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## The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength

Henry M. Schreiber

John Prados

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economy would enable any US government to manage economic diplomacy effectively.

Franklin Margiotta turns the discussion to a "domestic threat" to US national security: the inability to provide adequate manpower for the armed forces. He offers two factors to account for the manpower problem—defined in terms of both recruitment and retention: a declining sense of legitimacy of military services in American society and an identity crisis within the military services. Analyzing the effects of technological, social, and environmental changes on military institutions, Margiotta sees much trouble ahead for the all-volunteer force concept.

Morris Janowitz continues the discussion of manpower problems in the US armed forces with an analysis of the changing concept of the citizen-soldier in an all-volunteer force. He examines such things as motives for enlistment, and the effects of high turnover rates, concluding that the military does continue to mirror American society. Janowitz proceeds to raise the possibility of moving toward some form of universal national service, involving civilian and military alternatives.

Earl Ravenal discusses the relationship between force and power and the implications for US foreign and defense policy. Concentrating on the distinction between US capabilities and will to employ these capabilities on the one hand, and foreign perceptions of US capabilities and will on the other, Ravenal analyzes the contemporary problems and paradoxes of deterrence and defense.

The final chapter, written by the editor, is an interesting summary of the major comments and criticisms raised by the seminar participants during discussions of the individual papers. By

focusing on implications for US policy, the last chapter enhances the value of the chapters that precede it, and helps the reader to understand the difficulty of transforming interesting ideas into policy.

STEPHEN M. MEYER  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Prados, John. *The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength*. New York: Dial Press, 1982. 367pp. \$17.95

The title of John Prados' book *The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength* leads the reader to expect a full discussion on all aspects of Soviet military forces. The title promises more than the book delivers. There is virtually no treatment of Soviet conventional forces—ground, air, naval. However, this is the only instance in which this book fails to deliver; in every other respect more is given than is promised or expected. *The Soviet Estimate* is a remarkably fine work.

The Introduction limits more precisely the major emphasis of this carefully and thoroughly researched volume. In the author's words, "Basically . . . this book is a study of the effectiveness of US intelligence [in] one substantive area, Soviet strategic nuclear forces." The period covered is from the late 1940s, although a few earlier references are made, through the 1970s.

*The Soviet Estimate* is objective, comprehensive, and balanced in its judgments. I believe it will serve as a valuable reference resource for the professional intelligence officer, military or civilian, and for scholars interested in the workings of the intelligence community.

The careful reader will find in this book a brief sketch of the development of the Intelligence Community; a description of the intelligence process, from the

levying of requirements and the employment of collection techniques (although Prados focuses heavily on technical means of collection as against human sources) through to the analytical and estimative conclusions; and the difficulty of achieving consensus in the estimates. What stands out dramatically are the differences and the disputes that have occurred among the several intelligence components. In the 1950s Air Force intelligence argued that Soviet production of heavy bombers was at a very high level; the other intelligence elements disagreed. From 1957 through the early 1960s, Army intelligence (ACSI) repeatedly stated the Soviets were deploying large numbers of ICBMs; CIA disagreed.

Under ordinary circumstances there are difficulties in arriving at a consensus on critical intelligence estimates. The difficulties may be compounded if strong-minded personalities in the executive or legislative branches intrude into the estimative process. Often leading government officials such as Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, or Congressional figures have their own opinions on intelligence questions and have not hesitated to insist on their judgments. On occasion, but fortunately not often, politics has influenced intelligence estimates.

John Prados addresses with insight and effectiveness the relationship between intelligence and policy. Ideally intelligence serves policy and carefully avoids stepping over the sensitive line into the policy area. However, two problems commonly arise in the intelligence policy connection. First, the decisionmakers are not required to pay attention to the estimates they receive (and in a democratic society they should not be). Second, the personality of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and his relationship to the President may deter-

mine whether the line between intelligence and policy will be heeded. John McCone, a successful businessman prior to his becoming the DCI, consciously made policy recommendations. Prados states that Admiral Stansfield Turner at times suggested policy actions. Most of the men who have held the post of DCI, however, have scrupulously stayed clear of the policy area.

Virtually every significant intelligence problem relating to Soviet strategic nuclear forces is contained in *The Soviet Estimate*. Included are the following: the development of the Soviet atomic program and its missile delivery system; the story of US aerial photography during World War II and the later achievement of a space intelligence collection capability; the "bomber and missile gaps"; the Soviet efforts in ballistic missile defense. Some material in this book, as on the Cuban missile crisis, adds nothing new to what has been known, but provides a useful summary.

Perhaps the most interesting sections in *The Soviet Estimate* are those which focus on the controversies within the Intelligence Community. Was the Tallinn system intended by the Soviets for anti-aircraft or missile defense? What have been the levels of Soviet spending for defense? What are the capabilities and missions of the *Backfire* bomber? All these, and more, may be found in this book.

The writing is clear and spare, even if not exciting. The bibliography is extraordinarily extensive and is practically worth the cost of the book. Within *The Soviet Estimate* Prados has provided a balanced criticism of the US intelligence effort. He has evaluated its successes and its failures, and in Prados' judgment the successes seem substantially to outweigh the failures. However, as he suggests, as technological breakthroughs are

achieved, more difficult challenges are coming center stage which will complicate our intelligence collection and analysis efforts.

HENRY M. SCHREIBER  
Naval War College

Maddux, Thomas R. *Years of Estrangement: American Relations with the Soviet Union 1933-1941*. Tallahassee: University of Florida Presses, 1980. 238pp. \$15

The period between the American recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933, and the extension of Lend-Lease Assistance to Moscow in 1941, has generally been overlooked by historians of US-USSR relations. As Thomas R. Maddux rightly notes, however, it was during this time that many American attitudes toward the Soviet Union were molded—attitudes that continue to shape the foreign policy of the United States. *Years of Estrangement* hence fills a gap in American diplomatic history in this particularly crucial decade before the emergence of the United States as a global superpower.

In addition to his general account, Maddux makes several points that are of particular interest today. The current disillusionment with affairs in Europe has led many Americans to turn their attention to the Pacific Basin (and the Indian Ocean) as the future center of world power. This is certainly not an unprecedented position for the United States. America determined to turn its back on Europe after the end of world war in 1815, and the subsequent rise of the Holy Alliance, through the Monroe Doctrine and westward expansion. Even before the United States acquired California and became officially a two-ocean nation, the government in Washington (to say nothing of enter-

prising American traders) had evidenced an interest in Hawaii and points farther west. In this century, even though the United States has been forced to re-concern itself with the balance of power in Europe, America has also retained an interest in the affairs of Asia, and its marginal seas and islands.

When President Franklin Roosevelt negotiated with the USSR for the restoration of relations between the two nations in 1933, his primary strategic motivation was not cooperation with Moscow against the threat of Nazi Germany. Instead, Maddux argues persuasively, his intention was to make the Soviets more resolute in their opposition to Japan in Asia. By March 1933, Japan had created the puppet state of Manchukuo in Manchuria, and had moved south of the Great Wall to within 13 miles of Peiping. During this same time, Hitler had only just appeared on the European scene, and was several years away from taking his first unambiguous steps toward continental conquest.

Even though the United States had never fully and formally accepted the Versailles Treaty, Roosevelt could only assume that the principal European guarantors of the peace of 1919 (Britain and France) would restrain another German drive for European supremacy. But in doing so, the European colonial powers would be forced to turn their attention away from Asia, creating opportunities for Japanese expansion. The logical strategic arrangement would be, therefore, for the United States—with its own considerable interests in the Pacific, including Hawaii and the Philippines—to assume the major responsibility in deflecting Japanese advances in Asia. But the United States' freedom of action was greatly limited by the reigning isolationism in public opinion—hence Roosevelt's opening to Stalin as