

1983

Global Collective Security in the 1980's

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Recommended Citation

Staudenmaier, William O. and Stewart-Smith, Geoffrey (1983) "Global Collective Security in the 1980's," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 36 : No. 6 , Article 21.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol36/iss6/21>

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tional narratives influence the marine way of war in USMC schools and the staff colleges? Such is the highest calling of official history and it must be matched with institutional energy.

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Stewart-Smith, Geoffrey. *Global Collective Security in the 1980's*. London: Foreign Affairs, 1982. 142pp. \$18

Currently Nato's military strategists are wrestling with the dilemma of how to protect Western vital interests on the Eurasian continent without jeopardizing alliance economic and world order interests outside Europe, and to do this without raising the risk of nuclear war. To this end, a group of some 80 Ministers, Ambassadors, High Commissioners, and leaders in the field of strategic studies met in England in 1981 to discuss "A Global Strategy for the Defense of World Freedom." This book is the published proceedings of the conference.

In sixteen short articles, experts from 26 countries discuss the strategic problems associated with the perception that the Soviet challenge to Western interests is global, but Nato's response is not. Collectively, the conferees believe that the strength of the West lies in the freedom and vitality of its society and as such, there is room within this framework for individual differences. For example, retired Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, US Air Force, calls for a bold move into space

which will negate the Soviet's buildup of strategic offensive nuclear weapons. This strategic space-based defense against the Soviet ICBM force has two key advantages over the current incremental approach based on the MX. First, it can be achieved in half the time (5 years vs. 10 years) and secondly, it can be achieved at roughly half the cost (\$35-50 billion).

Prince Hassan Ben Talal, of Jordan, writes that the threat to the Middle East/Southwest Asia region is not primarily that of a Soviet invasion, but of the "all too real threats to our freedom from sources other than the Soviet Union." He believes that the key military factor in the region is the need to establish a military balance of power between Israel and the Unified Arab Command (minus Egypt). The Crown Prince further believes that this can best be accomplished by a regional collective security arrangement which could be reinforced by a super or major power when appropriate. The Gulf Treaty Organization, the author believes, is a good beginning.

Dr. Richard Pipes offers some interesting ideas of how to cope with the Soviet propaganda threat. He argues that many Third World countries perceive the Soviet Union as the propagator of an international creed whose authority rests on the threat of encirclement by capitalism and on the historic mission of communism to ultimately achieve victory over the "evil" of the West. To counter this perception, Dr. Pipes urges the West not to treat the Soviet

Union as a superpower (which it is only in the military sense), but to treat it as a great power—nothing more. He also rejects the Soviet notion that it represents the vanguard of history and he would renounce the Brezhnev Doctrine as being invalid. Dr. Pipes advocates nothing less than changing the psychological rules of the game. By so doing, Dr. Pipes argues, the West will be able to formulate an effective policy towards Soviet expansionism, one that builds on the strengths of Western society and will not abandon the psychological field to Soviet propaganda.

Other writers advance the perspectives of their own countries vis-à-vis the Soviet threat. For example, representatives from Japan, Australia, and Malaysia are concerned in similar ways with the Soviet buildup of army and navy forces in their region. Japan, of course, is concerned with her northern islands and with the nuclear situation. Australia and Malaysia are concerned with the Soviet's relationship with Vietnam and with that country's apparent drive for hegemony in Southeast Asia. All are concerned with keeping the vital sea lanes open.

A major conclusion of the conference was that since the Soviets represent a global threat to Western interests and have apparently shifted the strategic center of gravity from Central Europe to the more volatile areas of the Third World, the West will be defeated piecemeal unless it formulates a global, unified Western response. Realizing that a legal global

treaty protecting Western interest would be impossible to negotiate, the conferees focused instead on establishing informal links in functional areas such as intelligence, command and control, collective strategic planning, joint naval operations, joint arms procurement, ASW, strategic mineral procurement, antipropaganda and antiterrorist warfare. All in all this brief volume is a useful appreciation of the Western interests outside Nato that require attention.

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Dallek, Robert. *The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs*. New York: Knopf, 1983. 313pp. \$16.95

There is an increasing tendency in our era to analyze great events by attempting to explicate the subconscious, psychological motives that helped form them. In this ambitious book, Robert Dallek has constructed a study of the diplomatic history of the United States in this century that might be labeled "psychohistory." He is concerned with the "nonrational influences" in American foreign policy, or the "hidden side" of US diplomatic history. By this, the UCLA professor means the underlying emotions and psychological reactions of the American domestic populace as they influenced the major foreign policy events and trends from the turn of the century to the mid-1970s. As Dallek comments in his introduction, "It is a study of undercurrents, of mood, tone, or milieu, of a climate of feeling that