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Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument

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the most available means of influencing events in the Far East.

In the short term, Roosevelt appears to have been unsuccessful: the Kremlin signed nonaggression pacts with both Germany and Japan. Although the Soviet Union later came into the war against Berlin, and eventually Tokyo, Roosevelt's long-term performance is equally open to challenge. Maddux concurs in the judgment of most historians that Roosevelt was not sufficiently aware of Stalin's ambitions.

But Maddux also argues that the president's own shortcomings as a diplomat were magnified by the restraints imposed by public opinion, and by opposition from within the bureaucracy, most notably the State Department. (For example, the State Department tended to emphasize Stalin's weaknesses, and to demand a much harder line on negotiations with the Soviets.) Within the bureaucracy, there developed the now familiar split over Soviet intentions that further clouded (and continues to cloud) American foreign policy. Such men as William C. Bullitt and Joseph E. Davies contended that Stalin was a sincere revolutionary who aimed for the ultimate triumph of communism. The George Kennan school, in turn, emphasized power and security as the object of the Soviet state.

Maddux himself clearly comes down on the side of Kennan, with a few bows thrown in the direction of Stalin's ideology, during his critique of Roosevelt. Because the author offers no clear resolution of this debate, *Years of Estrangement* does not rise above the level of a competent historical survey of the period. In fairness to Maddux, however, this complex task is beyond the scope of his work. Perhaps the most useful way to view Soviet strategy in such a context is to emphasize its continuity. In 1938, for

example, the Soviets attempted to have a 35-knot, 60,000-ton battleship designed and constructed in the United States. This proposal was eventually thwarted by the Navy Department, but Roosevelt finally approved the construction of a 45,000-ton battleship with 16-inch guns for the USSR. In the 1980s, as the *Kirov* and its sister ships enter service with the Soviet Navy, the Kremlin no longer need ask America's leave for the development of its fleet.

PATRICK J. GARRITY
Public Research, Syndicated

Kaplan, Stephen S. *Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981. 733pp. \$29.95 paper \$14.95

Identifying some 190 occasions from the final stages of the Second World War to the massive intervention into Afghanistan in December 1979 wherein Soviet military power was employed as a foreign policy instrument, this work is a solid analytical counterpiece to the earlier work Kaplan wrote, with Barry Blechman, *Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington: Brookings, 1978). Reading the two one can make a relative assessment of American and Soviet perspectives and applications of military force in the furtherance of their foreign policy objectives. Kaplan points out that the Soviet military was employed as a purely coercive instrument in 158 of the 190 incidents and that the Soviets' propensity to seek military solutions to political issues has increased proportionately with the recent substantial growth and modernization of their military machine.

Organized into three main sections, the work begins with a historical analysis of the immediate foreign policy contexts

for various Soviet military activities in terms of forces employed and resultant actions. The detailed treatment of high-level Soviet decision making before and during major events involving peacetime force deployments is particularly worthwhile. While the precise circumstances may never be disclosed fully from Soviet sources, it is clear that the author has examined the available materials carefully and exhaustively. This is especially apparent in his assessment of the interventions in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968), as well as for actions pertinent to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the military buildup along the Sino-Soviet border during the tense summer of 1969.

While the Soviets appear capable of exploiting young and insecure political regimes throughout the Third World, they have a hard time maintaining identities of interest with some client-states. Though initially successful with a number of nations, the USSR has suffered reversals over longer periods of time with such states as Somalia and Egypt, and it has had to expend considerable effort merely to regain its earlier levels of strategic position and regional influence. Kaplan ends the first part of his book by observing that the USSR always has stood ready "to take advantage of extremely favorable circumstances—in particular, when it could intervene in behalf of a principle of international law, supported by a large number of Third World nations, with little likelihood of military confrontation with the United States, and with an otherwise large prospect of rapid success."

Part II consists of eight case studies of Soviet military force applications by various Western authorities. Those contributions by *Le Monde* correspondent Michael Tatu on Soviet rationales for the several military interventions into

Eastern Europe (with much meaning for current events in Poland) and by Professor William Zimmerman on Soviet involvement in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts are particularly useful. Two other contributors, Professor Alvin Z. Rubinstein on Soviet air and SAM deployments to Egypt during the 1970 "Canal War" and British analyst Colin Legum who writes an incisive appraisal of post-1975 Soviet and Cuban efforts in Angola and the Horn of Africa, help readers to derive broad perceptions of the various roles Soviet military power has assumed while employed in support of the USSR's foreign policy aims.

Although Kaplan maintains that as an instrument of foreign policy the Soviet armed forces have been used with a good measure of skill, particularly in the Third World since 1970, he concludes that, by virtue of its potential for overt conflict and nuclear confrontation, it is a tenuous mechanism. The author observes that sometimes the employment of force has led to unwanted results, as in the Cuban Missile Crisis where US interests were directly threatened. In that regard, Kaplan also notes that the Soviet leadership is acutely sensitive to manifestations of discord or uncertainty among US policymakers and, in the face of any high-level American hesitance, is prepared to use force to gain advantage.

The final part includes a number of useful reference tables that are particularly supportive of Kaplan's quantitative survey of Soviet military employment. In addition, Kaplan provides a chronological index of those identifiable events involving Soviet armed forces between mid-1944 and late 1979, as well as a detailed topical bibliography. If not the "final word" or the only analytical viewpoint on this topic, particularly in light of recent events or Soviet options for the future, Kaplan's work is surely

the most thorough effort to date that has attempted to capture the scope and thrust of Soviet politico-military activities. For that reason, and because the USSR will probably continue its pattern of "short of war" efforts for the foreseeable future, the work makes a valuable contribution towards an increased Western awareness of that multifaceted global campaign.

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Stuart, Douglas T. and Tow, William T. eds. *China, the Soviet Union, and the West: Strategic and Political Dimensions in the 1980s*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. 309pp. \$13.95 paperback.

The papers in this book are from a conference on Sino-Soviet relations held during May 1980 in Garmisch, West Germany. The authors include academicians, researchers, government officials, and journalists from both sides of the Atlantic.

The book opens with an extensive examination of the basis of Soviet and Chinese relations. Professor Vernon V. Aspaturian of Pennsylvania State University has written an essay entitled "The Domestic Sources of Soviet Policy Toward China" which could easily serve as a primer in comparative foreign policy. Aspaturian points out that the opinions and preconditioned stereotypes held by Soviet bureaucrats and other Soviet elites became self-sustaining as polemicists both developed vested interests in their positions and lost sight of the original causes for their inspirations. Thus he believes that in their view of China the important people in the Soviet Union are trapped by their Marxist ideology; they cannot escape feeling that

the PRC will develop and in doing so pose a threat to themselves.

Other authors in the opening section deal with the internal factionalism and economic constraints of both nations, the need for the West to plan for all possible contingencies, and the unimportance of ideology in Sino-Soviet relations.

The second section considers military matters. All authors discount the immediate possibility of any serious military actions between the USSR and the PRC, for inherent vulnerabilities and limitations would tend to make the military option too risky for either side.

William Green of the Heritage Foundation and David Yost of the US Naval Postgraduate School argue that the Soviet Union could succeed in military operations against the Chinese which would gain them additional territory. They outline the cases for an attack on the Chinese buffer areas, for a strike against Chinese nuclear forces, or for a "genocide" attack aimed at reducing China to chaos.

Professor Don Daniel, also of the Postgraduate School, argues that the Chinese Navy is and will remain essentially a coastal defense force with modest local interdiction and strategic nuclear capability. Other authors examine the internal Chinese debate between upgrading their forces with modern technology or retaining a defense posture based upon a traditional "people's war." There is also an analysis of the role of the US Seventh Fleet in bolstering China vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

The third section deals with PRC-USSR competition in certain of the world's regions. The general thesis is that each side is maneuvering forces and states to contain the other side. A number of authors discuss the support of Nato by China. Soviet inducements to maintain détente and cooperation with Western