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U.S. Marines in Vietnam: An Expanding War, 1966

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Communists did not begin their resistance activity until the Soviet Union was attacked by the Germans in June 1941.

What is brought out most graphically in this study was the increasing importance of technology for carrying out resistance work. The sophistication of the technology available to the Resistance grew greatly as the struggle continued during the war years. Communications became crucial; without the radio and other devices the struggle could hardly have been carried on. The airplane was absolutely essential. Air drops were needed for providing supplies, for moving people about, and for supporting special operations.

Resistance efforts differed greatly from one country to another. Geography, occupation policies, and national culture were among the reasons for these differences. In Yugoslavia the partisan forces numbered about 400,000 by 1944 and were organized into divisions. At times the fighting was carried on in conventional military battle. In Belgium, however, resistance concentrated on espionage; the illegal press; help to allied pilots making their way to the Free World; and the secret creation of underground forces. In the Soviet Union partisan activity was state directed and controlled. The British effort, carried out largely through the Special Operations Executive (SOE), worked closely with many of the Resistance groups on the continent.

European Resistance Movements has been translated from the original,

written in Danish. The translation seems to convey the author's views accurately and is certainly adequate in terms of clarity of expression. There is little of the awkwardness that is so common to most translations. However, the style, a product of translation or the original expression of the author, generally conceals the excitement and tension of the Resistance drama. For this reviewer the subject was constantly being analyzed in too clinical a manner and the drama had been excised. Nevertheless, this book contains the most complete story of the Resistance that has been told.

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Shulimson, Jack. *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: An Expanding War, 1966*. Washington: Marine Corps History and Museums Division, 1982. 390pp. \$9

The Marine Corps began 1966 in South Vietnam with a 41,000-man Marine Amphibious Force firmly established in three coastal enclaves in the northernmost provinces. By the end of the year, the force would number nearly 70,000. Author Shulimson effectively shows, however, why US forces were no closer to winning their war at the year's end than at its beginning.

In his operational chronology, he demonstrates how marine staffs supported a low-intensity pacification program aimed at winning loyalty of the civil population through increased security and material aid. The marines did not intend to pursue

the enemy forces into the hinterland but merely sought to deny them their basis of support in the more densely populated coastal region. These adversary field forces, when discovered in the coastal areas, were attacked by marine air, artillery strikes and battalion-sized sweeps.

Such marine operational or grand tactical procedures never faced the acid test of time. Shulimson deftly narrates how marine commanders struggled to salvage their plans against pressure from the army dominated command in Saigon for major offensive strikes against major Vietcong and North Vietnamese army units. Simultaneously, the critical underpinning of marine pacification objectives deteriorated as the coup-ridden, paranoid, and ineffective South Vietnamese political and military structure began to crumble in local marine areas, principally Da Nang. These and other conditions robbed marine operations of any momentum and long-term effect. Moreover, marine commanders fell even more into the net of Washington and Saigon statisticians, devising reporting and even operating procedures to feed the statistical requirements in the most effective and optimistic fashion.

In one sense, this and the other operational narratives in the Marine Corps' 10-volume Vietnam series constitute a "cruise book," complete with commanders' names, lists of units involved in operations and a rich assembly of first-hand impressions from participants, generally removed some 15 years from the time

the actions occurred. It also includes descriptions of combat support and combat service support actions relevant to the ground war narrative and comments upon the roles of other marines in Saigon, with non-marine units and the Seventh Fleet amphibious forces. Presumably, a more subjective analysis of marine operations in Vietnam will follow in the separate topical series proposed by the Director of Marine Corps History and Museums.

Shulimson's chronicle does provide the grist for subjective analysis of the marines' war in Vietnam, often by inference, and it suggests courses of inquiry for future research. For instance, how may we use marine experiences to evaluate the American method of fighting a "colonial" war with one-year personnel rotation subdivided for officers into six-month field and staff tours, barring death, wound, or injury? How effective were marine tactics when they consisted of reinforcing small unit contacts with additional platoons and companies—nearly always at the point of contact—piling on supporting arms firepower and sweeping the battlefield the next day for weapons and bodies. This offensive-defensive operational genre compares not in the least with Clausewitz's concept of battle.

In the end, one closes this volume with a deep sense of sympathy for the participants and an equally deep foreboding. How does one explain the endurance of "can-do" optimism in the face of patently crippling operational conditions? Can these opera-

tional narratives influence the marine way of war in USMC schools and the staff colleges? Such is the highest calling of official history and it must be matched with institutional energy.

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Stewart-Smith, Geoffrey. *Global Collective Security in the 1980's*. London: Foreign Affairs, 1982. 142pp. \$18

Currently Nato's military strategists are wrestling with the dilemma of how to protect Western vital interests on the Eurasian continent without jeopardizing alliance economic and world order interests outside Europe, and to do this without raising the risk of nuclear war. To this end, a group of some 80 Ministers, Ambassadors, High Commissioners, and leaders in the field of strategic studies met in England in 1981 to discuss "A Global Strategy for the Defense of World Freedom." This book is the published proceedings of the conference.

In sixteen short articles, experts from 26 countries discuss the strategic problems associated with the perception that the Soviet challenge to Western interests is global, but Nato's response is not. Collectively, the conferees believe that the strength of the West lies in the freedom and vitality of its society and as such, there is room within this framework for individual differences. For example, retired Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, US Air Force, calls for a bold move into space

which will negate the Soviet's buildup of strategic offensive nuclear weapons. This strategic space-based defense against the Soviet ICBM force has two key advantages over the current incremental approach based on the MX. First, it can be achieved in half the time (5 years vs. 10 years) and secondly, it can be achieved at roughly half the cost (\$35-50 billion).

Prince Hassan Ben Talal, of Jordan, writes that the threat to the Middle East/Southwest Asia region is not primarily that of a Soviet invasion, but of the "all too real threats to our freedom from sources other than the Soviet Union." He believes that the key military factor in the region is the need to establish a military balance of power between Israel and the Unified Arab Command (minus Egypt). The Crown Prince further believes that this can best be accomplished by a regional collective security arrangement which could be reinforced by a super or major power when appropriate. The Gulf Treaty Organization, the author believes, is a good beginning.

Dr. Richard Pipes offers some interesting ideas of how to cope with the Soviet propaganda threat. He argues that many Third World countries perceive the Soviet Union as the propagator of an international creed whose authority rests on the threat of encirclement by capitalism and on the historic mission of communism to ultimately achieve victory over the "evil" of the West. To counter this perception, Dr. Pipes urges the West not to treat the Soviet