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## The Internal Fabric of Western Security

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to the events in the region, a policy that had roots extending back to interagency studies and presidential directives dating from 1977. This, however, made it no less controversial. Owing to the varying perceptions of the threat it was organized to meet and the difficulties encountered in finding a regional home for it, the RDJTF has raised as many questions as it was purported to solve.

Major Johnson's examination of the RDJTF itself attempts to deal with these questions by analyzing its mission, organization, training, logistic-support deficiencies, and tactical doctrine. After recounting a series of significant deficiencies, he reaches an initial judgment that the RDJTF might not be capable of backing up America's commitment in the Persian Gulf. At the end of the book, however, he reaches a bottom-line conclusion that despite its acknowledged problems, "the RDJTF is a valuable instrument of American foreign policy and a capable military force." Unfortunately, the strength of this statement is significantly weakened by his analysis and earlier conflicting assertions which makes it quite possible for opponents of the concept, or more importantly potential adversaries, to disbelieve his base conclusion.

The key to the RDJTF's credibility is its ability to be employed quickly, but as Major Johnson points out, the most critical shortcoming of the unit is strategic mobility. He goes on to say that the only way the full RDJTF could be deployed now is for the president to use the Civil Reserve

Air Fleet. The resulting severe disruption of the civilian airline industry makes this a very difficult step to take. The key issue then becomes whether there would be sufficient domestic political support for such a presidential decision to employ the RDJTF in any contingency less than full confrontation with the Soviets. In addition, significant shortcomings in water, fuel, and the ability to evacuate the sick and wounded tend to support Johnson's initial judgment that "it appears that numerous tactical and logistic-support problems need to be resolved if the RDJTF is to be a capable military force."

One difficulty that readers may have with Major Johnson's book is the problem of unsubstantiated sources. Although for the most part he documents his work carefully, on several points he refers uncharacteristically to vague Pentagon, State, or White House sources. Although it is not widespread, it occurs often enough to be troubling to the scholar.

Overall, Major Johnson has produced a book that is easy to read, well-organized and understandable. Whether one is a casual observer or a serious student of military or foreign affairs, his book will provide an excellent introduction to the complex topic of the RDJTF.

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Flynn, Gregory, et. al. *The Internal Fabric of Western Security*, Totowa, N.J. Allenheld, Osmun, 1981. 250pp. \$32.50

Much has been written about the

"crisis" in Nato but few scholars offer any systematic evaluations of how the Western security dilemmas have evolved and still fewer identify the internal stresses in European political systems which affect the contribution individual states can make to Alliance defense programs. There is a direct relationship between European domestic crises and the chance of pursuing a vigorous foreign policy which recognizes the increasing challenge from the Soviet Union.

Foreign policy has played a dominant role in some recent European election campaigns, where Western defense commitments have been characterized as both threatening to the domestic economic welfare and endangering to East-West accord. Indeed, such arguments surfaced in Greece, Spain, and Portugal, where opposition parties crystallized formidable support around resolutions calling for the withdrawal from Nato or the reduction in (or total removal of) a number of US military bases. As a further illustration of this phenomenon, the December 1979 decision by the Nato Ministers to deploy 572 new intermediate-range nuclear systems in five Nato countries, has provoked a polarizing debate in those basing countries, seizing the national attention and eclipsing the generally dominant concern over the prospects for economic recovery during a global recession.

Under the auspices of the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, Gregory Flynn and his colleagues have constructed an insightful and sophisticated assessment of the

dynamics of Western security in "an effort to broaden understanding of how domestic considerations have gained an influence over the security policy priorities of the Atlantic Allies." Flynn has written four chapters which provide a strong framework for analyzing the relationship between the "internal and external agendas" of the Allies. The analysis notes the effect of two unfortunately parallel developments—the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower and heightened internal tensions in Europe, provoked by the phenomenon of Eurocommunism and economic divergencies between the Nato states.

The best of the Flynn chapters "The Security Challenge: The External and Internal Agendas of the Alliance," astutely concludes that the security challenges facing Nato are unlikely to resemble those of the past and that the Alliance is not prepared to respond to these new challenges. As Flynn notes in another chapter there is no longer a consensus among the Allies on how best to approach Nato's security dilemmas, in part because there is a broad spectrum of opinion on the nature and degree of the Soviet challenge. Here, the reader would have benefited from a discussion of how the US-inspired policy of détente with the Soviet Union had affected Allied policy planning and why détente was likely to be more attractive to those allies who stood to benefit (in economic terms) from a more conciliatory posture towards Moscow.

The four case studies presented

(West Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain) are well researched, providing both historical perspective and highlighting those factors which are unique to each particular case. Joseph Joffe's chapter is particularly useful as it describes West Germany's historic policy dilemma—*détente* vs defense. Joffe correctly concludes that West German foreign policy will continue to be the product of a struggle between two competing schools of thought, tied directly to the two major political parties in the Federal Republic—the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Christian Democrats (CDU).

Although it is imprudent to predict the direction of West German politics, the March electoral victory of the CDU (which seems to have stabilized Helmut Kohl's position as Chancellor) suggests that the conservative defense-oriented foreign policy espoused by Kohl has a greater attraction for the majority of the West German electorate than the SPD call for a renewed *détente*. More importantly, the vote appears to have been a rejection of Soviet attempts to sway German voters toward accepting the unilateralist approach of the Green party.

Laurence Martin's chapter on "British Defense Policy" provides a valuable analysis of the interaction between British domestic politics and defense spending, and in particular, the pernicious effect of a weak economy on defense planning.

While Flynn's book is valuable, it ignores a set of issues which, in my opinion, are likely to present Nato

with its greatest challenges—the security of the northern and southern flanks. These two regions (particularly the south) are isolated politically and militarily from Nato's concentration of power in the center. The southern flank nations are most vulnerable to Soviet pressure and are least likely to receive the level of rapid reinforcement which would be required to repel a Soviet military initiative. Also, three of those states—Spain, Greece, and Portugal—are reevaluating their contributions to and ultimately their membership in the Alliance. In addition, the sense of strategic partnership among the southern flank states has been weakened to the point where an attack on one may not be interpreted as an attack on all. That is, in the long run, the most potent threat to Nato's viability.

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Robinson, Douglas and Keller, Charles. *UPSHIP! U.S. Navy Rigid Airships 1919-1935*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1982. 236pp. \$29.95

In 1934, the most modern passenger aircraft in the world was the Douglas DC-2, which could carry 14 passengers (strapped in small seats), over ranges of 1,200 miles. On other routes, however, commercial air travelers flew in luxury, with sleeping accommodations, dining rooms, and lounges, over ranges in excess of 8,000 miles. Such was the difference between the technological sophistica-