

1982

## Book Reviews

The U.S. Naval War College

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

---

### Recommended Citation

War College, The U.S. Naval (1982) "Book Reviews," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 35 : No. 2 , Article 11.  
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol35/iss2/11>

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu](mailto:repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu).

# PROFESSIONAL READING

**“Proof, in its way, that we have been living  
in an intellectually dark age.”**

by

**Robert B. Bathurst\***

Baylis, John and Segal, Gerald, eds. *Soviet Strategy*. Totowa, N.J.: Allanheld Osmun, 2982. 263pp. \$31.85

There has come to be something of an Aberystwyth School of Soviet Strategic studies. The University College of Wales is the home of some very active thinkers in the field. Two, John Baylis and Gerald Segal, are both the editors and authors of a long introduction to the present volume. In addition, two of the contributors, Ken Boorh and Michael McGwire, are present or former scholars there. The other writers included are well known in the field. They have been intellectual pace-setters for years. There are no surprises here.

It would be useful to be able to say in what way the Aberystwyth School is distinguished from others or in what direction it is tending. Presumably this volume should give a clue, but if it does, it is well hidden. The editors say that the reason for the book is that it sought "to combine the most important arguments from both sides [here they mean the right and the left, the hawks and the doves] presenting a broad analysis of the key features of Soviet strategy." They have tried to accomplish this task by selecting seven essays, almost establishment essays, for republication. The essays are divided into headings (which seem to me to overreach their content) and the whole 250 pages, together with the introduction, constitutes what is being called "Soviet Strategy."

One must ask who comprises the intended audience for this book. The answer is not obvious to this reader. As the authors are already widely read and their positions are well known, the value of collecting a few articles from the seventies is not immediately apparent. There is not enough work in this book to treat any one aspect of Soviet strategy or any one author adequately. Two of the articles were published first in 1973. The most recently published, Michael McGwire's, is dated 1980 but it recapitulates (albeit in a very useful form) the results of his thought of three decades.

Perhaps the value the editors had in mind was to bring these useful articles together, unless, as I have begun to fear, they had some notion that their

---

\*Harvard University

## Professional Reading 67

choices provide a definitive statement about the left and the right of the strategic debate. It can be stated confidently that if that is the intent of the book, then, for all of the excellence of the writers it collects, it is a failure.

The blame for that failure, however, is not entirely that of the editors. If they had read with care the work of their colleague, Ken Booth, on ethnocentrism, they might have suspected that they were trapped in a mirror image. In fact, they give evidence in a footnote at the end of their essay that they suspect as much. After fruitlessly trying to separate writers and concepts, they finally admit that "we . . . use the terms hawks and doves . . . as a symbol of positions that in reality tend to be more complex." There are better symbols.

Dividing educated writers on Soviet strategy who are widely published in English into hawks and doves is a largely hopeless task. The debate about "strategic" war conducted, especially in the United States, in the 60s and 70s, was a kind of hermetically sealed, one-dimensional rumination, conducted largely by academics who knew little enough about war and almost nothing about men, and who talked to each other (with the press and government eavesdropping), frequently without any reference whatsoever to what the Soviets either thought, said, or did.

The results were, of course, bizarre. The world still waits for the genius who can put that phase of our "thought" in a cultural and ideological perspective. In any case, the authors collected in this volume do not fit into the hawk/dove bifurcation which the editors attempted. Neither do they fit into the criticism of one-dimensionality which I suggested. But their essays were written against that background and they argue with the concepts of that period more than with the much more subtle arguments which are beginning to appear today.

The introduction by the two Aberystwyth scholars and editors, being the most contemporary piece in the book, should have set a rather more interesting intellectual framework for the articles they selected than, in fact, it did. Perhaps they, wanting to write about the whole of Soviet strategy, tackled too much, or perhaps they succumbed too easily to the pattern of trying to fit every concept into some dichotomy or other, such as hawks and doves. Had they attempted less they might have achieved more, but when, barely on page 15, they say that they have "set the general background to Soviet strategy," we have the right to voice the exasperation such a casual sweep through politics and culture engenders. Our confidence in their perception is not enhanced by the comment that "despite the change in Soviet and American leadership in the last twenty years, little has changed in Soviet strategy." The syntax poses enormous problems, but the calculations pose even more. The last twenty years takes us back to Cuba and how can one say that much has not changed since then?

What might be much more accurate to say, if one feels that this assertion should be defended, is that the West has changed its strategy very little, but the rise of the Soviet Navy, as Michael McCgwire quite weightily argues in this volume, testifies to enormous changes on the Soviet side.

There is a very sensible article by Robert Arnett which argues with those who say that the Soviets claim they could survive a nuclear war with fewer losses than during World War II. As this whole discussion takes place in that one-dimensional world I referred to, it is difficult to disagree with Arnett, but also difficult to feel that anything has been really clarified.

The selection from Ken Booth's work about the Soviets' use of the military in foreign policy is from a period before he worked so brilliantly on the role of

## 68 Naval War College Review

ethnocentrism in these debates. As it is, this fleeting taste of a much larger work does not seem to me to be very satisfying.

Benjamin Lambeth gives a very good lesson on how to think about Soviet military doctrine until the end of the article when he asserts that, under stress the Soviets might do anything, including throwing out the whole book of doctrine. I suppose in some sense that is true, but it does not allow us to drop the problem, forsooth. We must ask questions about stress and patterns of reaction in conditions of stress. After all, stress is part of the human condition. Because we suffer from it, we don't suddenly change into baboons.

Dennis Ross rethinks Soviet strategic policy in what we can recognize as the government position, though stated interestingly. Much of what he says is so ethnocentrically accepted that it will appear self-evident. The idea that Soviet strategic doctrine is grounded in traditionally military concerns while ours, having been taken over by the academics, is something else, sounds right, but probably isn't. What as a nation our analysts seem unable to comprehend is the many facetedness of Soviet military strategy, its political, cultural and ethnic ramifications. Nor do they seem to understand that our own military are just as much a product of our system as are the academics. Both tend to choose, eventually, a big bomb as a solution to the confusing strategic problems which they do not have either time or patience to understand thoroughly.

Included is an important piece of Raymond Garthoff's on SALT I which has been revised in the light of SALT II and the subsequent disaffection. There can be no doubt that the SALT negotiations and decisions were among the most important events of the second

half of the twentieth century, for they will be thought to have seriously influenced the record of peace or war of this century. And indeed, the historical spectacle was dazzling. The men who held the key to the world's atomization were separated by only three feet of wooden table. As Raymond Garthoff was one of the people looking at the whites of their eyes, and as the truth about SALT has not been fully established, we must go back and back to try to understand the clash of ideas that took place during those negotiations.

Hannes Adomeit's seminal work on Soviet risk-taking is, of course, one of the most important studies of Soviet political behavior. He demonstrates in a systems analysis kind of way what historians have been saying for centuries, that Russians are risk avoiders. (It is only fair to add that historians say the risk-avoidance is a function of traditional Russian poverty. Industrialization is obviously changing that.) In any case, along with Nathan Leites' "Operational Code of the Politburo," it should be included in all collections of this sort, when there is no excluding principle of selection.

And finally, there is Michael McCwire's widely published article on the rationale for the development of Soviet seapower. For those who have followed the development of Michael's thesis over the years, this article contains little that is conceptually new, but as the fruit of thirty years of observing the Soviet Navy, it is, of course, significant.

For those who have not read these articles elsewhere, this collection is valuable and convenient. For those who have, it is interesting for it is a sampling of a decade of thought on strategic questions, proof, in its way, that we have been living in an intellectually dark age.

Polmar, Norman & Allen, Thomas B. *Rickover—Controversy and Genius—A Biography*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982. 725pp. \$20.75

"Some day I hope the Navy will have officers who will understand odd officers with odd talents." So said Ruth Masters Rickover in 1958 on one of the rare occasions she allowed herself to be interviewed by the press. Polmar and Allen in their rather lengthy and detailed biography describe Admiral Rickover's oddities of character and actions as well as his peculiar talents to get things done. As noted in the subtitle, it deals with a very controversial man with an undeniable genius.

Admiral Rickover, born in Poland, served almost 60 years on active duty after his commissioning in 1922. Until 1937, he served as a line officer in four-piper destroyers, battleships, and submarines. He was XO of the *S-48* for two years and had a brief stint of 2½ months in command of a minesweep in the Asiatic Fleet. After his initial tour as an EDO at the Cavite Navy Yard, Rickover served almost his entire ED career at the seat of government, Washington, D.C., in the Navy Department and, since 1949, concurrently in the AEC (Department of Energy). He served actively fifteen years as a line officer and almost 45 years as an EDO.

For professional Navy people age 45 and beyond—active and retired—there is little in this book about Rickover that has not been recorded before. This is not surprising, given Rickover's recognition as a most skillful public relations practitioner and his outstanding political acumen. Admiral Rickover has written 6 books, made more than 65 major speeches on various subjects since 1955, and has more than 1 million words of official testimony recorded in the Congress of the United States. The authors, however, have made a solid contribution to Rickover lore. They have done a thorough job of research in the printed medium, a oral history in

extensive interviews or correspondence with more than 200 persons in the Navy, the Navy Reactor Branch, DOE, and the civilian power and shipbuilding industries on the subject of Admiral Rickover and nuclear power. The chapter notes, bibliography, acknowledgements, and index should be most useful to others interested in the Rickover phenomenon.

Under Rickover—the zealous, tyrannical, autocratic driver of both Navy and industry and godchild of solons on the Hill—*Nautilus*, the world's first nuclear-powered ship, was completed and operating in 1954. By 1960, fifteen nuclear submarines were in commission; by 1967, the Polaris program's 41 SSBNs were completed; and by 1981, a total of 128 nuclear powered combat ships was operating. Over a quarter of the ships of the Navy are nuclear powered. Rickover's influence on today's Navy has been monumental—both materially and psychologically.

Admiral Rickover's material accomplishments have been widely acclaimed over the past quarter century—he is named in the dictionaries as being responsible for the development of the atomic submarine. Even so, there are those who have vociferously challenged his methods, if not his technical leadership—e.g., Rear Adms. J. James, A. Mumma, R. Moore; former chiefs/deputy chiefs, Bureau of Ships. Referring to Rickover, Capt. Dick Lanning (first CO of *Seawolf* SSN) has suggested that "When a revolutionary succeeds, he should be given five years then shot, or otherwise removed." Rickover's personal control of all government or industry-sponsored R&D in nuclear power was virtually unlimited—any such research that had been initiated but not sponsored by Rickover was stopped, abruptly.

The psychological impact of Rickover on the Navy is probably more profound but not so readily apparent. The authors suggest that we have two Navies—one,

## 70 Naval War College Review

the traditional Navy; and two, the nuclear, or Rickover Navy. And it appears that the nuclear Navy is very much in the ascendancy, both materially and personnel-wise. The authors say that Rickover hated the Navy, its institutions, its traditions. About 1951, he set about changing the system, and he succeeded. The Navy saw the reactor as a mechanism in the evolution from sail to improved propulsion; what counted was the warship, not the machinery that moved it. Rickover saw his machinery as the centerpiece of the ship, if not the whole Navy. In the nuclear Navy, weapons and the many associated equipments needed to fight a ship are definitely secondary to the propulsion plant.

The book is the story of a very controversial, a very self-serving, a brilliant manipulator of people, a zealous visionary, a bitter man—truly, an odd officer with odd talents whose impact on the Navy for over a quarter century has been uncanny. Rickover's ultimate effect on the Navy lies in the future. The Nucs of the Navy have no fear but many old-timers, in and out of the Navy, are deeply concerned about the fighting capabilities that a latter-day Machiavelli has wrought.

ELI REICH  
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Livezey, William E. *Mahan on Sea Power*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1982. 427pp. \$15.95

The revision of William Livezey's excellent work, first published in 1947, is timely and worthy of consideration by all students of the use and influence of sea power. His intent was to meet a definite need "for appraisal of Mahan's ideas, a correlation of them with the climate in which they took shape and an estimate of their influence upon the course of events." The original work did

fulfill this purpose and was well received by historians and navalists. Neither an unabashed hymnal for Mahan, as the Puleston biography, nor abrasively critical as Seager, Professor Livezey of the University of Oklahoma provides a scholarly, readable interpretation of the "influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan on American Sea Power." His thesis was that Mahan's primary value and role was as an advocate and annunciator of America's place in the world, a world of competition and force provided by a mighty fleet of capital ships, remains unchanged in this revised edition.

Livezey examines Mahan, the period in which he wrote, and his influence on the men and nation-states of his era. The industrial revolution, creation of world markets, colonialism, and expansion were all forces that required a framework for nation-states use. Mahan's conversion to imperialism and the need for "colonies, commerce and bases" were the trinity of necessary factors in his argument for the United States to become a great power. History "proved" that nations possessing sea power would be the great powers. The biology theories of Darwin were transferred to the arena of society where competition for a "disproportionate" amount of the world's resources was the "natural" order. Men and nations were destined to compete, competition fostered conflict, and conflict which was "justified" would resolve in the favor of those nations that were sea powers.

The somewhat circular argument of commerce, a merchant marine, and the resultant requirement for a large navy of capital ships to defend them, was the central theme espoused and defended by Mahan in his thirty-year writing career. Livezey's treatment of Mahan's theory of naval warfare is particularly sound, bringing an order to the rules and principles which are scattered, randomly, throughout Mahan's voluminous writings. The final chapter, Chapter 15, is new and looks at the concepts of

## Professional Reading 71

"command of the sea," nuclear technology, and a world vastly different from that which Mahan or anyone could have envisioned in 1914.

Livezey, writing in the aftermath of World War II, originally concluded that the doctrines of conflict and force propounded by Mahan were no longer sound as a basis for international action. "The atomic age has shown conclusively that the only guarantee of civilization is a society of nations." He assessed Mahan's doctrines of naval warfare as applicable, though modified by the tremendous impact of the carrier, submarine, and land-based aircraft, and concluded "there is little to justify the belief that naval strategy as enunciated by Mahan will be basically altered."

Writing again in 1980, he significantly revises his original conclusion: "It seems safe to conclude that the impact of technology . . . has so altered naval warfare from the days of Mahan that the erstwhile dean of naval strategy . . . is no longer the leading authority in current naval strategic thinking." He bases this argument on the concept of command of the sea, claiming that as overall command is no longer attainable, local sea control and denial are the more useful and obtainable objectives. With this view I must disagree and argue that though more difficult and at much greater risk and cost, a nation which by geographic and economic circumstances is dependent on the sea must, ultimately, be able to command the sea or, in the final analysis, lose its position of world leadership.

Overall, Professor Livezey's final chapter provides us with an update of U.S. and, to a lesser degree, Soviet thought on the use of navies and sea power. His carefully documented and annotated pages show thorough study of the authors who write and study the international scene, evaluate the use and importance of sea power and attempt to predict its importance for the future. No

serious student of military history and the influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan on U.S. naval thought past and present should be without this study.

T.A. FITZGERALD  
Captain, U.S. Navy

Kennedy, Paul M. *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914*. Winchester, Mass.: Allen and Unwin, 1980. 604pp. \$60

As the author of the superb book, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (1976), Paul Kennedy is no stranger to readers of this journal. Kennedy is, without a doubt, one of the world's most highly regarded historians and one of the leading, if not the leading expert on the subject of Anglo-German relations. Thus, the publication of *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism*, which is the fruit of more than ten years of concentrated research, is a major event.

The title notwithstanding, this is a book about the origins of World War I. Ultimately, Kennedy wants to determine why Britain and Germany went to war against each other in 1914. There are two well-known explanations with which Kennedy wrestles, each of which points to Germany as the *bête noire* and interestingly, each of which has the same root cause. The first is the domestic structure or primacy of domestic politics argument. Industrialization came late to Germany; and when it arrived with all its fury, it turned what had been an agrarian society on its head. Unlike the British case, modernization was not a gradual process in Germany. This wholesale disruption led to significant domestic instability, which ultimately manifested itself in an adventurous foreign policy. The outbreak of the war can be best explained by focusing on the domestic sources of conflict. Since the appearance

## 72 Naval War College Review

of Fritz Fischer's *Germany's Aims In The First World War* in 1961, the primacy of domestic politics explanation has been the more influential of the two explanations. (It should be noted that there are important differences among the members of this school of thought.)

The second explanation is the balance of power or primacy of foreign policy argument. Again, at the root of the matter is the industrial revolution. As a consequence of differences in the timing and the nature of the industrialization process in Britain and Germany, there was a significant change in the balance of power between these two countries during the period from 1860-1914. Britain was clearly the dominant European power in the mid-19th century. By 1914, Germany had the military might (which, for Kennedy, is largely synonymous with economic strength) to challenge Britain. Germany, like France under Napoleon and others before that, then set out to gain a position in the international system that was commensurate with her strength. In other words, World War I was a classic struggle for European hegemony.

No historian would deny that there are elements of truth in both of these explanations. The central question, however, is, which is the more important one? Forced to choose between them, Kennedy opts for the balance of power argument. He writes, "The decisive elements in the Anglo-German relationship, and the causes of the rising antagonism, are to be found . . . in the cold world of *Machtpolitik*, in the perception of clashes of interest between the two nations." What makes this book so important is that this conclusion challenges the primacy of domestic politics argument which has held the high ground for the past two decades. Forced to choose between Ranke and Marx, Kennedy chooses Ranke.

Although Kennedy adheres to the balance of power argument, he gives

considerable credence to the arguments of Fritz Fischer and his disciples—an indication of the great influence these historians have had. One of the real strengths of this book is that Kennedy has tried, as much as possible, to synthesize the primacy of foreign policy and primacy of domestic politics explanations. Thus, his book covers virtually every aspect of Anglo-German relations. In the end, however, he recognized that it would be necessary to choose between these explanations.

It is not Kennedy's choice which is troubling, but how he made that choice. There is no weighing of the two arguments, no explanation as to why one is more important than the other. One wants to know: what criteria did he use to judge the validity of each argument? If one is going to choose between competing explanations as Kennedy did, and moreover, if one is going to challenge the prevailing wisdom on a subject, then it is necessary to explain why your argument is more persuasive than the other one. Kennedy does not do this. Instead, he simply states, after a detailed exploration of virtually every aspect of the Anglo-German rivalry, that balance of power considerations are of primary importance. The reader is left waiting for the other shoe to drop.

As an encyclopedia of the many aspects of the Anglo-German rivalry, this book is a *tour de force*. One comes away from it with a thorough understanding of all the dimensions of the problem. For this reason, as well as the fact that the central conclusion is a revisionist one (at least at this juncture), the book is very important. However, because of its important shortcoming in dealing with the issue of ultimate causes, it does not measure up to what one expects from an author of Kennedy's stature.

JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER  
Center for International Affairs  
Harvard University



Haggie, Paul. *Britannia at Bay: The Defence of the British Empire Against Japan, 1931-1941*. New York: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1981. 264pp. \$49.50

By the mid-1930s, Britain was faced with the prospect of conflict in three separate theaters against three different opponents: Japan in the Far East, Italy in the Mediterranean and Germany on the European continent. Britain unfortunately did not have the necessary resources for dealing with all three contingencies simultaneously. Consequently, in allocating her scarce resources, she was involved in a constant juggling act. This excellent book, which is based on a careful examination of the official records of the period as well as numerous collections of private papers, graphically details the policies pursued in the Far East as the aging British Empire tried to check a rising Japan.

It was the Japanese who first interrupted the relative calm of the interwar period with their invasion of Manchuria (1931). At the time, the British were committed to sending immediately the Main Fleet to Singapore. And throughout the 1930s, as the German and Italian threats emerged, Britain still maintained its commitment to sending a fleet to contest the Japanese. However, as Haggie shows, this was a hollow promise by the end of the 1930s. Certainly, the decision in the first part of 1938 not to build a two-ocean navy removed any chance of sending a fleet to the Far East. Finally, in 1939, with a European war on the horizon, British planners decided to concentrate on launching an offensive in the Mediterranean. There would be no fleet for the Far East.

Those first years of the European war (1939-1941) were filled with disasters for the British. Nor surprisingly, the Japanese took full advantage of Britain's weakness. The British searched in vain for a way to check the Japanese. Mainly, they sought to ally themselves with the

United States. This was actually a constant theme in British grand strategy throughout the 1930s. However, the Americans refused to commit themselves to any form of meaningful alliance. Although Haggie does not explicitly criticize American policy, his description of that policy leaves little doubt that he believes it was foolhardy. The dénouement of this sad tale came in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, when the Japanese sank the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse*, and then captured Singapore. This was "the greatest single disaster to British arms since Yorktown."

Although Haggie is well aware of the formidable, if not impossible, task that British policymakers faced in the late 1930s and early 1940s as they sought to devise a deterrent strategy for the Far East, he is also sharply critical of British thinking in these years. For example he argues that although the British recognized that Japan was a threat, they consistently underestimated Japanese military prowess. Equally important, the British failed to recognize that naval forces alone would not be able to deal with the Japanese threat. They were tied to "an obsolete maritime strategy." The rise of air power after World War I, coupled with the mobility of land armies in the industrial age, meant that Britain would have to send large-scale ground forces and air forces as well as naval forces to deal with the Japanese. Of course, since Britain did not even have the resources to send a formidable naval force to the Pacific, one cannot help but wonder whether it would have made much difference if Britain had recognized the need to send greater numbers of air force and army units. By 1939, Britain's strategic needs were so much greater than her available resources that it was inevitable that she would suffer some egregious losses in the war. Imaginative strategic thinking might have helped somewhat, but in the end, as Haggie makes clear, Britain just did not

## 74 Naval War College Review

have the economic strength and the manpower necessary to oppose Italy, Japan and Germany.

JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER  
Center for International Affairs  
Harvard University

Marder, Arthur J. *Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981. 521pp. \$49.50

After Arthur Marder died on Christmas Day, 1980, the *Times* of London wrote that he was "a supreme naval historian" who was "one of the greatest exponents of British naval history of the Edwardian and Georgian eras." This posthumous volume (the only one we shall see of a projected two) confirms that tribute. Marder's relentless research, fair-mindedness and happy way with words all shine in this book. Although the bibliography was to be in the second volume, there are plentiful references to sources in the footnotes.

Marder's subtitle is "Strategic Illusions, 1936-41," but he shows clearly that the real illusion began in 1922 with the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 and its replacement with the innocuous (misspelled in the text, a sure sign that Professor Marder had not lived to shepherd his book past the printer's wolves) Four Power Treaty. "We have traded whisky for water," moaned one Japanese admiral, who also may have been having fun with the new American prohibition amendment. Under that treaty and the concomitant 5:5:3 battleship limitation Britain and the United States had ceded strategic superiority in the Western Pacific to Japan. Yet they both refused to adjust their political goals accordingly. By 1936, the threat of Hitler's Germany forced Britain to make such an adjustment; the United States never did so until Pearl Harbor changed the

political map of Asia. As late as November 1941, the State Department was resisting successfully "on political grounds" the Navy's request to remove the Marines from Shanghai and Peking.

Marder moves from his strategic appraisal to his main theme, the two navies. Here the contrasts are fascinating. Japanese officers who spent decades slanging their superiors to their faces with impunity (true, all were in their cups) are company men to the last, while the Royal Navy types, Dartmouth-tied and stiff-upper-lippish, cheerfully blackguard their comrades. Marder notes that this difference plus the destruction of much Japanese archival material has made his analysis of the two organizations hard to balance. But it is the mark of the historian that he has achieved a balance, while never losing that sharp eye for the telling personal foible which also enlivened the five volumes of *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow*.

The last third of Marder's work is titled "The Saga of Force Z," that ill-fated mini-task force that the Royal Navy was forced to use instead of sending the "main fleet to Singapore." Here Marder's control of his materials recalls his handling of Jutland in the third volume of his main work. The men and materiel are compared; the battle is well-charted and well-described; the summing up judicious and fair, although there is an ambiguous mention that the crew of the *Prince of Wales* was "a mixed one, mostly 'hostilities only,' and the latter could be difficult."

In concentrating on Admiral Phillips and his two capital ships, Marder does not scant the larger picture. Churchill really believed a few big ships alone could make a difference; he had never forgiven those who had allowed the *Goeben* to escape nor forgotten his own role in sending capital ships on the successful hunting of von Spee. Churchill had cited the roles of the *Bismarck*

and Tirpitz in tying down the Royal Navy as justification for Force Z. Did Churchill also have in mind the possibility of getting more American support at Singapore by offering an earnest of his own? Marder does not pursue the line of some critics that the disaster could have been avoided had British planes bound for Singapore not been diverted to the USSR. That Singapore was at jeopardy at all was a reflection of a strategic choice dictated by reality.

One comment (from both British and Japanese sources) that might bother sensitive American readers is that Force Z at least died in a try at the enemy, not running away from him as did the U.S. Asiatic Fleet. Had Professor Marder lived to do the second volume, he surely would have reported that the Asiatic Fleet's lamentable performance was due not only to inferior numbers, poor torpedoes, and the loss of air support at Clark Field, but also because of British insistence that the U.S. cruisers and destroyers be used for escorting convoys to Singapore rather than in offensive action.

One closes this volume with the melancholy reflection of Gibbon (which Marder himself had once quoted) on finishing *Decline and Fall*: ". . . I had taken my everlasting leave of an old and agreeable companion . . . ."

J.K. HOLLOWAY  
Naval War College

Leutze, James. *A Different Kind of Victory*. Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1981. 362pp. \$21.95

Although he was on active duty during World War II as a full admiral, today only a few naval officers could identify Admiral Thomas C. Hart without first reading this particularly good biography. Hart is of interest to us today primarily because he was commander of the United States Asiatic Fleet from 1940 until early 1942.

When Hart relieved Admiral Harry E. Yarnell in 1940 the Asiatic Fleet was

not an impressive naval force. It consisted of only 2 cruisers, 13 destroyers, 12 submarines, a few auxiliaries, and the 4th Marine Regiment. It possessed no tactical aircraft. The United States wanted a four-star officer to command it so that this country's representative in the many discussions that animated the international community in China would be equal, if not senior, to the officers of the other navies on the scene.

At that time the Japanese were attempting to consolidate their position in China by eliminating the British, French, and American presences there. The Europeans were preoccupied and weakened by their reverses in Europe and the United States had only begun to rearm. The United States and Japan were on a collision course that ended at Pearl Harbor.

Under these circumstances Hart's principal task as a naval diplomat was to conduct a presence mission in the classic sense: show the flag and exert what influence he could. Using firmness, patience and tact coupled with "common" sense, that rarest of all commodities, Hart wrung as much advantages for his country as was humanly possible from very difficult circumstances. Those who today so glibly talk of presence missions would do well to consult this biography.

In addition to a crumbling and increasingly dangerous situation in China, Hart had to deal with the British and the Dutch to coordinate some form of common action against the Japanese threat to Southeast Asia. Since Washington was neither willing nor able to make the necessary political commitment, Hart found himself in an almost impossible position.

When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, Hart was as surprised as anyone else that they attacked where they did. But he and the Asiatic Fleet were ready for war. Hart's preparations stand in stark contrast to those of General Douglas MacArthur who allowed the

## 76 Naval War College Review

U.S. Army Air Forces to be caught on the ground and destroyed. Thanks to this avoidable blunder the Japanese gained air superiority over the Philippines in one stroke. Then it was only a matter of time before they triumphed.

The absence of air defense anywhere, even over their base, meant that the surface ships could not attack the Japanese successfully. The only remaining naval weapon was the submarine. Soon Hart and his 29 submarine commanders (the number of submarines had risen during his tenure) learned to their dismay, that they were armed with torpedoes so defective as to be useless. Thus the Asiatic Fleet was robbed of all its weapons.

There was little that Hart could do. His common sense and his professional judgment dictated a withdrawal of his forces from the Philippines, rather than wasting them in action doomed to failure against the Japanese. Reluctantly, he ordered his forces to retire to the south. He and his small staff left in a submarine and under the keels of the conquering Japanese fleet proceeded to Java. MacArthur complained to Washington that the navy had deserted him.

When he arrived in Java Hart found to his surprise that he had been appointed the naval commander of a new allied command for Southeast Asia. His tenure in that position was brief, marked as it was by continuing reverses at the hands of superior Japanese forces, by Dutch intrigue to have their own admiral appointed to his position, and by MacArthur's malicious complaints to Washington. Finally, after much complicated maneuvering in Java, London, and Washington, Hart was asked to request his relief.

Leutze properly devotes the major portion of his fascinating and well-written biography to this short but extremely important period in Hart's life. He sets the stage for these complicated events and he tells of the great difficulties Hart had in receiving

adequate support and direction from Washington. There is a fascinating account of his relations with General MacArthur, then his military junior. The relations were not good. MacArthur's petulance, his arrogance, and his blindness to military and naval realities are revealed for all to see. How Hart dealt with MacArthur is a lesson in wisdom and forbearance.

When Hart returned home he did not retire. He served on the General Board and he conducted an extensive inquiry into the disaster at Pearl Harbor. Finally, when he retired from active duty he served for two years as United States Senator from Connecticut. He was blessed with a happy old age and died in 1971 at the age of 94.

The task of a biographer is not only to tell the story of his subject's life against the background of his time, but also to explain and to describe the man. In this respect Leutze has done an admirable job. Hart kept a personal diary in which he recorded the events of his life and his innermost thoughts. Leutze's keen insights tell us the kind of man Hart was and his historian's discipline prevents him from descending the slippery slope of psycho-history. The result is a vivid and compelling picture of a man and his times. It is also a model of what biography can and should be.

B. MITCHELL SIMPSON III  
Newport, Rhode Island

Ball, Desmond. *Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. 322pp. \$27.50

Desmond Ball has produced a carefully documented and well-written study of the strategic missile program of the Kennedy administration. He demonstrates that this buildup was not, as is commonly assumed, a response to the "missile gap" because Kennedy and his advisors no longer believed in the existence of such a gap at the time they

made their arms decisions. Nor, Ball argues, was the massive buildup a reflection of strategic doctrine as it went far beyond what Kennedy and McNamara thought necessary for deterrence. Rather, it was the outgrowth of political pressures upon the new administration, some of which Kennedy had created himself.

During the presidential campaign Kennedy had hammered away at the alleged weakness of the American strategic arsenal and had repeatedly stated his intention of supporting a variety of weapon programs to restore clear-cut American superiority. According to Ball, these promises, while they aroused public expectations did not account for the primary source of pressure upon the administration. This came instead from within the government, from the Air Force and Navy, both of which were intent on committing the President to buying as many missiles or submarines as possible. Air Force requests for the Minuteman, for example, ranged from between 3,000 and 10,000. The Navy, which toyed with the idea of a fleet of 100 Polaris SSBNs, pushed for 45; their calculation of the force levels required to achieve finite deterrence ignored completely the existence of the Air Force and its contribution to the American deterrent.

Both services used whatever political clout they had to lobby both the administration and the Congress for their respective programs and succeeded, Ball argues, in committing the administration to a much higher level of strategic forces than it had wished for. In this regard, Ball sees the lobbying efforts of defense contractors, certain to profit from expanded production of missiles and submarines, as another effective pressure upon the administration.

Ball believes, with good reason, that the Kennedy experience has great contemporary relevance. Whereas the Soviet Union has followed an evolutionary path to strategic force development,

improving its forces by means of a series of small modifications, the United States has proceeded by fewer but larger generational leaps. The Trident and the MX missile, regardless of the ultimate mode of deployment for the latter, represent another such leap. What level of forces will be deployed?

According to Ball, there is a tendency for existing numbers to assume sanctity and for systems to be replaced on a one-for-one basis regardless of the qualitative differences between them or the changing nature of American strategic requirements. His purpose in writing is to demonstrate the extent to which the Kennedy-McNamara strategic decisions—the source of today's numbers—were both hasty and the product of political compromise. By doing so Ball hopes to prod strategists and policymakers into taking a more open look at force requirements and presumably to opt for lower force levels.

Ball's analysis is sound if unlikely to find a receptive audience in the current administration. Like Kennedy, Reagan has come to power pledged to build up American forces to compensate for our alleged inferiority. To date his strategic decisions appear to be at least as influenced by bureaucratic in-fighting as those of Kennedy were. The Reagan administration is likely to bequeath to us a strategic arsenal that goes a long way toward meeting the "wish lists" of the services and defense contractors. Like the forces Kennedy built, they may bear only a marginal relationship to any coherent conception of real strategic needs.

RICHARD NED LEBOW  
Johns Hopkins University, Bologna Center

Henderson, William Darryl. *Why the Vietcong Fought: A Study of Motivation in a Modern Army in Combat*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979. 163pp. \$17.95

This is another of Greenwood's highly specialized publications, in this

## 78 Naval War College Review

case mainly of interest to those involved in retrospective analysis of the Second Indochina War.

In his preface Colonel Henderson develops the contrast between the People's Liberation Army (PLA), which endured, and the U.S. Army, which the author feels did not. The contrast shortly brings the author into a critique of *Crisis in Command* previously reviewed in this journal. He is highly critical and powerful in his comments on that work, but his commentary, however cogent, is really a digression.

The central question Henderson seeks to answer is why the PLA soldiers fought so well in view of the hardships they endured, including the tremendous firepower that was arrayed against them. His approach is to examine factors of motivation and control of the individual PLA soldier in the context of the relationships between the fighting men and the Communist party organization. He places particular emphasis on the importance of small groups of soldiers (the primary group, i.e., a three-man cell) and what makes them cohesive. All the data he examines comes from the period 1965-67.

Colonel Henderson concludes that soldiers' attitudes were shaped by three important forces: party organization and ideology, cadre leaders, and the primary groups. The cadre leader, who was the conduit between party and fighter in instilling homogenous values within the primary groups, was the key to success.

Henderson's general source of data is interviews conducted by RAND which sought to develop information on PLA organization and why it fought so effectively. He has added appendices which describe the nature and limitations of the interviews and he includes a questionnaire—though, as the author points out, the interviews were open-ended.

Henderson has succeeded in producing a very interesting and well done

monograph. Though it is aimed at the specialist on Vietnam, it has value to those interested in examining the motivation and control, and hence staying power, of insurgents elsewhere than Vietnam.

DOUGLAS KINNARD  
University of Vermont

Anderson, Terry H. *The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War 1944-1947*. \* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981. 256pp. \$18

Hathaway, Robert M. *Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America, 1944-1947*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981. 448pp. \$22.50

Anderson and Hathaway have contributed significantly to the cold war literature. Moreover, their books transcend the years in question to offer practical insights into alliance politics. And the backdrop of their topic is the not untimely problem of how a superpower responds to an accelerated decline in relative power. Political analyses of the early postwar years generally suggest that the world slid easily into a situation where there were only two actors on the international stage. American writings have been especially parochial in reducing these years to a bipolar confrontation while overlooking the complexities of Atlantic relations. The physical metaphor of the United States "filling the vacuum" left by a bankrupt and demoralized Britain has been a retreat from explanation. Both authors tell a far more complicated story.

From 1944 until 1947 Britain saw itself as in many ways more of a world power than either Russia or the United States. Its armed forces in a global ring of bases were better deployed than America's. Its fleet was so superior to

\*For another view of Terry Anderson's book see the review article by Richard A. Best, Jr., in the November-December 1981 issue, pp. 97-99.

## Professional Reading 79

Russia's that even in early 1947 the Admiralty could think seriously about selling Moscow an aircraft carrier. British development of jet aircraft led the world, while atomic research and an apparently durable Commonwealth added to these indices of power. Britain had no intention of joining what its wartime ambassador to Washington called the "mendicant queue" of exhausted European powers. Each author examines the ensuing tension as an ascendant America encroached on regions and responsibilities that the British economy could no longer underwrite. Although Britain had the trappings of what in 1944 was called a superpower, its economic capacities could no longer match its commitments. London was not prepared to acknowledge the extent of this shortfall.

Like Britain before, the United States encouraged global political, territorial, and especially trade relations that suited its own security and economic interests. Each country used its power to promote a convenient framework of world order. Anderson and Hathaway both describe how Britain was persuaded and sometimes forced to accept the U.S. vision of the postwar world. Now that many observers see a decline in U.S. power and a crumbling of the postwar structure, the British experience may be of pragmatic as well as purely intellectual interest to Americans.

Hathaway's work is clearly the more innovative of the two. Although both authors use the same U.S. and recently available British sources, Hathaway avoids the dry narration that can characterize traditional diplomatic histories. In greater detail than Anderson, he contrasts the styles as well as the world views of Washington and Whitehall. Ambiguities always bedevil coalition politics. But what made U.S./British relations especially difficult was the natural assumption that the same language and democratic values meant parallel national interests. This was

rarely the case. In those areas where interests overlapped, the putative allies proceeded carefully while casting side-long glances at each other.

What makes Hathaway's book superior is that he illuminates the cultural and bureaucratic origins of the U.S. and British misunderstandings. Neither country was a monolith. There were intense internal debates. Perceptions and expectations clashed between left and right and between globalists and pragmatists. Washington wrestled with alternative images of its postwar role while London scrambled amongst the constraints of a severely diminished economy. U.S. and British interpretations of the nature of the international balance of power did not coincide until mid-1947. Moscow, for its part, was torn between its ideological faith in the inevitable growth of Anglo-American antagonism and its assertions of a threatening capitalist bloc. Finally, the Soviets themselves ensured the development of previously elusive common interests between Washington and London.

Despite a more comprehensive title, Anderson gives no further attention than does Hathaway as to how Anglo-American diplomacy was conditioned by the relations of each with the Soviet Union. An interesting point that both authors neglect concerns the contradictory positions between military and civil government officials in both Britain and the United States. Unlike the United States, the Foreign Office soon after the war subordinated the military's role in foreign policy formulation. Although British diplomats were more confrontational in dealing with the Soviets through 1946 than were their American counterparts, the situation was exactly the reverse between the two militaries. The intra-governmental disputes only added to the international confusion that both authors document. It would have been fascinating for these authors to have continued through 1948

## 80 Naval War College Review

by which time the political landscape had cleared.

U.S. preeminence in Western diplomacy was guaranteed after three years of self-doubt and delay by the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, which led to the overshadowing of British interests in Europe and the Middle East, not to mention the Far East. But thirty-five years later, the United States finds itself exhibiting the well-known symptoms of decline: rampant inflation, chronic balance of payments difficulties, high taxation, and exposed positions abroad. It is no longer the arbiter of international trade, money, and investment. Some critics argue that accepting strategic parity with the Soviet Union, losing control over the world petroleum industry, and conceding regional dominance to local powers all indicate a great power in retreat. Hathaway and, as an adjunct, Anderson present the most relevant test case of a government's eroding ability to play an international role long taken for granted.

DEREK LEEBAERT  
Harvard University

Adan, Avraham (Bren). *On the Banks of the Suez: An Israeli General's Personal Account of the Yom Kippur War*. San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1980. 479pp. \$16.95

The wars of modern Israel in general and the *Yom Kippur* War in particular have spawned any number of books purporting to articulate for a large and apparently interested audience the lessons of modern combat. Given an understandable bias on the part of this writer—after all, Israel has won all of their wars at the tactical and operational levels (the strategic decision is not in yet)—most of the best of these books have come from Israel. Almost all of Israel's combat and political commanders have written memoirs at one time or another, but it is Bren's "book" that I have waited for so impatiently.

Because of the early days of confusion in the 1973 war, the Arabs on both fronts gaining strategic and tactical surprise and the unanticipated "lacklustre" performance of the IDF in those early days on the Suez front, journalists and political-military analysts everywhere began searching for scapegoats. I expected Bren's book to penetrate some of the myths created in the search and to illuminate some of the confusion: the death of the tank, the intelligence failure, the Agranat Commission, unity of command problems, and the BarLev Line. Bren does not disappoint.

Additionally, I waited for Bren's book because the Suez campaign has more to tell us ultimately than does the war in the Golan. The battle for the Golan Heights was a personal struggle of epic proportions between individual tank crews and small units and leaders against a tenacious and ultimately unlucky Syrian attack. Chaim Herzog has written the epic poem celebrating the Golan struggle—quite literally a "Gunfight at the OK Coral." Herzog has less to say about the Suez front in that his "war story" does not illuminate the confusion surrounding certain operational issues. Bren's book presents the operational view of an operational commander who is also a master tactician. Herzog's *War of Atonement* is a dramatic elegy; Bren's book is a passionate analysis. Bren's book does not fail my anticipation here either.

In the course of detailing the day-by-day combat activities of his own division, General Adan manages to cast an objective eye, to the point of self-criticism at times, across the entire spectrum of military and political concern, from strategy through front operations to the small unit tactics of combined arms formations. General Adan was in the middle of the bickering commanders: Sharon, Gonen, Tal, Elzar, BarLev, and Dayan—an unfortunate sideshow that seems endemic to high commands. Adan tells this story as



## Professional Reading 81

I expected him to tell it; while he may have some personal axe to grind, he is not a politician and at no time does the reader detect any untoward motivations in his side of this story.

Adan shows tellingly how the antics of General Sharon, using his political clout to get his way, subverted the entire Southern Command of General Gonen and nearly dislocated the Command's efforts early in the campaign. Even BarLev was unable to completely control Sharon. The resulting lack of unity of command was very costly at times. It is in this recognition that the reader also senses that the small unit cohesion so characteristic of the IDF, so lovingly shown in Chaim Herzog's work, held sway. General Adan also is at pains to show that Israel and the world ought never question the abilities of Israeli soldiers and tactical commanders even as it is sobered by the brilliance and sometimes excesses of the high command.

General Adan casts an equally searching eye at operational and tactical issues. He discusses the vulnerability of the main battle tank (very expensive) to the precision antitank missile (relatively inexpensive). While not minimizing this vulnerability, Adan suggests how the problem is overcome, that is, how it is lived with. In presenting the operations and tactics of the breakout, Adan gives the lie to the whole issue, showing what tanks are for—overrunning the intermediate air defense networks, logistics lines of communication, and command and control networks. Even the most resolute tankers will admit the weaknesses of armor against equally resolute dug-in infantry with the wherewithal to defeat individual tanks. Armored and mechanized forces ought to be used to drive deep into vulnerable rear areas of enemy formations, dislocating the enemy's tactical and operational plan, not assaulting dug-in infantry.

tively if not in detail, has to do with mechanized formations in urban areas. Adan's armored foray into Suez City was a disaster—at least for the tank battalion that went in. But Adan's hindsight and "lessons learned" will not strike a particularly resonant chord among *our* infantry tacticians. Adan agrees that tanks alone do not operate well in cities. He argues, however, that dismounted light infantry are not dazzling either. Rather, as he puts it, his most effective force was mechanized infantry, *mounted* and firing in all directions from their fighting vehicles—a slightly spruced up version of our current mechanized infantry carrier, the M113. Since urban warfare will be very characteristic of any war undertaken by NATO in Europe, we need very carefully examine General Adan's experience and assertions born in this experience.

Of necessity, only snapshots can be presented here; I have given you some. General Adan also discusses training, combat engineers—the Suez crossing and countermine warfare, Israeli style, have infatuated any number of our own generals—reconstitution, and, most importantly, unit cohesion. The war on the Suez Front is more characteristic of armored warfare than the slugfest on the Golan; General Adan presents this war patiently, with an eye to operational lessons learned. Our business must be to come to grips with these lessons and adapt them to the war that we must prepare to fight.

MICHAEL S. LANCASTER  
Major, U.S. Army

Stein, Janice Gross, and Tanter, Raymond. *Rational Decision-Making: Israel's Security Choices, 1967*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980. 398pp. \$25.00

Janice Stein, author of eight of the ten chapters of this volume, evaluates the substance and process of Israeli decision making on the eve of the Six Day War.

## 82 Naval War College Review

Her analysis, detailed, perceptive, and methodologically sophisticated, represents a significant theoretical and policy contribution to the fields of foreign policy and international relations.

Her theoretical contribution consists in the first place of a lucid exposition of three major paradigms of decision making: the analytic (rational actor), the cybernetic and the cognitive. She describes and evaluates critically the different rules of search, revision, evaluation, and choice that characterize each of these approaches. She then synthesizes a number of different paths to decision by combining and recombining elements of the several approaches. This is based on the assumption that complex decisions are often made by complex means. Stein's analysis of these multiple decision paths breaks new ground by stipulating some of the conditions likely to be associated with the use of different decision making procedures at different stages of the decision making process.

The second part of the book examines Israeli decision making in 1967 in the light of the theoretical framework described above. Stein finds that the Israeli decision making process was relatively open and flexible and on the whole closest to the analytic paradigm. The crisis accentuated the deliberate style of Levi Eshkol's leadership and allowed free wheeling debate within a collective decision-making context. Because dissent was permitted, even encouraged, evaluation of alternatives was more effective than it otherwise would have been as competing arguments were aired and new information pertinent to them actively solicited. Parochial loyalties, political compromises, and crisis-induced stress played little observable role in the decision making.

The principal obstacle to higher quality decision making was an ambiguous definition of Israel's security problem and an imprecise application

of the strategic concepts relevant to it. In defining and developing *casus belli* in the years between 1956 and 1967, Israeli policymakers had paid insufficient attention to the ways in which their various vital interests were interrelated. Nor had they distinguished effectively among different kinds of challenges and the responses most appropriate to them. According to Stein, these critical areas of incompleteness were responsible for competing problem diagnoses, divergent estimates of Egyptian intentions, and general policy confusion.

At one point in the crisis Israel's policymakers were actually "trapped" by the poor quality of their strategic logic. Nasser's announcement of a blockade of the Strait of Tiran threatened to cut off maritime traffic to Israel's port of Eilat. On a more fundamental level it could have been interpreted as a failure of deterrence: Nasser challenged Israel because he doubted her leaders' resolve to go to war in defense of their commitment to innocent passage through the Strait of Tiran. Israeli policymakers at first failed to conceptualize these threats separately and to decide whether the blockade itself or their own apparent lack of credibility constituted the more serious security problem. They also failed to recognize that the two problems called for quite different remedies.

Reopening the Strait with American assistance would have overcome the economic threat posed by the blockade but would have done nothing to restore Israeli credibility. It might actually have been expected to undermine it further by demonstrating Israeli dependence on what the Western powers were willing to do or allow. But because the Israeli cabinet had not distinguished between the two threats they were initially attracted to the American idea of a Western Flotilla reopening the Strait. This would commit Israel to quiescence so long as the American scheme appeared to have any chance of success.

Fortunately for Israeli leaders, who had become increasingly alarmed by the rapid Egyptian military buildup in the Sinai, the American initiative failed and they regained their freedom of action.

The policy lesson of 1967 is clear: confusion and illogic in defining and applying concepts of national security can lead to disaster. It did so for Israel in 1973, an assertion Stein convincingly documents in another publication,<sup>1</sup> for that country's last-minute success in battles it had been unready to fight was many times more capable than it might otherwise have been. If Israeli policymakers were confused in 1967 they were and are a paragon of purpose and consistency in comparison to their recent and present American counterparts. Given the demonstrated consequences of strategic confusion, Washington would be well advised to devote less attention to hardware and more to fathoming the purpose and implications of the commitments in defense of which that hardware might have to be used.

RICHARD NED LEBOW  
Johns Hopkins School of  
Advanced International Studies  
Bologna Center

Cottrell, Alvin J., ed. *The Persian Gulf States: A General Survey*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980. 695pp. \$37.50

Alvin J. Cottrell has produced an authoritative survey of the Gulf region. This comprehensive study is a storehouse of background information on the Gulf that selectively will be of interest to students, scholars, and government officials alike. It does not attempt to keep pace with the rapid changes in the area. Most chapters do not cover events since 1978, and some perhaps dwell too

much on earlier times. Nevertheless, it is a significant research tool and a handy reference work for those wishing to learn more about the intricacies of the Gulf context.

The book is divided into four parts of varying length and includes twelve appendixes. The four parts deal with history; economics and urban development; culture: religion, language, and literature; and arts and society. C. Edmund Bosworth contributes an article on the nomenclature of the Gulf, in which he examines the various names given to the Gulf in history, but leaves the contemporary political controversy between Arab and Persian advocates to "a subsequent chapter on the modern political and diplomatic history of the Gulf."

The first part of the book focuses on history and geography, with separate chapters on political geography, military affairs, and international organizations. The excellent chapter by Ralph H. Magnus provides a comprehensive background of the Gulf states' experience in international organizations that is especially useful in placing the emerging Gulf Cooperation Council in proper perspective.

The second part deals with economics and urban development, focusing primarily on oil and urbanization. The research is thorough, but dated by the rapidity of change in the area. It is still interesting and valuable as a historical reference.

Culture is the subject of the third part, with chapters on religion and law, languages, and Arabic and Persian literature. The insights into the Gulf society to be gained from reading these chapters would be greatly advantageous to students.

The final part of the work is entitled "Arts and Society in the Persian Gulf." While it does include art, architecture, and of course, carpetmaking, it also sheds light on vital pieces of the political puzzle. The chapters dealing with social change, the tribes of the Gulf, and

---

<sup>1</sup>Janice Gross Stein, "Intelligence and Stupidity Reconsidered: Estimation and Decision in Israel, 1973," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, September 1980, pp. 147-177.

## 84 Naval War College Review

competing ideologies are especially important.

The twelve appendixes prepared by Kimbriel Mitchell and staff add an encyclopedic dimension to the work and by themselves resemble a short reference book. The many statistics presented in the appendixes, apart from the tables, are not footnoted, but selected bibliographies are provided for each appendix.

*The Persian Gulf States: A General Survey* is an important compendium of information on the Gulf that will be of interest to anyone attempting to understand the factors and forces at play in this volatile area.

CHARLES G. MACDONALD  
Florida International University

Tombs, Robert. *The War Against Paris 1871*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 256pp. \$44.50, paper \$14.95

The suppression of the Paris commune, the final act of the Franco-Prussian war, marked the birth of the revolutionary myth that, to protect their narrow class interests, the French bourgeoisie crushed the democratic proletariat. Class warfare coupled with the traditional rivalry between Paris and the provinces led to open warfare and violent repression in the spring of 1871.

Robert Tombs has examined the war against Paris and indicates that the issues were in fact far more complex than those described by adherents of both the left and right.

Tombs demonstrates that the Versailles Army was not simply a reactionary force composed of remnants of the defeated Imperial Army. Rather, it was a fragile amalgamation of units raised by the Provisional Government of National Defense, volunteers, and returned prisoners of war. Moreover, the commune's forces were no revolutionary vanguard, while the Parisian Army was in fact much weaker than its numbers would indicate. Relatively few

battalions were willing to resist the Versailles regime.

Troops of the national government were not in fact anxious to fight the commune. One reason that Thiers and his generals laid siege to Paris instead of launching an immediate attack was the fear that the soldiers would refuse to do battle with fellow Frenchmen.

The conquest of Paris was relatively inexpensive. The vast majority of the casualties were caused by the repression after the campaign. Tombs explains this by pointing to the facts that a number of reactionary generals sought to destroy Parisian radicalism and the government was willing to permit them almost unlimited freedom of action. The Versailles Army, though not enthusiastic, was a disciplined force willing to follow the lead of its commanders. Vindictiveness of the few, not the willingness of the majority, led to the final massacres.

The results of the repression were at best ironic. Reactionaries were discredited for their mindless brutality. Moderates lost credit for their failure to control their forces, and the left gained a myth that had little to do with reality.

Tombs does not explore the wider ramifications of the Civil War. Was the commune the last gasp of the Jacobin left? Was it the start of the proletarian revolutionary myth? These and other questions remain unanswered. On the other hand the author does provide an excellent study of the problems involved in restoring the authority of the new regime in exceptionally difficult circumstances. Having been defeated in a foreign war and with German armies still on French soil, the unstable new regime had to restore internal order. The price was high, but the result was the ultimate creation of a republic that was to be the most enduring French regime since the end of the Napoleonic wars.

PROFESSOR STEVEN B. ROSS  
Naval War College

## Professional Reading 85

Gold, Edgar. *Maritime Transport: The Evolution of International Marine Policy and Shipping Law*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1981. 425pp. \$34.95

For good reason, the law of the sea is of growing concern to many nations. Traditional concepts of the law are no longer adequate as they apply to the ever-expanding and legitimate concerns of all nations. Human survival itself may depend on the wise and equitable use of the seas' resources.

Mr. Gold, both a master mariner and a professor of law, shows that maritime law became divided into "private" and "public" areas in the early 19th century. Private laws were influenced by ship-owners and dealt with commercial rules regarding carriage of cargoes, seamen's rights, insurance, and salvage. Public laws continued to be concerned with territorial rights, state jurisdiction on the high seas, coastal and international fisheries, and the rules pertaining to naval warfare. The divergence of private and public maritime law was noted by Maître Louis Franck, president of the Comité Maritime International at the first conference of this organization at Brussels in 1897. This meeting was convened primarily to unify and to codify existing regulations in the private sector. The desirability of bringing the two areas of regulation closer together was noted by Mr. Franck but no further action in this regard was undertaken by the C.M.I.

The establishment of the United Nations and the growing influence of newly independent nations collectively grouped with other less-developed countries have brought wide recognition of the need for appropriate maritime laws combining the private and public areas. Attempts to bring together these two major streams of maritime law have taken place in meetings of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. During the first gathering, UNCLOS I in 1958, primary attention

was focused upon the public law and the seas as a resource for food, minerals and energy. Discussions at UNCLOS II centered upon the same topics but with little further progress towards regulations which might be acceptable to all nations represented. The use of the seas for transportation was scarcely mentioned. During UNCLOS III, in 1973, the involvement of marine transportation was recognized, not for the purpose of carriage of cargo but because of the impact of ship-generated pollution and its effect upon the sea as a food resource. Broader consideration of transportation issues may be expected from future conferences.

Maritime transport and laws relating to the carriage of cargoes have received increasing attention at meetings of the United Nations Conferences on Trade and Development. The less-developed countries have been vocal in this arena, and Mr. Gold's book helps the reader understand their point of view. They appear to want to force private marine transportation to come under strict international regulation and to bring about cargo-sharing or other means of obtaining financial benefit from the private carriage of goods to and from their shores.

Mr. Gold states, "Like everything else in the late twentieth century, the uses of the ocean will be complicated and fraught with conflict in search for greater equity for the widely differing interests of people in a very unevenly divided world." This is an appropriate summation of the challenges facing the decision-makers in all areas of marine transportation.

The book combines a comprehensive history of maritime law and public policy in a highly readable volume of great relevance to the problems of the 80s. The completeness of coverage is evident from the headings of various chapters such as: The Evolution of Marine Transport, The Creation of Maritime Power, and the International-

## 86 Naval War College Review

ization of Marine Transport. Information has been gathered from many sources and these are abundantly quoted and annotated. Its value as a good reference source is enhanced by the inclusion of separate lists of abbreviations, statutes, and law cases. The bibliography is divided into 13 subject categories extending to 33 pages. There is a complete index.

Those interested in marine transportation will find *Maritime Transport: The Evolution of International Marine Policy and Shipping Law* a worthy addition to their libraries. Scholars of maritime history, maritime lawyers, and persons concerned with maritime policy will appreciate its value as a most complete and thoroughly researched reference work.

HERMANN A. ALLEN  
U.S. Merchant Marine Academy

Staar, Richard F., ed. *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1981*. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1981. 502pp. \$35

As the fifteenth consecutive volume in this outstanding series, the 1981 *Yearbook* covers a wide array of trends and events during the year 1980 among the world's communist parties and the nations they control. Amidst the always lively crosscurrents of international communist affairs, the massive Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, the acute unrest in Poland, and the continuing Vietnamese military conquest of Cambodia all loomed large. Representing a heightened propensity towards military activism as a major way of solving both domestic and external problems, these further mark the pronounced ideological emptiness of communism as an international political movement. In light of more recent events, particularly in Poland,

this edition again reveals the *Yearbook's* value as a detailed and incisive reference work. While its purchase price of \$35.00 appears high, its combination of high-quality analysis and extensive coverage makes the *Yearbook* a worthwhile investment.

With its country-by-country profiles of communist party organizations, both those in and those out of power, the *Yearbook* series consistently has permitted a broad appreciation of the unity and diversity of Marxism-Leninism as a global political movement over the past two decades. The 1981 edition is no exception. Its coverage for 1980 and early 1981 serves as an excellent prelude to the present. The introductory overview by editor Richard F. Staar, who since has joined the Reagan administration in a key diplomatic assignment, bears witness to that sense of currency. Probably it could stand on its own merits as a solid survey of major cross-currents and events in the communist world that bear watching for the future. That air of timeliness is also readily apparent in the section on communist front organizations and the comprehensive bibliography of recent publications on communist affairs. For its substantive analysis and timeliness, then, the *Yearbook* is perhaps matched only by the International Institute for Strategic Studies' annuals, *The Military Balance* and *Strategic Survey*.

In general, the national profiles on communist parties are high-quality contributions by recognized experts in their respective specialty areas. Students of Asian affairs, for example, will readily recognize the familiar bylines of Justus M. van der Kroef (Indonesia), Douglas Pike (Vietnam), Arthur J. Dommen (Laos) and Peter A. Poole (Kampuchea). Likewise, those familiar with Latin America, the Middle East, or Eastern Europe will find contributions by such authorities as Robert J. Alexander (Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil), William Ratliff (Guayana and Jamaica),

## Professional Reading 87

Bernard Reich (Egypt), Nicholas C. Pano (Albania), and Jan de Weydenthal (Poland), all of whom possess considerable literary *bona fides* as major Western authorities in their given areas of concentration. Some of the lengthier assessments, like R. Judson Mitchell's coverage of the USSR/CPSU and Stephen Uhalley's examination of the PRC/CPC, are solid efforts which could have been published individually.

The 1981 *Yearbook* is also enhanced by the annual estimate of communist party strengths across the globe. Since the demise of the official Department of State publication, *World Strength of Communist Party Organizations*, during the mid-1970s *détente* period, the *Yearbook* has become the sole source for such data. Over recent years, added coverage on the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Treaty Organization has also increased the *Yearbook's* value. Aurel Braun's treatment of these two key instruments of Soviet control over its East European neighbors in this edition provides excellent background for recent events. The biographic section, if brief, also is unique for its treatments of communist leaders. This edition includes biographies of former Polish CP leader Stanislaw Kania and the *heir apparent* to North Korean leadership, Kim Chong-il (who also happens to be Kim Il-sung's eldest son).

Regardless of twists and turns in the international scene, and within the communist movement itself, the 1981 *Yearbook* maintains the reputation of its predecessors as a valuable research aid for specialists and interested general readers alike. For both it helps them to make informed judgments on probable patterns of change and continuity in communist affairs during the rest of the 1980s.

JOSEPH E. THACH, JR.  
Office of the Assistant  
Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs

Fisher, Roger and Ury, William.  
*Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreements Without Giving In*. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1981. 163pp. \$10.95

Any book which is endorsed by Averell Harriman, Cyrus Vance and Ann Landers should immediately arouse interest, if not caution, and *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreements Without Giving In*, by Roger Fisher and William Ury is no exception. In 163 pages, the authors present a recipe for reaching agreement useful in negotiations ranging from intrafamily disputes to the Arab-Israeli conflict and arms control.

According to Fisher and Ury, the most basic sources of failure in negotiations are misunderstanding, misperception, and the emotions or personalities of the individual negotiators. Anchored firmly in the social-psychological school of bargaining, they assert that "Ultimately . . . , conflict lies not in objective reality, but in people's heads." To them, the main obstacles to the resolution of the Mideast conflict are "powerful emotions," and the Vietnam war is attributed to Lyndon Johnson's perception that the Vietcong and the governments of North Vietnam, the U.S.S.R. and China were a single and united entity.

On the basis of these diagnoses, a cure is prescribed. To limit emotional obstacles, negotiators should "separate the people from the problem," and attempt to discuss interests, principles and merits, rather than negotiating positions, threats, and personalities. Efforts to develop mutual trust, build a working relationship, and emphasize the common task of devising an agreement acceptable to both sides ought to be the focus of bargaining.

If one's negotiating partners are inflexible, stubborn and refuse to play by Fisher and Ury's rules, they propose another approach; the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA).

## 88 Naval War College Review

Rather than clinging to a negotiating position and risking failure, each side should consider the alternatives to an agreement. If the results of no agreement are worse than an agreement based on a fallback position, a rational negotiator should make concessions.

Unfortunately, as lawyers, they are more concerned with the normative than the behavioral; they describe the world as it should be, and not as it is. This problem is reflected most clearly in their references to international disputes and negotiations. Taking a purely "idealistic" view of international relations, according to which all disputes are the result of misunderstandings and misperception, they have no place for force or power. For example, they claim that in 1970, Egypt suddenly agreed to a cease-fire during the War of Attrition with Israel after an unnamed American lawyer had shown Nasser that the options available to Golda Meir were limited. (One presumes that Nasser was not capable of such an assessment without such assistance.) Fisher and Ury totally ignore the factors which other analysts consider of importance, such as Israeli deep bombing raids, and American "carrots."

Similarly, while there may appear to be external "objective standards" to which all parties to a dispute can subscribe in order to reach agreement, in practice, such standards are hard to find. In international disputes, Fisher and Ury suggest that "moral standards, tradition, and reciprocity" provide such "objective criteria." One need only recall the problems which arose over the issue of "self-determination" after WW I and to look at the difficulties in defining reciprocity in the context of arms control to realize the limitations of this approach.

The absence of a historical perspective also leads the authors to "reinvent the wheel." For example, they propose that a single text should serve as the basis for negotiations, and agreement

will result from the convergence of successive iterations. Despite claims that the Harvard Negotiation Project, headed by Fisher and Ury, invented the "one-text" procedure used in the Camp David negotiations, this process has been used many times before. The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty resulted from single texts that had been presented long before agreement, and this technique was employed by Henry Kissinger during his Mideast shuttles. The problem is in getting the parties to find enough common ground to get to a single working text. From there, it's easy.

However, this is not to say that process is irrelevant to negotiation. On the contrary, process would appear to play an important role, but prior to prescribing, it would be useful to analyze the impacts of process, communication and other variables. Such an analysis may reveal that direct negotiations and attempts to create specific texts for agreements, (which are considered essential by lawyers), may be inappropriate for some issues in international relations, and that tacit and indirect processes may be preferable. This is particularly important when the parties to negotiation are complex collective entities, such as states, and not the unitary actors assumed by the authors. This complexity introduces constraints on the negotiating process. For example, no consideration of U.S. policy in SALT would be complete without discussion of the roles of the DOD, JCS, State Department, the Senate, and domestic politics. Unfortunately, there is no room for these factors in the framework adopted in this book.

Fundamentally, this analysis is flawed by a failure to distinguish between simple coordination and negotiation. In cases in which common interests can be realized without cost, the problem is coordination, not negotiation. Coordination is required when both sides can be



satisfied with a "creative" solution. For example, Fisher and Ury cite the example of American aid to help the Israelis replace the bases they are giving up in the Sinai. The precise nature of the agreement must be worked out, but the relative costs and benefits for each side are clear. However, in a negotiating process, the costs and benefits must be determined. Where there are many ways of meeting common interests, and the costs and benefits depend on the precise terms of agreement, each side will try to get the best possible deal. For example, in arms control, stability can be gained through many paths, but any particular combination leads to a different distribution of costs and benefits. If either side accepted more than the minimum constraints on itself necessary to get an agreement, it would be needlessly sacrificing its own national security, (i.e., giving in). In their analysis, however, Fisher and Ury have not told us how to determine the best possible deal, and one is left without an alternative to the traditional pulling and hauling. In other words, they have told us neither how to "get to yes" nor how to "avoid giving in."

GERALD M. STEINBERG  
Center for International Studies, MIT

Schindler, Dietrich, and Toman, Jiri. *The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions and Other Documents*. Second revised and completed edition. Rockville, Md.: Sijrhoff & Noordhoff, 1981. 933 pp. \$105

In 1943 there was published in occupied Brussels, under the editorship of Marcel Deltenre, a volume entitled *General Collection of the Laws and Customs of War*. It was in four languages (French, Flemish, German, and English) in four parallel columns and constituted a major *tour de force* considering the circumstances of its publication. In addition, it represented the first major attempt to reproduce in

one volume all of the multilateral international agreements on the law of war which had been negotiated up to that time.

In 1973 Dietrich Schindler and Jiri Toman published their *The Laws of Armed Conflicts*. ("War" had become an unmentionable word and the euphemism "armed conflict" had replaced it in the lexicon of many writers on the subject.) Apart from a large number of typographical errors, mostly in the Table of Contents (necessitating the issuance by the publishers of an errata sheet) and a rather strange omission which will be mentioned later in this review, it was an important and extremely useful updating of the 1943 Deltenre volume (by then, long out of print). It included not only all of the multilateral agreements "which are in force; which have nor (or not yet) entered into force; which are no longer in force," but also a number of other relevant documents having their origin in such bodies as the United Nations General Assembly, the International Law Commission, the Institute of International Law, etc.

Now Schindler and Toman have published their "Second revised and completed edition," an invaluable substitute for the original one. Typographical mistakes have been eliminated; and an excellent paper has been used with the result that a larger compendium, with several hundred more pages, is considerably thinner than its predecessor. In addition to including all of the 72 documents which appeared in the first edition, the second edition contains seven new documents: one under the rubric "Methods and Means of Warfare"; five dealing with the protection of victims of war; and one dealing with United Nations forces. For the convenience of the researcher, the Table of Contents, which presents the documents in functional groupings, is followed by a "List of Reproduced Documents in Chronological Order."

## 90 Naval War College Review

While this reviewer cannot speak too highly of the volume and cannot envision anyone concerned with the law of war neglecting to have a copy readily available when doing any work in that area, there are two rather glaring omissions, one of which was undoubtedly intentional, and the other of which may have been so. Both editions omit the *1907 Hague Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities* (26 Stat. 2259). Was this because the editors believed that in view of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, this convention was no longer relevant? But their "Explanatory Notes," quoted above, state that the collection includes "all multilateral conventions," even those "which are no longer in force." Certainly, even if the *Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities* is no longer in force, a conclusion with which this reviewer would not agree, it deserves a place in the history of the law of war. And if it was the United Nations Charter which has caused this omission by outlawing war, what is the relevance both of the book and of the numerous agreements on the subject of the conduct of war which have been drafted during the past several decades, a number under the aegis of the United Nations itself?

In 1975 there was signed at Washington, London, and Moscow a *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and on Their Destruction* (26 UST 583). While it is true that this may have been considered by the editors to be an "arms control" agreement rather than one restricting certain specific means of warfare, actually it is merely more extensive in its prohibitory provisions than the other documents relating to chemical and bacteriological warfare, nuclear warfare, etc.; and certainly, anyone researching the field of legal restrictions on the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons in

time of war would be deemed extremely remiss if he or she failed to mention this very important convention which already has approximately 90 States as parties.

On the whole, the two omissions mentioned above cannot be considered as materially reducing the requirement that this volume be on the library shelves of any serious student of the law of war.

HOWARD S. LEVIE

Lowry Professor, Naval War College

Smith, Myron J., Jr. *The Soviet Air and Strategic Rocket Forces, 1939-1980: A Guide to Sources in English: Vol. X, The War/Peace Bibliography Series*. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-Clio, 1981. 321pp. \$45

In light of the seemingly exponential increase in writings on Soviet military affairs over the past decade, bibliographies on this topic may be depressing to reminders that one has not kept up with the literary "state of the art" now available to Western researchers in the field. In the case of Myron J. Smith's volume on Soviet aerospace forces, however, one might justifiably be overcome by a gigantic guilt complex and immediately launch into an intensive reading program.

Smith's earlier research guide on the Soviet Navy earned the praise of Robert B. Bathurst of Harvard University in his March-April 1981 *Naval War College Review* book review by virtue of its accuracy, completeness, organization, and usefulness.

Equal superlatives apply to the work at hand both for the vast array of English-language sources that Smith has arranged within an easy-to-reference organizational format, and for its timely relevance to the substantial development of Soviet military power and the commensurate expansion of politico-military activities to distant regions in recent years. Encompassing some 3,250 sources, including transla-

## Professional Reading 91

tions of Russian military writings and little-known research materials, Smith's volume well may rival most larger Western library indices with its thorough topical survey.

From an organizational standpoint, it is quite possible that the title greatly understates the full scope and thrusts of the data contained therein. Besides a wide array of source entries on the Soviet Air and Strategic Rocket Forces as suggested in the title, Smith's work also treats the USSR's Ministry of Defense and the vast military economic structure that supports it, aerospace weaponry and related support technologies, aerospace implications for arms control issues and the Soviet-American strategic competition, and the employment of aviation and missile forces in the USSR's quest for influence and power in distant areas.

Two further sections underline a major strength of the bibliography, its emphasis on historical development, with a considerable collection of source entries on the Soviet Air Force during the Second World War and on its postwar development to date. The latter also traces the origins and expansion of the National Air Defense Forces (*PVO-Strany*) and the Strategic Rocket Forces since the 1950s as full-fledged components of the Soviet armed forces. Smith also begins each of the seven sections with a descriptive introduction that serves as worthwhile background for specialist and generalist alike, particularly with respect to the clarification of complex organizational structures and technological data.

To be sure, the work is much more a reference guide than a mere bibliography. Besides the valuable and extensive set of source entries it also includes a detailed four-decade chronology of key events, as well as several authoritative appendices of definite pertinence to the topics of Soviet aerospace forces and air power. One of these provides biographical data on those figures, both past and

present, who raised Soviet aviation to its current powerful status.

Another appendix furnishes excellent military organizational charts covering the Ministry of Defense and its key airpower components, while still a third offers an exhaustive list of English-language Western and Soviet journals that have addressed the topics at hand on either a full-time or occasional basis. Those without fluency in Russian might take heart from this listing since it includes a considerable number of Soviet-published entries and Western translation series, like those of the U.S. Department of Commerce Joint Publication Research Service (JPRS), which minimize our deficiencies in foreign languages in the pursuit of effective and detailed research.

From start to finish, then, this work stands as a fully professional effort to provide an authoritative reference guide on Soviet air and missile forces. Beginning with the insightful foreword, with its overview of Soviet airpower trends from the Bolshevik Revolution onwards, by Dr. Kenneth Whiting of the Air Force's Air University, it bears all the earmarks of a vital and enduring research tool of definite value to scholars and military professionals. Endorsing Professor Bathurst's previous suggestion on the Soviet Navy guide, one hopes that Smith will make some further provision periodically to update the work to accommodate both later events and the resultant analysis such matters will surely receive.

JOSEPH E. THACH, JR.

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs

Parrish, Michael. *The U.S.S.R. in World War II; An Annotated Bibliography of Books Published in the Soviet Union, 1945-1975*. New York: Garland, 1981. Two Volumes. 907pp. \$110

Few scholarly occupations are so needed and so neglected as that of the

## 92 Naval War College Review

bibliographer. When, therefore, one is presented with such a masterful work as this under review, it is difficult to restrain the superlatives. Fortunately, there is no need to. It is a beautiful work, fulfilling a very great need, accomplished with great intelligence, taste, and judgment.

If one had to choose, he probably would rank the Second World War as the major political event of the twentieth century. One would think, that being the case, that its major participants would have arrived at some consensus about it. Nothing is further from the truth. The Soviets—left, right, and center—have consistently seen that war as largely their war, one in which the United States played a subordinate, safe, and untaxing role. For the entire Soviet nation, it remains a central preoccupation, a demonic focus of their intellectual energies, long after the West, certainly the United States, seems to have lost interest in it.

The Soviet fixation on the Second World War vastly influences its politics now, its military preparedness, the morale of its armed forces, the expectations of its people, its assessment of the West and of foreigners, and countless critical aspects of political life. Therefore, it is simply dangerous for us to be ignorant of the work the Soviets are doing on that war and foolish of us to ignore the vast amount of information available to us about how Soviets fight.

John Erickson, the foremost historian of the Soviet military in the West, has written an informative introduction, emphasizing the value of this bibliography for all of us. As one who has agonized through the avalanche of material pouring from the Soviet press for the postwar years, he must also be foremost in gratitude that thirty-five years of work in this vast field has been catalogued so brilliantly.

And not only is it catalogued! Mr. Parrish has also annotated many of the entries with erudition and discrimina-

tion. For example, in his necessarily brief entry on the most important Soviet book up to now on the beginning days of the war, Alexander Nekrich's *June 22, 1941*, Mr. Parrish compares it to General Grigorenko's book, refers to the English translation, refers to Soviet criticism of Nekrich and refers to a relevant article by John Erickson. Now that is bibliography at its best!

Michael Parrish wisely did not discuss the controversy in Moscow that ensued after Nekrich's book was published and which led to his expulsion from the Soviet Union. That controversy, however, underscores an important fact of Soviet historiography, indeed of all Soviet publishing. Professor Nekrich came to the conclusion that the Soviet military organization was not prepared for the Nazi onslaught, that Stalin was guilty of miscalculation and of disastrous leadership. He wrote that, however, when the "chaw" was over, when the period of relative relaxation of censorship had ended, when the cult of Stalin was making a comeback, and when (which is almost always) the military was not to be criticized, Professor Nekrich found himself an outcast from all his professional association, unemployed, and therefore a candidate for a charge of parasitism.

This peculiar characteristic of Soviet publishing, that some things can be said at one time and not at another, makes Michael Parrish's work simply invaluable. To peek in at the truth, we must be prepared to read not just the work of historians, but also memoirs by prominent writers, reports from correspondents, perhaps even fiction. After all, half of all that is published in some years in the Soviet Union is war literature.

For those interested in the navy, there is a section devoted to the maritime aspects of the Second World War with 238 listings. The entries include all that I have known and used and many more besides. Parrish's wealth of information seems here, too, inexhaustible.

## Professional Reading 93

For example, he tells you that a book called *The Ocean in Flame* [my translation] is about the heroism of the Transport Fleet of the Far East during the war years. Other entries lead you to books which discuss the role of the navy in the Battle of Stalingrad, the analog in modern Soviet mythology for the Battle of Troy.

In the section "Military Art, Tactics and Weapons," there are references, invaluable for the modern tactician, to the Soviet experience of fighting under different conditions of climate and terrain, of partisan problems, of leadership and morale. This section would be a reasonably efficient guide to works illuminating the Russian way of war.

The works referred to are, of course, primarily in Russian, which presents some difficulties for many readers; however, by now, there is a vast amount

of translated material available in various Washington archives, material which is difficult to use precisely because there are few good bibliographies. Now with this bibliography, some of that material will become more accessible, even to the non-Russian reader.

Finally, it is a delight to say that it is beautifully and accurately printed, without the transliteration and typographical errors that mar so much of the work in this field. One does not have to waste time, as so often happens, trying to guess what the original cyrillic must have been.

For Michael Parrish, a resounding three cheers!

ROBERT B. BATHURST  
Harvard University

---

## RECENT BOOKS

### Selected Accessions of the Naval War College Library

Annotated by

Doris Baginski, Steven Maffeo  
Mary Ann Varoutsos and Jane Viti

Abrahamson, James L. *America Arms for a New Century: the Making of a Great Military Power*. New York: Free Press, 1981. 253pp. \$17.95

Students of American military history will be interested in this probe into the effects of the Progressive Era (1880-1920) on the transformation and modernization of our country's armed forces. Abrahamson describes how the United States, which was a minor military force at the end of the 19th century, had become a great military power by the end of the Great War. He explores the reform efforts of such military greats as Generals Sherman, Schofield, Pershing, and Wood; and Admirals Porter, Luce, Dewey, and Fiske. The book assesses the military's awareness of trends that were reshaping both domestic conditions and the world order, and the likely effect of those transformations on America's military institutions and policies.

Barton, John H. *The Politics of Peace; an Evaluation of Arms Control*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1981. 257pp. \$18.50

The political mechanisms underlying war and the political requirements for arms control are examined separately in this study to assess the impact of an