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## Military Helicopters of the World

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were much higher than 80 feet—their radar antennae being about 120 feet above the waterline in the case of the new battleships.

An appendix entitled "Examples of Radar Operations during World War II" consists of some excerpts from action reports of but one warship, the cruiser USS *San Francisco*.

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Polmar, Norman and Kennedy, Floyd D., Jr. *Military Helicopters of the World*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1981. 370pp. \$29.95

Since the dawn of history, man has envied and sought to imitate the bird's ability to fly. After centuries of effort he finally learned to fly, after a fashion. Today he does so by hurling tons of metal horizontally into the air, and he remains airborne as long as this frantic rush forward continues. But for many years man has longed to leave the earth in a more majestic manner: vertically! For nearly 200 years balloons have been used to transport passengers aloft vertically, but they provide the pilot with little control over the direction of the travel. Thus, it was left to the inventors of the 20th century to devise a craft which could lift pilot, passenger, and payload vertically into the air, move at will in any direction, and even hover over a given piece of terra firma. This craft is the remarkably versatile helicopter, and the Naval Institute Press has recently published a book which is sure to become the reference source for information on the military uses of rotary-wing aircraft.

*Military Helicopters of the World* is the joint work of the well-known defense writer Norman Polmar, and Floyd D. Kennedy, a highly respected analyst of Soviet naval and air doctrine.

Their encyclopedic effort covers over 200 helicopter models which have been designed and flown since 1917. The authors have taken an unusual approach toward organizing the tremendous amount of data which fills the book's 370 pages. The book is arranged alphabetically by nation of design origin, and then alphabetically by the name of the firm or individual who designed rotorcraft within that nation. There are twelve such sections, and since the book deals with helicopter development for the past 65 years, we find sections for Austria-Hungary and Germany (Third Reich).

Preceding the nation-by-nation review, the authors have included a section entitled "Perspective" which provides a historical overview of helicopter development ranging from Leonardo da Vinci's "air gyroscope" in 1483 to the Soviet Union's new Mi-26 *Halo*.

Adding to the book's usefulness as a reference publication are a glossary of helicopter-related terms and acronyms, and four information-packed appendices.

The longest appendix provides biographical data on individual helicopter designers (such as Igor Sikorsky and Frank Piasecki) as well as information on design organizations (such as Sud Aviation and Hughes Aircraft Company).

Three other appendices discuss rotary-wing aircraft designations; armament; and serial number assignment.

The authors have done an impressive job of assembling the facts, figures, and photographs to document over six decades of helicopter design and operation.

The serious researcher will enjoy the depth of information provided on designs which were built and flown in large number by the nations of the world. The casual reader, however, may be more

intrigued by entries which discuss such exotic aircraft as the Japanese Kayaba KA-1 which flew Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) missions from the flight deck of a small carrier in 1942; and the Third Reich's unpowered Focke-Achgelis FA-330 "automotive kite" which was towed aloft by a cable attached to a submarine traveling at high speed on the surface.

Authors Polmar and Kennedy have written what is sure to become a standard reference source on the world's military helicopters.

JOHN E. JACKSON

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Tucker, Robert W. *The Purposes of American Power: An Essay in National Security*. New York: Praeger, 1981. 190pp. \$12 paper \$5.95

During the early years of the Carter administration, Robert Tucker was among the few academics who recognized the danger of overreacting to the Vietnam experience and spoke out eloquently for a more realistic approach to national security policy. As the Carter years came to a close, Tucker remained at the forefront of those pressing for a more vigorous foreign and defense policy, and, in part through his writings in *Commentary* magazine, became identified with a tough-minded approach to the question of protecting petroleum supplies, including the possible requirement for US forces to seize oilfields in the Persian Gulf.

*The Purposes of American Power* is Tucker's contribution to the body of literature that sought to influence the foreign and defense policy process that the Reagan administration was expected to unfold in 1981. Like other essays of this kind, it has a very short half-life: written

in 1980, and published in 1981, many of its concepts have already been overtaken by events. For example, Tucker predicts that "without question, a more consistent and resolute American leadership would restore a measure of European confidence and elicit a greater degree of cooperation."

It is arguable that the issue of European-American relations is too complex for such a straightforward formulation: the experience of the Reagan administration's first year is that firmness of purpose does not automatically guarantee European support. As recent debates with some of the European allies over the Yamal Pipeline, contributions to defense spending, or US policy in Central America clearly indicate, it is not merely leadership, but the *direction* that leadership takes, and the degree to which that direction appeals to the Europeans' own perception of their interests (regardless of the accuracy of that perception), that affects the level of support forthcoming from Europe.

Events have also overtaken Tucker's argument in favor of US employment of the Sinai airfields that Israel was returning to Egypt. Egypt clearly will not permit the United States to operate from Etam and Etzion (whose Hebrew appellations are not likely to survive the passage of 1982) and Israel is in no position to grant the United States any rights over them.

What is striking about Tucker's book, however, is the clarity with which it both unravels the knots that complicate the formulation of national security policy—budget constraints, alliance obligations, public concerns about foreign policy—and dissects, and rejects, the arguments put forward by advocates of global containment, on the one hand, and of détente (however packaged) on the other. Tucker is also extremely