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French Ensor Chadwick: Scholarly Warrior

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arguable. Some may claim that Weigley does not provide convincing support for his view. Others may say that limiting circumstances precluded any other command decisions than those that occurred in 1944-45. The third conclusion, that preparations for future warfare should take into account the deficiencies of the army during the Second World War as well as its achievements, is of special interest to those concerned with the practical utility of history—its contribution to a list of "lessons learned." Weigley's authority for his present judgments might increase, were he to undertake a study centered on grand strategy. Others might well ask whether Weigley's study provides much help in dealing with the kinds of war that have occurred since 1945 as against a big struggle between superpowers.

What of the sources and authorities that Weigley adduces to support his analysis? He places basic reliance on three types of material—official histories produced in the United States and elsewhere, especially the U.S. Army's multivolume history of the Second World War, published memoirs and biographies, and unpublished primary information such as diaries, letters, and interviews. *Eisenhower's Lieutenants* is largely based on information in the Army's official history. Additional information that has become available supplements this mother lode. Official historians will discover that Weigley deviates frequently from their judgments but relies heavily on their information. The result is a triumph for official history. As the first authoritative treatment of government activity, official history must be judged not by whether those who follow agree with its interpretations but whether it provides a useful point of departure for later investigations. Weigley's favorable citation of the Army's "green books" and other official histories in his notes and in bibliographical commentaries for each chapter demonstrates his confidence in the

initial investigations as a starting point.

Eisenhower's Lieutenants makes a superb contribution to military history in both substantive and methodological senses. Weigley already stands in the front rank of his field. His new book adds further luster to his reputation as one of the founders of the "new" military history in the broadcast meaning of that term—a military history that makes a quantum leap beyond the received knowledge. He provides a sound point of departure for those who take up the subject hereafter; as such it is a book for all seasons, one deserving of the highest accolades.

DAVID F. TRASK

Center of Military History

Coletta, Paolo E. *French Ensor Chadwick: Scholarly Warrior*. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1980. 256pp. \$18.75 paper \$10.75

French E. Chadwick is not a household name in America and this solid, well-researched, and scholarly biography by Professor Paolo E. Coletta of the Naval Academy will not make him one.

But he was an interesting man, at least as far as we can find out in the absence of personal papers. Certainly, he was important in the Navy of his time, and highly regarded by the Service's thinkers and doers. Graduated from the Naval Academy toward the end of the Civil War, Chadwick saw some wartime sea service, but no combat.

For the Navy, the next twenty years were a period of decline and torpor. But Chadwick, using his intelligence and his interest in scientific matters positioned himself to play an important part in the rebuilding of the Service which began in the eighties.

He was ordered to London in 1882 as the first American naval attaché ever and for the next seven years kept the U.S. Navy informed on the latest

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advances in European naval technology. More than that, he negotiated the purchase of plans for some of the Navy's first new warships, the *Texas* and *Baltimore*. Later, after a tour commanding one of the new steel gunboats, he served as the chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence. The respect in which he was held by his peers at this time may be gauged by the fact that it was Chadwick whom Alfred Thayer Mahan hoped would succeed him as a president of the Naval War College. And when command of the modern armored cruiser *New York* became available in 1897, it was Chadwick who was given the appointment. It was as commanding officer of that ship and as chief of staff to Rear Adm. William T. Sampson, who commanded the North Atlantic Station during the Spanish-American War, that he gained his main experience in war. Because Sampson flew his flag from the *New York*, Chadwick was simultaneously both C.O. and Chief of Staff.

After the war Chadwick became a charter member of the General Board, served as president of the War College (albeit later than Mahan had hoped), and commanded the South Atlantic Squadron. But it was Chadwick's new career as a historian after his retirement that sets him apart from his colleagues. Indeed, it is only Mahan among his contemporaries who could boast a stronger claim to the mantle of historian. Chief among Chadwick's works was his two-volume study, *The Relations of the United States and Spain: The Spanish-American War*, published in 1911; this work remains even today a standard history of the conflict, especially for its naval dimension. The longevity of this work is in itself a high compliment to the extent as well as the quality of Chadwick's research.

Coletta had a serious problem, because almost none of Chadwick's private papers still exist; as a result, Chadwick comes across as lifeless, and we know little of his thinking. This "grievous

lack" is especially noticeable when the reader would like to gain a better insight into such matters as Chadwick's curious pro-German stance during World War I.

Despite this hardship, Professor Coletta has written a fitting memorial to a very useful naval officer.

WILLIAM J. HOURIHAN

Trask, David F. *The War with Spain in 1898*. New York: Macmillan, 1981. 654pp. \$29.95

The brief war with Spain in 1898 brought the United States an overseas empire and signaled this nation's entry into the ranks of the great powers. For the new navy, shaped by Mahan, Luce, and the other prophets of American seapower, the war was a first operational test, triumphantly passed. Yet for all the significance of the "Splendid Little War," its historiography, especially on the military side has been until recently sparse and unsatisfactory. Historians during the last two decades have produced major reassessments and reinterpretations of the domestic and international political aspects, but no authoritative general military account has appeared since 1911 when Rear Adm. French Ensign Chadwick, himself a veteran of the conflict, published his two-volume study. Walter Millis' satirical *The Martial Spirit* and later hasty imitations have contributed little to our knowledge beyond providing generations of college instructors with anecdotes for their freshman survey courses.

In *The War with Spain in 1898*, David F. Trask, formerly Director of the Office of the Historian at the State Department and recently appointed Chief Historian of the Army Center of Military History, meets the need for a new synthesis of the military history of the war. Part of the Macmillan Wars of the United States series, Trask's volume traces the course of what was really the Spanish-American-Cuban-Philippine