Naval War College Review

Volume 35
Number 4 *July-August*

Article 8

1982

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Wielding more military might across a greater territorial expanse than at any time in its history, enjoying greater political influence around the globe than it ever had before, and possessing the world's second largest national economic base, the Soviet Union basks in its power, prestige, and influence. But lurking just beneath the superpower pomp are some fears that date to the time of Lenin.

Encircled by nations either unfriendly to the Soviet Union or subservient to the USSR only through force of Soviet arms; for the most part unsuccessful in efforts to develop and maintain close long-term relationships with developing nations; and beset by internal economic problems ranging from declining labor productivity to impending dependency on outside resources, Soviet leaders in the near future must make some difficult decisions. The decisions that Brezhnev and his successors make will not only determine the Soviet future, but possibly that of the rest of the world as well.

It is, of course, impossible to say with certainty, "This is how the Soviet leaders view their challenges and opportunities," just as it is impossible to predict with certainty the Soviet response to a particular national or international situation. Nevertheless, historical precedent, present policy and performance, personal contacts, and ideological rhetoric enable analysts to draw at the very least a generalized outline of Soviet views of the present and near future.

I. The Military Equation

Military power has always been a primary concern of the Soviet state. Born in revolution, threatened by external enemies from the time of its inception, and having suffered through civil war and invasion, Soviet concern for military power is understandable. There is an urge not only to defend (and in the eyes of some expand) the boundaries of the Soviet state but to increase the number of client states. Hence, Article 28 of the Brezhnev Constitution includes among the goals of Soviet foreign policy "consolidating the positions of world socialism" and "supporting the people's struggle for national liberation." Soviet awareness of the various utilities of military power is evident.

During the past decade in particular, Soviet military capabilities improved at an impressive rate. Nothing indicates that the rate is slackening. In the West, this causes great concern. Yet the question must be asked, how do the men in the Kremlin view

their military buildup? Much may be learned by considering four general categories of military capability from the Soviet perspective.[1]

The "Strategic" Nuclear Balance. The Soviet leaders must be pleased with the strides the USSR has taken to redress what had been, from their perspective, an imbalance in long-range nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union entered the 1970s clinging to a tenuous parity achieved as much by American constraint as by Soviet effort, and left the decade with clear superiority in a number of measurements, including number of launch vehicles and throw-weight. Additionally, the Soviet Union pursued effective research and development programs in several technologies for the most part ignored by the United States, particularly in cold-launch and in antisatellite weaponry. The gap between Soviet and American missile accuracies was narrowed as was that between Soviet and US MIRV technologies. Command, control and communication sites were hardened or made mobile, thereby giving the Soviet leaders additional confidence in their ability to use their nuclear forces if the need arose.

The military import of the Soviet improvements was matched, in Soviet eyes, by the United States' acceptance of parity. Indeed, on numerous occasions Soviet spokesmen identified their attainment of nuclear parity and American acceptance of that reality as the third significant realignment of the so-called "international correlation of forces," the first being the creation of the Soviet state in 1917 and the second the establishment of the socialist commonwealth of nations in 1945. To the Soviets, it meant not only that an American attack on the Soviet Union was less likely than before, but also that American military interventions in other areas of the world were less likely. From the Soviet perspective, there was (and is) legitimacy to this outlook. During the era of nuclear parity, defined loosely as the time from the 1972 Moscow Summit and the signing of SALT I to the present, the United States refrained from intervening in: Vietnam during the final days of the Republic, Angola during the height of the civil war, the Horn of Africa during the Ogaden conflict, Nicaragua during Somoza's final days, Afghanistan following the 1978 coup and the 1979 Soviet intervention, and Iran. Even Ronald Reagan has ruled out American military intervention in El Salvador. Little wonder that to the men in Moscow, long-range nuclear parity bears political as well as military fruits.[2]

Still, there is cause for alarm in Moscow. Despite internal American disagreement as to the wisdom of individual systems, the United States is continuing developmental work on the MX, on cruise missiles, and on a number of exotic systems. The "Trident" SLBM has entered service, and probably at least one new bomber will improve the air arm of the long-range American nuclear force. Additionally, during the last months of the Carter presidency the United States changed its nuclear targeting to include hard sites, thereby giving the United States the ability either to launch a preemptive strike or a controlled second strike. Finally, SALT II, the only element which would have given a degree of predictability to American "strategic" nuclear programs, appears to be a dead letter.

Moreover, despite opposition, Nato still intends to deploy in Europe nuclear weapons capable of striking the Soviet homeland. Great Britain has decided to modernize its sea-based deterrent, France may follow suit, and China continues its nuclear development programs.

Admittedly, most of these American and Allied initiatives will not bear results for

some years. But to the Soviet leaders, and Brezhnev in particular, the challenge to parity arising from these programs is clear. It is not surprising, then, that Brezhnev declares that the United States, its allies, and its near allies will never be allowed to reattain nuclear superiority, as has recently been called for in some quarters in the United States.

The Military Situation in Europe. When viewed through Soviet eyes the military situation in Europe is stalemated. The continual upgrading of forces by both the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has not resulted in either side attaining sufficient superiority to predict confidently the outcome of a conflict in Europe. Even so, the Soviet Union has grounds for satisfaction about the military situation in Europe. Nato forces have no ability to carry out a successful attack eastward; internal Nato bickering over policy has to some degree undermined Nato solidarity; and no European Nato nation has adhered to the three percent growth rate targeted for defense expenditures in 1979.

Meanwhile, during the 1970s, Soviet forces in Europe considerably strengthened their fighting capabilities in relation to Nato forces. Firepower, mobility, and sustainability were all improved.[3] Soviet tanks are as capable as any in Nato's arsenal, and Soviet armored fighting vehicles enjoy advantage over their Nato counterparts. Self-propelled artillery has entered the Soviet inventory, theater nuclear weapon systems have been upgraded, and chemical warfare capabilities unrivaled in any other national or alliance armed forces have been put in place. Command of the entire Warsaw Pact area air defense system is directed from Moscow, while 31 Soviet divisions are deployed in Eastern Europe, 20 of them in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG). An additional 41 divisions are stationed in the four military districts (Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian, and Odessa) bordering Eastern Europe. Other divisions within the USSR can be deployed quickly to augment these forces.

Clearly, Soviet leaders wield an impressive array of forces in Europe. However, Brezhnev and other Politburo members are undoubtedly aware that their seemingly secure military position in Europe has real and growing weaknesses, both in political and military senses. Politically, Rumania refused to expand military spending at Soviet behest during 1980, and even with the declaration of martial law in Poland, the uncertain situation there threatens the Soviet military position in Eastern Europe, particularly that of the GSFG, whose primary lines of communication run through Poland. Additionally, Nato has expressed growing concern over the Soviet force improvements, a concern not ameliorated by the token Soviet withdrawal of a tank division from East Germany.[4]

The military situation in Europe, especially that immediately behind their own front lines, remains a concern to Soviet leaders. Impressive buildups in their own land, naval, and air forces have not, from the Soviet perspective, resulted in a decisive military advantage in the theater.

Long-Range Projection Capabilities. In 1962 Andrei Gromyko told Western diplomats that the Soviet Union would "never again" be embarrassed by being forced to change policy as had happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis. To a very great degree, Soviet policy during the crisis was molded in accordance with the USSR's inability to project military forces over long distances in short periods of time. In the

twenty years since the Cuban crisis, the USSR has enhanced its force projection capabilities significantly. Indeed, as Brezhnev himself has said on several occasions, Soviet interests are now global, and no important international issue can be addressed by any nation without taking into account the Soviet position. The growth of long-range force projection capabilities has proceeded hand-in-hand with the expansion of Soviet interests.

Long-range airlift, still small by US standards, continues to grow. Antonov 22s and Ilyushin 76s, the mainstays of the current airlift fleet, proved their ability to provide effective long-distance supply service during the height of the Angolan civil war in 1975 and in Ethiopia in early 1978. The construction of a blue-water fleet, including a nascent aircraft carrier force, is another indication of the Soviet desire to improve its long-range force projection capability, as is the construction of the largest national flag merchant marine in the world. These long-range fighting and lift capabilities are supplemented by the surplus weaponry which the USSR has seen fit to distribute among various client or dependent states.

While in many respects Soviet capabilities in this area are still clearly inferior to those of the United States, great strides have been taken. Throughout the past decade, outcomes of conflicts in the Third World have been influenced if not determined by the newly developed Soviet capabilities—in Egypt in 1973, in Angola in 1975, in Ethiopia in 1977-78, in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in 1978, and in Afghanistan in 1980. From the Soviet perspective, it is a record to be proud of.

However, after nearly a decade of neglect, the United States is beginning to turn its attention to its own capabilities in this area. A modern or modernized airlifter will probably be built, new sealift ships are to be constructed, and the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force is being strengthened. While none of these projects, with the possible exception of the last, promises to have significant impact on comparative Soviet-American capabilities before the middle of the 1980s, the American wakening is not encouraging to the Soviets.

Home Defenses. No other nation has home defense forces comparable to those of the Soviet Union. The People's Republic of China has more men under arms commirted to the defense of the Chinese homeland, and in some ways the United States enjoys superior technical capabilities. When quantity and quality of resources devoted to home defenses are assessed together, however, rhe Soviet Union is peerless.

The home defense forces center around the National Air Defense Forces (PVO strany) and the Army. PVO strany has approximately 550,000 men who operate 7,000 radars, 2,600 interceptors, and 10,000 surface-to-air missile launchers. Because the air defenses of Moscow's Eastern European allies are integrated with PVO strany's command, control, and communication network, the Soviet Union has an air defense system that reaches far beyond its own border, and which includes interceptors, SAMs, and ballistic missile defenses. Accompanying these active air defense forces is an extensive program of passive civil defense activities. While there is no Western consensus about the potential effectiveness of these forces,[5] it is evident that a large percentage of the Soviet defense budget is earmarked for them. Further rubles are devoted to research and development in so-called "exotic" air and missile defense systems such as laser weapons programs and charged particle technology.

While PVO strany and the forces in Eastern Europe provide defense for the homeland against the threat from the West, Soviet eastern and southern flanks are defended by forty-six divisions deployed along the Sino-Soviet border. In contrast to the forces which they face across the border, Soviet divisions are well-equipped and armed, even though some are category 2 and 3 divisions. For the present, and indeed for the near future, the Soviets must view their homeland as secure against anything other than a nuclear attack.

Everything considered, the military equation undoubtedly presents Soviet leaders with an uncertain situation. While security of the homeland appears assured at all levels lower than nuclear, forces are moving which may, to the more pessimistic Soviet leaders, bode ill in future years. Instability within the countries of the Warsaw Pact, accelerated defense expenditures in the United States, and continuing efforts of the Chinese to modernize their huge army cannot be viewed with equanimity by the men in the Kremlin. While the current military equation is undoubtedly acceptable, the future may well appear less promising.

II. The International Political Scene

Just as important as the military equation in the Soviet measure of the contemporary world situation is the international political scene. We will examine four broadly defined areas of Soviet concern with the international political scene—Eastern Europe, the United States and Western Europe, China and Japan, and the developing world. While it is impossible to identify any of the four as being of paramount importance to the USSR, for that depends on which issue is at stake, all present different opportunities—and threats—to the USSR.

Eastern Europe.[6] In 1976 Helmut Sonnenfeldt appealed to the leaders of the Nato nations to recognize that an "organic relationship" existed between the Soviet Union and its Eastern European neighbors. While it was and is unclear what an "organic relationship" implies, it is nevertheless evident that Eastern Europe means many things to the Soviet Union and its leaders: security, markets, a "window on the West," ideological support in various world fora, and perhaps, in the minds of some, empire.

The Soviet Union and the Eastern European nations have been interconnected by increasingly complex multilateral and bilateral ties since the conclusion of World War II. Multilateral organizations include the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). These are supplemented by a variety of military, political, economic, and cultural agreements which bind the Soviet Union to each of the other Eastern European states individually, and each of the Eastern European states to each other.

On many issues, however, these pacts imply neither unity nor community. Despite the commonality of Communist governments, diversity is common in Eastern Europe. From the Soviet perspective, this diversity presents a challenge and a threat which in the long term may undermine the "organic relationship" of which Sonnenfeldt spoke.

The importance of Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union may best be illustrated in military and economic terms. In addition to serving as a five-hundred-mile-wide

territorial buffer zone, it serves as a forward basing area for roughly three hundred thousand Soviet military personnel. In 1979, approximately one-half of all Soviet foreign trade was with CMEA countries (41.7 billion rubles out of 82.3 billion rubles). This trade was evenly split between imports (20.0 billion rubles) and exports (21.7 billion rubles), with the exports accounting for roughly five percent of the total Soviet national income (438.3 billion rubles).[7]

The Soviet Union has made some effort to create an integrated Eastern European economic structure. Successes include an electrical power grid system, an oil pipeline, and a joint pool of railroad equipment. These efforts have been hampered, however, by charges of Soviet high-handedness. For example, when the Soviet Union decided to bring the price which it charged Eastern European nations for oil more nearly in line with prevailing world prices, it did not consult with its customers beforehand, despite the fact that they were in the midst of five-year plans. The customers were understandably upset.

If tensions were limited to disagreements over oil prices, Soviet leaders would have little about which to be concerned. However, other difficulties exist, including problems over continuing availability of resource supplies, internal economic organization, foreign policy behavior and political control. The problems are minimal in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, but significant in Hungary, which has for all practical purposes abandoned Soviet-style economic decision making, and Rumania, which follows its own independent foreign policy course. In Poland, internal economic issues have combined with cultural, national, and religious fervor to raise a challenge to Communist political control itself.

Poland presents an extremely complex and critical problem to the Soviets. More populous than any other Eastern European state, Poland is geographically at the core of the Eastern European commonwealth of socialist nations. Supplies intended for GSFG units must traverse Poland. Thus, from a Soviet geo-political perspective, as well as a military one, a favorable solution to the Polish dilemma is critical.

A favorable resolution is also requisite from ideological and economic perspectives. If solidarity's challenge to party dominance is not met, similar challenges to party control in other Eastern European nations may occur. At the same time, the stagnation of Poland's economy has forced Poland to fall behind on its debt repayment to the West, a fact which is not pleasing to the USSR since the Kremlin itself is seeking additional Western credit.[8]

While the Soviets probably would have preferred to see the Polish Communist Party play a larger role in the short-term resolution of the problem, the December 1981 declaration of martial law was welcomed. The clearest gauge of the degree of Soviet pleasure regarding martial law was the royal treatment accorded Marshal Jaruselski during his March 1982 trip to Moscow, but events later in the spring cast dark shadows over Jaruselski's accomplishments.

Even if the immediate difficulties are stamped out, problems remain in Eastern Europe. Unless the Kremlin increases its exports of raw materials, Eastern Europe must inevitably turn elsewhere for those necessities. At the 1980 CMEA conference, the USSR did promise that oil deliveries would continue unabated. With economic eyes turning outward, and political ties altered because of the continuing Polish crisis, the Soviet leaders can see little in Eastern Europe about which they can be pleased.

The United States and Western Europe. No other aspect of Soviet relations with the external world is as contradictory as its relations with the West. On the one hand, the West is the economic and military enemy, a foe which Marxism-Leninism maintains is ideologically mandated to seek the destruction of the Soviet state. On the other hand, the West is the source of potential investment capital, and of industrial, technical, and agricultural expertise without which the Soviet economic future appears bleak.

Soviet assessments of the future of the West are no less contradictory. Every leader since Lenin has predicted the eventual collapse of the West. While that collapse has never been viewed as imminent, it has always been viewed as inevitable. The question, however, is "When?"

Soviet leaders know the West depends greatly on external sources of energy and other material needs. At the same time, the Soviet media is replete with reference to high levels of Western inflation and unemployment, as well as to inequitable distribution of wealth and income. There is no doubt that the leaders view these Western problems as serious and worsening.

However, the Soviet leaders must ask themselves whether they should seek to exacerbate these problems. Any such effort could be expected to elicit Western response, particularly from Ronald Reagan, who in his first Presidential press conference restated in strong terms his belief that the USSR had used détente as a "one-way street" to improve its international position and who has since on regular occasions accused the USSR of fomenting unrest throughout the world. Soviet access to Western investment and technology may be further limited in such an eveut, thereby additionally complicating the domestic economic picture. Access to the West's capital on technology may be cut anyway, in which case Soviet leaders may believe they would have nothing to lose if they undertook to exacerbate Western problems. Indeed, given the difficulty Western states have had in cooperating with each other on joint policy issues, an effort to harm one nation's political or economic situation while at the same time aiding another's may appear attractive to the Kremlin. The Soviet effort to conclude a natural gas pipeline agreement with various Western European countries in the wake of the declaration of martial law in Poland may be seen as a manifestation of this policy.

To the Kremlin, its relations with the United States must be the most perplexing issue within the context of East-West relations, especially because of the turnabout in America's attitude toward defense spending. The Soviet Union, already spending 11-15 percent of its gross national product on arms,[9] has declared its intention to match whatever American buildup Congress approves. Given the centralized structure of the Soviet state and economy, there is little doubt that it can do so. The question is how other sectors of the economy will be affected.

Resurgent American will in defense and foreign policy is reflected in resurgent American attention to domestic issues of the economy. Concern over lagging US competitiveness in international markets has led to renewed interest in the "reindustrialization" of America. Large-scale dependence on external sources of oil has been reduced, with an eighteen percent drop in imports recorded from 1979 to 1980 alone, and more since.

In its assessment of the United States, then, the Kremlin is torn between two views. In one, the Reagan administration, headed by a president who the Soviets

believe "does not understand Communism, the Soviet Union, or (the Soviet Union's) support for national liberation movements,"[10] will clearly place more emphasis on defense, on an assertive US foreign policy, on revitalizing the American industrial base, and on reducing resource dependency than have previous administrations. These efforts, in Soviet eyes, will inevitably worsen contradictions within the United States and within the capitalist world. Thus, the Soviets believe, the fiber of the US body politic will be weakened as social programs are curtailed and as the gap between rich and poor increases. From the Soviet view, this is desirable. Conversely, the US actions will make the United States a more formidable adversary in the middle to late 1980s, as American economic capacity and military capabilities are improved.

Soviet analysis of the European situation follows similar lines, although the USSR's country-by-country views of European nations differ tremendously. For example, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Great Britain has been decried by the Soviet media as the "Iron Maiden" who seeks confrontation with the USSR even as her policies further damage, from the Soviet perspective, an already weak British economy. Conversely, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt is often praised for his "realistic" assessment of the international situation, particularly for his desire to maintain trade relations with the USSR even in light of deteriorating East-West political relations.

Thus, from the Kremlin's point of view, the Western European scene is fraught with contraditions. Strong economies are juxtaposed to weak ones, and accommodating foreign policy postures are balanced by more confrontational ones. Francois Mitterand's France presents the Soviets with perhaps the most difficult case: a socialist government ready and willing to cooperate domestically with communists, but often opposed to the USSR in the international arena.

To be sure, the Soviet leaders are well aware of the problems which confront Western Europe. Declining rates of industrial productivity, great dependence on foreign sources of energy and materials, political and social fragmentation occasionally giving rise to violence and terrorism, and an uncertain political will as evidenced in mixed European responses to the capture of the American hostages in Iran, the Soviet "incursion" into Afghanistan, and reaction to nuclear weapons, give Soviet leaders reason to look with some confidence to a future Europe less able and less willing to oppose Soviet intentions. But this confidence must be offset by the knowledge that Western Europe has reserves of wealth and technical know-how that could delay its perceived decline and even, given the right set of circumstances, reverse it. A successful European union, a technical breakthrough in energy, and a revived sense of national or transnational European self-confidence are not beyond the realm of possibility.[11]

China and Japan. Soviet views of the Far East are colored by historical antipathy, ideological animosity, territorial aggrandizement, and latent racism. All is not solely the product of Soviet rule, but may be traced back to the years of the czars and even earlier. Despite occasional optimistic references to the future development of improved relations between the USSR and its Asian neighbors, there is nothing concrete to imply that anything other than tension will continue on the Soviet Eastern boundary.

China is the chief concern. The issues separating the two countries are numerous and intractable: a one-million-square-mile territorial dispute, disagreement over proper interpretation of ideology, rivalry over "senior" status in the international socialist community, Soviet unwillingness to aid China's nuclear program and economic development, and mutual charges of international expansionism are the major issues. Sino-Soviet antipathy over these issues has been accentuated by the gradual rapprochement between the People's Republic and the United States, culminating in the American recognition of the Beijing government and the revelation that the PRC maintains intelligence gathering stations for the United States on its territory. Put in its most basic terms, from the Soviet perspective, the meaning of these and other events is simply that a Sino-American semi-alliance has been forged. Even continuing Sino-American jousting over the sale of US military equipment to Taiwan has done little to alter this fundamental Soviet perspective. And to the Soviets, in the event of any conflict, the probability of a two-front war is increased.

The Soviet Union clearly hoped that Mao's death would bring about a transformation in Sino-Soviet relations, but that hope proved ill-founded. The post-Mao leadership succeeded not only in attaining American recognition but also in normalizing relations with Japan. Additionally, on 3 April 1979, Beijing informed the USSR that the 1950 Sino-Soviet Alliance would be allowed to lapse in 1980. All things considered, the Soviet leadership has had nothing but difficulties with China for the past twenty years, and can see only a continuation of this history in the future.

As one of its four "modernizations," the PRC has sought to upgrade its military capabilities, particularly with regard to attempting to attain weapons from the United States and Western Europe, but results have been slight. One indication of the limited results of this "military modernization" was the great difficulty the Chinese encountered in their 1979 "punishment operation" against Vietnam.

Even if the Chinese "modernization" has met with little success, and even if the effort has been downgraded, the USSR views China as a military threat. The most telling measure of Soviet concern is the growth of Soviet military capabilities in the Far East: from fifteen divisions in 1967 to twenty-one in 1969 to thirty in 1970 and, finally, to forty-one in 1981. While many of these are category two or three divisions, it nonetheless remains true that almost one-fourth of the Soviet army's manpower is on or near the Sino-Soviet border.

If the political and conventional military situations *vis-à-vis* China are unattractive to the Soviet leaders, the nuclear situation must be little short of appalling. Even while the USSR closed or perhaps reversed the nuclear gap with the United States, the PRC was developing capabilities sufficient to guarantee that the USSR view the "Chinese nuclear threat" as real and growing.

To the Soviet leaders, Sino-Soviet relations are complicated by continuing difficulties with Japan, a nation which maintains cordial ties with the United States and has improved its relations with China. In general terms, sources of Soviet-Japanese antipathy are much the same as in the Chinese case: territory, ideology, history, and economics. The continuing Soviet refusal to return several islands to Japan (the so-called "Northern Territories") which the USSR seized at the conclusion of World War II is particularly galling to the Japanese. There is no indication that the USSR intends to remove this sore; within the past three years Soviet military presence on these islands has been increased.

Japanese mistrust of Soviet intentions has been further fueled in recent years by the USSR's restationing of a large segment of its navy in the Pacific and by regular Soviet reconnaissance flights along the Japanese coast. Partly in response to those actions and partly in response to American urging, Japan increased its defense budget for 1981 to 12 billion dollars, a record of 7.6 percent increase over the preceding year. Predictably, the Soviet press condemned this action as a "resurgence" of Japanese militarism undertaken at the behest of the American military-industrial complex. Despite the fact that 12 billion dollars is, by superpower standards, a miniscule sum to spend on defense, the Soviet Union may well view the increase as an ominous portent of things to come.

The 1978 Sino-Japanese peace treaty gave Moscow cause for even more alarm, particularly when it was viewed in conjunction with the termination of the Sino-Soviet treaty announced a year later. Even the continuation of Japanese investment in the Soviet Far East did little to assuage the USSR's apprehension over the Sino-Japanese agreement.

In the Far East, then, the Soviet leaders may see themselves confronted by increasingly coordinated opponents, both of whom are interested in upgrading their military capabilities and both of which have territorial claims against the USSR. It is understandable that the USSR, believing itself to be increasingly boxed-in on its Eastern coast, is not sanguine about the course of future events in the area.

The Developing World. If a single word may be used to describe the Soviet Union's view of its own policy toward the developing world, that word is frustration. While extensive Soviet efforts to win friends and influence people have helped diminish Western prestige and influence in the developing world, it is not at all clear that Soviet prestige and influence have been greatly enhanced. Only recently, after the Soviet Union turned to the pursuit of military diplomacy, has its influence in the developing world expanded significantly, and then only in those few countries in which there is a large Soviet or proxy presence, specifically Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Afghanistan. Even these successes have been offset to a degree by the loss of Soviet presence and influence in Somalia and Egypt, and by Angola's continuing (but so far largely futile) efforts to expand commercial and economic relations with the West.

It may be argued that Moscow turned to military diplomacy because of the failure of its economic and ideological diplomacy. For many years, the USSR sought to provide economic aid and to offer an ideological example in its competition with the United States and China. Its string of failures is impressive: Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Egypt, the Sudan, Somalia, Mozambique, Indonesia, and India, and there are more. While Western influence has declined in these and other states, a fact about which the Kremlin's rulers are duly appreciative, the Western decline has not been replaced by long-term Soviet gain. Indeed, if one looks at the attitudes toward Western investment adopted by some of the more recently independent states, even those which are generally viewed as pro-Soviet, it is clear that pragmatism predominates. Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe serve as prime examples.

This is not to say that the Soviet Union has not improved its position in the developing world. It has. But, almost without exception, that improvement has been achieved through military means. Thus, treaties of friendship and cooperation are in

force with Angola, Ethipoia, South Yemen, and Afghanistan, among other nations; these four nations have sizable contingents of Soviet, East German, or Cuban forces based within them. A similar treaty is in effect with Vietnam, a country ruled by the Lao Dong Communist party; Soviet deliveries of munitions and equipment have not only enabled Vietnam to dominate Laos and Cambodia, but also have allowed the USSR to become a force in Southeast Asia. Soviet arms shipments to Iraq, yet another nation with which the USSR has concluded a treaty of friendship and cooperation, have been instrumental in attaining a degree of influence in Baghdad. Cuba's role in exporting revolution in the Caribbean basin is aided and abetted by large-scale Soviet economic subsidies and military assistance.

The Soviet Union has succeeded in enhancing its position in developing nations through its military arsenal. But that arsenal does not guarantee success. The Soviet Union at one time had treaties of friendship and cooperation with Egypt and Somalia, and funneled large quantities of military goods into both nations; today, there is no Soviet influence in either. In Nigeria, all but three Soviet military advisors were recently ordered to leave. Angola seeks Western investment capital and refuses to be drawn into a closed relationship with the USSR despite the Soviet-Angolan treaty. India, which receives significant quantities of Soviet arms and is bound to the USSR by a treaty of friendship and cooperation, steadfastly sets its own course in international politics. Iraq is staunchly Islamic and has recently executed indigenous pro-Soviet Communists.

While occasionally Soviet military diplomacy has been effective, Soviet economic and ideological diplomacy has regularly been ineffective. Few if any developing nations look to that country as a model for political or economic emulation, and even close Third World friends like Ethiopia have been unwilling to create a Soviet-style party. On those occasions when Soviet economic aid has been extended, it has often been given for massive projects of limited utility. Even trade does not serve effectively to link the Soviet Union to developing nations. In 1979, the last year for which trade statistics are fully available, Soviet trade with the developing world amounted to only 9.5 billion rubles. Interestingly enough, even this limited trade took on the appearance of a classic neo-colonial economic relationship, with Soviet exports to the developing world (6.3 billion rubles) being nearly twice as great as imports from it (3.2 billion rubles).[12]

The Kremlin's assessment of its future role in the developing world, it is reasonable to argue, must be based on the hope of continued Western preoccupation with internal difficulties, and on continued and increased reliance on Soviet military diplomacy. It is clearly within Soviet capabilities to influence militarily the outcome of given situations in the developing world, and the Soviet Union has few other tools on which to depend. Given the growth of international concern in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and even Latin America about the impact of superpower rivalry in these areas, it is not inconceivable that the USSR may find its military gifts welcome in only one or two nations in a particular region, and feared by the rest.

Historically and ideologically, Soviet leaders may still take comfort in the certain knowledge that Western control of the developing world has passed, and will probably decline still further in the future. It must be equally evident, however, even to the men in the Kremlin, that the decline of Western control and influence has not and will not lead automatically to greater Soviet control and influence.

Thus, in its relations with the developing world, the Soviet Union must turn to the only effective tool it has if it wishes to expand its influence in the developing world. Military diplomacy must be preeminent, if only by default. The key point is that for all practical purposes the Soviet position in the developing world rests on a single instrument, a position in which no leader likes to be placed as he surveys the future.[13]

III. Domestic Political Issues

Domestically, the USSR is confronted by a host of difficulties, some of which are the result of its system. These problems are interrelated, but let us separate them into political and economic issues, and treat them successively: the political issues first.

Ideological Stultification. In the Soviet Union, upwardly mobile men and women must belong to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Such people undertake few tasks without first referring to, or quoting, Karl Marx or V.I. Lenin. The Soviet citizen is subjected to a daily barrage of Marxist-Leninist rhetoric spewed out by the state-run press. The CPSU has a role in practically every activity, from running sports clubs to constructing apartment buildings. In short, the USSR is a nation dominated by allegiance to an ideology.

Yet it is an ideology that has by many accounts lost its relevance as a motive force in Soviet society.[14] In the words of one acquaintance, "Everyone is a Communist, but no one is a real Communist." Lip service is paid to the ideals Marx and Lenin espoused, but few Soviet citizens remain convinced that the ideal remains attainable. Continual emphasis on ideology throughout the course of a normal day has apparently influenced some Soviet citizens simply to ignore it. *Pravda, Izvestiia,* and other party and government newspapers go unread. Walls of buildings which have been converted into impressive posters lauding communism and the Soviet state are ignored, as are banners hung throughout the cities. As one travels through any Soviet city, one sees a populace trapped in its own boredom.

Additionally, the party and its apparatchiki, in the eyes of some, have become the new ruling class. Offspring of party functionaries are for all practical purposes guaranteed entry to universities and access to the better professions. Party leaders shop at private stores which are stocked regularly with goods unavailable in ordinary stores, and often with goods especially imported from the West. Preachments of socialist ideals ring hollow next to such favoritism.

The prevailing attitude has become one of "What's in it for me?" Perhaps the strongest indication of this is the black market, a flourishing second economy brought about by the shortcomings of the centralized primary economy and by the *laissez-faire* attitude toward self-aggrandizement that increasingly dominates Soviet life. This attitude reaches even the highest level of life, a fact strikingly brought home recently by the arrests on black marketeering charges of several individuals directly linked to Brezhnev's daughter.

This does not mean that Marxism-Leninism is about to be abandoned or even criticized. Its espousal remains a prerequisite to advancement in most walks of Soviet life. Rather, a malaise has set into Soviet revolutionary idealism. It is a malaise with which the Soviet leadership must deal, for politically, from the Komsomolsk and the trade unions through the military and the party, the entire

structure and legitimacy of society are based on the continued relevance of Marxism-Leninism.

The articles which appear in *Pravda* and *Krasnaia Zvezda* appealing for "active implementation of socialist standards" and "emphasis on correct ideological teaching and its implementation of socialist standards" are indicative that the leadership is aware of the attitude which has developed toward Marxism-Leninism. As current Politburo members, themselves raised on the rhetoric and practice of revolutionary idealism, survey the future, they must be uncomfortable at the thought that the younger generations are less motivated by ideological zeal than they were. To a body of very old national leaders, few thoughts could be more disquieting than the realization that the populace as a whole is in the process of losing its sense of purpose.

Geriatric Leadership. While ideological fervor appears to be moribund in wide segments of the population, the Politburo and Central Committee remain steadfast in their pursuit of Marxism-Leninism. Yet the Politburo itself faces a problem somewhat akin to that faced by the ideology it espouses, for it is in the process of dying, not from cynicism but from age. Within the last two years, two of the most powerful men in the hierarchy, Alexei Kosygin and Mikhail Suslov, have died.

With the exception of Leningrad party leader Grigory Romanov and agricultural expert Mikhail Gorbachev, members of the Politburo are in their upper sixties and seventies. Indeed, the average age of a Politburo member is 72, with Brezhnev himself being 76. One of Brezhnev's most likely successors, Andrei Kirilenko, is three months older even than he.

The issue of age by itself is relatively unimportant, but the question of how individuals raised in a particular era view a given situation has direct and immediate policy relevance. Jerry Hough, for example, has developed a generational theory of Soviet leadership outlooks, and has concluded that the probability for policy change in the post-Brezhnev era is great once a so-called caretaker period of rule has passed.[15] The direction of change, Hough argues, is unpredictable. The men who will replace the Brezhnev Politburo, it is assumed, will be of a different generation, have different views, and prefer different policy prescriptions. With the exceptions of Romanov and Gorbachev, it is not known who will rise to prominence from within younger generations.

This, of course, is not a problem unique to Soviet society. But what is remarkable is the tenacity with which Brezhnev and his colleagues have excluded younger men (with the two exceptions noted above) from positions of power. Thus, for the most part, speculation on post-Brezhnev policies are fruitless other than to yield generalized potential trends. Though it has often been said that the post-Brezhnev era leadership will in all probability lack the remembrance of the horror of war, that is hardly probable in a nation one third of which lay under the invader's lash only 40 years ago. What 20 year old (now 60) would not have been in the army? What 10 year old (now 50) would not have suffered? What 5 year old (now 45) would not have lived his formative years in a devastated land? The new leaders certainly will have witnessed the growth of their country to superpower status, the growth and retrenchment of American power, and their own version of the revolution of rising consumer expectations. This melange of differing outlooks can be expected to result

in policies different from those initiated by Brezhnev and his colleagues but no one can say in what ways they will differ.

The Nationalities Question. While the succession issue makes old men fear for their positions and young men anxious to attain new positions,[16] the nationalities issue raises questions about the viability of the Soviet Union as a modern nation state. Over one hundred different nationalities coexist within the USSR, with the Great Russian population slowly dropping toward the fifty percent level (53.4 percent in 1970, 52.4 percent by 1979). If their birthrate continues to drop, by the year 2000, Great Russians may well be in the minority.

In Central Asia, however, the rate of fall of the birthrate does not match the rate of fall of the Russian birthrate. The Soviet Central Asian population has risen from 24.2 million, or 11.6 percent of the population in 1959, to 43.1 million, or 16.5 percent of the population, by 1979. Assuming current trends continue, by 2000 over 30 percent of the Soviet population could be Central Asians. Many of these people share an Islamic heritage. As of 1982, there is little to indicate that the revival occurring in much of the rest of the Islamic world has spilled over into the Soviet Union, but from the perspective of Moscow, there is clearly potential for trouble, given both the relative and absolute growth in size of its Muslim population, and the proximity of that population to the revolution in Iran and the war in Afghanistan.

Potential Soviet nationality difficulties are not limited to Central Asia. Although causes of complaints differ from region to region and from group to group, Ukrainians, Germans, Poles, Moldavians, Georgians, Armenians, Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians in recent years have also made known their resentment of treatment at the hands of the politically dominant Russian leaders. The 1977 Brezhnev Constitution, for example, mandated that Russian be the *lingua franca* of the USSR, but riots in several Caucasus republics forced recognition of the legitimacy of local languages as well. More recently, in the Baltic states, expressions of nationalism have been strongly opposed by the Soviet leadership.[17]

Given Moscow's stress on spreading the Russian language and culture throughout the country, historical Russian chauvinism toward neighboring cultures, and sizable though sporadic opposition of the neighboring cultures to that chauvinism, it is not too much to imagine the growth of nationalities problems within the USSR. It is true that Moscow has recognized this potential for trouble, and has taken some steps to ameliorate the potential; reacceptance of local language and maintaining a "local" as party first secretary in each republic are some of the more noteworthy steps. The question remains, however, whether such steps will be sufficient to contain latent but real desires for national liberation within the Soviet Union when almost without exception positions of power in the party, the military, the KGB, and the Council of Ministers are held by Russians. As seen by Moscow, the turn of the century—when fewer than half of the Soviet military's recruits will be Russian, one out of three Central Asian, and the remaining one-sixth members of other minority nationalities—may present a discomfiting picture.

Dissent. Aside from the nationalities question, despite extensive efforts, dissent has not been eliminated in the USSR. While dissent is neither widespread nor does it carry great weight with the Soviet populace as a whole, both the Soviet party

apparatchiki and the intelligentsia have in recent years become increasingly aware of those voices raised in opposition to prevailing social pattern. The party has responded with repression; the intelligentsia, by listening.[18]

Given the nature of Soviet society and prevailing attitudes toward dissent, and given the advanced surveillance and control technologies available to the state, dissent presents an extremely limited threat to the body politic. At the same time, the leadership views any challenge to CPSU authority as a challenge that must be, and will be, met. As Brezhnev and his colleagues assess the future of their country, their ideology and upbringing predispose them to attach a greater level of significance to dissent than facts warrant.

IV. The Economic Situation

Though politics cannot be isolated from economics, certain issues face the Soviet Union which are primarily of an economic nature. These may be roughly grouped under three broad headings: industry and its organization, agriculture, and energy and resources.

Industry and Its Organization. The essence of Soviet industry and its organization is centralization. Most important economic decisions are made in Moscow and relayed and adjusted through various bureaucratic levels until they reach the operational level in factories. Not surprisingly, this chain of command leads to production bottlenecks, to managerial lack of initiative, to production designed to meet a statistical target rather than a user, and to slow technical innovation in production processes. Taken individually, the problems are immense; taken collectively, they have forced the creation of a black market economy which rivals the primary economy in size and scope and over which the central authorities have no control. Officially, the black market economy is small and diminishing; in reality, it is large and growing.

Production bottlenecks are often the result of centralized production quotas, differentiated responsibilities, transportation infrastructure shortcomings, and the black market. Quotas lead to the manufacture of a product designed best to meet the needs of the producer rather than those of a user. Thus, the manufacturer of an assembled product may be unable to produce it because parts he requires have not been made. The factories from which he intended to purchase those items have made products which enable them to most easily meet their own production quotas.

Similarly, even if an item meeting a particular specification has been produced, there is no guarantee that it will arrive where it is needed when it is needed. In most cases, the responsibility of plant managers ends when production is completed. Their responsibility does not extend to delivery. That responsibility is taken up by one of the various transport ministries.

Transport ministries themselves face difficulties both in infrastructure and scheduling. With uncertain production schedules, rail lines are inefficient. Railroad cars may sit for weeks waiting to load, only to be moved, empty, shortly before they are actually needed. With more and more Soviet resources and raw materials coming from the east and being transported to the west where the factories are, the shortage of rail lines and roads creates problems. The completion of a second transcontinental rail line will alleviate the problem, but will not solve it.

Not surprisingly, managers who must meet production quotas often turn to the black market to help them do that. Inevitably, this creates additional bottlenecks as other plant managers wail in vain for purloined parts. Thus the problem grows.

When managerial initiative is employed, it is directed toward meeting the quota. Other initiative is often discouraged by the centralized decision-making process. To be sure, the Brezhnev government has on occasion attempted to provide incentives for initiative and for the elimination of industrial bottlenecks, but to date these efforts have been ineffective.

Reforms have also been ineffective in improving the quality of goods. Industrial equipment may be described as minimally satisfactory, while, generally speaking, consumer goods are of poor quality. Perhaps shoes are the best indication of this. In 1979 some 739 million pairs of leather shoes were made in the USSR, or enough for three pairs for every citizen.[19] Yet, people complained of shortages of shoes regularly even when GUM and other Soviet stores had full shoe bins. When reports circulated in Moscow about a shipment of Italian shoes which would go on sale at GUM, Moscovites stood in line for hours, only to be disappointed when the reports proved to be rumor.

Soviet industrial organization also causes slow technical innovation.[20] Managers hesitate to close down their production lines for any length of time to bring innovations on line since to do so would jeopardize their attainment of quotas. While some innovation is in fact rewarded, the barriers to it are formidable.

Agriculture. Recent agricultural achievements have been dismal. In 1979, 1980, and 1981 output fell far short of target levels. Waste and spoilage heighten the problem. The agricultural outlook is grim indeed. Even more frustrating from the Soviet perspective is the fact that private plots, averaging less than one acre each, and totalling only 1.4 percent of the available farmland, produce 61 percent of the potatoes, 54 percent of the fruit, 34 percent of the eggs, 30 percent of the vegetables, and 29 percent of both meat and milk.[21] This is persuasive evidence that the average kolkhoz and sovkhoz worker devotes his attention when possible to his own plot rather than the collective or state farm.

Under the Brezhnev regime, the Soviet state has made massive investments in agriculture and in storage capacity to reduce loss by spoilage. These have not solved the problems. Roy Laird, perhaps the West's most astute observer of the Soviet agricultural scene, predicts even worse failures are to come.[22] Famine and starvation do not appear to be imminent, but neither do surplus and plenty.

Energy and Resources. In the past, Soviet leaders could take solace from their industrial and agricultural problems in the sure knowledge that the Soviet Union was self-sufficient in all major strategic minerals and fuels. Increasingly, however, that sure knowledge has become fiction as easily attainable sources of fuels and resources have been depleted and as consumption levels have increased. By 1977, the Soviet Union and other CMEA states imported as a percentage of consumption nine percent of their zinc, ten percent of their silver, 13 percent of their nickel, 23 percent of their phosphate, 28 percent of their bauxite, and 68 percent of their cobalt.[23] While these are small figures in comparison to those for the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, they nonetheless augur a significant change in the Soviet mineral situation: the

USSR may become increasingly dependent on external sources of minerals. This is a condition which leaders from Lenin through Brezhnev have sought to avoid.

Soviet resource concerns extend to oil as well. Although the USSR is still the world's largest oil producer, Soviet oil surpluses are diminishing. In the most extreme forecasts, if the USSR is to continue to meet the energy needs of its own economy and its allied or client states, it must begin to import oil sometime during the 1980s. Thus, the Soviet leaders must decide on how they should move to expand or even maintain current production. With 85 percent of the known Soviet reserve being situated east of the Ural Mountains, and roughly 85 percent of the Soviet population and industry lying to the west of the same range, the already serious transportation problems will grow worse. Additionally, because much of the oil is in severe climates and hostile terrain, the cost of extracting it will mount.

Alternatively, the USSR may turn increasingly to non-Soviet sources of supply, possibly in the Persian Gulf area. Gulf oil is more convenient to Soviet sites of consumption than Siberian oil is. The problem from the Soviet perspective, if the decision is made, is how best to acquire Persian Gulf oil. Already strapped for hard currency, much of which is obtained from the West by the sale of its oil to Europe,[24] the Soviet Union will be subject to more difficulties as its oil exports fall in the near future. Hence the question remains: how can the USSR best acquire external oil?

V. Conclusions: New Capabilities and Old Nightmares

The Soviet armed forces are impressive across a broad spectrum of capabilities. Pro-Soviet governments rule in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and the Soviet voice is heard in virtually every international forum. Truly, the Soviet Union has much of which to be proud. But even now, at the height of its power, astute observers—and the men in the Kremlin are astute—may detect the beginning of receding Soviet influence and power, if not in an absolute sense, then at least in a relative sense. From the Soviet perspective, after so much has been won after so hard a struggle, the world appears to be closing in. Even with its immense influence and power, nightmares from the past have not been eliminated, and are more real now than at any time since World War II. The future appears grim.

The isolation and encirclement feared by Lenin and all his successors appear to be occurring. The Soviet hold on Eastern Europe is less certain than at any time since 1948; in the United States a resurgent nationalism has developed and there are plans for rearmament; a new alliance seemingly has been forged between China, Japan, and the United States; and conflicts rage along much of the southern boundary of the USSR. And, while developing nations have freely taken Soviet arms and money, they have rarely accepted its ideology or its leadership.

Similarly, Soviet leaders from Lenin through Brezhnev have loathed dependency on the external world for any Soviet need. All recognized the necessity of attracting foreign investment to the USSR, but all also sought resource self-sufficiency. Yet as we have seen, the USSR is becoming dependent on external sources for materials, and the future threatens more such dependence.

Internally, the nationalities question has plagued first Russia and now the USSR. The dynamics of population growth do not favor the Great Russian people, and extensive Russification efforts have not significantly reduced the import of the

nationalities issue. Ideology has lost its motivational impact, and the economy, so dynamic from the late 1950s through the early 1970s, has stagnated.

Thus, from Moscow's perspective, the old fears may be coming true—encirclement, dependency, national fragmentation, ideological irrelevance, and economic stagnation.

It is from two difference points of analysis, then, that we must assess the Soviet Union's views of the 1980s. The first is that of capabilities. In the near future, Soviet military power may be expected to increase. At the same time, the fabric of Soviet economic, political, and social relations on both the domestic and international levels may be expected to hold relatively constant. A plateau has been reached, or is soon to be reached, after which the influence afforded the USSR by its new capabilities may well begin to diminish.

The second point of analysis is that of fears. As Soviet liabilities increase during the 1980s, and as potential external threats make themselves manifest during the same period, the Soviet leaders may conclude that the tide of history no longer clearly favors the USSR. Internal and external problems may magnify one another. As one recent article put it, the Soviet Union may increasingly become the "sick man of Europe."[25]

At this point, the composition and membership of the Politburo becomes a key question. How would any leader react to the realization that the nightmares of his predecessors were becoming the realities of his own rule? How would a Soviet leader, or a member of a collective leadership, react to the realization that his country's new capabilities, so carefully nurtured in the face of overwhelming odds for two-thirds of a century, were in fact growing less influential as the years passed? Would he lash out in frustration to attempt to set right the course of history, or would he accommodate his ideology and ambitions to new realities?

Brezhnev, his Politburo colleagues, and the successors of both the General Secretary and his colleagues will have momentous decisions to make. Their assessments of the "international correlation of forces" will play prominent roles in those decisions, both as they determine that correlation at a particular point in time and as they interpret its ebb and flow in the future. To some degree, they must have confidence, induced by the dictates of ideology, that short-term setbacks will be reversed in the long term. But as men currently in the Politburo view the 1980s, it would be understandable if they were less than convinced that the USSR is riding the crest of the wave of the future.

NOTES

1. For a fascinating look at the Soviet perspective on US military capabilities, see *Whence the Threat to Peace* (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1982) which was prepared as the Soviet response to the US Department of Defense pubication, *Soviet Military Power*.

2. See Benjamin S. Lambeth, "The Political Potential of Soviet Equivalence," *International Security*, Fall 1979, pp. 22-39; and Daniel S. Papp, "Nuclear Weapons and the Soviet Worldview," in David R. Jones, *Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual 1980* (Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press, 1980), pp. 337-351.

3. John Erickson, *Soviet Warsaw Pact Force Levels*, USSI Report 76-2 (Washington: United States Strategic Institute, 1976); and *Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact Military Balance* (Washington: Congressional Budget Office, 1977).

4. Reports persist that the withdrawal of the single tank division was more than offset by the reassignment of smaller tank units to other Eastern European based divisions. There is no hard evidence to substantiate or refute these reports.

5. For different views on PVO strany, BMD, and civil defense, see David R. Jones, "National Air Defense Forces," in Jones, pp. 108-153; Michael J. Deane, *Strategic Defense in Soviet Strategy* (Washington: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1980); and Leon Goure, *War Survival in Soviet Strategy: USSR Civil Defense* (Washington: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1979).

6. Eastern Europe is considered here to include Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. Albania, which left the Warsaw Pact in September 1968, and Yugoslavia, which never joined, are excluded for the purpose of this discussion.

7. *The USSR in Figures for 1979* (Moscow: Statistika, 1980), pp. 54-55, 179.

8. See *The New York Times*, 14 March 1982, p. 1. Rumania is also in virtual default.

9. *The Military Balance 1980-81* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980), pp. 12-13.

10. TASS Press Release, 30 January 1981, in response to Reagan's remarks about the Soviet Union in his first press couference as President, 29 January 1981.

11. For an excellent brief analysis of Soviet policy toward Western Europe, see Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global* (Cambridge: Winthrop, 1981), pp. 95-118. See also Richard Pipes, *Soviet Strategy in Europe* (New York: Crane Russak, 1976); R.J. Vincent, "Military Power and Political Influence: The Soviet Union and Western Europe," *Adelphi Paper Number 119* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975); and Thomas Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970).

12. *The USSR in Figures for 1979*, pp. 54-55.

13. For further discussions of Soviet policy in the developing world, see Robert Donaldson, ed., *The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and Failures* (Boulder: Westview, 1981); Roger Kanet, ed., *The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974); Geoffrey Jukes, *The Soviet Union in Asia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); and David Albright, ed., *Communism in Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980).

14. See, for example, George Feifer, "Russian Disorders," *Harpers*, February 1981, pp. 41-55. See also *The Christian Science Monitor*, 11 March 1982.

15. Jerry F. Hough, *Soviet Leadership in Transition* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1980).

16. According to some analysts of Soviet politics, a subtle attack on Brezhnev began in December 1981 with the publication of an article in *Aurora* criticizing an old writer who did not know that it was time to die. This attack allegedly continued in early 1982 with the arrests of several friends of Brezhnev's daughter and the continued absence of Brezhnev's son from his job.

17. *The Christian Science Monitor*, 5 January 1980.

18. David Kowalewski, "Trends in the Human Rights Movement," in Donald R. Kelly, *Soviet Politics in the Brezhnev Era* (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 150-181; and Hedrick Smith, *The Russians* (New York: Quadrangle, 1976), pp. 439-463.

19. *The USSR in Figures for 1979*, p. 74.

20. See Paul M. Cocks, *Science Policy: USA/USSR, Volume II: Science Policy in the Soviet Union* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980).

21. *The New York Times*. 24 May 1982, p. A-3.

22. Roy D. Laird and Betty A. Laird, "The Widening Grain Gap and Prospects for 1980 and 1990," in Roy D. Laird et al, *The Future of Agriculture in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* (Boulder: Westview, 1977), pp. 27-47.

23. James Arnold Miller et al, *The Resource War in 3-D: Dependency, Diplomacy, Defense* (Pittsburgh: World Affairs Council, 1980), p. 58.

24. See *The New York Times*, 14 March 1982, p. 1.

25. See Feifer, pp. 41-55.

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