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

PROFESSIONAL READING

REVIEW ARTICLE

HISTORY, WAR AND THE MILITARY PROFESSIONAL

by

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Henry Ford once remarked that "History is bunk!" That feeling is so widespread that the new professor soon learns he must include a defense of history's utility in his repertoire because his firsr task is to convince his students that the study of his subject is worthwhile. If teaching experience at West Point and the Air Force Academy can be taken as a guide, that task is not exceedingly difficult when it comes to the operational part of military history, for if the cadets do not see any other benefit in that dimension of the subject, at least it has more entertainment value than many other parts of the curriculum. Motivation is, however, a tougher problem when one gets to the other aspects of the work such as the political or economic sides of war. As both West Point and Colorado Springs are basically engineering institutions, it is probably justified to say that the tastes of the cadets are not too far removed from those of the military profession in general as it, too, is technologically oriented. When I was a midshipman at the Naval Academy, the popular name for history was "Bull." While one might argue that a part of the reason for that jargon was merely that the formal title of the department was simply too cumbersome for day-to-day use, there is a good bit of evidence that the attitude implied by the word was indeed held by many midshipmen as well as a good many of their seniors.[1]

While there are doubtless still many among us who privately think of history and kindred subjects as "bunk" or "bull," many others would argue that the discipline has risen in status within the armed forces. It is now possible to major in the subject at both the Air Force and Naval Academies (though the vast majority of students graduate with technical degrees), and the Naval War College curriculum has a substantially greater historical content than heretofore.[2] For many decades, the study of military history was not considered a respectable activity for civilian scholars, but according to Allen Millett[3] and many others, the discipline has come into its own since World War II. Much good work has appeared since that time, and Millett is optimistic that the trend

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will continue. However, if the military part of the discipline of history is alive, well, and maturing, one could hardly say the same for one of its components, the history of airpower. The most that could be asserted there is that though airpower history is still in its infancy, it is showing some encouraging signs of progress.

Naval officers may well wonder about the wisdom of discussing the historiography of airpower in a professional naval journal. Mahan seemed to argue that there is a set of eternal principles of war that could be discovered and applied in future battles—that there was therefore a great and immediate utilitarian value of the study of naval and military history, but the frustrations of the world wars, Korea and Vietnam (among many other things) have led most scholars to deny that history repeats itself.[4] A more or less typical current view is that of Dr. James A. Huston who argued that the professional officers' objectives in the study of history should not be of such a utilitarian nature but rather should be: to broaden his experience base, to improve perspective and to gain inspiration.[5]

Unlike the social scientist or the researcher in the basic sciences, the naval officer cannot use controlled experiments to increase his experience base to the point where it can support reliable generalization about the future of warfare—war is too expensive and too complex for that. Consequently, as poor a substitute as is the reading of history, the professional is impelled to use it and try to discern its elements of change and continuity.

An argument could be made that, since the naval officer's personal experience has to do with war at sea, the reading of the history of war on land and in the air may be even more important to him than is the reading of naval history. Further, the power projection part of the Navy's force is largely airpower and the theory and doctrine governing the use of SLBMs arises directly from the experience of the use of airpower in the strategic bombing role. Of course, the expansion of one's professional reading program beyond the limits of naval history and further back in time is quite liable to broaden perspectives and, perhaps, increase the confidence of the commander in times of crisis.

Dr. Huston's idea on the worth of history as a source of inspiration is usually thought of only in a positive sense and as having its greatest application at educational levels lower than that of the audience of this journal. Yet, inspiration can also have its negative aspects, and there are those who have asserted that one of Billy Mitchell's most important (if inadvertent) contributions was, from his viewpoint, the negative one of stimulating the U.S. Navy to make more rapid progress in naval aviation that might otherwise have been the case.[6] Finally, as both Dennis Showalter and Philip Crowl (not to mention Carl von Clausewitz and many others) have argued, the study of any of the variants of military history should inspire in the prospective commander a healthy skepticism as to the validity of both evidence and the most clever plans of the peacetime strategists.[7]

One of the signs of maturity in any field is the appearance of a general survey and that has not yet happened for the history of airpower. Robin Higham made a start towards such a work with his *Airpower: A Concise History* some years ago,[8] but it was not possible to make it sufficiently comprehensive to give the reader a general introduction to the study. Another of the signs of the maturity of a field is the appearance of scholarly bibliographies, and one of Higham's other works, *A Guide to the Sources of U.S. Military History*, is a competent symbol of the growth of the field in general.[9] Its chapter relating to airpower cannot, of

course, be comprehensive enough to do the same for that particular part, but the Office of the Chief of Air Force History has produced some useful work in that realm.[10]

One of the signs of the immaturity of airpower history is that the material being published still has an exceedingly large content of romantic narratives designed to feed the popular appetite and biographical studies flawed by hero worship. Still, serious scholarship is appearing more and more often. The present article is devoted to the review of some of the latest writings on the history of airpower which demonstrate that, though it is still possible to find publishers for some rather shallow material, definitive studies are beginning to appear—and an encouraging portion of them are coming from official sources.

The historian "learns" at the outset of his career that official history tends strongly to be tainted by the imperatives of bureaucratic politics. Yet, there has long been (and continues to be) evidence in airpower history that proves that the generalization is *not* altogether accurate. The famous official work, *The U.S. Army Air Forces in World War II*, is a case in point.[11] Not only was it artfully done and based on competent scholarly research, but it was also honest enough to admit the disappointments of the establishment; such as recognizing that the B-29s had not bombed the Japanese into submission, for the submarines had already killed Nippon's industry through the interdiction of its supplies when the Superfortresses began their campaigns out of the Marianas. Of course, a skeptic might be moved to say that Craven and Cate (and their contributors) were the exceptions that prove the rule. They were not the ordinary bureaucrats whose future was identified with the establishment, but rather were true civilian scholars who were mobilized only for the duration. Two recent works suggest that even in peacetime official history need not always be the "party line."

The first is *The U.S. Air Service in World War I* edited by Dr. Maurer Maurer for the Office of Air Force History.[12] The prize-winning *Air Service* is a collection of documents dating from the Great War and its immediate aftermath. Though the editorial comments are deliberately scarce, they are so well chosen that they give the work a coherence not often found in such collections. Maurer Maurer is one of the deans among the official historians at the Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center at Maxwell Air Force Base and his long service there has clearly qualified him to turn out the definitive work in the field.

In the months immediately after the Armistice, Col. Edgar S. Gorrell of the Air Service was put to work collecting materials for the Chief's final report and for an official history of the combat activities of the U.S. Army's air arm. That constitutes the substance of Maurer Maurer's first volume, and it makes interesting reading indeed. Colonel Gorrell was an engineer of the first order who had graduated from West Point near the head of his class. He attacked his task with the same energy that had brought him to the fore in his previous roles. The result is that today's historians of the First World War are blessed with a set of documents that go far beyond what one would expect from that early day, especially in view of the shortness of the American participation in the war and the helter-skelter way in which we demobilized. This volume by itself establishes the fact that the body of ideas that has governed the later development of airpower was already well established by the time the United States entered the war in 1917. Though the reconnaissance and air superiority roles were clearly the most important in that war, all of the other missions that were later assigned to air

forces were conceptualized first in Europe before 1918. It is also clear that by the end of the war airmen and soldiers on both sides were beginning to get a glimmer of the potential of airpower in the air-to-ground role, especially in pursuit of a defeated enemy.

Seldom is heard a discouraging word in the typical U.S. Air Force unit history of the Vietnam War, but things were different during the infancy of military airpower. Maurer Maurer has included a good many documents that show that the Air Service was faced with a logistical nightmare in France though some great deeds were accomplished. All of the aircraft used by the U.S. Army in France were of foreign design, and most of them were manufactured overseas. The only bright spot in that part of the Air Service's work is the record of the Liberty engine in all its variants which seems to have earned a fine reputation with our airmen and among our allies as well. Much of the literature on the First World War concentrates on the action at the front, but *Air Service* in its first volume (and subsequent ones) gives ample treatment to the training, supply, engineering and planning activities behind the line.

Planning is a theme of the collection of documents in the second volume of *Air Service*, and the main outlines of the political battle over the control and development of airpower in the twenties and thirties were already rather fully developed well before Germany surrendered. Pershing, probably followed by the bulk of the officers of the U.S. Army, readily saw the great value of the new instrument in war. But he envisioned it as an auxiliary to the "Queen of Battle," the infantry arm. Both Pershing and Mitchell insisted that air superiority was essential, but, though the United States did not become involved in any of the strategic bombing activities of the war, Mitchell nonetheless argued that airpower in the future would have such an independent mission—and that it would likely be decisive. In *Air Service*, Mitchell's writings are accompanied by some of those of the other originators of our airpower doctrine: Gorrell, Bolling, Foulois, to name but a few.

Maurer Maurer's third volume constitutes a kind of case study by which the reader might judge the validity of the theories presented by the documents in the preceding book. It is wholly devoted to the Battle of St. Mihiel of September of 1918 and its nearly 800 pages are a comprehensive sampling of the orders and reports of the American air units participating in the fight. Mitchell was in command of what was the largest air battle of the First World War. Of course, definitive judgments cannot be made because (among other things) the Germans were nearing the end of the road, having exhausted themselves with their offensives of the spring and summer of 1918, and in any case there were obvious tactical advantages for them in permitting the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient. Still, sampling the mission reports of the lieutenants involved is sure to add to one's perspectives on the flavor of that particular war.

The final volume of *Air Service* is largely a collective end-of-tour report. Rather strenuous efforts were made to acquire material from all manner of combat and support officers before they were permitted to embark for home and a wide sampling is included. The book closes with a primitive version of World War II's Strategic Bombing Survey—which makes it quite clear that bomb aiming throughout was not a science—nor was it even an art, but rather only a matter of luck. There are some assertions for the morale effects of bombing, but practically no one claimed much in the way of physical results. Thus, Mitchell, his cohorts, and his intellectual descendants who fought for the strategic bombing idea and an independent air force in the two decades of peace that

followed had precious little empirical evidence upon which to base their demands.

The U.S. Air Service in World War I is, then, the definitive work in the area. It is expertly edited by one of the recognized authorities on the subject. The layout and design of the book is enviable. The artwork itself is worth an afternoon of browsing. It contains countless photographs that have not appeared in print before. The maps are competent and the drawings are attractive and accurate. (One minor flaw is that the scheme for supplying captions for some of the drawings is unclear—some interesting illustrations remain unlabeled and seem to be in the same category as others that *are* explained.) Most important, *Air Service* supplies a comprehensive and balanced collection of primary source documents on the air war. While it is not light reading for the casual student, it *is* absolutely essential as a starting point for the scholar of the First World War.

A second official work of first-class historical quality is Sydney F. Wise's *The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, vol. I, Canadian Airmen and the First World War.*[13] Contrary to what one might expect from the title, the work is not parochial. As the Canadian airmen were integrated into the Royal Naval Air Service and the Royal Flying Corps in France, and as the two services were united into the Royal Air Force early in 1918, the book gives a comprehensive picture of the air war from the allied, or at least the English, side of things. Further, because the British Navy's air arm was so heavily engaged in the land war and because the Canadians were in its ranks in some numbers, the naval part of the air war gets a good bit of attention.

Sydney Wise is superbly qualified to write *Canadian Airmen and the First World War*. He has all the academic prerequisites having been a professor at the Royal Military College of Canada, Queens College, and Carleton University. Wise is also a past president of the Canadian Historical Association and was one of the authors (with Herman O. Werner and Richard A. Preston) of the highly regarded *Men in Arms*.[14] But, in addition to the academic qualifications, he also possesses technical experience uncommon among airpower historians for he himself was a pilot in the Royal Canadian Air Force during World War II.

History of the RCAF is organized on topical lines and the result is a well-balanced study of the aerial part of the British experience in fighting World War One—but, at the same time, the men from Canada who participated receive ample recognition—and they constituted nearly a quarter of the strength of many of the units of the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service. Quite logically, the book begins with several chapters on preparation: planning, training, and the like.

Then, more than a hundred pages are devoted to the naval aspects of the air war—and these will be particularly interesting to the readers of the *Naval War College Review*. A start was made toward carrier aviation in the Royal Navy, seaplane reconnaissance and bombing operations were prominent, and large naval aviation units fought in support of the land war at the northern flank of the Western Front. Finally, though the aircraft of the day could hardly hope to hit a U-boat, Wise claims they were nonetheless a decisive factor in the antisubmarine war because of the inhibitions their presence imposed on the tactics of the German commanders. Here, as elsewhere in *History of the RCAF*, artwork of rare quality is included in support of the text. Fold-out maps are a splendid aid to understanding the photographs mined from the archives of the Canadian Government are indeed a treat. Among these are some illustrating the launching of

Sopwith Camels from lighters towed at high speeds by destroyers!

Another of Wise's principal topics is "Strategic Airpower." The ideas which emerge from this part of the work are similar to those inferred from *Air Service*. The airmen carried away great expectations about the future of strategic bombing, the soldiers thought that aviation was great as an auxiliary to ground forces, many held that the effects of bombing on the morale of soldiers and civilians alike were considerable, but the empirical evidence of the physical effects certainly seemed to support the claims of the soldiers. One of Wise's strengths is his ability to meld the larger story with episodes of the individual flyers in an effective way. This makes his book fairly exciting reading without disrupting the coherence of the general explanation of the role of airpower in the Great War.

Wise's fourth major topic has to do with the support of the land war. The ideas presented are similar to those one infers from Maurer Maurer's work: artillery spotting, reconnaissance, and air superiority missions were the most important ones and close air support, especially in pursuit of defeated forces, was beginning to come into its own. One minor flaw in the book is that technical change was coming so rapidly in World War One that the reader is hard pressed to keep up with it. To one accustomed to seeing the F-4 about our bases and decks for nearly twenty years, the parade of new aircraft types in World War One is difficult to comprehend without an appendix that would provide the drawings and performance data that would enable him to compare the types and better understand the meaning of change. Airmen came out of the the war with highly inflated expectations for the potential of strategic bombing and a somewhat inflated idea about the achievements of air superiority efforts. They did not much appreciate the decisiveness of the reconnaissance and artillery spotting roles. In the following years, therefore, army cooperation missions received insufficient development and we had to relearn about their importance from the Germans in the first two years of World War II. Further, though the exaggerated claims of the "aces" were apparent enough in the histories, that inflationary tendency was not sufficiently recognized. Wise might have added that one of the "aces" who missed the point was Hermann Göring who in the battle of Britain insufficiently discounted the claims of his own pilots and therefore made some bad decisions on the pursuit of victory in 1940.

For the student of military aviation, then, *Canadian Airmen and the First World War* is a book that may be read with great profit. It tells a comprehensive story and tells it honestly. The prose is competent and the artwork complements it well. The documentation is beyond cavil. Though the author himself is a veteran of the establishment of which he writes, he rebuffs the powerful temptation to glorify it. That sturdy quality, found in an *official* history, stands in stark contrast to another new book published *commercially*: Edgar Puryear's *Stars in Flight: A Study in Air Force Character and Leadership*.[15]

Stars in Flight is a set of minibiographies of the World War II chief of the U.S. Army Air Forces, Gen. Henry Arnold, along with the first four chiefs of staff of the U.S. Air Force. The first defect of the work is its title, rather too melodramatic and inaccurate in the image it attempts to project. Without taking anything away from the admirable men described, it is nonetheless true that two of the five had absolutely *no* combat flying time in their logs and their great achievements really were in organization and planning rather than in action.

On the surface of things, Edgar Puryear seems well qualified to issue such a study on professionalism. He

holds a Ph.D. in "Political Science and History" and is a lawyer as well. He was an officer in the Air Force, but he spent most of his active-duty time on the faculty of the USAF Academy, about a decade, before he resigned from the service to enter the law. He had already written a similar book which has received a good bit of attention: *Nineteen Stars: A Study in Military Character and Leadership* which covered the lives of Generals Marshall, MacArthur, Eisenhower and Patton.[16] Dr. Puryear is frequently a lecturer to student officers at the Air University, Maxwell Field, Alabama.

The ritle is not the only fault wirh the jacket of *Stars in Flight*. The book is about five of the most importanr fathers of the U.S. Air Force (of the cold war period, be it noted) and the artwork in its front contains the silhouette of only one aircrafr: the Soviet M-4 Bison (counterpart of the B-52)! Of course that is no fault of the author as he probably did not even see it before it went to the market, but it is only the first of a multitude of editorial errors uncharacteristic of Presidio Press.

The principal defects of the work are the fundamental assumptions constituting the world view of the author and serious mistakes in methodology. Much of the early literature of the history of airpower was characterized by assumptions that invariably the leaders of the U.S. Army Air Corps were selfless patriots, the leaders of the Navy were selfish bureaucrats, and the political leaders of the United States were ignorant, reactionary, or perverse. Puryear accepts these assumptions. The result is a hero-worshipping piece that will not impress the general public, much less the junior leaders of the armed forces. Puryear's stated purpose is to inspire romorrow's air leaders, but a book that downplays the "warts" cannot do that.

The second major fault in the work is its methodology. Let's start with the small items and work up. The footnotes on materials in prinred form are at the ends of the chapters; those citing material drawn from interviews (and Puryear leans heavily on oral documentation) are placed ar the ends of the paragraphs to which they pertain. Much of the material that is uncontroversial and common knowledge is footnoted; some which is subject to serious question is not documenred. Direct quotes, apparently from Gen. Thomas D. White's diary, to cite only one example, go without annotation (p. 185). Puryear leans heavily on the recollections of senior officers long after the events they are describing and seems never to question them. He purs forth uncritically the narratives from effectiveness reports and the citations from awards and decorations. Faults are noted, but they are dismissed as mere "boys-will-be-boys" mistakes that demonstrate the good nature of the subjects and that they were all regular fellows. He fails even to attempt to balance favorably biased evidence with similar materials from competing bureaucracies or competent secondary works. He documents some chapters heavily, but others hardly at all.

General Arnold's chapter has 77 footnotes, and General Spaatz' gets 68. General Twining's has seven, citing five sources (*Howitzer, Stars and Stripes, U.S. News & World Report, Saturday Evening Post* and *Look*). He accepts the descriptions of character contained in the West Point yearbook, *Howitzer*, apparently not realizing that very often they are conceived by classmates with hidden humor for the purpose of perpetually teasing their friends in the years after graduation. I have no doubt at all that Gen. Henry Arnold was a man of the highest character. However, Puryear attempts to prove that point by closing his case with a quote from an obituary written by one of Arnold's comrades in their West Point alumni magazine!

Stars in Flight is open to question on the matter of balance. Carl Spaatz, the Air Force's first Chief of Staff and one of the great aviation pioneers, gets fairly full treatment from his cadet days through the end of the interwar period, with somewhat lighter treatment as a combat commander in World War II. His rour as chief of the U.S. Air Force receives no discussion at all! Yet, the first chief of any institution is certain to have a profound effect on its future for it is he who establishes the initial set of organizational processes that have an important effect on decisionmaking for many years. Many of the precedents set by George Washington still affect the way that we do things in America today.

The character attributes that become the generalizations Puryear draws from the biographical case studies are: "Duty," "Honor," "Service before Self," "Courage," and Decisiveness. Who can argue with the notion that these are useful characteristics for the one who would be a great military leader? In fact, they have the status of truisms that hardly need substantiation. A separate chapter is included at the end of the book on each one, and in his explanations, the author gives some treatments that are so general and so obvious that they can be of little use to the junior leader, and others that are just plain wrong. In his chapter on "Duty" for example, Puryear asserts that one should never tamper with the institution's assignment process, but rather the good soldier takes whatever comes along realizing that he will get his reward in the long run. In today's Air Force, at the very least, that is very bad advice and a virtual guarantee that the young officer will never get close enough to levers of power to do any permanent good for his country (not to mention himself). Assignments to responsible positions are almost always made on a "by-name-request" basis and are very often the result of personal relationship between the requestor and the assignee. To stay out of the game is to commit one's self to a string of low-level positions with no responsibility—likely to be viewed by the powers as a lack of initiative, not a commitment to duty.

Puryear's own evidence contradicts his generalization. In the passages of Carl Spaatz who had been serving as the World War One commander of the largest American flying school in France, we find his citation for rhe Distinguished Service Cross quoted:[17]

> Although he had received orders to go to the United States, he begged for and received permission to serve with the pursuit squadron at the front.

Then we find Puryear quoting Spaatz writing to Arnold:[18]

> . . . I cannot agree . . . . [that being selected to attend the Command and General Staff College is worthy of congratulation] I am going to Leavenworth not because I expect it will do me any good, but primarily because I am ordered there and secondarily to get away from here [Washington] . . . .

And quoting Brig. Gen. Andrew Tychsen on Spaatz at Leavenworth:[19]

> There was never a time that Tooey bothered himself with the study requirements handed out to all students. A number of times I witnessed Tooey taking out the sometimes bulky material from his slot and slide it all into the nearest waste basket.

That is hardly supporting evidence for the notion that the prospective great air leader must always take whatever assignment comes his way without murmur, salute smartly and turn to with determination and vigor!

Stars in Flight, then, really does not do justice to rhe men it describes. The evidence does not support all its generalizations, the generalizations are often truisms and do not cover the field (Puryear does not sufficiently address the factor that *all* of his subjects were

graduates of West Point), nor does he seem to recognize Clausewitz' citation of the importance of chance and imponderables in war—*luck*, along with Duty, Honor & Country, helps, and the weight of the story is to change these five men from extraordinarily competent human beings into "Marble Men." Some years ago, Thomas L. Connelly did a history of the history of Robert E. Lee that demonstrated the damage that was done by elevating the Confederate hero from greatness to sainthood.[20] On the surface of things, there does not seem to be much harm in providing the junior officers of the service with heroic models by transforming the old greats from flesh and blood into marble. However, the effect can be deadly. Insofar as *Stars in Flight* is seen as the voice of the establishment, or of the older generation, the sanctification of yesterday's leaders can undermine the credibility of the leadership and widen the generation gap. The junior officers of today are no more naive than those of yesteryear and they know that marble men are seldom, if ever, found in the ranks of any generation. The outcome is added difficulty with the retention problem, or, at the very least, the erosion of the very professional values that Puryear wishes to raise above the motivations of the market place.

Another recent commercially published collective biography gives a first impression similar to that of *Stars in Flight* for its title, too, causes the reader to suspect that an act of sanctification is to follow. *A Few Great Captains*, however, is cut from different cloth.[21] Though it is founded upon some assumptions that are similar to those underlying *Stars in Flight*, it does permit some of the warts to show in its portraits and it does not claim complete omnipotence for airpower. It tells the story of the development of the U.S. Army Air Service and the U.S. Army Air Corps through the eyes of some of the principal air leaders (some of them the same characters dealt with in *Stars in Flight*). It, too, assumes that the air officers in general were moved mainly by considerations of patriotism and that the motives of the leaders of the Army General Staff, the U.S. Navy, the executive arm of the U.S. Government, and the Congress were not as noble. *A Few Great Captains* takes the story up to the outbreak of World War II, and the second volume of Copp's work will examine the way in which the air force his captains built survived the rest of battle.

DeWitt S. Copp is admirably qualified for the work. He himself served as a World War II pilot in the air force that his subjects built. Since then he has worked as a journalist, a history teacher, and a screenwriter. That experience has given him an enviable writing style. Though it is quite obvious that the breadth and depth of the research underlying *A Few Great Captains* is far greater and better balanced than that of *Stars in Flight*, the documentation is slight—almost all of the few footnotes are explanatory in nature, and the reader is left wondering as to the sources of many things. That is a shame because it limits the usefulness of the book as a contribution to the growing scholarly literature on the history of airpower. That is especially true as the work is a comprehensive one, it seems sound enough, and it offers many new insights on the germination phase of American airpower. The book is sponsored by the Air Force Historical Foundation which also publishes *Aerospace Historian*, one of the few American periodicals devoted exclusively to the history of airpower.

The organizing theme of *A Few Great Captains* is that the entire interwar period can be seen as a struggle between the far-seeing airmen who understood that the principal role of the future air forces would be an independent mission against the sources of enemy strength and the traditional soldiers and sailors who felt that

airpower was a useful adjunct to land and seapower but that there was not much potential in strategic bombing against industrial and morale targets in the enemy's heartland. Copp writes, it seems, from the perspective that the airmen were right and the Navy and ground part of the Army were wrong—but of course his conclusions on the point will come in the second volume. As we have seen in *Air Service* and *Canadian Airmen*, the data drawn from the First World War clearly supports the assertions of the interwar surface warriors, and the arguments of the "Great Captains" were based on faith in the future rather than on concrete evidence from the past.

The demand for the separate air service was somewhat subdued after the court martial and resignation of Billy Mitchell (1925), and those to whom he passed the torch expressed their dissent most prominently in the struggle for the development of a long-range heavy bomber and for a modicum of autonomy *within* the U.S. Army. They won both battles by rather narrow margins, and the contest is described by Copp in a detailed and competent way. In his eyes, perhaps the greatest of the great captains was Frank M. Andrews who was the first commander of the GHQ Air Force, the precursor of the independent air force that came into being after World War II. Copp does glorify Andrews (and many others) as fighters against ignorance and obstructionism, but he does not carry it to the kind of sanctification found in *Stars in Flight*. His treatment of Andrews is comprehensive, and a contribution to the growing literature. Andrews *was* an important figure in the development of U.S. air might and one whose role has not been sufficiently recognized because his death in an aircraft accident cut his career short at a time when the other great captains were about to go on to mount what probably will forever remain history's most massive strategic bombing campaign—and to win the struggle for the independent air force. Naturally, the others have attracted greater attention from historians and biographers, and the book at hand fills an important gap.

It is too early to pass final judgment on *A Few Great Captains* for the main conclusions of the story will come in the next volume which will cover the battle testing of the ideas of Andrews and the others. It will be interesting to see how Copp will handle the evidence which *does* emerge from World War II. The whole point of the interwar struggle revolves around the notion that strategic bombing would be *the* decisive factor in future wars. Copp seems to agree with his captains' assertions that this would be so. Yet one of them, Henry Arnold, attempted to measure the effects of the great campaign on Germany and Japan when he created the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.[22] The resulting conclusions go about as far as does any responsible scholarship when they hold that the bombing was *a* decisive factor, and no more than that. One escape from the dilemma Copp has created for himself might be the argument put forth by some of the great captains who did survive the War: strategic bombing never received a fair test. In Europe, they say, the mass required was not permitted to develop (early enough) because of the constant diversion of heavy bombers to the anti-submarine campaign, their deployment to North Africa, and their distraction in a tactical role supporting the land-sea battle at Normandy. In Asia, it has been further argued, the submarines had already destroyed Japanese industry through starving it for raw materials before enough mass could be brought to bear for a true strategic bombing assault. It is a perfect illustration of the difference between political and military science on the one hand, and the pure and applied sciences on the other. In physics, the difficulty would be

overcome simply by running additional experiments until the flaws were eliminated and the sample were wide enough; in strategic bombing, one doesn't do such things with thousand-plane raids against other people's cities.

Because of the impossibility of running sufficient tests in political and military science, expert opinion must carry a greater weight than it does in other disciplines. One of the experts on the strategic bombing campaign is Walt Whitman Rostow and he has recently published a small book on one of its most significant controversies: General Eisenhower's decision to favor the arguments of the tactical airmen against those of the big bomber men. The former wanted to assign the strategic bomber force against the rail yards in France so as to isolate the landing area (Normandy in June 1944) and prevent the movement of German reserves against the beachheads during the critical early phases of the campaign. Gen. Carl Spaatz and the others associated with the strategic bombers asserted that the concentration on oil targets and on cutting rail lines and bridges would be more decisive aids to the struggle on the surface. Of course, the oil part of the argument was straight out of classical strategic bombing theory. Rostow's *Pre-Invasion Bombing Strategy* is a detailed examination of Eisenhower's choice and it seems to fit well with current decision theory.[23]

Though Rostow is now a professor at the University of Texas, as is well known, he is no ivory-tower intellectual. He has long had a prominent role in government and he is a primary source of sorts for the subject of the current book. He served as a member of a target planning group in wartime London and his unit favored the ideas of the strategic bomber proponents, but the book is a dispassionate one and not a polemic. The classical decision theory work, Graham T. Allison's *Essence of Decision*,[24] uses the attempt of Nikita Khrushchev to emplace nuclear missiles in Cuba as a case study to illustrate his (Allison's) three models of the governmental problem-solving process. However, Eisenhower's decision before D-day would have served as a case study equally well—perhaps better because it was more compact and less complex than the Cuban case. Both the tactical and strategic men thought that the weight of logic was on their own sides, and that illustrates one of the difficulties of the "Rational Actor Model." No matter how much material is gathered and how hard the staffs work, the evidence will ever be ambiguous and some assumptions will be required. Thus, even if only "rational" procedures are permitted to intrude on the decision process, sincere men can nonetheless come up with opposed solutions. But further, the "Bureaucratic Politics Model" can be identified in the Normandy case for the personality of Air Marshal Tedder, arguing on the tactical side of the issue, was so powerful that Eisenhower seems to have had a special confidence in him. Further, a part of the argument of that side was that the organizational processes of the bombing forces were such that too much effort would be required for each rail (or bridge) cut and thus larger targets, such as rail yards, would have to be selected. As for the oil targets, the tactical men argued that the organizational processes of the German war machine were still resilient enough that the effects of the oil attack would not manifest themselves in time to help the landings. For all of that, though Eisenhower clearly opted for the rail yards, the processes of the organization were such that the decision was distorted in the implementation and in the end the oil targets and the bridges were also attacked—with good results. *Pre-Invasion Bombing Strategy* provides good reading for the military man, the historian, and the political scientist alike. Rostow's writing style is clear and

economical and his arguments are persuasive.

The books at hand provide ample material to keep the officer-scholar busy all winter and spring. *Air Service* is useful to the professional military man mainly as a reference and it is a definitive one. The specialisr in the history of airpower will want to become quite familiar with Maurer Maurer's fine work. *Canadian Airmen* is a model official history, and the readers of *Naval War College Review* will find it readable enough to serve as an introduction to the allied side of the air battle in World War One. *Stars in Flight* should detain neither the serious professional warrior nor the scholar. *A Few Great Captains* is better; it is highly readable and can serve the naval officer as a competent introduction to the development of Army airpower between the wars though it cannot be the ultimate in scholarship on the subject because of the flaws in its documentation. Officers inreresred in air history or decision-making theory will find *Pre-Invasion Bombing Strategy* well worth the expenditure of reading time.

As we have seen, military history, especially in the United States, developed much later than the orher fields of the history discipline. If for no other reason, this was inevitably so because the century of "free security" the Americans enjoyed after the War of 1812 guaranteed that the interest in rhings milirary would be rather limited. Simply stated, America's neighbors were just not *that* formidable. It was equally certain that the subfield of airpower history would mature at an even later date. *Stars in Flight* suggests that it is not yet out of its infancy; *Air Service* and *Canadian Airmen* prove that progress towards maturity *is* being made.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Mersky, Peter B. and Polmar, Norman. *The Naval Air War in Vietnam.* Annapolis, Md.: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1981. 224pp. $17.95

The Vietnam war has often been described as an undertaking "long on sorrow and short on glory." In retrospect, it seems that what glory there was in this difficult conflict often came from the exploits of the brave young aviators who carried the battle to the enemy's doorstep. *The Naval Air War in Vietnam*, by Peter Mersky and Norman Polmar, graphically tells the story of the many Navy and Marine Corps pilots who rode into battle wielding the most sophisticated weapons in the history of warfare. It is noteworthy that the authors did not fall victim to the disease sometimes known as "fighter-itis"; they also chronicle brilliantly the contributions of reconnaissance and patrol aircraft that performed equally vital if less glamorous tasks during America's longest war. Polmar, winner of the Navy League of the United States Alfred Thayer Mahan Award for Literary Achievement, is best known for his highly respected editing of the U.S. section of *Jane's Fighting Ships.*

He is joined by Peter B. Mersky, a former naval aviator and air intelligence officer, in a venture that gives the first full account of naval air warfare during the Vietnam era.

The book is introduced by V. Adm W.L. McDonald, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare), who describes it as

> the most complete chronicle of the air war in Viet Nam yet to be published. This book offers a vivid description of what that war was to the warrior in the sky and how he performed.

Drawing from the personal experiences of the pilots themselves (over 50 of whom are mentioned by name), the authors tell of the heartbreaking frustration generated by the incredibly strict constraints placed on their actions by political leaders seeking to limit the war to a set of unrealistic parameters. These restrictions were reminiscent of similar sanctions placed on pilots during the Korean war which allowed them to bomb only the *south* end of Yalu River bridges. The authors cite many examples of the impact of such restrictions:

> The port of Cam Pha, an important North Vietnamese coal depot, could not be attacked when there were any foreign ships in the harbor. Naturally the North took advantage of this ruling and it was a rare day when a foreign ship was not tied up to a pier at Cam Pha. The frustration of the men who risked their lives daily entering the intense corridors of flak and

SAMS can be imagined, as they fought not only the enemy on the ground, but also the so-called rules of engagement laid down by their government. Even when ships in harbors opened up with 37-mm fire, the Navy pilots were strictly admonished not to fire back.

The Naval Air War in Vietnam depicts accurately a wide spectrum of air operations ranging from massive raids against the North to lonely patrol flights along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The authors detail the use of dozens of aircraft types from the last of the Navy's piston-engine attack planes, the A-1H *Skyraider*, to the F-14A *Tomcats*, which provided fighter cover during Operation Frequent Wind, the final evacuation of Saigon. They even provide a glimpse of such exotic craft as the Patrol Air Cushion Vehicles (PACV) that were described as "one-third airplane, one-third helicopter, and one-third boat" and the SP-5B *Marlin*, the last flying boats used operationally by the U.S. Navy.

This outstanding book is filled with more than 200 photographs and charts, and while it is a "must" for every aviator's bookshelf, it will be enjoyed equally by readers with their feet on the ground but their hearts in the clouds.

JOHN E. JACKSON
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Rausa, Rosario. *Gold Wings, Blue Sea: A Naval Aviator's Story.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980. 200pp. $15.95

Flying of any kind seems to hold a general attraction for people but naval aviation has its own special mystique centered on the aircraft carrier and its around-the-clock flight operations. Carrier ops successfully made the transition from prop-driven to jet aircraft a couple of decades ago, an era of transition which this book bridges.

The author, a reserve naval captain, completed naval flight training in the late 1950s and served several tours on board the *Forrestal* as an AD (later A-1 Skyraider) pilot. Nearly two-thirds of the book deals with his exploits as a student pilot and vignettes of life as an operational aircrew on duty in the Mediterranean. The last third of the book relates Rausa's experiences during a combat tour with the A-1 aboard the *Coral Sea* during the Southeast Asia conflict.

This book does not break any new ground in the trials and tribulations of learning to fly or life as a military pilot. Many of the stories about a particular flight or shipboard personality are loosely tied together with no connection to each other. For those who served with Captain Rausa, these scenes will probably prove both enjoyable and memorable.

The author's role as the pilot of a reciprocaring airplane on board a predominantly jet-equipped carrier provides a different insight into a world that is virtually gone. The details of interminable nine-hour low-level strike missions leave the reader thankful for present-day cruise speeds. There is a certain glamour, however, to an aircraft whose speed allows the pilot time to think.

Gold Wings, Blue Sea is well-written but the interesting sections are too thinly scattered to be enjoyable. It is not a comprehensive look at carrier aviation but it is the story of the years which made up so much of one naval aviator's life.

DON RIGHTMYER
Captain, U.S. Air Force

Sherrard, D.G. *To Antarctica With the Royal Navy,* New York: Vantage Press, 1981. 122pp. $7.95

David Sherrard and I served together in the mid-60s. He was at times extremely amusing, and at times, exasperating. I feel he was born too late; he might have done well in submarines in

the First or Second World War, he would certainly have prospered in Nelson's navy, but had he been born in the 16th century he could have been a Drake or a Hawkins. For he was a buccaneer at heart and his restless spirit did not fit with the somewhat bureaucratic and technically muscle-bound Royal Navy of the 1950s and 60s.

In light-hearted and witty style, Chapter 1 relates an incident I remember well when David cut through what he called bureaucratic red tape, to achieve a boyhood ambition to dive on the wreck of H.M.S. *Prince of Wales* in the South China Sea. He was, almost inevitably found our, "banished" from the Far East as punishment and arrived home just in time ro replace the sick executive officer of H.M.S. *Protector*, the Royal Navy's oldest ship, before she sailed on her annual voyage to Antarctica.

David describes the voyage from several viewpoints. There is some standard, but not dull, travelogue which icebergs and penguins, a helicopter crash and the *Graf Spee* monument in Montevideo; there are interesting sidelights on how his shipmates reacted to the long spells at sea interspersed by visits to exoric South American porrs; he also uses the voyage to give us a flavor of the Royal Navy, past and present, and to ride some hobbyhorses. Perhaps best of all, he describes with a wicked, yet often affectionate, pen the many unusual characters he mer. Like certain electronic devices, as soon as Sherrard detects a slight charge one way he seems to be able to amplify this significanrly. His abrasive side brings out the worst in some people while his humor and humanity bring out the best in others. So we meet an outrageously pompous colonial governor, a delightful pair of Falklanders called "Horrible Henry" and "Canadian Annie," the "Purple People Earer"—an Englishwoman he met in Rio, and many others larger than life.

For the civilian, David Sherrard explains many naval customs and expressions, including the Crossing the Line Ceremonies, Deck Hockey, the "Golden River," the "Feast of the Passover" and how most commercial ports have a "city improper." Between rhe threads of travel, characterization and naval lore, Sherrard takes the opportunity to fill any gap with an iconoclastic blast against authority, especially "chair-bound" admirals and civil servants. Just occasionally he overdoes this, but he is always amusing.

Finally one comes to the end of this voyage with some regret. I felt that I was actually at sea with David again and once more listening to his tall sea-stories. One also realizes that in the descriptions of the relationships between himself, his caprain, his sailors and his officers, he has subtly and artlessly put across a valuable lesson on man-management—or as David Sherrard would say—leadership.

M.G.M.W. ELLIS
Commander, Royal Navy

Poole, Walter S. *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: Vol. IV, 1950-1952.* Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1980. 479pp. $49

This volume is part of a formerly classified series produced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Division about the JCS and the formulation of national policy. This particular work only deals with the period from 1950 to 1952 but the significance of events of that time far outweighs their chronological breadth.

Despite the tremendous drawdown of U.S. military forces following the end of World War II, the Truman administration was determined to make further reductions in the Defense Establishment of the early 1950s in a move toward budgetary economy. One of the

key documents that registered a strong opinion that buildup, rather than reduction, of U.S. military strength was essential was drafted in early 1950 by a Joint State/Defense Department committee. It became known by its National Security Council identifier, NSC 68, and urged an aggressive strengthening of the U.S. military in light of the Communist takeover in China and the Soviet Union's new fission weapon. NSC 68 did not overcome the tendency toward force reductions, however, prior to the beginning of the Korean war in June 1950.

The invasion of South Korea prompted President Truman and his staff to reevaluate the forces needed to thwart the Communists and to prevent the Soviet Union from starting a global war. A revised NSC 68, known as NSC 68/1 and 2, was approved in September and served as the guidance for a massive rearmament effort. While all of the services enjoyed some increases, the Air Force seemed to be the major beneficiary. The priority was supported because the Air Force was believed to be most susceptible to obsolescence due to technological change and it was perceived as the service most likely to deter the Soviet Union from war. Poole sees this trend as a foreshadowing of the later Eisenhower reliance on "massive retaliation."

The second half of this book deals in depth with the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other areas that would later hold great significance in U.S. defense matters. The author touches on the impact of the Korean conflict on NATO matters and the move to rearm West Germany.

The 12th chapter covers the U.S. commitment to Taiwan and increased American involvement in Indochina. These are particularly poignant areas of interest to examine in our present day, post-Vietnam environment.

Taken by itself, this volume provides an excellent look at defense questions in the era of the Truman years. Together with the other volumes in the series, it will provide long-term views of the evolution of national defense planning since World War II. Besides the excellent narrative, this book also serves as an invaluable seedbed for further reference to JCS documents by virtue of its origin and the reliance on primary documents.

Volume IV is a good piece of official history and will prove useful to anyone interested in the early years of the cold war.

DON RIGHTMYER
Captain, U.S. Air Force

Weigley, Russell F. *Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany 1944-1945.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981. 800pp. $22.50

Professor Weigley entitled his book *Eisenhower's Lieutenants* with Douglas Southall Freeman's portrait of *Lee's Lieutenants* in mind. Like his distinguished predecessor Weigley decided that a study of the principal commanders and their associations offered the best means of approaching his topic—an assessment of "the merits and deficiencies of an army at war," in this case the U.S. Army in Europe during 1944-45. (p. xvi) Weigley is identified with the "new" military history, which he defines as "the history of armies and soldiers in their social and political context," so it may surprise readers of earlier works such as *The American Way of War* to discover that this book concentrates relentlessly on battle. Because the author began with a large question in mind, nothing less than the desire to determine whether an army whose tradition was that of a frontier constabulary could be transformed speedily during the Second World War into "a serious competitor of European armies long accustomed to international contests on a grand scale,"

he felt compelled to concentrate on combat. "A day's trial by battle often reveals more of the essential nature of an army than a generation of peace." (p. xv)

The outcome is an extraordinarily detailed account of the command performance of the U.S. Army during the campaigns in France and Germany from June 1944 to May 1945. Emphasis is on the commanders under Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower—especially Gen. Omar Bradley and Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., but also on many other army, corps, and division commanders such as Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Jr., Gen. Jacob Devers, Gen. Courtney Hodges, and Gen. Carl Spaatz. Weigley rarely takes the reader to Eisenhower's headquarters, and he deals with the command post in Washington only when decisions made there had to be dealt with to explicate field operations.

Weigley's examination of the course of the battle in Normandy, across France, and into Germany allows him to develop a general thesis that involves a striking paradox; the U.S. Army embraced a "strategic credo" that ran counter to the theoretical basis for the organization of forces in the field. The strategic premise was that "war is won by destroying the enemy's warmaking ability, particularly his armed forces; mere maneuver will not accomplish this destruction; the destruction is to be accomplished by confronting the enemy's main armed forces directly and overwhelming them with superior power." (p. 7) Nevertheless, Weigley insists that the principle of mobility underlay the Army's organization. By 1940 Army practice emphasized the use of infantry to supply power through head-on confrontation of the enemy; armor would be used to exploit infantry successes.

This paradox—a strategy at cross-purposes with organizarion—accounts for the outcomes of various enterprises in 1944-45. Weigley deals with a number of subjects in terms of power *versus* mobility, among them the following:

—The reason for the sluggishness of the initial campaign in Normandy was not only that the British sought to avoid heavy casualties but that the terrain required "sustained combat power" rather than mobility. The planners concentrated too much on the landing and not enough on the operations to follow, an error that had much to do with the tendency of operations in Normandy to bog down. Weigley has constantly in mind the chance that a stalemate could have developed in France comparable ro that of 1914-1918, a possibility implicit in the failure of the Americans to organize their forces for the kind of war that was likely to materialize in Europe.

—Among the reasons for the avoidance of stalemate was **ANVIL-DRAGOON**, the attack northward through southern France from beachheads on the Mediterranean coast. Weigley argues that those who view rhis operation as eccentric would logically have to question "the whole American wartime strategy of gathering massive armies to overwhelm the enemy's main strength—the **OVERLORD** enterprise itself." (p. 237) **ANVIL-DRAGOON** created opportunities to come to grips with the enemy that would not have materialized otherwise.

—Although Weigley obviously admires General Patton, he roundly criticizes his operations in a vital respect. Although Patton was aggressive, utilizing speed and mobility, he was not effective in "the application of overwhelming power to crush the enemy. The most aggressive senior American commander remained a soldier of saber and spurs." (p. 245)

—Weigley imputes great significance to the "Autumn Interlude" that occurred from September to December 1944, when the American advance faltered. This pause stemmed from the failure of

the Allies to provide resources equal to the task in France. The issue was not whether to pursue a broad-front strategy as against deep, narrow penetrations to key locations "the more basic trouble was that the Anglo-American alliance had not given Eisenhower enough troops to carry it [broad-front strategy] out safely . . . . The American army in Europe fought on too narrow a margin of physical superiority for the favored American broad-front strategy to be anything but a risky gamble." (p. 464)

Gen. Sir Bernard Montgomery serves as one of the villains of the piece. Monty is blamed for the failure of **MARKET-GARDEN**, an airborne attack intended to open the way to Germany for the British commander's 21 Army Group. Tactical errors "simply left the 21 Army Group with too many tasks to be done and too few men to do them." (p. 355) Monty's aggressiveness was like that of an "energetic fencer" rather than that of Napoleon, Moltke, or Grant, who annihilated enemy armies. This failing led to an incomplete counterattack in the Ardennes. Montgomery frittered away an opportunity to capture a huge German force and thereby shorten the war.

Weigley is also critical of American command during the Battle of the Bulge. The victory in the Ardennes belonged to the soldier; the commanders failed to foresee the German attack and took a long time to regain control of the battle. Because the American Army normally is superior to its opponents in materiel, the question rises whether it can survive without this advantage. The Ardennes is one of the few engagements that can be cited to quiet such doubts, Guadalcanal being another.

When Weigley describes the final victory, he ventures criticism of Eisenhower and Bradley. After the Ardennes the question of whether to adopt a broad-front strategy or a single-front strategy faded into irrelevance because "Eisenhower's armies could now pour forward almost everywhere. Strangely, they did not do so." The supreme commander thereby lost an opportunity to annihilate the enemy. He held back "a large share of his American armies from the advance," causing delay in the victory and shaping "the postwar balance of prestige if not of outright power to America's disadvantage." (p. 669) Bradley falls within this indictment; he used his troops to mop up in the Ruhr rather than to continue the offensive. If only, bemoans Weigley, the Americans had been on the left of the Allied front instead of Monty's 21 Army Group, and if only it had been decided to strike at Berlin. In that event there might have been a good prospect of reaching the German capital before the Russians. "There seemed to be no end to the tyranny imposed by those circumstances that had placed the British on the left and the Americans on the right all through the European campaign, persistently denying the opportunities for most rapid movement to the American armies that excelled their Allies in armored mobility." (p. 688) The ironic outcome was that the mobility of the Americans did not come into play at this decisive moment.

After completing his remarkable portrait of Eisenhower's commanders, Weigley offers his general conclusions. For years to come these views will influence much of the scholarship relating to the American Army in general and to its performance during World War II.

Weigley believes that the frontier constabulary made a successful transition to a conventional army of the European type, encompassing the destruction of the "mightiest of Europe's armies." The war in Europe turned into an essentially American campaign, one "shaped by the United States Army's concepts of strategy, operations, and tactics as well as fought on the Allied side mainly by American soldiers." After

1945 the army would "assume the central responsibility for the military defense of the West against a Red Army grown mightier than the Wehrmacht at its zenith." (p. 729)

However successful, the achievement in Europe fell short of completeness because the army embraced mobility at the expense of power. American formations lacked sufficient punch at critical moments. Moreover, "the paradoxical commitment to a power-drive strategy of head-on assault in an army shaped for mobility further contributed to prolonging the war by undermining the possible uses of mobility itself." Weigley feels that mobility was used mainly in the defense rather than as a means of concentrating troops for breakouts or for pursuit, the exception being COBRA, which culminated operations in Normandy. The outcome was a campaign of "unimaginative caution." Eisenhower and his lieutenants were "addicted to playing it safe." Obviously the American Army was correct in avoiding undue risks, given its superior resources, but "bolder generalship might have shortened the war." (p. 729)

The deeper explanation for the imperfections of the U.S. Army was that it lacked a "clear conception of war." It failed to opt either for winning "by direct application of superior power" or "by means of superior mobility." The victory stemmed from resources rather than from "a decisive head-on battle of annihilation" or from mobility through "a consistent strategy of indirect approach." Relative inexperience in large-scale war explains the outcome in 1944-45. The basic question that remains is whether the nation is prepared for a big war in the future. Given a threatening international military balance, "we cannot afford a complacency drawn in part from past military victories, at least one of which—the victory in Europe in World War II—was more expensive and more postponed than it might have been, because American military skills were not as formidable as they might have been." (p. 730)

What is to be made of Weigley's *tour de force*? There follow comments on three aspects of *Eisenhower's Lieutenants*—its concentration on command in battle; the validity of the conclusions; and the utility of the evidential basis for the study.

Weigley's decision to study higher command directs attention to the most concrete level of strategy, namely to what might be called *operational strategy*—the plan for the use of tactical units in battle. Sometimes the domain of operational strategy is called "grand tactics," a means of highlighting its closeness to combat. (The opposite end of the strategic spectrum is "grand strategy," which mobilizes all the capabilities of the nation—political, economic, and psychological as well as military—to achieve larger political aims during both peace and war.) The military historian who wishes to examine the land battle waged by the U.S. Army in Europe is well advised to stress command. In so doing, however, he leaves important dimensions of the Second War to others, such as Allied operations distinct from those of American forces, operations of all kinds in other theaters, and the most elemental aspect of statecraft related to warfare—the coordination of strategy and policy. Scholars who adopt different approaches may be able to test Weigley's conclusions profitably. Those who do so will find no better point of departure than this study of command.

Weigley's larger conclusions are bound to arouse considerable interest. The first of these, that the European campaign forced a remarkable transformation in the army from frontier constabulary to European type of formation, seems likely to receive general approbation, even if critics carp at details. The second one, concerning the conflict between strategy and organization (power *versus* mobility) is far more

arguable. Some may claim that Weigley does not provide convincing support for his view. Others may say that limiting circumstances precluded any other command decisions than those that occurred in 1944-45. The third conclusion, that preparations for future warfare should take into account the deficiencies of the army during the Second World War as well as its achievements, is of special interest to those concerned with the practical utility of history—its contribution to a list of "lessons learned." Weigley's authority for his present judgments might increase, were he to undertake a study centered on grand strategy. Others might well ask whether Weigley's study provides much help in dealing with the kinds of war that have occurred since 1945 as against a big struggle between superpowers.

What of the sources and authorities that Weigley adduces to support his analysis? He places basic reliance on three types of material—official histories produced in the United States and elsewhere, especially the U.S. Army's multivolume history of the Second World War, published memoirs and biographies, and unpublished primary information such as diaries, letters, and interviews. *Eisenhower's Lieutenants* is largely based on information in the Army's official history. Additional information that has become available supplements this mother lode. Official historians will discover that Weigley deviates frequently from their judgments but relies heavily on their information. The result is a triumph for official history. As the first authoritative treatment of government activity, official history must be judged not by whether those who follow agree with its interpretations but whether it provides a useful point of departure for later investigations. Weigley's favorable citation of the Army's "green books" and other official histories in his notes and in bibliographical commentaries for each chapter demonstrates his confidence in the initial investigations as a starting point.

Eisenhower's Lieutenants makes a superb contribution to military history in both substantive and methodological senses. Weigley already stands in the front rank of his field. His new book adds further luster to his reputation as one of the founders of the "new" military history in the broadcast meaning of that term—a military history that makes a quantum leap beyond the received knowledge. He provides a sound point of departure for those who take up the subject hereafter; as such it is a book for all seasons, one deserving of the highest accolades.

DAVID F. TRASK
Center of Military History

Coletta, Paolo E. *French Ensor Chadwick: Scholarly Warrior.* Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1980. 256pp. $18.75 paper $10.75

French E. Chadwick is not a household name in America and this solid, well-researched, and scholarly biography by Professor Paolo E. Coletta of the Naval Academy will not make him one.

But he was an interesting man, at least as far as we can find out in the absence of personal papers. Certainly, he was important in the Navy of his time, and highly regarded by the Service's thinkers and doers. Graduated from the Naval Academy toward the end of the Civil War, Chadwick saw some wartime sea service, but no combat.

For the Navy, the next twenty years were a period of decline and torpor. But Chadwick, using his intelligence and his interest in scientific matters positioned himself to play an important part in the rebuilding of the Service which began in the eighties.

He was ordered to London in 1882 as the first American naval attaché ever and for the next seven years kept the U.S. Navy informed on the latest

advances in European naval technology. More than that, he negotiated the purchase of plans for some of the Navy's first new warships, the *Texas* and *Baltimore*. Later, afrer a tour commanding one of the new steel gunboats, he served as the chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence. The respect in which he was held by his peers at this rime may be gauged by the fact that it was Chadwick whom Alfred Thayer Mahan hoped would succeed him as a president of the Naval War College. And when command of the modern armored cruiser *New York* became available in 1897, it was Chadwick who was given the appointment. It was as commanding officer of that ship and as chief of staff to Rear Adm. William T. Sampson, who commanded the North Atlantic Station during the Spanish-American War, that he gained his main experience in war. Because Sampson flew his flag from the *New York*, Chadwick was simultaneously both C.O. and Chief of Staff.

After the war Chadwick became a charter member of the General Board, served as president of the War College (albeit later than Mahan had hoped), and commanded the South Atlantic Squadron. But it was Chadwick's new career as a historian after his retirement thar sets him apart from his colleagues. Indeed, it is only Mahan among his contemporaries who could boast a stronger claim to the mantle of historian. Chief among Chadwick's works was his two-volume study, *The Relations of the United States and Spain: The Spanish-American War*, published in 1911; this work remains even today a standard history of the conflict, especially for its naval dimension. The longevity of this work is in itself a high compliment to rhe extent as well as the quality of Chadwick's research.

Coletta had a serious problem, because almost none of Chadwick's private papers still exist; as a result, Chadwick comes across as lifeless, and we know little of his thinking. This "grievous lack" is especially noticeable when the reader would like to gain a better insight into such matters as Chadwick's curious pro-German stance during World War I.

Despite this hardship, Professor Coletta has written a firting memorial to a very useful naval officer.

WILLIAM J. HOURIHAN

Trask, David F. *The War with Spain in 1898*. New York: Macmillan, 1981. 654pp. $29.95

The brief war with Spain in 1898 brought the United States an overseas empire and signaled this nation's entry into the ranks of the great powers. For the new navy, shaped by Mahan, Luce, and the other prophets of American seapower, the war was a first operational test, triumphantly passed. Yet for all the significance of the "Splendid Little War," its historiography, especially on the military side has been until recently sparse and unsatisfactory. Historians during the last two decades have produced major reassessments and reinrerpretations of the domestic and international political aspects, but no authoritative general military account has appeared since 1911 when Rear Adm. French Ensor Chadwick, himself a veteran of the conflict, published his two-volume study. Walter Millis' satirical *The Martial Spirit* and later hasty imitations have contributed little to our knowledge beyond providing generations of college instructors with anecdotes for their freshman survey courses.

In *The War with Spain in 1898*, David F. Trask, formerly Director of the Office of the Historian at the State Department and recently appointed Chief Historian of the Army Center of Military History, meets the need for a new synthesis of the military history of the war. Part of the Macmillan Wars of the United States series, Trask's volume traces the course of what was really the Spanish-American-Cuban-Philippine

War from its beginnings in the Cuban nationalist insurgency of 1895-1898 to its conclusion in the downfall of Spain's Caribbean and Pacific Ocean empires. Trask takes fully into account the recent political and diplomatic studies of the war, as well as the expanding monographic literature on the military background and conduct of the conflict. He draws not only upon American, bur also upon Spanish, British, European, Cuban, and Filipino sources.

This is a military-political history, detailing the interaction of diplomacy, military preparations, and armed conflict, an approach well justified, for the war is a classic illustration of Clausewitz' oft-quoted lines about the continuation of politics by other means.

In assessing the reasons why the United States went to war with Spain, Trask portrays President William McKinley as a capable wartime chief, who shaped military operations to achieve his policy goals. At the same time, he notes that McKinley had a keen sense of the limitations which domestic public opinion places on the President's choices in foreign policy. Taking issue with the William Appleman Williams "Open Door Imperialism" economic interpretation, Trask declares that the United States entered the war in response ro an idealistic impulse to free Cuba, combined with great power assertiveness and the chauvinistic emotions aroused by the accidental destruction of the *Maine* at Havana.

The pacific McKinley resisted public and congressional pressures for intervention as long as he could and gave way in the end, not out of cowardice, but out of conviction that Spain could not or would not end the violence and suffering in Cuba by the only possible means: granting Cuban independence. Trask demolishes the myth that Spain already had agreed to all McKinley's demands before the President asked Congress to authorize armed intervention in April 1898. Indeed, on the basis of evidence from Spanish sources, he suggests that the fragile Madrid government in the end preferred to lose Cuba by war rather than by a domestically divisive deal with the despised *insurrectos*.

The reader generally familiar with the war's military campaigns will find much that is new in this account. Trask effectively lays to rest Mr. Dooley's canard that "The United Srates foughr the war in her sleep, but Spain fought in a trance." He gives a full account of the extensive military planning that preceded hostilities—planning unprecedentedly detailed and sophisticated compared with previous American practice. In that planning, the Navy, and especially the then new Naval War College, had the leading role. Trask details the fleet's maneuvers that brought to battle and destroyed the Spanish squadrons at Santiago and Manila. He acknowledges the competence and professionalism of the reformed Navy. And he reminds us of Admiral Cámara's attempt to lead a reinforcement squadron from Spain through the Suez Canal to Manila a move foiled at least in part by the U.S. countermove: formation of the Eastern Squadron from the fleet in the Caribbean for operations in European and Mediterranean waters. Neither force actually carried out its mission, but the story of these squadrons indicates the far-flung nature of the operations of 1898.

Trask also gives the U.S. Army its due. He points out that while less well prepared for war than the Navy and less well led at the War Department and senior command levels, the Army nevertheless expanded ten-fold within 4 months and launched successful expeditions to Santiago, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. The Army's performance in 1898, in the face of obstacles greater in many ways than those confronting the Navy, was an impressive demonstration of effectiveness and laid the groundwork for Elihu Root's postwar work of

modernization and reform.

Trask's book is of value for anyone interested in the early experimentation of the United States with its role as a great power. Even at the high price, it is an indispensable addition to the library of any serious military or naval historian.

GRAHAM A.COSMAS
U.S. Army Center of Military History

Polmar, Norman. *The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet.* 12th ed. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1981. 421pp. $24.95

The 12th edition of this book continues Norman Polmar's tradition of excellence, at least in the pictorial reference part, which is, of course, the great bulk of the book. The photography is very good, and the statistical data certainly accurate enough for this kind of reference.

It is a big book, over 400 pages. It breaks down the ships of the U.S. Fleet by general type, with 11 categories of ships and 7 kinds of craft. Classes and types of ships are described in terms of their missions, design objectives, and a brief history of the class in some cases. The Military Sealift Command is ably covered, as are the many kinds of service craft, drydocks, and other support ships which might have been left out of a lesser work. Naval aviation receives an equally comprehensive treatment, including descriptions of the types, organization, air wing deployments, and even the markings of different squadrons, wings, and fleets. The aviation photography complements the text just as well as does the ship photography in the first part of the book. The book concludes with sections on weapons and electronics, once again with useful photographs to highlight what might have been uninteresting data. The final chapters cover the U.S. Coast Guard and the 14-ship "fleet" of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The chapter on the Coast Guard is far superior to other such fleet references because the Coast Guard gets the same overview treatment as the Navy: organization, missions, aviation, personnel, and then coverage of specific types of ships and craft.

If there is any criticism to be offered, it concerns Mr. Polmar's rather bleak presentation of the Navy's problems and its capacity and will to resolve them, presented in the four-page introduction entitled "State of the Fleet." The problems are certainly there, and, as Mr. Polmar says, they will be hard to solve, but they are more a reflection of the state of flux in national foreign and defense policy than disarray in the Navy.

In summary, *The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet* is the definitive reference on the subject. The information is concise, well organized, accessible, and very nicely displayed. It is well worth the price and should be purchased by every ship and ready room in the fleet.

P.T. DEUTERMANN
Commander, U.S. Navy

Bucknell, Howard III. *Energy and the National Defense.* Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1981. 235pp. $19.50

In this short, easily read book, Howard Bucknell presents a comprehensive summary of the national and world energy situation and its implications for national security. He makes clear the urgent need for aggressive action to relieve our heavy dependence on oil and gas, outlines available alternatives, and discusses the political and economic factors which bear on our collective decision process.

The recent "oil glut" makes it easy for us to forget that oil and gas are finite resources which have been heavily depleted. Howard Bucknell marshals an impressive array of figures and graphs intertwined with effective argument to

show that we cannot reasonably expect world oil production to keep pace with demand for very many more years. Clearly, adequate substitutes must be found, or severe economic disruptions, social upheavals and wars will result.

Bucknell surveys the various means of alleviating dependence on oil and gas. He points out that the "Energy Crisis" is really an oil and gas crisis, and that ample supplies of other forms of energy exisr and can be developed. He discusses in some detail the political and economic conditions which bear on America's ability to effectively utilize these other sources. He advances forceful argument that a diversity of sources including nuclear power, solar energy (in all its forms) and coal must be developed; that no one or two of these will suffice, but all are needed in applications suited ro their natures; and that fuel conservation is essential during this transition period. He further argues that because of the real urgency of the situation and the concurrent failure of the general public to recognize this urgency, free market forces will probably not bring about the needed developments soon enough to avert serious and perhaps calamitous consequences. He considers strong government action necessary to stimulate technological advance, to provide incentives for energy development, and to focus public attention. He also points out that the adversary relationship which has arisen between advocates of the various energy alternatives is quite destructive, since all these alternative sources are needed to support our increasingly industrialized world society.

Concerned citizens and national policymakers alike would do well to read this book. Howard Bucknell has succeeded in establishing an orderly framework for considering the complex information on energy matters. His views are clearly stated and well supported, and should be of great help in solving the energy problem. The problem is real and the need for solution is urgent. Failure to deal adequately with the energy problem will have disastrous consequences.

WILLIAM G. COLLINS, JR.
Commander, U.S. Navy

Said, Edward W. *Covering Islam*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980. 186pp. $10.95

Edward Said's book is about how the "coverage" of Islam has actually led to the "covering" of what Islam is all about. Said's aim is to defend Islam from the unattractive image offered by TV and the press, especially during the hostage crisis in Iran.

Islam has been misrepresented by the press, says Said, and he attempts to show how our biases have shaped the American view of Islamic culture. In light of the reports coming out of Iran since the taking of the U.S. Embassy late in 1979, Said's view is keenly divergent from the most common presentations. He believes that reporters and commentators, attempting to understand a culture of which they knew little, and whose language they could not read, found themselves without a framework for understanding the contemporary Islamic world. Convenient sources of information were scarce, so often the reporters and commentators had to make do with the information and attitudes they started with. As a result, the accepted view of the culture became a hostile one. Islam was equated with anti-Americanism. This Western image foreclosed any examination of the deeper meanings of Islam as a religion.

At the outset of the book, the author traces the opposing viewpoints of Occidentalist and Orientalist thought. (Said has expounded on the concept of Orientalist thought in his book *Orientalism*.) To the Muslim, the West represents the great evil, so the ordinary American, ill-informed though he was, was not all that wrong. To the West, Islam is the culture that dares to

threaten the world of superpowers. Said contrasts the distorted treatment of Islam as a fanatical religious sect with the favorable treatment Israel receives. He maintains that television and the press merely reflects their interests:

> This is the point. The media can do all sorts of things that are eccenrric, unexpectedly original, even aberrant. But in the end, because they are corporations serving and promoting a corporate identity—"America" and even "the West"—they all have the same central consciousness in mind.
>
> (p. 48)

According to Said, a similar problem exists within academia. Supported by both the U.S. Government and U.S. corporations the intelligentsia "responds to what it construes as national and corporate needs." (p. 142) Thus scholars frequently deal with the current events or analyses deemed important by their supporters and not with the issues of Islam itself. The author does concede, however, that some scholars are breaking away from this mold and are beginning to look at events in the Islamic world with the objective of determining the interpretations of Islam which helped bring about these developments.

Covering Islam presents a view of Islam that take the reader beyond the walls of the American Embassy in Teheran. It provides insights into Islam and illustrates how the newspapers and TV may have misrepresented it. In a particularly interesting chapter dealing with the Iranian crisis, Said offers a view of the crisis through the eyes of a David confronting Goliath, a frame of reference rarely addressed in the United States.

Covering Islam attacks the reader's frame of reference and challenges his assumptions about Islam, forcing him to confront his comfortably held opinions. Thus, it challenges the image of Islam that has been adopted by America itself and dares the American to see Islam as something besides a political force. While many readers will not accept all (or most) of Said's conclusions, and many others will be put off by his style, it is not possible to read the book without at least a modest reconsideration of one's views.

CADET MICHAEL D. RICCIUTI
U.S. Military Academy

Ferencz, Benjamin B. *An International Court: A Step Towards World Peace—A Documentary History and Analysis*, Vols. I and II. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana. 1980, 538, 674pp. $37.50 each

The enormous growth during the past decade of terror-violence, narcotics dissemination, genocide, torture, and alleged war criminaliry, along with revived historical interest in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals (and their progeny), have provoked a vigorous public policy debate over the feasibility of an international criminal court. The argument is one of long standing, daring back to the Second Hague Conference of 1907, and resumed at great length during the interwar period. Although the German Kaiser escaped trial as an international criminal after World War I, through asylum granted by The Netherlands, a dozen lesser accused offenders were subject to legal process, but only half were convicted and their punishment was mild.

A dual assassination of Yugoslavian King Alexander and French Foreign Minister Lois Barthou in 1934, plus the murder of Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss that same year, resulted in the convening of a League of Nations conference at Geneva in 1937 to deal with the dilemma of international terrorism. Two conventions were promulgated, one on the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, and another on the Creation of an International Criminal Court. But like the

League itself, these two documents fell victim to popular indifference and global crisis. Only one government ever ratified the Terrorism Convention, that of Imperial India, and this was one more ratification than the Criminal Court Convention received. However a precedent had been established which was to revive in the legal debates on these subjects after World War II and following the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials.

These two tribunals gave impetus not only to the origins and development of the international protection of human rights, but also to numerous efforts to criminalize and punish future acts of genocide, war criminality, and aggression. They resulted in the 1948 Genocide Convention (which provided for jurisdiction of an international tribunal), the 1949 Geneva Conventions (which granted universal jurisdiction to apprehend and try violators), and the 1974 Definition of Aggression (which loosely prohibited military aggression with remedial action left to the discretion of the U.N. Security Council). The problem with the establishment of any international penal tribunal, aside from those created by victorious belligerents, is not only that of enforcement, but also the question of what exactly is to be enforced.

There are in existence a number of international treaties and conventions which criminalize individual conduct, such as engaging in slavery, narcotics, war crimes, counterfeiting, and air piracy, with the general rule that the apprehending state either prosecutes or extradites the accused offender. This is the indirect enforcement model. The background to this approach is reported in detail by Mr. Ferencz, a former Nuremberg prosecutor and prominent international lawyer. His documentation is formidable, with a major focus in the first volume on the two Hague conferences, the Terrorism Conference, and the genesis and development of the postwar trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo.

The latter represent a quasi-military version of the direct enforcement model, and the author's second volume centers on the efforts and debate within and without the United Nations to develop an international penal tribunal. On the world community level an International Court of Justice has been established to deal with the grievances of nation-states, while the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights represent regional attempts to establish a legal system that would include the individual as victim and wrongdoer. As to the future, the author is undoubtedly optimistic in his larger vision when he terms those three courts "an inevitable response to the needs caused by international independence."

Terrorism and hostage-taking comprise the final segment of Volume II, and rereading the documents presented is a discouraging and disillusioning experience, for it is quite evident from both the record of the past decade and the events of the current era that the United Nations is unable to control either terrorists or member states sponsoring these reprehensible acts. The U.N. Hostage Convention November 1979, for example, did nothing to remedy the Iranian hostage crisis and was virtually ignored by the Secrerary-General in his ineffective attempt to mediate the quarrel.

Mr. Ferencz has supplied an invaluable documentary collection for students, scholars, and political commentators concerned with the attempts to formulate and to preserve a minimum world order. There is a great deal of significant raw material for the military historian, as well as the civilian legalist, to digest and to contemplate. The author's commentaries also provide a useful framework with which to analyze and evaluate the triumphs and tragedies of twentieth-century international organization. Sad to say, defeats still out-

weigh victories in the verdict of history and on the scales of justice.

ROBERT A. FRIEDLANDER
Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University

Huong, Huynh Thi, ed. *Bibliography of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts*. Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross and Henry Dunant Institute, 1980. 389pp.

There can be no argument with the statement made in the introduction by the editor of this volume that "this is the most comprehensive bibliography prepared yet on international humanitarian law." It contains 5,166 separate entries and only a very small number of duplications. While this reviewer confesses that he has a little difficulty in understanding how such works as the late Ernst Feilchenfeld's classic on the economics of belligerent occupation can be said to fall within the classification of "humanitarian law," this is probably due to a decision on the part of the editor to give the term an extremely broad interpretation.

Although works in a great number of languages and from a great many cultures are included, the majority are in English or French; and where publications such as those of the United Nations are listed, the English versions are used. The Analytical Table, an amplification of the Table of Contents, should prove very useful. It would have been even more so if it had included page references as does the Table of Contents. A check of more than 50 of the titles listed disclosed only one error of citation—and that was with respect to one of this reviewer's own works! There can be no doubt that this bibliography will be of major assistance, and a tremendous time saver, to any researcher in the field of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts, whether experienced or a neophyte.

HOWARD S. LEVIE
Newport, R.I.

RECENT BOOKS

Selected Accessions of the Naval War College Library

Annotated by

Doris Baginski, Steven Maffeo
Mary Ann Varoutsos, and Jane Viti

Baker, Mark. *Nam; the Vietnam War in the Words of the Men and Women Who Fought There*. New York: Morrow, 1981. 324pp. $12.95

Based upon interviews with a number of the men and women who served in Vietnam, this collective oral history shows the continuing effects of the war upon some of those deeply affected by it. Their recollections evoke the sights, smells, and sounds of their experiences, ranging from their first impressions to some lasting memories. Baker's interpretation of the American character at war is intended to provide insight into the meaning of Vietnam for the veterans themselves and for the history of the nation as a whole.