
Republicans (5)	Republicans (28)
Senator William S. Cohen (R-Me.)	Representative Robin L. Beard (R-Tenn.)
Senator Slade Gorton (R-Wa.)	Representative Douglas K. Bereuter (R-Neb.)
Senator Arlen Specter (R-Pa.)	Representative Tom J. Bliley (R-Va.)

Senate**	House**
Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska)	Representative William F. Clinger, Jr. (R-Pa.)
Senator John Warner (R-Va.)	Representative Richard B. Cheney (R-Wyo.)
Democrats (7)	Representative Larry Craig (R-Id.)
Senator Gary Hart (D-Colo.)	Representative Lawrence J. DeNardis (R-Conn.)
Senator J. Bennett Johnston (D-La.)	Representative Charles F. Dougherty (R-Pa.)
Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.)	Representative Jack Edwards (R-Alaska)
Senator George J. Mitchell (D-Me.)	Representative David F. Emery (R-Me.)
Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.)	Representative Cooper Evans (R-Ia.)
Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI)	Representative Paul Findley (R-Ill.)
Senator David Pryor (D-Ark.)	Representative Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.)
Senator Jim Sasser (D-Tenn.)	Representative Bill Green (R-NY)
	Representative Thomas Hartnett (R-SC)
	Representative John Hiler (R-Ind.)
	Representative Duncan Hunter (R-SC)
	Representative Ken Kramer (R-Colo.)
	Representative Bob Livingston (R-La.)
	Representative Dan Lungren (R-Calif.)
	Representative Paul McCloskey, Jr. (R-Calif.)
	Representative Marc L. Marks (R-Pa.)
	Representative Lynn Martin (R-Ill.)
	Representative James L. Nelligan (R-Pa.)
	Representative Marge Roukema (R-NJ)
	Representative Claudine Schneider (R-RI)
	Representative Paul S. Tribble (R-Va.)
	Representative G. William Whitehurst (R-Va.)
	Democrats (15)
	Representative Don J. Albosta (D-Mich.)
	Representative Berkley Bedell (D-Ia.)
	Representative Tony Coelho (D-Calif.)
	Representative Thomas A. Daschle (D-S.Dak.)
	Representative Norman D. Dicks (D-Wash.)
	Representative Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.Dak.)
	Representative Vic Fazio (D-Calif.)
	Representative Thomas M. Foglietta (D-Pa.)
	Representative Martin Frost (D-Tex.)
	Representative Dennis M. Hertel (D-Mich.)
	Representative James Jones (D-Okla.)
	Representative Tom Lantos (D-Calif.)
	Representative Dave McCurdy (D-Okla.)
	Representative Stephen L. Neal (D-NC)
	Representative Bruce Vento (D-Minn.)

*The Military Reform Caucus is an informal group with two goals:

1. They want military forces that can win when called upon.
2. They want the support of the nation for such forces, not for one or two years, but for the long haul—to 1990 and beyond.

**Membership in the Military Reform Caucus changes as often happens in such informal groups, thus there is no official member list.

NOTES

1. "America's Defense: A Plan for The 1980s," Senator Dave Durenberger. Also, see the *Washington Post*, 13 February 1982, p. A-7.
2. *Congressional Record*, 30 March 1982, pp. H1166-67.
3. A Report by Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, US Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Before House Armed Services Committee on The FY 1983 Military Posture and FY 1983 Budget of the US Navy, 8 February 1982.
4. See a discussion where "uncontrollable" outlays are described as the product of permanent appropriations, expenditures from prior year budget authority, and spending for entitlement programs. Report 97-29, "Supplemental Appropriations and Recession Bill, 1981," 97th Congress, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 4 May 1981).
5. *Congressional Record*, 10 February 1982, pp. S670-688.
6. *Congressional Record*, 3 March 1982, p. H661.
7. *Congressional Record*, 12 May 1981, p. H2107.
8. *Congressional Record*, 21 May 1981, p. S5443.
9. *Congressional Record*, 12 May 1981, p. H2095.
10. *Congressional Record*, 15 July 1981, p. H4339.
11. *Ibid.*, p. H4343.
12. *Congressional Record*, 25 March 1982, p. S2875.
13. *Congressional Record*, 31 March 1982, p. H1301.
14. Warren Rudman as quoted in *U.S. News and World Report*, 5 October 1981, p. 46.
15. *Congressional Record*, 8 April 1981, p. E1692.
16. *Congressional Record*, 29 March 1982, pp. E1317-18.
17. *Congressional Record*, 10 June 1981, p. H2833.

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