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The cover: A cruiser's motor whaleboat returns to the ship after having retrieved an exercise torpedo in the Atlantic. Photo by Frank Uhlig, Jr.
PRESIDENT'S NOTES

During the past year we have heard a swelling of voices raised in protest against nuclear weapons. These voices have echoed through Europe and have been joined in strident chorus by a growing number of voices within the United States. Many of these voices come from people who are genuinely concerned about the prospect of nuclear war and the concomitant effects of such a war upon the world in which we live. One of the major voices has been that of the American clergy.

A number of clergymen of a particular faith have spoken out on the immorality of the use of, or the threat to use, nuclear weapons. They hold that: it is immoral to use the (strategic) nuclear arsenal of the United States; it is immoral to make declarations of the intent to use the (strategic) nuclear forces of the United States; but, mere possession of the strategic arsenal as a deterrent is morally neutral, i.e., there is no objection to the possession of nuclear weapons while arms control negotiations proceed (while foreswearing any use of or threat to use nuclear weapons). This latter point has a subtlety which many, including the Soviet Union, will find difficult to grasp. The corollary to this proposition is that military officers who participate in planning for the use of nuclear weapons or who are associated with the employment of nuclear weapons cannot morally belong to the faith of those espousing this proposition.

Because a number of students had voiced concern over the ongoing debate and its implications for military officers, we recently spent an afternoon at the Naval War College listening to a panel of distinguished clergy and laymen present their views on the question of the morality of nuclear deterrence. The majority did not share the views of the spokesman for the extreme view, but emphasized the need for curbing the arms race through arms control, pointing out that a strategy of nuclear deterrence was morally tolerable; not satisfactory, but tolerable.

Fortunately, there was also a recognition of the need to defend one's country and home against aggression in any form. Our students, who participated on a voluntary basis, questioned the panel at length. At the end of the session, many questions remained and, while no solutions were reached, it was a good airing of a timely and sensitive question.

This debate was, in microcosm, a reflection of the enigma of nuclear weapons. The genie is indeed out of the bottle and the practicality of stuffing it back in the bottle is extremely remote under current conditions of the superpower relationship.

I have talked with a number of people who oppose reliance on nuclear weapons in any form. Unfortunately,
these discussions have not been marked by any proposed solutions which bear any reasonable prospect of attainment.

Several points, which often appear to be swept under the rug in the emotional nuclear debate, should be borne in mind:

1. The U.S. military is as acutely aware (perhaps more so) of the potential damage of the employment of nuclear weapons as are other concerned Americans.

2. It does take two to tango in the macabre world of arms control. Unless we can negotiate from a position of adequate strength, very little incentive to negotiate is offered to the other side. And, most importantly, unless the basic approach of the Soviet Union to real arms control changes radically, very little of substance can be expected to emerge from arms control negotiations.

3. Cosmetic agreements for the sake of agreements themselves hurt more than they help. Significant cuts, particularly in the area of fixed land-based strategic ballistic missiles, should be the primary goal of both sides.

4. Any agreement must be equitable and verifiable. While this may appear simplistic, it is the bedrock of any arms control agreement. Adequate verification may be increasingly difficult to attain several decades hence.

5. Arms control efforts must be woven into the whole fabric of national security policy. This has not been so in the past.

6. Arms control efforts must be undertaken in close coordination and consultation with our allies. After-the-fact consultation can only generate distrust and lack of solidarity.

I have lived in the arcane world of arms control for a number of years and have experienced both its frustrations and its hopes. We all want a more secure and peaceful world. We do need to be mindful of John F. Kennedy's caution that negotiations "are not a substitute for strength—they are an instrument for the translation of strength into survival and peace."

EDWARD F. WELCH, JR.
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THE FLEET BALLISTIC MISSILE

SUBMARINE—AN IRRESISTIBLE FUTURE

by

Captain Robert H. Smith, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Several decades ago, when the fleet ballistic missile submarines were first commencing their patrols, copies of a certain seascape were distributed. Sub-titled "Polaris on Station," it showed an empty ocean and a gull wheeling above the gray waves. The painting was a favorite of Admiral Arleigh Burke, then CNO, who saw to it that it came to the attention of many.

The SSBNs are on patrol still. Their missiles, increasing in range, accuracy and payload, have evolved smoothly through successive modifications of Polaris and Poseidon; there is now Trident I and eventually there will be Trident II. Year after year SSBNs have been going to sea, disappearing and returning in accordance with their unannounced schedules. The Blue crew departs, the Gold takes over. The very silence that attends it is testimony to the soundness of the concept, the technical skill and imagination going into its creation, and no less to the character and training of those who man the "Boomers." Some day, far off, they will tell their stories; perhaps too there will be novels worthy of these men and their ships. The right ones will catch the human flavor, the exhilaration when the first topside hatch is flung open at patrol's end, the joy of fresh air and sunlight once again.

An irresistible idea from the outset, the argument for placing more nuclear deterrent power in submarines grows stronger. Yet doubts persistently shadow that message so perfectly conveyed in Admiral Burke's popular seascape.

Some shadows should dissipate naturally. The saga of the Trident submarine's construction difficulties will not be dwelled upon. One suspects, from history of other painfully born weapons systems, that the troubles will recede in their wakes as first Ohio, and then other Tridents, slip away on patrol routinely and all but unnoticed. Nothing vanquishes criticism like success.

Ambivalence pervades the Navy's own attitudes towards its SSBNs. There is admiration for their superb professionalism, respect for their vital role. But there is also the view that regards the SSBNs as a force apart, not really quite naval at all, while at the same time they are large consumers of resources that presumably could be used to...
strengthen a Navy hard pressed on many seas. The validity of that view, however, is based upon the wishful idea of a more fluid interchangeability of funds than is borne out by experience of the real world of appropriations. Had SSBNs never existed, it does not automatically follow that today’s Navy would be richer by another aircraft carrier or a single frigate. These must justify themselves through the logic of different debates.

However, the author would like to slip away from unsatisfying arguments and take a different tack. To try to turn grudging acceptance into something better, we offer thoughts on two levels, both conceptual and inspirational. First the conceptual.

Begin by rejecting the perception that holds the SSBN to be alien to our fundamental notions of seapower. In the SSBN we see exemplified great mobility, concentration of firepower, the ability of a warship to lose itself in the vastness of the oceans only to reappear and be ready once again when needed; we see too the ability to project power ashore and to measure the involvement of that projected power, to fire and wait, to disappear and return to fire again. It is naval power that a returning Mahan would not find difficult to accommodate to his theories. It is the protean embodiment of presence and deterrent power.

On the inspirational side we simply assert that over a span of turbulent flowing history in which U.S. pride and prestige, its strength as well, has undergone more than its share of affronts and bruises, the SSBNs have been a memorable success, a source of gratification to the nation. The glow of their performance has brightened the Navy.

Most enduring of the doubts about the SSBN, however far-fetched, still revolve around questions of potential vulnerability. Doubts are kept alive in some quarters not entirely in the spirit of pure inquiry.
unknown to ourselves, and overstepping advances in sensors that ignore the modest evidence of their many year track record. Study demands consideration, along with acoustics, of all kinds of exotic and nonacoustic phenomenology, lasers, radiation, infrared, turbulence anomalies, heat, internal waves, biologics, contaminants, magnetics and electromagnetics, even neutrinos, as possible candidates for detection and tracking. The foregoing are a sampling of items bandied about in the unclassified literature, a grab bag for the serious researcher and the imaginative amateur alike.

Any of these ideas theoretically can serve. But it is easily forgotten that the detection process in the sea is always a matter of catching hold of short-lived phenomenon of passage, or a struggle against terrific energy losses to discriminate useful signals against a cluttered background and, in the quest for longer ranges, a setting of detection thresholds that risk hoarding numbers of false alarms beyond which the process becomes self-defeating. Get close enough and one can probably detect an SSBN with anything. But how does one manage to get close in the first place? There’s the rub.

A flaw in many studies, and the cause of their frequently somber tone, is too-quick a willingness, having found reference in Soviet writings to research in some area, to be convinced that our adversary has attained a workable, indeed threatening, capability and is taking it to sea. In this it helps to be young. Then concern over what the Soviets may be able to achieve is unhindered by memory. One does not have to recall the tremendous surge of research by the United States in alternative detection schemes that grew out of the Battle of the Atlantic, and which went on for many years afterwards, nor how the vigor of investigation waned as the promise of each new idea turned to dust.

In conjunction with predictions of great advances in sensors, but perhaps also to compensate for those advances not being fulfilled, it is necessary as well to impute to the enemy tactics involving extraordinary numbers of ships and airplanes. Sometimes it will be Soviet surface forces conducting broad searches meant to drive the SSBNs into a killing trap, to corral them; in other cases it may be aircraft making magnetic anomaly detector sweeps. This latter one is an oldie, reviving periodically to compete for our attention and ultimately, good sense again triumphant, to be discarded. For if it helps to be young, it is also de rigueur to be without operational experience, to know the sea and military forces only from books. One must believe in the picture of large numbers of long-range Soviet aircraft—try thirty, fifty—operating thousands of miles from their bases, flying abreast a few miles apart in a front a hundred miles wide, using a short-range localization device and skimming a bare few hundred feet above the ocean surface hour after hour. These aircraft must be relieved by another equally large flight of aircraft, and then yet another . . . a million square miles of ocean searched out in a few days.

Such an operation, in which there are no false contacts or gaps in coverage, where bad weather never intrudes and the MAD gear works perfectly in the hands of errorless operators, bears no relation to the unsteady world of oceans that the U.S. Navy knows. Implicit too in these scenarios is the assumption that numbers, indefinitely increased, can do the trick. Four times as many ships do four times as well; ignored are the coordination problems, the saturation of the environment with noise, the rising rates of self-generated false contacts and the sharp decline in efficiency.

A further condition indispensable to accepting any possibility of the foregoing kinds of hypotthesized operations succeeding is adherence on the part of
the U.S. Navy to what must be described succinctly, if not with analytical precision, as the “fat, dumb, and happy” syndrome. No matter how startling what is happening out there—whether it be surface forces steaming back and forth across critical patrol areas, or an armada of Bear-Fs thundering over the wave tops—we are oblivious, without interest or reaction. Not merely, by the way, has the nation failed to note the creation of all these extra forces the Soviets would need to carry out these awesomely forced scenarios—a buildup that would take years—but our SSBNs feel neither curiosity nor alarm. They do not turn away from, and at once set distance between, those persistent sounds of hostile echo-ranging being heard even through the hull. They simply plod on in patterns of unfailing repetitiveness. Nor does higher command see fit, at the first signs of such unprecedented Soviet operations, to move decisively to order our SSBNs to remote areas beyond the reach of the would-be detector and his weapons. As if there were not, when survivability suddenly becomes the dominant objective, hundreds of millions of square miles available when the great southern oceans are included.

Generally glossed over in consideration of these SSBN-threatening scenarios, is the context of politico-military strategy in which they would have to fit. We do not delve sufficiently into what reasons presumably the Soviets would be trying so mightily to kill our SSBNs. The effort would not be made in isolation. It does not make sense to try to kill one or two SSBNs; there is logic only with intent to destroy them all. Otherwise, the result is merely to sound an enormous alarm, alerting, probably panicking, the U.S. into action whose consequences the Soviets could not predict but which would, as a minimum, cost them surprise.

Thus if the Soviets were to mount such an effort it would have to be accomplished covertly, and as part of a total strategy in which the mass destruction of the SSBNs is coordinated with closely timed, intricately planned strikes at the full strategic deterrent power, land-based and air-based as well, of the United States. This presumptive dark miracle, with its added challenge to the Soviets of placing themselves, without U.S. knowledge, in position to destroy all SSBNs simultaneously and on signal, is, of course, another variant of the “out of the blue skies” scenario. It is a script, as Herman Kahn observes, in which no one over fifty can believe. Least of all can one credit it to the coldly rational and cautious power structure of the Soviet Union.

If a certain lack of reverence has been noted in this inquiry into SSBN vulnerability—and space precludes addressing a host of other theories that crave rebuttal—one can only reply that there are matters for which only irreverence will do.

One occasionally wonders if such study, most of it supported by the Navy itself, has not in a curious and unintended way served to keep alive doubts which otherwise could be dispelled. Continual questioning confers plausibility to questions that do not merit it. To the outside observer our SSBNs are a system seemingly constantly in need of reassurance. There is no precedent, it is something new in the world, for a system so terrific, demonstrably so successful, to examine its performance with such minute introspection, as if ever fearing the worst.

Yet it is an explicable paradox that the Navy itself is the primary sponsor of these studies. To begin with, it is mandated by Congress. But also the effort has much substantive value. It keeps us thinking, alert, virtually eliminates even the remote possibility of being out-paced technologically. No less importantly, it defends against domestic political surprise. It is protection against the foolishness of such
predictions, repeated by some who ought to know better, that in a few years (fill in any number you wish) research will have found a way of making the seas "transparent," presumably in acoustical terms. The Navy's money is well spent on the kind of homework that allows it to reply with confidence: Baloney!

Consider, though, just suppose that—at some future time, in some unimaginable way—the seas actually were rendered transparent. Literally, all at once, the wave of a magician's wand and the seas become as clear as crystal, every submarine instantly as visible as the giant bluefin tuna migrating across the glittering shallows off Bimini. How bad off would we be? Well, if every SSBN were totally visible at all times, and indeed also obligingly bathed in floodlights by night, the problem of an enemy's fulfilling the essential conditions of their neutralization, the continuous tracking and instant readiness for the coordinated destruction of them all, would remain immense, probably impossible still. Nor, by the way, is the SSBN exactly toothless if it has to eliminate a pesky shadower. Readers may detect here echoes of arguments that defend the idea of taking deterrent power to sea in surface ships as well. Fair arguments they remain too.

The irony is little remarked how vigorously we exercise ourselves over hypothetical perils to an elusive SSBN continually in motion, able to alter its area of uncertainty by a thousand square miles in a single hour, a quarter of a million square miles in a day, when compared to the fixity of our missiles in silos, their surveyed locations known to the same inches of accuracy that one's lot is written in the county records.

Some advantages of the SSBN and the case for taking more deterrent power to sea have already been implied, others are so obvious that they have become cliché and it is hard to make ourselves listen. Here we go anyway. As has been said, mankind needs less to be instructed than to be reminded.

Of invulnerability, and hence survivable power, enough said. In nuclear strategy such are chips of gold in an impervious vault.

Equally obvious is the truth that to the extent that we take nuclear weapons to sea we remove crucial military targets from the land where people live, away from cities and farms and industries that constitute our societal network, the civilization that we resolve to preserve.

An advantage of the SSBN is the testable, directly measurable, confidence that we can place in its dependability. At sea we are able to proceed through the full sequence of command and control, launch, firing, flight and impact phases of system operation, including random missile selection, in procedures that cannot be duplicated realistically with land-based missiles close to cities. The foregoing leads to contemplation of another factor, less often mentioned, which is the inherent advantage of military power concentrated in a military vehicle, completely militarily manned, divorced from external support. Sixty days at a time men and ship are removed from home and highway, getting to and from the job, and the beguiling distractions of the civilian interface. On patrol the ballistic missile submarine represents to the nation tautly contained deterrent power in a state of constant alert, dedicated to its task twenty-four hours a day.

A profound evolution of U.S. nuclear strategy, although it has been taking place over a number of years, only recently has gained prominence in the public consciousness. Change has taken place through realization that what deters the United States from nuclear war is not necessarily what will deter the Soviet Union. The Soviets have made it plain that they do not believe in Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). The widespread American view of nuclear war, i.e., that the first use of any
nuclear weapons will swiftly and inevitably escalate into the spasms of all-out attack, leaving merely dazed and hopeless survivors in the ruins to repent their follies, and with nothing more happening after this exchange of punishment, is not reflected in Soviet strategy or tactics. Terrible as these weapons are, the Soviets regard them not for deterrence, but for the fighting and the winning of wars. Now, the average U.S. citizen's attitude towards the use of nuclear weapons may, at bottom, be absolutely the accurate one—even as we seek through the dialogue of SALT and other means to persuade the Soviets that their view is the wrong one—but the challenge remains. We are forced to confront the asymmetry of the opposing views and to ask ourselves what it is then that will deter the Soviets. We do not know for sure, but there is one thing that ought to stop them.

It is not, as many persons are quick to fear, and as Soviet propagandists play the hypocritical tune, that we are planning to fight nuclear wars, or toying with the idea that such can be won. Rather, U.S. strategy is to convince the Soviets that whatever kind of war they might choose to start, they cannot possibly win. To keep that thought constantly in the forefront of Soviet consciousness, no better way exists than sufficient SSBNs at sea. Capable of firing its payload in large salvos, or meting it out in discrete deliveries as commanded over time, able to attack from unpredictable directions, the SSBN constitutes a uniquely flexible and indestructible war-fighting capability whose meaning is unmistakable to the Soviets. No vehicle can serve so well the demands of new strategies that must be credible to the Soviets beyond any possible temptation of perilous miscalculation. This emerging truth, more than any other, argues for greater U.S. reliance on the deterrent advantages of the SSBN. Evidence is growing that the people of the United States are getting together on this one.

Something like a national consensus recently seemed to take shape in regard to the proposed MX deployment scheme, all the many variants of the "shell game," and in the President's subsequent decision to defer further action until 1984. For a fleeting time at least a disparate body of opinion—conservative and liberal alike, Easterner and Westerner, the environmentalist and many a military professional as well—were united in opposition. A wave of negative feeling surged and peaked. The whole vast assemblage of concrete holes and poky transporters out there in the desert all at once struck a great many people as a poor way to proceed, an idea whose time had passed. It seemed that the most advanced technological nation on earth ought somehow to be able to find a better way of doing the job. Deflected for several years, the idea is probably dead forever.

The author is not aiming to topple the Triad, though notaverse, as is evident, to giving it a nudge. Also we observe that the arguments for it are not graven in stone and history records, in weapons as everything else, a new star's ascendancy while another sets. The logic of its circumstances suggests that the value of the land-based missile will diminish, the uses for which it is uniquely suited inexorably shrinking. Given the missiles present and forecast for the SSBN—given too the increasing prospects of accuracies comparable to those fired from land—justification for the land-based missile appears to narrow to, and to hinge upon, the issue of connectivity. If it be deemed an imperative that unbreakable and secure communications—such as are only possible, if at all, only through land-lines—continuously link at least one leg of the Triad, then the case for the land-based missile continues prima facie. However, the author questions the basic premise of
such ironclad connectivity, believing it not indispensable in terms of nuclear strategy and doubting the attainability of that ideal in practice.

Today's on-racing pace of technological development has left the average citizen far behind, groping in a fog where understanding of military weapons is concerned. The sciences upon which they are based have grown increasingly abstruse, the systems ever more complex, and theories of war have acquired vocabularies indecipherable except to the specialist. Not so long ago, a man might roughly relate the instruments of war and its vehicles to something touching his civilian existence, the four-wheeled vehicle, the rifle with which he hunts deer, the piston-popping aircraft, and the artillery shell, the latter's explosions not so different, except in magnitude, from what he saw when dynamiting stumps. No more.

Yet once in a while fortunately the citizen may suddenly, and gratifyingly, grasp something about one of the mysterious systems for which he pays his taxes. A ray of light comes through a chink in the clouds, illuminating some truth that had been hiding from him.

Consider our citizen more closely. If the world at times baffles him, he also has the affluence to help put worries aside. He can travel to lovely places. Picture him winging to Hawaii, say—he may be a doctor from Sauk Centre, a grocer from Waco, no matter—his thoughts are on pleasure, of palm trees and warm beaches waiting. A few hundred miles out from San Francisco the coastal clouds clear and he looks down at the Pacific. He leans back, sips a cocktail, munches from a packet of macadamia nuts. Meal and movie come and go and still the flight drones on, five-hundred-fifty miles an hour. He orders another mai-tai—why not, it's vacation time, hiboo—and after a doze that ocean is still below, his plane seemingly suspended above an infinitude of blue. It occurs to him that there's an awful lot of ocean out there and that on his entire flight he has glimpsed but a tiny fraction of it. And at this point he has an inkling at least of the truth that mariners learn the hard way—a reality that cannot be grasped by putting one's arms around a twelve-inch globe—that the earth is mostly immense wases of water.

Back home, when our rested traveler reads headlines on nuclear strategy, or hears noisy debate on the tube, recollection may stir in him of those hours flying over the ocean. And suddenly it hits him: "Hey, there's where to put those beasts, far from my town and where no enemy can ever find them." Now almost certainly—and this is neither to patronize our citizen nor to enshrine lack of sophistication in a special dim world—he has no knowledge of acoustic propagation loss, never seen a sound velocity profile, and if he's ever heard of a neutrino, he may vaguely suppose that it's a kind of diet biscuit. But his instincts, multiplied millions of times, add up to a collective wisdom that time should only strengthen. Because, hey, the guy is bang on right!

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Captain Smith, well known for his provocative articles on naval matters, particularly on antisubmarine warfare, is Vice President of the Summit Research Corporation near Washington, D.C.
NOW IS THE TIME
TO: RETHINK, REDESIGN, AND REDEPLOY
NAVAL AVIATION

by

Captain William K. Sullivan, U.S. Navy

Naval commanders have always prided themselves on the Service’s ability to operate outside the constraints of politics ashore while still remaining readily available nearby at sea to intercede as necessary. Partly for this reason, naval aviation and the Marines have played prominent roles in most crises since the end of World War II.

However, unless our forces become dramatically stronger than they are now, we cannot continue to muster local superiority in such areas as the Arabian Sea on a sustained basis while still maintaining carrier presence elsewhere. Any attempt to do so will aggravate personnel and maintenance problems long present within the naval air forces, and could deal a final death blow to near-term readiness. Clearly, if we are to go on deploying in the ways to which we have become accustomed, we must have more ships. Still, a goal of 600 ships now appears on its way to becoming the victim of any one of several factors:

- Major defense cuts required to balance the federal budget or to make way for revived social programs.
- Failure to meet retention and enlistment goals in the long term.
- Inability of the industrial base in the near term to increase ship construction significantly.

Therefore, in planning naval aviation’s future, we should establish certain criteria which, in the face of uncertainty, will provide a force capable of supporting our national strategy. These are:

- To maintain our flexibility while confronting strategic and economic uncertainty.
- To integrate and correlate our existing forces where possible to stretch their operating capability.
- To be prepared to continue with a fleet of fewer than 600 ships.

If the budget axe falls then we will still want to maintain the offensive capability inherent in our carrier battle groups. The geographic range of the Navy’s responsibilities is too broad, and its forces too small, to adopt a defensive posture in a global conflict. The war must be taken to the enemy, with the objective of destroying his naval forces so we can retain our freedom of action. Perhaps, then, a new way to deploying our carriers should be considered, one which permits us to concentrate superior power at the point of confrontation so that the battle can be fought on our terms.

A New Carrier Deployment Policy.

The traditional way to provide combat capability in support of a U.S.
military strategy of forward defense has been to keep as much of the fleet forward as possible. The question must be asked, "are such forward deployments still credible?" A more efficient program for deploying our carrier forces would seem to be the first order of business. The objective should be to decrease our strategic uncertainty and increase that of our foes by increasing our flexibility and readiness. This is particularly important in a global conflict when the boundaries between the Atlantic and Pacific fleets' areas of responsibility will begin to blur, requiring the fleets to support each other on a more regular basis. Even in a regional crisis such mutual support is necessary in order to prevent an inequitable workload from falling upon one fleet or the other. Such assistance was rendered during the Korean and Vietnam wars and continues to this day.

However, after a generation and more of straining our carriers and their men to do everything anyone thought to demand of them, carrier deployments should be planned to accommodate only the most important U.S. interests. Now consideration must be given to the needs of our personnel, the demands of maintenance, and an equal workload.

The way to do this is to deploy only two carriers at one time. One, the on-station ready carrier, would be in the area of immediate concern to U.S. interests (likely to be Southwest Asia for the foreseeable future). The other, the standby carrier, would be in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, or the Pacific, ready to respond to other potential crises or to reinforce the on-station ready carrier. Neither would be scheduled to be away from home port more than six months, and the standby carrier would relieve the ready carrier on station after three months. The rest of the carrier force not in overhaul or service life extension would be held in home waters, ready to deploy either in succession or en masse as the situation warrants.

This change in deployment habit and custom will increase our readiness to go where formerly we seldom went. And that is becoming more and more important as the potential for trouble increases in Africa, the Caribbean, and Central America. A plan for responsive carrier deployments will also more readily support a sequential naval strategy, one where we have to pick and choose between many commitments. This is an exigency we probably will have to contend with for a long time.

Any plan which would withdraw continuous carrier presence from waters where U.S. naval air has customarily operated is certain to provoke debate. However, our familiar deployment habits have tended to leave much of the fleet vulnerable to destruction by Soviet long-range air. Furthermore, a fleet spread as thin as ours normally cannot be prepared as well as it ought to be for either a war or a crisis. If the Soviets were to attack either NATO or someplace else it would be more disconcerting to them to speculate on how to handle carriers deploying in force than to contend with a few small and geographically fixed battle groups.

Releasing the forces from fixed deployment schedules would also ease the expensive demand on the logistic support ships, which even in non-war must strain to meet the demands we place upon them. In order to maintain some enduring presence overseas, our forward deployed forces—currently centering on the carrier battle group—could be replaced by smaller battle groups consisting of surface ships and attack submarines armed with cruise missiles. The carriers would be deployed in force only to trouble spots, they would sail only as required, remain only as long as required, and be relieved by lesser forces for an enduring presence as soon as possible.
The concept of responsive carrier deployments has a significant offensive connotation—for it opens up to us the ability to respond with maximum force to strengthen any of our smaller battle groups that might be threatened. The concept not only recognizes a situation that is being forced upon us by events, but it also acknowledges our inability to maintain a continuous presence in three oceans at a time. The difference between 12 and 15 carriers would probably still be marginal in terms of accommodating the threat and a fixed deployment schedule in three oceans when one views an ever-expanding list of commitments for carrier forces well into the next century.

While overseas homeporting of additional carriers might be reconsidered, this move is fraught with possible problems. Events are changing too rapidly, even within countries allied to us, to foresee the consequences of such a move. Facilities established to support overseas homeporting of an additional carrier could be totally lost if we found ourselves forced out of the host country.

A Policy to Integrate and Correlate Our Forces.

Captain Jeremy D. Taylor's proposal to assign the majority of the Marine Corps' tactical aviation to carrier air wings deserves serious consideration. Captain Taylor would assign the Marines to the three additional ships planned to achieve a force of 15 deployable carriers in the desired 600-ship fleet. The following force design expands on Captain Taylor's article. Further, it envisions that funds needed to pay for Navy aircraft and Navy aircrews for the additional carriers would instead become available for another proposal, to be examined shortly.

The force design envisions three amphibious strike forces, each built around a strike carrier. Suitable strike aircraft drawn from Marine air wings would be assigned to the strike carrier and the other aviation-capable ships. Conventional aircraft would operate from the strike carriers, while VSTOL and helicopters would operate from the LHAs, LPHs, and LPDs. Most air operations would be conducted from strike force ships, except when the situation allows for temporary shore basing. This concept resurrects the sea-basing concept and expands it to include a strike carrier. An enlarged sea-basing design is necessary since the full spectrum of Marine air cannot be deployed until secure airfields are available in or near the amphibious objective area. Presently, such deployment relies on an existing airfield or on building one, assuming the terrain allows for such construction.

Therefore, although Marine air is tactically superior in terms of flexibility and diversity of aircraft, there is, in actuality, little conceptual difference between the way the Marines and the Air Force's Tactical Air Command plan to deploy their air assets into a theater. Hence, USMC tactical air lacks the unique quality of the forward deployed Marine ground and helicopter forces during the crucial employment phase of an operation when the landing force must primarily depend on Navy tactical air for support. The fragmentation of the USMC assault system during this crucial phase brings into serious question the integrity of the Marine air-ground task force. Expanded sea-basing of Marine tactical air would also provide for an increase in readily available air-delivered firepower, particularly if there is a delay in delivering ashore conventional fire support means such as tanks and artillery.

The Midway is a likely candidate to be one of the strike force carriers, since she is already homeported overseas near the First Marine Air Wing. As Captain Taylor points out, two other likely candidates are the currently idle Oriskany and Bon Homme Richard.

One of the battleships planned for reactivation would also be assigned
each amphibious strike force for gunfire support. The cruise missiles planned for the B3s would primarily be the antiship version—a capability that would increase protection of the force during stand-off and all-weather operations against enemy ships. Conventional take-off and landing and VSTOL aircraft would operate from the force’s carrier, while the helicopters would be dispersed throughout the other aviation-capable ships, such as the LHAs and LPHs.

Conceptual Amphibious Strike Force 1986-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>No. of Ship</th>
<th>Ships</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Helos CTOL/VSTOL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CVL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3600</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPH</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3800</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LHD</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tr>
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<td>LSD</td>
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<td>400</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2280</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BB</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14,680</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Approximately equal to the Tacair supporting a Marine Amphibious Brigade.

A program to make the LPDs totally VSTOL-capable should be considered as another way of increasing aircraft dispersal at sea in order to decrease force vulnerability. The little-known success of such ships as bases for coastal interdiction aircraft during the Vietnam war attests to the potential of using this highly underrated ship in an offensive air support role. The redesign of the requested LHD-X amphibious assault ship so she can handle VSTOL aircraft, a proposal made last summer by Senator Gary Hart (D-Colo.), would provide still another way of dispersing aviation within the amphibious task force. The force could be provided some ASW and antiship surveillance and targeting capability through the use of the carriers or converted LPDs as host ships for helicopters designed for landings.

The next step would be to assign the ready amphibious strike force to the Rapid Deployment Force. This infusion of extra mobility and offensive firepower consisting of an old but rejuvenated attack aircraft carrier, some smaller deck carriers, and some ships armed both with cruise missiles and heavy guns, would greatly enhance the value of the Rapid Deployment Force. Just as in the proposal for a new carrier development policy, the amphibious strike forces would also be held in home waters, to be used only when and where the situation warrants.

Additional troops and equipment not aboard strike force shipping could be transported by Military Sealift Command shipping or airlifted to an embarkation point near the amphibious objective area, loaded aboard the empty amphibious ships, and then delivered to the landing zone. If required, the remainder of Marine aircraft would fly directly from their home bases to the objective area once suitable airfields for them have been secured.

This arrangement would be a vast improvement on the way we deploy Marines presently, for it would be imprudent indeed to commit the small units forward deployed during a major war without undue risk to all of them.

An Alternative to the 600-Ship Navy.

The development of a long-range naval aviation strike force may be an alternative to building a significant number of ships if the latter proves to be prohibitively expensive in terms of time and cost. Such a force lends itself to be manned to a significant degree by reserve personnel and could exemplify the success of the U.S. Naval Reserve P-3' squadrons and the Air National Guard. When faced with mobilization, the reserves in this force would more likely be operationally ready to augment the regular Navy than, for example, those in a squadron of frigates. Tactically it would seem, for example, that the Battle of the North Atlantic could be
fought well with an aircraft designed for:

- Strikes against the foe's naval infrastructure, using cruise missiles.
- Attacks on the enemy's surface ships.
- Laying mines in waters which otherwise we couldn't reach.

A force with such an aircraft would not be a separate strategic air command encroaching upon Air Force responsibilities, for the long-range naval aviation strike force would be engaged solely in the naval mission of sea control and sea denial. During World War II, the Navy flew its own bombers for control of waters within range of land bases and it is time again to investigate seriously the feasibility of this approach. The 1958 DOD Reorganization Act and the 1975 Collateral Functions Training Agreement addressed the general concept of the U.S. Air Force training for and performing collateral functions in support of naval sea control operations. However, with the demise of the B-52D, there will be a void in USN-USAF interaction which will likely not be filled as readily by a sophisticated supersonic successor less capable for sea control operations, and more committed to strategic bombing missions, than its subsonic predecessor. While the carrier battle groups would continue to have an antisurface warfare mission, the long-range naval aviation strike force would allow them more opportunity to concentrate on local conventional and tactical nuclear warfare strike missions outside the coverage of the LRNA force.

With the significant savings realized by using Marine air wings on additional carriers rather than funding more Navy air wings, it will be possible, at least in part, to fund the design, development, and procurement of long-range aircraft. For the same cost, this is likely to result in procuring more offensive power. For example, considering personnel alone, it would seem that a long-range force designed primarily for offensive missions could be manned with significantly fewer people than a surface force with equivalent offensive capability, a significant consideration when one is uncertain if future enlistment and retention objectives are realistic. By the mid-1990s the number of eighteen-year-olds will decline by 26 percent from 1979's record high. The implications of smaller manpower requirements are apparent in terms of money and manpower. The considerations are even more important if the long-range naval air force were substantially manned by reservists.

Economically and operationally, a case can also be made for deactivating the reserve-manned carrier air wings in favor of using the money and personnel for a partially reserve-manned long-range naval aviation strike force. The latter would likely be a more reliable force since it would respond more quickly and be logistically maintained more easily than the reserve carrier air wings. We possess reserve carrier air wings on the assumption that there will be flight decks available immediately. But those decks may not be there when the reservists are ready for them. Even now, the reserve P-3 squadrons are about 24 percent less costly to operate than the reserve carrier squadrons, a factor that would likely be similarly applicable to a reserve-manned long-range naval aviation strike force. Such a force could also be maintained readily by civilian technicians and mechanics during a period when skilled Navy personnel were scarce. Another consideration aiding readiness is the fact that naval air reservists work in civilian occupations more closely associated with their active-duty assignments than surface reservists—whether performing their civilian or their military duties, many are pilots, technicians, and mechanics, whereas few surface reservists perform their service skills in civilian jobs.
In order to build weapon systems with a powerful offensive capability without drastically increasing their size and manning, both of which add to the cost, we must build those that require the least possible in the way of defense. The long-range aircraft defensive mechanisms would be less expensive than those of surface ships since greater survivability would be inherent in their environment of operations. Such aircraft, operating over water distant from Soviet antiair weapons and fighters, would be safe compared to ships which—in the same waters—would be vulnerable to antiship missiles and torpedoes. Furthermore, the aircraft would not be as susceptible to chemical or biological warfare as surface forces. In modern terms, the long-range naval aircraft may be the best way to gain maximum offensive power without having to invest in defensive systems, which may be both expensive and unreliable. More importantly, a force of such aircraft would not require construction of AAW and ASW escorts. The Air Force's AWACS aircraft could provide the AEW they would need.

A force of long-range naval aircraft would provide the least vulnerable, most expeditious, and most credible means we could have of coming to the aid of our Nordic allies bordering the Norwegian Sea, not only through the use of weapons such as Tomahawk, but also through that of the naval mine. Presently the Navy cannot lay mines on a large scale in seas, harbors, or critical chokepoints. A force such as we have been discussing and able to conduct offensive minelaying offers an opportunity for the Navy to take advantage of this highly cost-effective approach to warfare. As we perceive the possibility that the Soviet Navy is shifting from sea denial to sea control operations, we must be prepared to reverse our roles in this area and counter their numerical superiority through the development of a versatile, mine-capable, sea-denial long-range naval aviation strike force.

While recognizing that the time on station of aircraft would not match that of ships, their in-transit reaction time to potential crisis spots would be significantly faster, which would partially compensate for their lesser endurance. New propeller technology is also promising and may result in fuel savings from 25 to 40 percent above present turboprop aircraft operating at subsonic speeds of 0.7 to 0.8 Mach. Long-endurance aircraft designed for up to five days airborne are now on the drawing board.

The fact is that the U.S. Navy will be needing a new maritime patrol aircraft in the late 1980s or early 1990s to replace the P-3 series aircraft. The VPX could come in several subsonic versions of a standard airframe suitable not only for ASW but also for long-range attack missions, electronic warfare, refueling, logistics, and strategic communications. Large aircraft are more easily standardized in design for multimission concepts than are small aircraft. Not only would a subsonic aircraft be satisfactory operationally, but it would not require the scarce and costly strategic materials needed to build sophisticated supersonic aircraft.

At any time the industrial base can be geared up more quickly to produce aircraft than to produce ships. This would be particularly true if the aircraft were a variant of a new commercial transport planned for production over a period of several years. Using a variant of a commercial aircraft would also be less expensive than specially designing an airplane for the Navy, since the engine and airframe tooling expenses would have been borne by the company which developed the aircraft. Such an approach would also be a significant step toward keeping our commercial aircraft-building companies viable during a period when they may be dependent upon defense work. Other alternatives might be a Navy modification of the Wide Bodied Cruise Missile...
Carrier, of the long-endurance Big Bird aircraft, both of which are being considered as airborne launching platforms for missiles.

In short, the long-range naval air force might help us redesign our Navy so we can both afford it and man it.

Establishing a force of long-range aircraft at the expense of carrier aviation and surface ships will certainly make it harder for the Navy to attain balanced force levels. However, such a goal may be impossible anyway when considering the many multifaceted tasks our Navy performs. Even if a balance were eventually realized, the scales would still be small in comparison with those by which the Soviet Navy measures their symmetry. Therefore, we should consider developing intentional force asymmetries in areas other than our sea-based air supremacy. A LRRA strike force, with a significant mine-laying capability, may more effectively direct our efforts against the geographic and tactical limitations of the Soviet Navy than surface combatants which will be needed for escort missions.

In summary, we can have a deployment plan which results in greater readiness and flexibility on the part of our carrier and amphibious forces, at less operating, maintenance, and personnel costs than we presently pay.

Certainly the plan implies a version of the swing strategy—one that deploys our naval aviation and amphibious assets from either or both coasts to wherever they best suit our interests. While there are political sensitivities to such a strategy on the part of certain allies, it may be time to confront those apprehensions directly. In any event, even though they are not always acknowledged because of internal political reasons, our interests and those of our allies coincide more often than not.

In the long run, a responsive carrier and amphibious force strategy may be more palatable for our allies to accept, primarily because it can be made more credible than one in which continuous regional presence sometimes results in political irritations. Lastly, formation of a long-range naval air force will meet the sea control and sea denial missions in an effective and economical manner. The result of implementing these concepts might be the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps able to emerge from the initial devastation of hostilities with a force still capable of protecting all essential U.S. interests worldwide.

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**BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY**

Captain Sullivan is a naval flight officer currently on the staff of the Naval War College.

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**NOTES**


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The Heart of the Matter:
Remarks on Operations and Logistics

"I have always been deeply interested in the administrative side of love, which I find more absorbing than its purely erotic aspects. What Lady Chatterley and her gamekeeper did in the woods is, to me, of only passing interest, compared with how they got there, what arrangements were made for shelter in the case of inclement weather, and for refreshments, how they accounted for their absence, whether either party could recover incidental expenses, and in so how. This attitude is, after all, not so unreasonable. Most great generals have admitted that planning campaigns and winning victories in the field is relatively easy compared with arranging transport and supplies. An army, Napoleon said, in one of his most celebrated remarks, marches on its stomach. So do lovers. If the administrative arrangements are faulty, the campaign which follows cannot but be laborious, and even victory brings little satisfaction."

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Editor's Note: The Naval War College Review is indebted to Lt. Cdr. Arthur Goldman, USNR (Ret.), for bringing this material to our attention.
"Amphibious warfare and combined operations," claimed Admiral of the Fleet Lord Roger Keyes, shortly after having been dismissed by Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill from his post as Director of Combined Operations, "is a form of warfare which is responsible for the foundation of our great worldwide Empire." It would indeed have been difficult for an island power to have acquired an empire any other way. Combined operations of one form or another certainly constituted the most characteristic mode of warfare adopted by the British during the period when Keyes was Director of Combined Operations. They were also, under his direction, the most conspicuously unrewarding in terms of practical military results.

Keyes' own introduction to combined operations was the bloody and unsuccessful assault on Gallipoli in 1915. He later commanded the great seaborne raid on Zeebrugge in 1918. This was also categorized by British official historians as a failure, because it did not achieve its primary purpose, the closure of the German U-boat base at Bruges. Churchill nonetheless described it as "the greatest feat of arms in the Great War and certainly . . . unsurpassed in the history of the Royal Navy." Before the second world war assaults of this kind, but hopefully more successful, appealed to the Commander-in-Chief Plymouth Station, Admiral Sir Reginald Ernest-Ernie-Plunkett-Drax, as an appropriate offensive strategy for the United Kingdom in a future European war. He proposed to Admiral of the Fleet Lord Cork and Orrery in September 1937 that "one or two brigades of Royal Marines should be entered and specifically trained as an amphibious striking force. It would be of great value if even one division of the British Army could be given special training in combined operations." In February 1939 Drax composed a memorandum pointing out that "the U.S. Royal Marines [sic] are regarded everywhere as a 'corps d'elite' because they
form the spearhead of every military expedition that is to be undertaken. For
the above reason I would urge that the creation of a Royal Marine striking
force of not less than one brigade should be fully considered at a very early date.”

Drax’s proposal was endorsed by Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond on the
very civilized grounds that “otherwise our offensive (in the major category) is
confined to the damnable business of air bombing.”

No action had however been
taken before the German invasion of
Poland raised the question of British intervention on the continent as an
immediate practical problem. Keyes,
then in retirement, called on Churchill
to suggest the possibility of a stroke
which might be delivered with great
effect by the Navy and RAF within the
next 36 hours or so.”

His proposal was not taken up. Nor was his subsequent offer to lead an expedition to occupy
Iceland, even though he claimed that
“the Royal Marines . . . would go anywhere in the world for me.”

The 2d Royal Marine Battalion sailed for
Reykjavik on 8 May 1940, but Keyes was
not with them.

The Iceland expedition could not be
termed a “raid,” in any event, involving
as it did the landing of a permanent
occupying force. But raids became a
matter for serious consideration when it
became apparent that the British
Expeditionary Force was going to be
either expelled from the Continent by
the advancing Germans or forced to
surrender. Parliamentary Under
Secretary of State for War Sir Henry Page
Croft asked his Minister, Anthony Eden,
if there were not “wonderful beach
landing places all along the Belgian and
French coast line? Why not,” he asked,
“land separate battalions with four days
rations, even if you have to bring them
out again at night?”

Churchill was highly responsive. He
told Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff
Committee General Sir Hastings L.
Ismay on 4 June, only twenty-four hours
after the evacuation from Dunkirk had been
completed, that “we should immediately
to work to organize raiding forces on these coasts where the population
is friendly. Such forces might be
composed of self-contained, thoroughly
equipped units of say one thousand up
to ten thousand when combined.”
Churchill had already decided where these units were to come from. He told Ismay
that “when the Australians arrive it is a
question whether they should not be
organized in detachments of 250 . . .
capable of landing on the friendly coasts
now held by the enemy . . . Enterprises
must be prepared with specially-
trained troops of the hunter class, who
can develop a reign of terror down these
coasts, first of all on the ‘butcher and
bitch’ policy; but later on . . . we could
surprise Calais or Boulogne, kill and
capture the Hun garrison, and hold the
place until all the preparations have
been made to reduce it.”

The command structure was set up at
once. Adjutant-General of the Royal
Marines Lieutenant General Alan G.
Bourne was appointed Commander,
Offensive Operations, on 11 June 1940,
with a directive to “harass the enemy
and cause him to disperse his forces, and
to create material damage, particularly
on the coastline from Northern Norway
to the western limit of German-
occupied France.”

Bourne was confirmed as Director of Combined Operations on 20 June. He began immediately
to do the best he could in terms of his
directive with what he had available.

On 24 June, 115 officers and enlisted
men of the 11th Independent Company
crossed the English Channel in eight
Air-Sea Rescue launches of the RAF, in
clear breach of the Geneva Convention
regarding the use of such vessels. They
landed at three points within a 20-mile
radius of Boulogne. One group found
nothing of interest. Another stalked a
German seaplane, which eventually flew
off, unaware of their presence. The
third killed two German sentries in an
affray at Le Toquet, during which the leader of the raiders had part of his ear shot off. These were but not wholly unsuccessful. Bourne’s next operation achieved total failure. Churchill had been particularly aggrieved by the bloodless German occupation of the Channel Islands. “If it be true,” he wrote to Ismay, “that a few hundred German troops have been landed on Jersey or Guernsey by troop-carriers, plans should be studied to land secretly by night on the islands and kill or capture the invaders. This is exactly one of the exploits for which the Commandos would be suited. . . . The only possible reinforcements which could reach the enemy during the fighting would be by aircraft-carriers [presumably meaning troop-carriers], and here would be a good opportunity for the Air Force fighting machines.” It might have seemed an even better opportunity for the Luftwaffe, as the British coast was 90 miles from the Channel Islands at the nearest point, and the coast of German-occupied France only 25 miles distant.

By the same token, however, it was the kind of operation that Croft had originally envisaged. He urged Eden to advise Churchill to “shell the Channel Islands to hell . . . work out a plan for the reconquest of the Channel Ports and holding a big area of North of France or Belgium, then if you are not strong enough to advance into Germany, let the enemy attack you until he has lost two million men.” Bourne’s enterprise was not on quite such a scale.

On the night of 14 July, he sent 11th Independent Company and 3rd Commando across the sea in two destroyers, landing them in seven Air-Sea Rescue launches. One launch broke down and its passengers had to be reembarked; another landed on the island of Sark by mistake and found nothing; and the party which actually reached Guernsey found nothing either and withdrew, leaving six men (including two of the seven who had been landed) behind it. It was all, as Admiral Sir Ralph Edwards, Chief of Staff to Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, declared, “quite useless in results.”

Edwards found stronger terms to describe Churchill’s response to Bourne’s fiasco. “Roger Keyes is to become D.C.O.,” he noted in horror. “Are we all barmy—God, preserve us from the ‘OLD GANG!’ it’ll lead to disaster.”

Churchill himself had no doubts that the appointment of Keyes to be Director of Combined Operations would be a change for the better. “The idea of working all these coasts up against us by pinprick raids and fulsome communiques,” he told Ismay, “is one to be strictly avoided.” Sir Roger Keyes is now studying the whole subject of medium raids—i.e., by not less than five nor more than ten thousand men. Two or three of these might be brought off on the French coast during the winter . . . . After these medium raids have had their chance there will be no objection to stirring up the French coast by minor forays. During the spring and summer of 1941 large armoured irruptions must be contemplated.”

The Commandos were to be increased to this end to 6,000 men and the Independent Companies to 1,750, necessitated by the detriment of preparations being made to cope with the threat of an imminent German invasion. Chief of the Imperial General Staff General Sir Edmund Ironside complained bitterly that the War Office continually, in their efforts, skim the cream off the jug for overseas operations, Northern Ireland and the Azores. I never know what things will not be taken away from me at any moment.”

There was not much to take. Ironside felt that the defending forces were “so woefully thin on the ground” that there was “no doubt that the Germans might effect a landing at any point and with little warning . . . . Every portion of the coast at which I look seems weaker.
than the other and the troops less trained and more unhandy.”

It was at this point that Churchill instructed the Chiefs of Staff to prepare for an operation against the port of Dakar in French West Africa, despite their warning that “an occupation by land forces in the face of French resistance would be an operation... for which we have not at present the forces available.”

The proposed action against Dakar was not indeed conceived as a raid, although it was largely inspired by the need to put the new French battleship Richelieu out of action. Its primary purpose was to land Gaullist forces in French West Africa, in the hope that this would induce the French colonial territories to reenter the war against the Axis. It did, however, necessarily involve a massive combined operations exercise, as precisely the time when decrypted German messages indicated that the invasion of Britain itself could be expected.

It was thus not surprising that the Chiefs of Staff were bitterly unwilling to give what Keyes regarded as adequate attention to the project. “The truth of the matter,” he complained, “is, the Army has raised some irregular troops, but has not equipped them yet... the Navy... has failed to provide the ships and landing-craft to prosecute amphibious warfare. The Air Ministry puts every obstacle in the way of carrying them overseas by air. It is not easy to get on with the war.” Getting on with the war was no doubt what the harassed Chiefs thought they were doing, at the very height of the Battle of Britain.

Churchill nonetheless called on 31 August for a plan to land Gaullist troops at Casablanca after a successful completion of the Dakar enterprise. This was followed on 2 September by a demand for “a plan for the recapture of the Channel Islands.” Keyes was overjoyed. He had no doubt that “a coup de main at Casablanca could succeed under a resolute Commander.” As for the Channel Islands, “promptly that [sic] the German invasion is defeated or definitely frustrated, we should seize... and hold them. Moon and tides are suitable between 28th Sept and 8th October,” he added precisely.

Responsibility for the Dakar venture was allotted to Gen. Noel M. Irwin of the Royal Marines as, owing to the threat of invasion, on 10 September, the Commandos themselves had been placed under the control of Commander in Chief Home Forces. Irwin’s task was simply hopeless. General notice of the expedition had been given by the tendency of Gaullist officers to drink toasts à Dakar at Simpson’s or in Liverpool bars. The Gaullists were likely to be a liability in other senses as well. They had no training at all in landing from boats, and would thus be utterly useless in the actual assault.

There were also some extraordinary logistic and administrative snafus. Chief of these was the fact that there was no overall commander of the operation, and consequently no special headquarters ship from which to command. The naval forces were under the orders of Adm. Sir John H.D. Cunningham, who flew his flag in the cruiser Devonshire. Cunningham was supposed to share authority equally with Irwin who was sailing in the battleship Barham, in company with Gen. Charles de Gaulle, who of course was in undisputed command of the Free French contingent. The Barham’s main role was to engage the French battleship Richelieu and carry out long-range bombardment of the forts. So Irwin on occasion found himself sailing out to sea to avoid the very accurate French gunfire, while the troops he commanded were heading in a quite different direction.

Apart from that, equipment had been stowed in quite haphazard fashion in the transports, so nobody knew where everything was; the transports had to communicate with the rest of the
expedition by signal lamps, as there were not enough trained wireless operators; and Irwin and his staff had one typewriter with which to make 200 copies of 140 pages of Operational Orders. But the most serious aspect of the whole affair, apart from the fact that it was a total fiasco, was that it required an aircraft carrier, two battleships, four cruisers and 10 destroyers to be absent from home waters, at a time when every man, ship, and airplane might have been needed for the immediate defense of the United Kingdom itself.

Dakar served mainly to give the British another experience of defeat when they needed it least. De Gaulle’s approaches were rejected; the battleship Resolution and the cruiser Cumberland were badly damaged; and four Fleet Air Arm fighters were shot down by the defending French P-36s. A French destroyer and two submarines were sunk, but this was hardly the object of the exercise.

All this naturally strengthened the determination of the Chiefs of Staff not to allow their exiguous resources to be siphoned off to serve what had so far proved to be unrewarding operations. Chief of Air Staff Sir Cyril Newall flatly rejected Keyes’ demand that 6 fighter and 4 bomber squadrons be made available at once for Combined Operations. Newall protested that the Air Force, alone of the Services, was engaged in a continuous day and night battle with the enemy and could not afford to divert squadrons for specialized training for peripheral operations. On the same day, Keyes got himself involved in an even more unfortunate issue of inter-Service rivalry. He told Brigadier Anthony St Clair-Montford, Bourne’s successor as Adjutant General of the Royal Marines, to prepare his men for garrison duties in the Azores when the islands had been captured by the Commandos. St Clair-Montford responded furiously to Ismay that the “whole of the training of the Brigade since its inception had been directed towards making them capable of landing against opposition... and the use of other troops is the greatest blow to the pride and tradition of the Royal Marine Corps since its foundation over 250 years ago.”

Ismay referred St. Clair-Montford’s letter to Churcheill, who showed it to Keyes. The latter was quite unmoved. “As a marine,” he commented, “he not unnaturally disapproves of my irregular troops in principle—as of course they are doing marines’ work.” But he did not address himself to the real question of why the Commandos should be doing marines’ work at all. Drax had certainly envisaged that soldiers should be trained in combined operations to supplement a striking force of marines. But the essence was that the Royal Marines should constitute the spearhead of any seaborne assault themselves, and should be augmented to this end. Keyes seemed rather to be thinking in terms of using irregulars to fulfill the role that Drax assigned to the marines, instead of just recruiting more marines. The logic was not clear. What was clear was that Keyes’ claim that the Royal Marines would go anywhere in the world for him had just lost a lot of its credibility.

This was not the only problem of logic or principle bedeviling the strategy of combined operations. Churchill and Keyes both believed that the Italian attack upon Greece opened new possibilities for sea or airborne assaults against the weaker Axis partner. They were not, however, concerned to distinguish between hit-and-run raids and orthodox landings with a view to permanent occupation, which would clearly require different tactics and different equipment.

London was seething with plans. Churchill strongly advocated the capture of the Italian island of Pantelleria, between Sicily and Tunisia. Croft came up with a proposal for an invasion of France and the Low Countries with
"twenty motor battalions, four armoured divisions and forty infantry divisions," which the British did not in fact possess at the time. Keyes told the Prime Minister emotionally that "no doubt it was ordained on the battlefield of Blenheim that you would lead the British Empire to victory in this critical hour. But I am sure it was also ordained on the battlefield of Gallipoli that I would help you to this end." He then stormed into the office of Assistant Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Sir Henry Harwood, to tell him that what the Navy lacked nowadays was guts.

Harwood indignantly reported that event to Admiral Sir James Somerville, Commander in Chief of Force H in the Mediterranean. Somerville commended bitterly that "R.K. is another of Winston's pets. He has no responsibility and thinks only of glorifying the name of R.K. He doesn't take any long views as to what our policy should be when we're in a position to strike really hard."

It was certainly unfortunate that the Director of Combined Operations should have succeeded in unifying the three Services only in opposition to himself, especially at a time when the Chiefs of Staff and the War Cabinet were totally confused as to where and how to strike next.

Churchill continued to favor the occupation of Pantellaria. Keyes was enamored of raids on the Dodécanese, Rhodes, and Castellorizo, all Italian-held islands in or near the Aegean, with the option of permanent occupation. The Chiefs of Staff themselves thought that the occupation of Sicily would be "a move of great strategic importance . . . with a view to denying it to German forces." Churchill however argued instead for the occupation of Sardinia. Finally, Hugh Dalton, Churchill's Minister of Economic Warfare, recommended a raid on Norway's Lofoten Islands "where the fishing is at its height and where there are industrial plants to convert the catch into oil, meal and other by-products."

While the British argued, the Germans acted. The Luftwaffe arrived in Sicily in January 1941, altering fundamentally the military balance in the Mediterranean and both forestalling any British landing on that island and at the same time demonstrating the military wisdom of such an operation, if it could have been carried out in time.

Keyes nonetheless determined to push on with his own projects and the Sardinian operation as well as with an airborne raid "for cutting off the water supply of towns in the heel of Italy by dropping parachutists to destroy the Apulian Aqueduct . . . A submarine is to visit the coast of Italy at a prearranged position to bring off the party, using either 18-foot punts or several Berthon boats for the embarkation." Churchill noted in the margin: "I approve WSC."

The threat to the success of any of these operations posed by German dive bombers based in Sicily was simply dismissed. "The risk of being knocked out by them is greatly exaggerated," wrote Keyes to Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, "especially against stout hearted people like mine, who will sit down and take them on with Bren guns." Portal referred this perception of Keyes to Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean Fleet Adm. Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, who had recent and vivid experience of the effectiveness of German dive bombers against British warships.

Cunningham wrote privately to First Sea Lord Pound, expressing the hope that Keyes would not himself be present when any of the proposed seaborne assaults against the Italian islands were carried out. Pound showed the letter to Churchill, who passed it on to Keyes, who responded by denouncing the "hostility and timidity" of Pound himself; proposed that the Chiefs of Staff and their Joint Committees be thrown overboard; and that he himself be
They discovered that the supports of the aqueduct were not made of masonry, as they had been advised, but of reinforced concrete, against which their charges would have been useless. They accordingly blew up the first bridge they came across, took to the hills, and eventually surrendered to the local police.

All that remained was to assign responsibility for the fiasco. This should have been easy. Faulty intelligence had made the success of the operation impossible in any event, and the commanders of the troop carriers should have been instructed under no circumstances to reveal the location of the rendezvous. Keyes however reserved his condemnations for Vice Admiral, Malta, who had taken an unpalatable but unavoidable decision, which in the event had no effect upon the actual fate of the raiders. "In view of the fact that there is 100 fathoms of water within seven miles of the rescue position," Keyes told Churchill, "I consider our failure to carry out the salvage arrangements, promised to the parachutists, amounts to a clear breach of faith."19

Churchill himself told Ismay that he did not "remember having been consulted in any way upon this proposal to land parachute troops in Italy . . . . The use of parachute troops was a serious step to take, in view of the invasion aspect here."20 But Ismay, who was never just a simple soldier, produced the memorandum in the margin of which Churchill had noted his approval of just such a proposal.

This episode was followed within a fortnight by two more combined snafus. One, an attempt to land Commandos on the island of Kasos in the Dodecanese on 14 February aborted, because the tides had not been charted correctly. The other was an unqualified defeat. The cruiser Bonaventure, the destroyers Decoy and Hereward, and the gunboat Ladybird closed Castellorizo at dawn on 25 February 1941. Some 200 Commandos were landed, along with 25
Royal Marines from the Ladybird. The Italian opposition was quickly overwhelmed. However, the force came under air attack, during which the Ladybird was damaged and forced to retire. Even more unfortunately, the captain of the Ladybird decided to reembark his marines before sailing back to Alexandria, assuming that they had done their specific job and would not be required further.

Meanwhile the officer in charge of the operation, R. Adm. Harold T. Baillie-Grohman, had decided that the permanent garrison would have to be landed at night, because of the threat from air attack. Accordingly he ordered the rest of the squadron back to Alexandria as well, intending to return on the evening of the 26th, bringing reinforcements from Cyprus. The Hereward was first ordered to investigate a report that an enemy ship had entered the harbor. When no contact was made, Baillie-Grohman signaled to return to Alexandria. The following morning two Italian destroyers landed 300 troops after a brief bombardment. The Commandos were hemmed in by sundown, and forced to surrender. This seemed to Cunningham to indicate a basic weakness of Keyes' irregulars. "These Commandos we have out here," he told Pound, "are on a Tommy-gun and knuckle-duster basis and can't defend themselves if seriously attacked. I had sent 25 Marines bristling with machine-guns, but some fool ordered them to re-embark." The fact that the Navy had failed to distinguish itself either he attributed to the fact that Baillie-Grohman, "though I did not know at the time was unfortunately a sick man. This accounts for much and accounts largely for lack of resolution and judgment displayed by some of those concerned in operation... I must admit to having underestimated enterprise of the enemy and the effort they would make to frustrate our occupation." Having accepted responsibility himself, Cunningham then appointed a committee of inquiry to investigate the reasons for the failure. Chairman of the committee was Admiral Baillie-Grohman, who Cunningham believed to be primarily to blame. The Navy looks after its own.

Churchill's attention was fortunately distracted at the time from this minor disaster by a minor triumph which went under the code name "Claymore." On the night of 3 March, five destroyers escorted two landing ships to the Lofoten Islands, with 3rd and 4th Commandos on board. A German armed trawler was sunk, 315 Norwegian volunteers and 225 German prisoners and collaborators were taken off, five small ships were destroyed, and 11 fish-oil factories and 800,000 gallons of oil were left on fire. For the first and only time, everything did in fact go according to plan. It was unfortunate that the full propaganda value of the affair was impaired by the difficulty of making fish-oil sound serious. The Germans themselves were in fact able to make some propaganda mileage out of the raid, claiming that "only a country which has sunk so low as England could have attempted such a Don Quixote action." 47

Churchill was perfectly justified in telling Keyes that "the unqualified success of Claymore says much for the care and skill with which it was planned and the determination with which it was executed." However, Goebbels was also right. The main reason why the British were undertaking small raids like Claymore was that they were in no position to carry out more substantial military operations.

Commando raids were essentially in the same category as guerres de cour or guerrilla warfare. They were the recourse of the weaker side, adopted because of the impossibility of adopting the methods of the stronger. They could never be more than pinpricks, possibly irritating or distracting the Germans, but utterly ineffective in terms of
military significance. They could in fact be positively counterproductive. One of the major objectives of the raids was to enhance British morale. But this could obviously be the case only when the raids were successful. Most of the raids before Claymore could only have improved German and even Italian morale.

Far more serious was the danger that the strategy of combined operations was drawing away resources for trivial purposes which were desperately needed by the conventional Services to stave off the imminent danger of total defeat.

British military prospects had indeed never seemed more depressing than in the spring of 1941. Keyes had nonetheless never been more euphoric. On 11 April, two days after the Germans had broken through the Greek defenses at Salonika and trapped the Australian 9th Division in Tobruk, he suggested that it was "an excellent opportunity to give the German defence in the Channel a real good run for their money... we might have a free-for-all of everything that can hit on the South Coast and count the bag in the morning!" The Director of Combined Operations did not seem to know that the British simply did not possess enough landing craft to transport a force across the Channel that could cause any real concern to the German forces awaiting them. Nor did he seem able to appreciate even a military reality so tangible as the effectiveness of German dive bombers. The "fear of air attack," he told Churchill, "has been the keynote of the 'NO' men's [sic] strategy." 43

But even Keyes' sympathizers must have been having serious doubts as to his complete rationality. He informed Eden that "the Almighty has given me an instinct for war and the vision to see what is essential in its prosecution! I could give many proofs. Moreover I have always been lucky. Winston would be wise to make me C-in-C and Governor-General of the Atlantic Islands." 44

This was ominous indeed. The Prime Minister did, however, give Keyes one more chance to employ his Commandos. This was to be a combined operation in support of the Australian 7th Division, which had just been sent into Syria. A force of 420 Commandos, including Keyes' own son, Maj. George C. Keyes, was to land north of the Litani River, while the Australians attacked from the south. It was Murphy's Law in an untrammelled operation once again. Everything that could go wrong, did. Major Keyes' own party landed south of the Litani, and had to be ferried across by the unimpressed Australians, for whom they were supposed to have secured bridgeheads. The two groups which landed north of the river as planned were promptly taken prisoner by the French. The irrepressible D.C.O. claimed that "the success of this operation... illustrated the value of the Commando troops and this form of warfare." 45 But the Australian official historian seemed to be on safer ground in describing the raid as "ill-arranged," and insisting that the eventual victory of the Australians was gained "despite the... ill-planned and costly landing by the Commandos." 46

Litani would certainly have done nothing to enhance Keyes' credibility in the eyes of the Chiefs of Staff, or to make them more sympathetic to the general concept of combined operations. They were outraged beyond measure when Keyes then attempted to detach units of the Canadian divisions in the United Kingdom for specialized training with the Commandos, without consulting the Commander in Chief Home Forces Gen. Sir Alan Brooke. 47 The Chiefs protested bitterly to Churchill. Keyes defended himself by claiming that he was "now in a position to prevent the Chiefs of Staff from losing the war, but they will certainly postpone victory... Their chief objective seems to be to array all
the difficulties and dangers of any offensive operation."  

When this brought no response except a violent personal confrontation with the harassed Prime Minister, Keyes pleaded that: "I hope you realised that I am trying to serve you and the country by pointing out how damnable you are being let down in connection with the conduct of amphibious warfare."  But Churchill had finally been driven to the conviction that it was impossible for Keyes and the Chiefs of Staff to work together harmoniously, and impossible for him to go on supporting Keyes against the opposition of all three conventional services. "Your title of Director," he told Keyes cuttily, "does not correspond with the facts... I am convinced that excursions from this country to the continent, unless entrusted to specially chosen commanders, must have behind them the authority and resources of G.H.Q. Home Forces... I should find it very hard to resist the advice of all my responsible experts."  

When this failed to subdue Keyes, Churchill took the final step on 4 October 1941, replacing him as Director of Combined Operations by Commodore Lord Louis Mountbatten. "I have to consider first my duty to the State which ranks above personal friendship," he wrote. "In all the circumstances I have no choice but to arrange for your relief." Keyes seemed incapable of comprehending the situation. "Make me C.N.S. [Chief of Naval Staff]," he begged the Prime Minister. "If Alexander won’t take me as First Sea Lord, for the second time! Why not make me First Lord. What is the use of having a first lord in war time like Alexander?—who understands nothing about war."  

No answer was possible. None was given. There was still a tragic final scene to be played. Six weeks after Keyes had been sacked, his son led a Commando raid on Beda Littoria on the Libyan coast, in an attempt to assassinate German General Irwin Rommel. The raid was a total failure. Fifty-seven out of 59 men of 11th Commando were lost, including Maj. George Keyes, who was killed in action.  

The appointment of Keyes as Director of Combined Operations seemed inspired at the time. It proved to be both a personal and military disaster. Two fundamental weaknesses can be identified, apart from the very serious question of the mental or emotional stability of Keyes himself. Combined operations required by definition the harmonious and mutually supportive cooperation of the three conventional British Services. Keyes, however, deliberately went out of his way to offend or intrigue against the very people upon whose good will his own success totally depended. Still more serious was his failure to recognize the essential difference in tactical doctrine between raids and invasions. This was not indeed a failing unique to Keyes himself. The British had traditionally conceived of amphibious warfare essentially in terms of landing an army for continental service on a friendly or at least neutral shore. The Royal Marines had never been developed like the U.S. Marines as a permanent self-sufficient invasion force, with its own artillery, armor, and air arm. The prospect of having actually to assault unfriendly shores left the British with two obvious alternatives. They could expand the Royal Marines to take on a vastly more ambitious role. Or they could train units of the Army to act in the seaborne assault capacity normally

**BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY**

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regarded as appropriate to Marines. They chose a third alternative, the Commandos.

But the Commandos were in fact trained as raiders rather than as assault troops. They relied on surprise and evasion, rather than on their capacity to storm defended positions and hold them against an organized counterattack. There is nothing surreptitious or evasive about a seaborne invasion. A totally different tactical doctrine was required. The fiascos of the Channel Islands, the Apulian Aqueduct, Castellorizo, the Litsani River, and Beda Littoria were merely underlined by the final catastrophe of Dieppe. The most important military lesson to be learned from Commando raids was how not to invade enemy-occupied Europe.\(^\text{15}\)

NOTES


5. Memorandum by Drax, "Royal Marine Striking Force," February 1939, Drax Papers, file 2/9, CCAC.

6. Sir Herbert Richmond to Drax, 4 January 1939, Drax Papers, file 2/8, CCAC.

7. Sir Roger Keyes to Winston S. Churchill, 7 September 1939, Keyes Papers, file 13/12, CCAC.

8. Keyes to Churchill, 26 April 1940, Keyes Papers, file 13/13, CCAC.


10. Sir Henry Page Croft to Anthony Eden, 28 May 1940, Croft Papers, file 2/4, III/2/1, CCAC.


12. Directive to General Bourne, "Raiding Operations," 17 June 1940, Keyes Papers, file 13/1, CCAC.


15. Croft to Eden, 28 June 1940, Croft Papers, file 2/4, III/12/1-7, CCAC.

16. Ferguson, p. 49.

17. Sir Ralph Edwards Diaries, 15 July 1940, Edwards Papers, file 1/2, CCAC.

18. Ibid., 18 July 1940.

19. Churchill to Ismay, 27 July 1940, Keyes Papers, file 13/1, CCAC.


23. Keyes to Ismay, 27 August 1940, Operational Papers of the Prime Minister's Office, *Premier 3/330/7, Correspondence with Sir Roger Keyes*, PRO.

24. Keyes to Churchill, 6 and 11 September 1940, Premier 3/330/7, PRO.
26. Anthony A. St Clair-Mondefo to Ismay, 16 October 1940, Premier 3/330/7, PRO.
28. Croft to Sir Robert Haining, 29 November 1940, Croft Papers, file 2/4, III/19/8, CCAC.
29. Keyses to Churchill, 16 December 1940, Premier 3/330/7, PRO.
30. Sir James F. Somerville to Lady Somerville, 31 December 1940, Somerville Papers, file 5/22, CCAC.
31. Sir Dudley Pound to Andrew B. Cunningham, 31 December 1940, Premier 3/350, Picket Operation (attack on Tirio Dam), PRO.
32. Hugh Dalton to Churchill, 17 January 1941, Premier 3/328/7, Clamore Operation (Lofoten Islands), PRO.
33. Ismay to Churchill, 28 January 1941, Premier 3/100, Coelostus Operation (Raid in Italy), PRO.
34. Keyses to Sir Charles Portal, 25 January 1941, Keyses Papers, file 13/5, CCAC.
36. Churchill to Keyses, 6 February 1941, Premier 3/330/7, PRO.
37. Keyses to Churchill, 6 February 1941, ibid.
38. Sir William T. Ford to Cunningham, 13 February 1941, Premier 3/100, PRO.
40. Churchill to Ismay, 15 February 1941, ibid.
41. Cunningham to Pound, 14 March 1941, Premier 3/124/1, Picket Operation (Castelforte), PRO.
43. Churchill to Keyses, 7 March 1941, Premier 3/328/7, PRO.
44. Minister of Conference in Upper War Room 1130 Friday, 11 April 1941, ibid.
45. Keyses to Churchill, 30 April 1941, Keyses Papers, file 13/9, CCAC.
46. Keyses to Eden, 12 May 1941, Keyses Papers, file 13/13, CCAC.
49. Sir Leslie C. Hollis to Keyses, 1 July 1941, Keyses Papers, file 13/8, CCAC.
50. Keyses to Churchill, 2 September 1941, Premier 3/330/7, PRO.
52. Churchill to Keyses, 30 September 1941, Keyses Papers, file 13/13, CCAC.
53. Churchill to Keyses, 4 October 1941, ibid.
55. Admiral Maund actually claims that no worthwhile lessons at all were learned from the early Commando raids, either because what was learned was inappropriate, or because the real lessons were forgotten. See Maund, p. 112.
THE OLD DESTROYERMAN’S TRIVIA QUIZ
compiled by
Captain W.G. Carson, USN
(with help from a few other ancient mariners)

If you served in destroyers in the 1940s, 50s or 60s, you'll find that this quiz triggers long dormant memories. Many of the items were essential to the skills and training necessary to get through the daily business of the fleet, but haven't been used now in a decade or more. Even if you have never served in destroyers, you'll probably find things here that will tickle your memory if you are older, or amuse you if you are younger.

Some of the questions have more than one answer, and in general the more hoary the answer the higher the score. See the next page for the answers and to find out just how ancient a mariner you really are.

1. What order was given to the helm just prior to rolling a depth charge pattern?
2. What was a DM?
3. What was the publication number for the signal book before it became ATP-1 (Volume II)?
4. Why did DERs tend to cause confusion in exercises in coordinated antisubmarine warfare?
5. What was a speed key operator?
6. How many rounds were in a clip of 40mm ammunition?
7. What was the name of the plotting device used for close-in, repetitive attacks on a submarine by two destroyers that were using hedgehogs or depth charges?
8. What was TBS?
9. What were the rules of the road for an encounter between a ship and a waterborne seaplane?
10. What was Sniffer?
11. What was the mental crutch to remember the difference between Method Rum and Method Coke when reorienting a bent-line screen?
12. Of what use was a table of haversines?
13. What was Weapon Alfa?
14. What was a cruising turbine?
15. What were the Piano flags used for?
16. Why did "Pouncers Red" cause hearts to skip a beat?
17. What kind of ship was USS Blackhawk?
18. What type of craft used the "skimmer-scrapper" tactic?
19. What type of overhead was there on the bridge of your first destroyer?
Destroyerman's Trivia  31

Answers to "The Old Destroyerman's Trivia Quiz"

1. "Rudder amidships!" to avoid damage to the steering gear. The spacing for the pattern was determined by the ship's speed and the drop interval. The order for a full pattern was, "Roll one, roll two, mark five center, roll four, roll five!" (One point if you knew the rudder order, two if you knew the order for the pattern as well.)

2. A destroyer minelayer—essentially a destroyer with mine rails, but DMs were in mine squadrons rather than destroyer squadrons. There were also DSMs—destroyer mineweepers—of which the mythical USS Caine is the best known. (One point.)

3. ACP 175. It had a pebble-grained maroon cover. Before it was ACP 175, the signal book was CSP 734. (One point if you answered ACP 175, two points for CSP 734.)

4. Because DERs (radar picket escort destroyers) had the same type of diesel engines as submarines, DERs sounded like submarines snorkeling on passive sonar systems. (One point.)

5. A radioman who had been tested and certified as an operator competent in rapid CW (Morse code) communications using a special sending device. The number of speed key operators was a measure of the communications proficiency of a ship and was a source of pride for those ships that had several. (One point.)

6. 40mm ammunition came in clips of four rounds. Replacement of quad 40s with twin 3/50s began late in WW II, but there were plenty of 40s around as late as the early 1960s. (Two points.)

7. The Gimko Circle, a device used on the dead reckoning tracer in CIC for dual ship antisubmarine attacks. The Gimko Circle, for example, told the attacking ship which way to turn after the attack according to the relative position of the other ship. The device was essential, but not always successful, in keeping the ships from colliding. (One point.)

8. Many thought that TBS was any tactical voice radio circuit guarded on the bridge and that TBS stood for "Talk Between Ships." Actually, before the "AN" nomenclature was adopted by the Navy, transmitters were designated by "T" followed by one or two other letters. TBS was a common transmitter, but just one of a series. (Two points.)

9. In international waters, rules of the road applied to seaplanes just as to any other powered water craft. In inland waters (as in San Diego where ships and P5M Marlins often) the rules were silent, although civil aeronautics regulations for seaplanes were the same as rules of the road for ships. In any event, the prudent mariner granted seaplanes considerable latitude. (One point.)

10. Sniffer (officially Exhaust Trail Indicator, or ETI) was an air-sampling device on S-2 Tracker antisubmarine airplanes. Sniffer could detect the products of combustion, hence give an indication that a submarine might have recently snorkeled in the vicinity. Sniffer's usefulness was limited by its false alarm rate. (One point.)

11. Method Rum was a "straight shot" to station. The three methods of reorienting a bent-line screen were Rum, Coke and Ginger. Method Rum was most rapid but also most dangerous since some ships were required to pass near the main body. Another mental crutch was "Rum ran through, Coke chase tails." (One point for either.)

12. Haversines were used for reducing star sights by spherical trigonometry before the Work Projects Administration employed itinerant mathematicians to compile H.O. 214. (Two points.)

13. A trainable mount that threw a hedgehog-like projectile to some distance. On voice radio circuits, the code
words for an impending attack with Weapon Alfa were, "Standby to Pinpoint." (One point.)

14. An additional steam turbine that produced more efficiency but less flexibility of operation of the steam power plant. The cruising turbine was used when steaming at moderate, fairly constant speed, and had to be cut out of the system for maneuvering. Since commanding officers generally preferred flexibility to efficiency (oil was cheap then), cruising turbines were seldom used. (One point.)

15. Piano flags were alphabet flags used to govern signals before governing pennants came into use. Papa (Peter) was replaced by the Preparatory pennant, India (Item) was replaced by the Interrogative pennant, November (Nan) was replaced by the Negative pennant, and Alfa (Able) and Oscar (Oboe) were replaced by two-letter governing groups. (Two points.)

16. In Pouncers Blue, the pouncers (ships stationed between the screen and the main body) would reorient to the new axis of the bent-line screen after the rest of the screen had completed reorienting. In Pouncers Red, all screening ships including pouncers would reorient together. Reorienting bent-line screens was in itself a complicated business, and having pouncers milling around in the evolution seemed more than a body should have to bear. (One point.)

17. USS Blackhawk was the China Station destroyer tender. (Two points. If China Station needs explaining, deduct one point.)

18. Two antisubmarine aircraft acting in consort. One would be at higher altitude searching (usually with radar). The other, at low altitude, would prosecute any contacts developed. (One point.)

19. If your answer was none, give yourself two points. If your answer was canvas, give yourself one point. If your answer was anything more substantial, you get no points. Captains thought that OODs who were comfortable were likely to be inattentive to duty.

**Scoring**

- 0 to 5 points: Still wet behind the ears.
- 6 to 10 points: Salty seaman.
- 11 to 15 points: Old sea dog.
- 16 to 20 points: Truly an ancient mariner.
- 21 to 26 points: Have you checked lately to see if you're still alive?

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**BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY**

Now on the staff of the Naval War College, Captain Carson began his extensive service in destroyers in 1963 in the Colahan (DD 658), one of the World War II Fletcher class.
THE POLITICS OF BEGIN'S BAGHDAD RAID

by

Captain M. Thomas Davis, U.S. Army

There have been numerous dramatic developments in the Middle East during the past year. Although 1981 will not be remembered as a year that contained events with the significance of those in 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1977, it will nonetheless be recalled as a turbulent and intense year in the history of this most dynamic area. It saw an intensification of the trauma and agony in Lebanon; a clash between Israel and Syria over the legitimacy of the political "turf" controlled by each around the Litani River basin; the reelection of Menachem Begin and the appointment of a more nationalist, ideologically doctrinaire Israeli cabinet; an escalating confrontation between the United States and Libya in ways that sometimes went beyond the verbal; the brutal murder of Anwar Sadat; and the effective annexation of the Syrian Golan Heights by the Israeli Government. The year revealed the scope of the increasingly strained relations between the United States and Israel as the divergent interests of the two countries became more apparent to Washington if not to Jerusalem. The year just prior also saw demands in the United States for a fundamental reconsideration of the American-Israeli association, a phenomenon best illustrated by calls for negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization made by two ex-Presidents and a former national security advisor.

But of all the Middle Eastern drama which 1981 provided, perhaps the most significant in terms of its long-range impact was the 7 June destruction of the Iraqi nuclear facility at Osirak by the Israeli Air Force. Coming at a time when the new Reagan administration was just beginning the formulation of a comprehensive Middle Eastern policy, and following the laborious efforts of the President's special envoy, Philip Habib, to control and defuse the seemingly explosive confrontation between Israel and Syria in southern Lebanon, this provocative, unilateral action by the Begin government created perceptions in the United States and elsewhere from which Begin's Likud party leadership will have difficulty recovering.

In addition to antagonizing the Reagan administration, the raid has illustrated quite clearly that the interests of the United States and Israel in the Middle East are in many ways very distinct, and it has initiated a reappraisal of American-Israeli relations that has found favorable response in the American press and with the American public. All of these developments are extremely serious for Israel's long-term interests particularly if the cooling
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Effect on American-Israeli relations that the raid initiated continues. Should the evolving judgment about the raid's justification indicate that Israel acted for reasons not totally related to immediate security concerns, then the American connection to Israel may never completely return to its previous condition. The current evidence (and trends) indicate that this development is very likely.

The raid came as a complete surprise to the U.S. Government and sent American officials scrambling to distance Washington from the Israeli action. Despite the claims made by Jerusalem that the action was required because of the belligerent attitude of the Iraqi regime and its intention to use the facility for the production of nuclear weapons to be used against Israel, the State Department condemned the raid on 9 June and on the following day announced the suspension of the delivery of four F-16 fighter-bombers, the type used for the attack.

Shortly after that public and relatively harsh treatment of a major ally, Secretary of State Alexander Haig sent a letter to Congress, pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act, stating that a substantial violation of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 23 July 1952, under which the terms of the sale of American military equipment to Israel are determined, "may have occurred."

The American criticism of the Israeli attack continued unabated into the United Nations. It was inevitable and unavoidable that the Iraqi government would ask for some sort of UN action against Israel. What came as a surprise to many was that the U.S. Ambassador in the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick, openly negotiated the wording of a Security Council Resolution acceptable to the U.S. with the Iraqi representative, Foreign Minister Saadun Hamadi. The fact that such contacts were being made at all (since the United States and Iraq have had no diplomatic relations since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war) added additional weight to the U.S. vote to condemn the Israeli action. Jerusalem probably expected that the United States would block any Arab attempt to condemn the raid, forcing the Arabs to take the case to the General Assembly where the proceedings would be much more lengthy and the results much easier for Israel to disregard considering its contention that the Third World states compromising that body are hostages to Arab oil and financial power. Indeed, Iraq continued to press the case and did succeed on 12 November 1981 in having the General Assembly vote a condemnation of the Israeli action, terming it a "serious threat" to the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor nuclear power worldwide. The United States voted against the General Assembly resolution but claimed it did so largely on procedural grounds.

The reaction of the U.S. Government and the American people must have come as something of a shock to the Israeli Government. Many key supporters of Israel in Congress were highly critical of the attack and openly stated that the United States was faced with a dilemma whose solution was not necessarily favorable to the Israeli position. Several Congressmen, skeptical of the justifications offered by Israel, noted that whereas Iraq was a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Israel quite pointedly was not. It was also observed that the operations of the Israeli nuclear facility at Dimona had never been subjected to the inspection of the IAEA whereas the Osirak reactor had been regularly inspected. In response to this, the Israelis and their supporters in the United States challenged the effectiveness of the IAEA inspection program, claiming that the inspections were announced in advance, that the host country could control the times of the inspections through manipulation of the inspectors' visas, and that.
the last time the Iraqi facility had been inspected the previous January, the inspectors had been a Ukrainian and a Hungarian.7

In addition to the adverse actions of the American government, the response of the American and Western press to the Osirak raid was surprisingly negative. Many editorial pages, accustomed to carrying pieces supporting Israel in its struggle for peace and recognition, turned a decidedly hostile face toward this specific action. Some were quick to raise the curious connection in timing that existed between the raid and the upcoming Israeli elections only three weeks away.8 Because the scientific explanations for the raid offered by Jerusalem were quickly amended with alternative analytical arguments, the action did not allow for a clear or easy determination of the veracity of the Israeli claims about the ultimate uses of the Osirak reactor. After the Israelis further alienated public opinion in the West with their 16 July raid on downtown Beirut, polls began to reflect that a majority of Americans believed the Israelis should not receive more military aid and that Washington should put more pressure on Israel to seek peace.9

The Israeli defense of the bombing was in itself a significant contributing factor to the rough treatment Jerusalem received at the hands of the Western press. Prime Minister Begin had declared at a news conference on 9 June that the military option was exercised because of the threatening rhetoric which had emanated from the Iraqi leadership through its controlled press. Begin specifically cited a 4 October editorial from the Baghdad daily al-Thawra as declaring that the Iraqi nuclear reactor was intended for use “against the Zionist enemy.” However, a review of the paper revealed no such quote. In testimony before Congress, two State Department officials, Nicholas A. Velonis, the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, and Ronald J. Spies, the Director of Intelligence and Research, stated that a thorough search had failed to locate the quotes attributed by Prime Minister Begin to the Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein. Secretary Velonis summarized this situation by noting that, “Each such article that has been brought to our attention, we have found did not exist.”10 The Israeli case was further eroded by Prime Minister Begin’s fantastic assertion that the Iraqis had constructed a weapons assembly plant 130 feet beneath the reactor to avoid detection from the IAEA inspectors. He later changed the depth of the bomb factory to a less incredible 13 feet.11

The Israeli government could clearly have predicted many of the responses that the raid on Osirak drew from the American government—even to some extent from the American press and public. They obviously knew that the action would be sharply denounced in the United States and that the result would be strained relations (at least in the short term). It is arguable that they understood or anticipated the full dimensions of the adverse response that actually developed in the wake of the action. But accepting that Jerusalem understood there to be some risks, why did they decide to execute the raid when they did?

It is, of course, quite possible that the rationale for Prime Minister Begin’s decision was as he stated it: the Iraqi nuclear program was a danger and it had to be dealt with because of the specific realities of Israel’s geographic size and demography. The Israeli government had openly been attempting to draw international attention to the weapons potential of Osirak since shortly after the 1976 agreement between Iraq and France to build the facility. In the summer of 1980, Prime Minister Begin and Deputy Prime Minister Yadin had made it quite clear that Israel considered
Osirak to be a danger. In addition, Jerusalem was very angry over a decision by Italy to sell Iraq a “hot cell,” which could be used to extract plutonium, and by the French decision to provide highly enriched uranium. In August 1980, Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Mordecai Zipori stated that if international pressure on Iraq didn’t produce results, then Israel would have to consider other means.”

Despite the efforts of Israel’s supporters in the United States to have the U.S. Government bring pressure on the French and Italians over their treaty association with the Iraqi nuclear program, the State Department made no concerted effort to influence the European nuclear connection with Iraq. But neither did the Begin government exert itself to elevate the visibility of the issue. When Secretary of State Alexander Haig visited Israel during his April 1981 trip to the Middle East, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir raised the topic, but admittance did not “go into details.” The record, therefore, is clear in reflecting that the Begin government was concerned about Osirak; the record, however, is unclear about the actual nature and the immediacy of the Iraqi “threat.”

Jerusalem claimed that it had to act when it did because the Osirak reactor was going into operation on 1 July (the day after the Israeli general election) and that the facility would give the Hussein regime the capability of producing nuclear weapons within a year. Prime Minister Begin insisted that this technical situation, when matched with the provocative statements attributed to Hussein, left him no choice but to act as he did to neutralize the threat. But the evidence of the actual capability of Osirak is far from conclusive.

During the congressional hearings held after the attack by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, it quickly became apparent that the judgments of experts from several agencies both within and beyond the U.S. Government were extraordinarily different. In sifting through the testimony, however, a loose consensus seems to emerge around several points: potentially the Iraqis could produce nuclear weapons from the facility, but it was unlikely that they would be able to do so in less than five years; although the inspection procedures of the IAEA were less than optimal, they were probably sufficient to detect any significant violation on the scale necessary to produce uranium or plutonium weapons; and that on balance the Iraqis would probably have elected to site a weapons assembly facility away from the reactor if constructing a bomb was their primary motivation. As for Baghdad’s intentions, the analysis of Professor Albert Carnesale of Harvard’s School of Government seems quite balanced: “that their intention was . . . to violate all of their international agreements to produce bombs as fast as they could, and to take the risk of being detected. That I find unlikely. That they wanted a weapons option, I find likely.”

A second aspect of the rationale offered by the Israelis for the timing of the raid concerned the dangers inherent in bombing a functioning nuclear facility. The contention was that bombing the facility after the reactor core had gone “hot” would have exposed the population of Baghdad to possibly lethal doses of radioactivity. Like all of the other technical aspects, this one is also in dispute. A study conducted by the Congressional Research Service stated that an exact determination of the effects of an attack by conventional weapons on a nuclear reactor is difficult to produce because of the numerous variables involved, such as weather conditions and the scale of the damage. However, based on the available information, the CRS concluded that it would be “most unlikely for an attack with conventional bombs to expose people beyond the immediate area to lethal doses of radiation.”
It is clear from the analyses that the technical evidence is somewhat cloudy—in fact, quite cloudy. Shortly after the attack, it became widely known that the U.S. government was far from satisfied with the intelligence analysis used to justify the attack. Shortly after the raid, the Israeli press was reporting that U.S. Intelligence had "rejected" the Israeli assessments and that Israel was sending its information to Washington for consideration. If the United States were skeptical, it certainly had good reason.

Although it is widely described in the American press as the best in the world, the fact is that Israeli intelligence does not have a laudable record over the last few years. In the 1973 war, Israel was caught unprepared largely because of intelligence failures. In his recently published memoirs, former Defense Minister Ezer Weizman reports that on the eve of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1973, his intelligence chiefs were predicting war! Since 1973, the Israeli intelligence effort has reflected a clear propensity for overstatement. Whether this was the circumstance before the Baghdad raid is uncertain; but the possibility exists that if the decision to attack was made because of the intelligence judgment, the Begin government "safe-sided" the estimates to a significant degree.

The question has been asked as to whether the timing of the raid reflects a bureaucratic coup by the Israeli military-intelligence establishment. Evidently they were the ones most concerned about Osirak as well as the possessors of the means for most expeditiously meeting the threat. Since Labor Leader Shimon Peres is widely regarded in Israel as something of an intellectual "dove," and was in fact very critical of the raid after its execution, it is possible that Begin was sold the faulty goods displayed at his 9 June press conference because the Israeli military realized that the chances of having such an operation approved if Peres became Prime Minister were zero—hence the need for hasty action.

There is substantial doubt that the Israeli attack was executed primarily from fear that after 1 July Saddam Hussein was planning to chart a course of reckless nuclear adventurism. Shai Feldman, a noted Israeli scholar, has questioned the veracity of the Begin government's initial justification for the raid. He suggests that Jerusalem was not concerned about any immediate Iraqi nuclear attack or effort at nuclear blackmail, but rather about the future dangers of a nuclear Middle East with the salient aspects of the Arab-Israeli dispute still unresolved. The judgment that an immediate threat to Israel is an insufficient explanation for the raid is, therefore, not an isolated opinion. The weight of evidence indicates that the concerns Menachem Begin had about Osirak were likely centered on another point of time. This leads to the conclusion that the decision was not made because of the immediate threat, but because of the long-term threat which was not distant enough for the current conditions and immediate prospects.

Even this thesis, however, is too gentle. Considering all of the unsettled technical arguments, the possibility cannot be dismissed that the raid was undertaken for largely political reasons—not, as some have suggested, Israeli domestic politics (although the favorable side-effects there cannot be wholly discounted), but rather in terms of international politics.

There has been too little made of the significance of the late President Sadat's visit with Begin at Ophira in southern Sinai just three days before the Osirak attack. Sadat had gone to Ophira in an effort to influence Begin to exercise restraint in the Syrian crisis that had arisen over the placement by Damascus of ground-to-air missiles in southern Lebanon. Begin had declared this move to be a threat to peace and had even
announced that he had been prepared to destroy the missiles on 30 April, but had waited in response to an American request. Sadat was concerned that a prolonged crisis between Syria and Israel would indefinitely delay the Palestinian autonomy talks that were the major second feature to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and the Camp David process.21 Sadat must have also been concerned about the possibility of being dragged into a new war because of Israeli and Syrian intransigence, although the side with which he would cast his fortune was not clear. Despite the fact that the Egyptian press had in general been critical of both sides,22 there was at least one report that indicated Sadat was considering a tactical alliance of some type with the Syrians in the event of hostilities.23

It was obvious to everyone that Sadat was growing increasingly uncomfortable with his isolation within the Arab world. Egypt has been the centerpiece of the Arab movement since Nasser so enthusiastically embraced the Pan-Arab theme in the mid-1950s. Since late 1980, Sadat had been taking some circumscribed steps to move Egypt back into the mainstream of the Arab world. He had offered assistance to Iraq in its simmering war with Iran, and he had initiated an effort to warm Cairo’s relations with Saudi Arabia. In February he had begun to broaden the legitimacy of the PLO by encouraging that organization to form a government-in-exile in cooperation with the West Bank Arab mayors. All of these efforts reflected a keen interest in reentering Arab politics and reasserting Egypt’s Arab interests.24

An end of Sadat’s isolation in the Arab world in advance of other Arab states joining in the peace process was a disturbing prospect for the Begin government. There were numerous voices in Israel asking the nature of the control that Israel would exercise over Egypt after Cairo had achieved the return of the Sinai scheduled for April 1982. In addition to that abstract consideration, there was the more concrete concern about the difficulties anticipated when the Israeli government moved, as agreed, to break up the settlements such as Yizmit which had grown in the northern Sinai during the post-1967 years.25 Sadat and the Egyptian peace were the only substantive achievements that the Likud leaders could reference in the heated election struggle against the Labor Alignment led by Shimon Peres. Should the certainty of those historic facts become dubious, then both the election and the immediate Israeli future would become questionable.26 Begin had to do something that would indisputably demonstrate to the Israeli electorate, to the hostile Arab governments, and to himself, that the intentions of Sadat were precisely as the Egyptian leader had stated them in Jerusalem in 1977, and at Camp David in 1978.

The raid need not have been launched three days after Sadat and Begin had met in Israeli-controlled territory. By Jerusalem’s own admission and argument, the reactor was not scheduled to go on line for nearly a month. The concern may have been that canceling the meeting would blow the strategic “cover” of the mission, but surely an easily justifiable excuse could have been found to keep Sadat in Cairo: Begin could have simply checked into a hospital and claimed that the rigors of the campaign had aggravated his well-documented heart condition, or taken the high principle approach by arguing that the immediacy of the election made it inappropriate to conduct the meeting at the summit level. Jerusalem understands the significance of timing in international politics. This was just recently demonstrated when the Begin cabinet decided to push the Golan Heights bill through the Knesset so that the deed would be done before Secretary Haig rescheduled his Middle Eastern trip previously scheduled for late
December. That Jerusalem made the decision to go ahead with the Sadat meeting as scheduled clearly indicates that Sadat himself was at least a target if not the target of the whole exercise. The timing of his trip with the raid left Sadat wide open to charges of collusion from his severest Arab critics. The rebuffals open to him were limited to claims that he was totally uninformed (which most Arabs would elect not to believe) or that he was used and duped (which few statesmen would readily admit).

That the intention of the Osirak raid was to maintain and reinforce the isolation of Egypt within the Arab world is, of course, arguable and speculative; unquestionably many of the factors cited by Jerusalem were significant concerns. Nonetheless, this thesis does seem to be consistent with the other actions Israel took during the course of the year: the 16 July bombing of Beirut which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Lebanese and Palestinian civilians and heightened the antagonistic passions of the PLO; the Israeli opposition to the American sale of AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia and the later provocative overflights of the Saudi Tabuk airbase by the Israeli Air Force which have served to annoy the rulers of Riyadh; and lastly, the December annexation of the Golan Heights, clearly a development which Syria would hardly view with indifference. Through all of these actions, Egypt has stood calmly by, making meek protests while being condemned by fellow Arabs for its Israeli connection. Further evidence indicating that the Osirak nuclear pile was not the primary target in June can be gleaned from the mild Israeli response to the refusal of French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson during his recent visit to Jerusalem to refuse unequivocally future nuclear assistance to Iraq—in fact, the Israeli government made every effort to term the visit a spectacular success.

Although the truth remains elusive, the questions remain substantial. If it is the goal of Israel to keep Egypt suspended in Arab purgatory, then enormous doubts arise over the feasibility of the Reagan administration's desire to create a regional "strategic consensus." Under the present conditions, such a creature would have to be built around allies who are hostile at worst and devious at best. The evidence indicates that this dichotomy is the core of the current contentious nature of the American-Israeli condition.

**BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY**

Capt. Davis is currently assigned to the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, and serves as the Assistant Professor for Middle Eastern Studies.

**NOTES**


40 Naval War College Review

9. See the polls cited by Dale.
11. See Rubin.
15. Hearings, p. 95.
18. See Peres' article, "A Strategy for Peace in the Middle East," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1980, pp. 887-901; also see the article by A.B. Eban, the probable Labor Foreign Minister had the June elections gone the other way, "Camp David—The Unfinished Business," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1978-9, pp. 343-354. A representative Likud critique of these labor positions can be seen in Likud's campaign ad run in The Jerusalem Post, 5 June 1981, p. 9.
19. Shai Feldman, "The Raid on Oaie: A Preliminary Assessment," Tel Aviv University, Center for Strategic Studies, CSS memorandum #5, August 1981.
20. See Flora Lewis.
21. The actual discussions at the fourth session were not disclosed. See the Middle East Journal, Autumn 1981, Chronology on p. 396.

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At the root of every legal question is not an answer but a doubt.

RULES OF THUMB FOR GUT DECISIONS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EMERGENCIES

by
Alfred P. Rubin

In my personal library there is a rather tattered and stained, leather-bound book published in 1741 by the British Admiralty and issued to Navy commanders. It is titled, Extracts from the Several Treaties Subsisting Between Great Britain and Other Kingdoms and States of such Articles and Clauses as Relate to the Duty and Conduct of the Commanders of the King of Great Britain's Ships of War. It is 264 pages long and contains in elegant print the pertinent articles of all the treaties with France, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium (then called the Austrian Netherlands), Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Denmark, Savoy (now expanded to a united Italy), Turkey, Morocco, Algiers, Tripoli (now called Libya), and Tunis. The oldest is with the Austrian Netherlands, and dates to 1495. The compilation is current as of 1741. Some of the articles deal with the rights of merchants as neutrals when the other treaty party is exercising belligerent rights, such as blockade, against a third state; some with the incidents of peaceful seaborne trade, some with belligerent rights as between the treaty partners themselves, such as provisions dealing with contraband and prize court proceedings. Such a compilation was not only useful but a practical necessity in 1741 if Great Britain were to give her navy the job of protecting British commerce at sea.

It would be both undesirable and impossible to compose an equivalent compilation for our naval commanders today. It is impossible to furnish our naval commanders with a compilation of all the treaty articles that might pertain to their duties because of the growth of the international community and the proliferation of treaties and executive agreements pertinent to seaborne commerce and the laws of war, and other matters of possible immediate concern to naval commanders, like individuals' rights to political asylum. To serve a function equivalent to the 1741 compilation a current volume would have to be huge, cross-indexed, and accompanied by interpretive legal memoranda and philosophical analyses of the impact of treaty commitments on third parties, the implications of inconsistent obligations owed to the same party, different parties, international organizations, and parties with reservations or
qualifying interpretations to multilateral documents. And it would quickly be realized by the naval commanders that this set of volumes (which is what it would turn out to be) would be incomprehensible without more study than time and energy would permit. Besides, it would probably be useless in an emergency not squarely envisaged in some pertinent treaty. Since emergencies are never squarely envisaged, since it is never clear that any particular treaty is pertinent to the exclusion of others, and since questions of interpretation arise over the simplest legal language, a modern compilation could not serve the function of the 1741 compilation.

It would also be undesirable. It is no longer true that the rules of international law are codified in documents that make sense to an intelligent and experienced person who has not devoted considerable time and effort to their study. Scan simply the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and consider that any American compilation like the 1741 book would not include the current version of the draft Convention of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) because that draft is not yet (and, indeed, may never be) a treaty ratified by the United States. But to conclude from that fact that the rules of 1958 still bind the United States and the flag states of all the other parties' vessels our Navy ships might encounter on the high seas would be totally wrong. The new draft embodies practices and interpretations accepted as proper, even if not formally binding, and the burden would be on the state relying on the 1958 Convention's formulation in case of doubt to show that it had not been changed by universal acquiescence in some new practice as evidenced by the current draft. Indeed, the extension by the United States itself of an exclusive fisheries zone reaching two hundred miles from its coasts was accomplished not by a revision of the 1958 Convention but by legislation against the advice of the State Department. Moreover, not all maritime states are parties to the 1958 Convention, and the relationship of that attempt to codify the law of the sea to states which rejected the codification, for whatever reason, is complex and cannot easily or quickly be summarized. And what is true for that single Convention is true for many.

When I contemplated this situation, it occurred to me that a general rule existed which all seagoing officers learn sooner or later: On questions of treaty interpretation, only Washington is capable of giving guidance. The naval officer who tries to act as his own lawyer, like the lawyer who tries to handle his own case, treads dangerous ground and will probably hang his client.

And what is true for treaty interpretation is true for all other questions of international law; perhaps even more so when there is no definitive text at all to refer to, or only a text like a statute, or a UN General Assembly resolution, or a draft unratified treaty, that is written for other purposes and aimed at other people. It is not rational to assign a competent international lawyer to each ship, not because there is a great shortage of competent international lawyers—but because the calibre of military lawyers is at least as high as the calibre of lawyers in our society in general, including its academics—but because a competent international lawyer himself will know that at the root of every legal question is not an answer but a doubt. A learned analysis of the precise legal risks of alternative courses of conduct in an emergency is not only useless in practice; it is impossible.

This is not to say that guidance, even elaborate and detailed guidance, should not be attempted, but that the utility of complex rules of engagement and equivalently detailed orders is limited to the circumstances in which the naval commander has the time and opportunity to...
use them. They may fill a gap between an emergency situation where quick and decisive action (or a decision not to act) is imperative to save life, protect a command, or assert a major national interest, and the situation in which there is time and opportunity to seek the guidance of a headquarters equipped to give it. But they cannot themselves guide a naval commander who must make a quick decision.

What is needed is not definitive guidance, then, but a few, easily grasped, rules of thumb; guidance for guts when a gut decision must be made.

Gut decisions by naval commanders are usually well based in their experience and general knowledge of American interests and policies, but cannot serve without rules of thumb when legal interests are at play. Our guts frequently deceive us. An anecdote, slightly inapropos, may be worth preserving:

In 1965 I was the lawyer in the Office of the Secretary of Defense charged with responsibility for legal aspects of our Southeast Asian operations. My principal client was John McNaughton, a native of Pekin, Illinois, then Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), who in private life had been a professor of law (but not international law) at the Harvard Law School.

At a meeting in his office he asked for the views of his staff, including myself as his lawyer, on a proposal that had been referred to Secretary McNamara by President Johnson: Should we mine Haiphong harbor? As was typical in those days, we had not been given advance notice of the subject of the meeting, thus I had not checked the SEATO Treaty or other documents when I was suddenly asked whether it was legally required that the United States notify its allies before undertaking the operation. McNaughton's view was that it was undesirable as a matter of policy to notify our allies. Notice was tantamount to asking for objections, they might object, and raise political problems even if legally we would be justified in the mining. Confronting them with a fait accompli would be easier for them to accept and explain to their own constituents than what might appear to be a concurrence construed out of their failure to object.

I disagreed. My view was that the risks to their merchant ships in Haiphong, which might be delayed there past the moment our mines were armed even if our notice were given before then, were significant, and that our failure to notify them before the mines were laid would, if they then objected, either result in our delaying the arming of the mines (in which case we might as well have given them prior notice), or create serious political problems ultimately resulting in their drawing back from supporting us in Vietnam, which at that time was still considered possible and desirable. I thought that the consultation provisions of the SEATO Treaty might apply, but without the text to check and no time to do the necessary legal research into the negotiating history of the Treaty and the terms on which it was submitted to our Senate for advice and consent, I could not be sure of my view of the law.

"Is it just your guts then, Rubin?", he asked.

"Yes, sir," I admitted.

"Well, then" he replied (and I will probably always remember his precise words), "your guts and my guts just disagree on this one." The serious meeting ended in laughter.

In retrospect, I don't know whose guts were closer attuned to political and legal realities; I think mine were, but that opinion rests on later research and knowledge of what in fact happened in Vietnam, including our allies' increasing distrust of our military and political judgment there, things that neither of us could know at the time. It was my impression that the decision then not to mine Haiphong harbor was made on other bases, possibly wrongly, and I
don't know what impact advance notice to our allies might have had. McNaughton is, tragically, dead and cannot give us his version of the anecdote.

The point is the need for some rules of thumb to help guide our guts; to help focus the issues and give us a handle on the legal and policy implications of military action. With this in mind, I suggest the following fundamental principles as possibly useful to naval commanders.

1. Reciprocity. A fundamental rule of the international legal order is the equality of all states, big and small, before the law. Great strength may give us great political responsibilities, and possibly even some legal rights and powers not available to lesser states, but in general, and as a matter of basic principle, rights we assert for ourselves in the absence of agreement by others are rights that all other states can assert against us. If an American naval commander insists on sending a boarding party to a Peruvian gunboat suspected of harboring an American fugitive, a Peruvian commander (indeed the commander of a legally equal Ecuadorian vessel) will sooner or later be asserting the same right against an American naval vessel. To argue then that we have rights against our legally equal Latin American neighbors that they do not have against us is almost certain to have major political implications of the utmost gravity. The fact that we are bigger and stronger than our Latin neighbors will not prevent them from expropriating American property, or even, as in the case of the Pueblo off North Korea, seizing an American military vessel. Collective political action through the Organization of American States might be their non-military response. Remembering the rule of reciprocity would dampen down the understandable enthusiasm of an American naval commander unduly intent on accomplishing a law-enforcement mission.

2. Minimal Force. It is fundamental to the international law of war, as well as to wise management, that unnecessary suffering and destruction is improper. Whether a use of force to "teach a lesson" is justifiable as "reprisal" or on some other basis must rest on particulars. It is a potentially difficult legal question to which the answer normally would be no. The international law of self-defense, which was definitively formulated by Daniel Webster in diplomatic correspondence with Lord Ashburton, the British Minister in Washington, in 1842, justifies only the minimum force when the necessity is "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." International law, like the law of many states in the United States, requires a threatened party to retreat before the threat as long as retreat is safe before using force in self-defense. This is not to say that there are no circumstances in which a naval commander may use force beyond the minimum necessary to safeguard his command, only that as a rule of thumb he should not; if he does he is likely to involve the United States in serious complications, an escalating use of force by others, and will find his superiors, to their dismay, forced to apologize for action he thought was justifiable.

3. Effectiveness. In the long run, legal relationships flow from the facts, not from the technical labels we frequently use to disguise unpleasant reality. Thus, if a rebel group that has control of a foreign vessel is labeled a "pirate" or "terrorist" group by the recognized government against which it is fighting, and the United States does not recognize the legitimacy of the rebel government or its legal capacity to commission naval vessels, to the degree the labels represent a political idea of the defending government or the United States and not the facts, it is the labels that will ultimately be changed.
capturing a Chinese Communist gunboat in 1970, when the United States recognized the Chinese Nationalist Government as the sole Government of China, and that Government called the Peking authorities merely bandits, would create legal and political complications that might help clarify the law, but at the cost of his reputation for common sense. The reality of Communist control of the mainland of China actually determined American relations with Peking as early as 1949, and we accorded Chinese Communist "volunteers" the privileges of legal belligerents in Korea from the first days of their entry into that conflict in 1951, despite maintaining for political reasons a set of legal labels that made that status inconsistent with our public legal position. This is not to say that there are no legal effects to unreal labels, only that as a rule of thumb, in the absence of express guidance from above, naval commanders should rest their evaluations of reality on reality itself, not on subtle and complex political and legal considerations that may require the formal use of deceptive legal labels for a time.

4. Legal labels and "Autointerpretation." Legal words are almost always deceptive even to lawyers. President Ford is a lawyer, and he called the Kampuchean naval force that seized the Mayaguez "pirates." The State Department quickly "clarified" the situation denying that the President had intended "piracy" in the sense of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, thus denying that the legal results of the label should flow. In fact, there is ample historical and legal basis for President Ford's use of the word, but that use is not the one purportedly codified in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas. There seem to be at least six quite different conceptions of "piracy" that have been used from time to time by international lawyers to justify suppressive action, some of them wholly outdated, merely political, or simply irrelevant to the situations to which their legal implications are occasionally sought to be applied; President Ford was apparently using the word without a clear idea of which sense was intended. As a rule of thumb, then, naval commanders should beware of drawing legal results from labels used by newspapers, staff lawyers, or even the President of the United States.

The unwise of acting on the basis of labels rather than on the basis of facts is reflected in a deeper conception familiar to international lawyers: Autointerpretation. Since all states are equal before the law, and there is no formal legislative body and only a very limited judicial competence in the international legal order, the legal classification of facts on the basis of which action is taken by states must always in the first instance rest on "autointerpretation." The classification made by the acting state's responsible officials for their own purposes. But autointerpretation is not a definitive legal determination of the true relationships and their legal results. States have apologized for acts taken pursuant to self-serving autointerpretations which in retrospect seemed more like mere adversary briefs than convincing analyses. The final determinations are made by the political pressures of the entire international community and by history. Thus naval commanders, like international lawyers, should approach the most convincing legal arguments with a certain degree of skepticism. A firm position stated by a Soviet vessel that the United States has no legal right to retain custody of a fleeing Soviet sailor reaching an American vessel on the high seas cannot legally be more than a Soviet autointerpretation of the law. It cannot in theory or practice be a determination of the law however persuasively argued. And, similarly, in the absence of an order absolving an American naval commander of responsibility for his action,
even a legal position uttered by the United States Government is a shaky basis for action. Wise policy must be influenced by legal perceptions, just as it must reflect economic interests and military interests, but the self-serving legal briefs of only one party are not a solid basis for decisionmaking, even in legal theory.

5. Supremacy of the Law. It may seem odd after this analysis to refer to the law as supreme, but it is necessary. The final determinations made by politics and history are devastating. To ignore the inherent weakness of autointerpretations and adversary briefs before the glare of publicity, counterargument and the many legal and political actions that states take to keep each other in line would be foolish indeed. But to ignore the obvious fact that the final determinations of the law made by the world community and by history deal severely with those who ignore the law is to be blind indeed. The guidelines of reciprocity, minimal force, and the ultimate effectiveness of facts, coupled with a healthy skepticism about glib legal labels and an appreciation of the inherent doubts that underlie all legal argument until history has had a chance to deliver its judgment, seem appropriate. They lead to caution in action, which is all to the good when real lives and property are at stake, but do not inhibit necessary action in a true emergency.

So far, we have been addressing international law at such a basic level that the degree of generality may obscure the practical utility of the law. It is possible to be more specific.

6. Territoriality. The prehistoric basis for our nation-state system probably rests on religious and ethnic-family and tribal feelings rooted in our deepest inheritance; part of our wiring rather than our software programming. It is also possible that to some degree our emphasis on territorial integrity is built into the system. International law takes account of both in allowing states to make rules for their nationals wherever they may be, and to make rules for everybody, foreigners as well as nationals, within the territory politically dominated by the rule-making and rule-enforcing authority, the government. The system is more complex than it seems; there are territory-less rule-making and rule-enforcing organizations, like churches; there are exemptions from territorial enforcement for transiting diplomats and others; there are overlaps and underlaps. Fundamentally, however, the territorial sovereign is supreme in his territory, and his territory includes his internal waters, territorial seas and, for some purposes, wide belts of fisheries and other exploitation zones. When a vessel of another state appears in any of those zones, even if there is no treaty governing the situation, as is in fact the case regarding extended fisheries zones today, and even if for some purposes the zone is labeled part of the high seas, an overlap of sovereignty occurs. The flag state of a vessel has the jurisdiction in that vessel necessary to allow the master to exercise the authority he needs without fear of a claim against him for false imprisonment or assault when he disciplines a crewman or passenger. Indeed, from earliest days vessels on the high seas and in foreign ports were conceived as part of the territory of their country of origin for purposes of internal discipline and property rights. But a vessel is not a part of the flag state's territory; the analogy loses its persuasiveness quickly when contemplating air space above the vessel and the routine exercise of port-state customs and immigration authority on board visiting private vessels. The extension of territorial jurisdiction is built on a fiction, limited by the principle of effectiveness, and yields in general to the prescriptions of the territorial waters or ports. Even though warships, by long usage and mutual
acquiescence, are normally considered immune from the territorial sovereign's enforcement authority, in case of conflict their only recourse is to leave the territorial waters. In general, in these days of rising international claims to law-making and law-enforcing authority for special purposes in large areas of what formerly were considered to be the high seas, claims which the United States makes also, principles of reciprocity would normally require an intruding military vessel to leave rather than contest any assertion of right based on the extension of territorial jurisdiction seaward. There may be cases in which passage is forced, but those must be dictated by higher authority, which will presumably have considered the impact of reciprocity, minimal force, and effectiveness, as well as the relative persuasiveness of the autointerpretations of all states concerned, before issuing the orders. But as a rule of thumb, a naval commander can no longer confidently oppose territorially based claims with assertions of historical rights based on glib labels like "high seas" and "freedom of navigation" or even "innocent passage."

7. "Functional" Sovereign and Diplomatic Immunities. Traditional perceptions of the immunities of diplomats and of arms of the sovereign, including naval vessels, have been rapidly changing in the past few years. While there can be no doubt of the illegality of the Iranian seizure of American diplomatic and consular personnel and even private American nationals in Teheran in 1979, the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations ended whatever had remained of theories of absolute diplomatic immunities and replaced it, to the extent developing conceptions of law outside the treaty framework had not already done so, with a conception of "functional immunities": immunity from host-state territorial jurisdiction limited to what was necessary for the accomplishment of the diplomatic mission. Old catch-phrases, like "train of the Ambassador," and the idea that an embassy is a little bit of foreign territory enclaved in the host state, to the extent they had lived till then, died. The United States agrees with the changes, and it would do us no good to resist them. Thus, when a foreigner seeks asylum from his own government in an American embassy, the right of the United States to grant that asylum is severely limited. Occasionally, heart-wrenching circumstances, as with Soviet religious dissidents in Moscow, or Cardinal Mindszenty in Budapest, lead the United States to permit an asylum situation to arise where there is really very little legal basis for our position. But those are rare and decided at the highest political levels in the United States. A naval commander faced with a fleeing foreigner may be in a somewhat better practical position if he can leave the territorial waters of the host state, but his legal position is also weak. As with embassies, he has no legal immunity from the actual prescription; he must rest on his functional immunity from local enforcement action. He may violate international law by not paying due regard to the law of the coastal state.

This is not to say that, as a rule of thumb, asylum should always be denied. There are humanitarian concerns that permit it. But the naval commander must be aware that his immunities are limited and grave difficulties may result if he cannot defend his command before the fury of a host state convinced that its jurisdiction and hospitality have been abused. Of course, if the asylum incident occurs on the high seas or within American waters, no such conflict of jurisdiction exists and rescue operations and asylums are governed by American law alone in the first instance.

Another modern trend is the increasing restriction on the immunities of foreign states acting in a commercial capacity. The fact of a ship being
designated a naval vessel by the law of its flag state represents today only an autointerpretation of facts that a foreign state or its national court might well want to look at from a different point of view. The United States has been in the forefront of states denying sovereign immunity from law suits based on the commercial activities of foreign governments, and the concept of "commercial" is held to rest on the nature of the operation, not its purpose. Combat operations and legislation are regarded as in their nature governmental; routine navigation and local activities that are typical of any ships, not just public vessels, are regarded as in their nature commercial. Thus, buying ships' stores even for a warship is regarded in the United States as a "buying," not as a governmental activity in support of combat operations, and a common law suit can be brought against the purchaser to enforce the purchase contract. It has not yet reached the point of permitting the arrest of a warship in an admiralty proceeding to enforce a lien, but the trend is heavily in that direction. The fact that the United States might stop short of setting such a precedent is not necessarily an indication that foreign countries, which have watched the American initiative with some apprehension, will stop at the same point we do when they evaluate their own interests and come to their own autointerpretations of the law.9

8. *Humanitarianism*. There is a serious question in the minds of international lawyers whether humanitarian principles, whatever they may be, form part of the legal obligations of states. Strong arguments can be made both ways. As a rule of thumb it is probably true that things done in derogation of a foreign sovereign's jurisdiction in the interest of saving life are not likely to raise serious problems, but that derogations to save property are. The British historically raised the issue over slavery: a right to life issue to them and a right to property issue to the Portuguese, Americans and others. The result was a victory in theory for property, and a victory in practice for the British, who marshalled public support and political pressures until slave trading states agreed to change their laws and to permit, by treaty, the British to enforce antislave-trade rules on their vessels. There are, of course, times when equivalent problems arise today, for example over the right of a foreign national to flee oppression not linked to life-threatening mob action but to his own government's abusive exercise of its jurisdiction. In those cases, the intervention of American vessels to help the fleeing foreigners is frequently viewed as an interference in the foreign state's internal affairs—its territorial integrity and the ancient link a state has with its nationals wherever they may be. In general, the greater the political motivation for the flight, and the less the immediate life-threatening emergency, the more dubious the justifiability for American action, even as a passive receiver of fleeing persons. If there is any rule of thumb in this area, it would seem to be equivalent to the rule we all apply when we see our neighbors quarreling or beating each other and their children; we don't interfere unless the situation becomes shocking to the point that we cannot simply stand by and watch. At that point, regardless of the law the risks seem worth it.

9. *Mind Your Own Business*. One of the most profound rules of the international legal order, so much so that it has a Latin phrase to go with it, *pro interdictis acta*, is that a quarrel between others is legally of no concern to us. There is no basis for an international claim unless a legal interest of the claimant is violated; there is no basis for diplomatic or military action unless that basis can be found in the law. In international law, phrases like "honest broker" and "friend to all" have no force. The institutional arrangements
for community action rest on the consent of the states to whom the complaint or military action is addressed. That consent has been given in the adherence of nearly all states to the Charter of the United Nations, but that consent extends only to collective action using the organs of the United Nations and to individual states deriving their authority from United Nations legal action, as the United States and other states did in Korea in 1950. Regional organizations, like the Organization of American States, have a role to play in resolving international disputes and occasionally authorize military action. The quarantine of Cuba in 1962 was authorized by the Organization of American States, thus it was possible indirectly to construe the entire action as occurring with Cuban consent, Cuba being still a member of the Organization. There were, and are, doubts as to the legal power of the Organization to take enforcement action. The Soviet Union is not a member, yet the quarantine involved interference with Soviet vessels. Moreover, enforcement action is the exclusive prerogative of the Security Council of the United Nations under the Charter to which all members of the Organization of American States are also parties. But those doubts are subtle, and technical, and were unnecessary to resolve once it was clear that the United States had a legal position that assured it of the support of its Latin American neighbors in the action against Cuba and the Soviet Union in the Western Hemisphere. In that case, the rule of thumb may have worked better than a more technical and detailed analysis of the law would have permitted. The rules of thumb thus that require naval commanders to mind their own business and limit self-defense actions to true emergencies, do not operate to prevent collective action; rather they require collective action instead of individual action when a quarrel between others threatens general community interests. They witheld from any single state, including the United States, the legal power to act as a universal policeman, and strengthen the collective mechanisms that disperse responsibility for keeping the peace among all the members of the community and limit the risks of confrontation.

The foregoing listing of rules of thumb for gut decisions is not exhaustive, but I hope they hit the major points and will be useful to operating naval commanders.

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**BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY**

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**NOTES**

2. UN Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP.10/Rev. 3.
6. For some historical instances in which the British labeled as "pirates" the military arm of some Malay Sultanates which they were treating in other ways as states in the international legal order, see Alfred P. Rubin, "The Use of Piracy in Malay Waters," *Georgetown Papers* 1968, 1970, p. 111. In 1628 the English East India Company captured eighteen "piratical vessels" in Gobunza Harbor (Sumatra
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7. On the hopelessly confusing codification of 1958 see Alfred P. Rubin, "Is Piracy Illegal?" American Journal of International Law, January 1976, p. 92. Distressing, the 1958 codification is repeated more or less verbatim in the current draft before UNCLOS III cited above at note 2.

8. The leading article on this is Leo Gross, "States as Organs of International Law and the Problem of Autointerpretation," in George A. Lipsky, ed., Law and Politics in the World Community (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953), pp. 59-88. Professor Gross first popularized the word "autointerpretation" to label this complex but fundamental conception.

9. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S. Code Secs. 1330, 1602 sqq., provides that the state itself shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States in any case in which the action is based on "an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States" (Sec. 1605(a)(2)). It also provides that a foreign state shall not be immune "in any case in which a suit in admiralty is brought to enforce a maritime lien against a vessel or cargo of the foreign state, which maritime lien is based upon a commercial activity of the foreign state" (Sec. 1605(b)(1)). "Commercial activity" is defined in the act to include "a particular commercial transaction" and says further that "The commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the . . . particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." (Sec. 1603(1)(d)). Legal questions about the constructibility and precise meaning of these provisions are only now beginning to be decided by American courts. Foreign countries enacting their equivalent statutes are not bound by the American Constitution or American interpretations of the American statute.

A Soldier's Lament

"A soldier should be sworn to the patient endurance of hardships, like the ancient knights; and it is not the least of these necessary hardships to have to serve with sailors."

Attributed to Field Marshal Montgomery
THE GREAT SEA RACE

by

Passed Assistant Engineer Frank M. Bennett, U.S. Navy

The large swift cruiser was given the name Columbia, and her remarkable speed and beautiful appearance have combined to make her the pride of the new navy and have won for her the popular appellation, "The Gem of the Ocean." The name bestowed upon her is in accordance with a law requiring vessels of her size to be named after states of the Union, the District of Columbia being regarded as a state for this purpose. While work was progressing on the designs for this so-called commerce-destroyer, Chief Engineer N.P. Towne, U.S. Navy, then director of the drafting room of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, facetiously dubbed her the Pirate, and this name, being seized upon by the newspapers as appropriate, clung to her long after the authorized name was announced, and has appeared many times in serious use both at home and abroad in descriptions of the ship. The Columbia was built by the Cramp Company from designs furnished by the Bureaus of Steam Engineering and Construction and Repair, the contract price being $2,725,000. A speed of twenty-one knots maintained for four consecutive hours was specified and a premium of $50,000 offered for each quarter-knot in excess of this, while a penalty was provided of $25,000 for each quarter-knot the speed might fall below twenty-one knots. The official steam trial took place November 18th, 1893, and the Columbia maintained for four consecutive hours the remarkable speed of 22.8 knots; the premium for seven quarter-knots in excess of the contract speed amounted to $350,000.

For the legislation that called this magnificent specimen of the engineer's art into existence the naval service is indebted to Honorable Charles A. Boutelle more than to any one man, while credit for her wonderful steaming qualities belongs to Engineer-in-Chief George W. Melville. Mr. Boutelle was Chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs in the House of Representatives and he had much opposition to overcome, both in his committee room and on the floor of the House before the building of the ship was voted. This opposition was based upon doubt as to the possibility of building a ship of the size and speed proposed, and also as to the propriety of providing vessels of such a type for the Navy. Mr. Boutelle knew, just as Mr. Isherwood had known...

*Adapted from Bennett's The Steam Navy of the United States (Pittsburg: 1896), pp. 821-833.
years before when he had projected the Wampanoag, that the mere possession of such a vessel in time of war yields an invaluable advantage to the nation owning it, and his faith on the subject was not theoretical, for as a volunteer officer he had learned in the hard school of experience the most useful lessons of naval warfare.

When the question of supplying power to drive the ship at the high speed desired was being considered at the Navy Department, Engineer-in-Chief Melville proposed to secure it by installing three screws, an unusual but not novel practice, for some of the Mississippi River iron-clads during the Civil War had as many as four screws, and triple screws had been applied more recently to small torpedo cruisers in Europe. Secretary Tracy hesitated about undertaking such an experiment on so large and expensive a scale and gave his approval only after the most earnest arguments from Melville, who well knew that anything short of complete success would involve his own professional ruin. To all who knew the prominent part taken by Mr. Melville in establishing the characteristics of this great ship, it was a source of gratification to observe that the principal credit for the achievement was accorded him when the trial performance of the vessel became a triumph.

Though matchless in her class when compared with foreign vessels, the Columbia has not been free from attack by theorists within our own country. It has been asserted that she, or her type in general, is not as well adapted for war purposes as a swift armed mail steamer; that in spite of her high trial speed, her speed comparable with that of the better mail steamers can be developed by her under the usual conditions of service, and that the engineers and firemen of the Navy cannot drive her at the rate obtained by the picked men used in running contractors' trial trips.

To settle the question of her endurance at sea, the Secretary of the Navy ordered her to cross the Atlantic Ocean at full speed, without using forced draft except the last day of the voyage. The Columbia left Southampton, England, shortly after noon on Friday the 26th of July, 1895, and arrived at Sandy Hook at 8:59 a.m. the next Friday, having made a run of 3,090 knots in six days, twenty-three hours and forty-nine minutes, or at an average speed of 18.41 knots per hour for the whole distance.

Natural draft was used the whole trip, it having been found impossible with the force on board to supply coal from the remote bunkers the last day in sufficient quantity to permit of forcing the fires. The engineers' force of the Columbia numbered 196 men of all ratings, the working force being less than this by about a dozen men detailed as mess cooks, and by the daily sick list; sixty men from the deck force were sent to duty in the fire-rooms, but even with this help the force was inadequate and the work was most killing for all.

This voyage of the Columbia was by far the fastest transatlantic or long-distance passage ever made by a vessel of war, and proved that in her the United States owns a steamer that can sustain for as long a period as will ever be necessary asea-speed greater than that of any but a very few of the Atlantic "greyhounds," while her speed under natural draft was but a little less than that of the fastest mail steamers running over the same route with adequate force in their engine departments, and habitually using forced draft. This is shown by the following table of the best performance of the swiftest Atlantic liners between Southampton and New York:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Speed</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faeroe Bismarck</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10 hrs.</td>
<td>32 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normannia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12 &quot;</td>
<td>30 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16 &quot;</td>
<td>43 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17 hrs.</td>
<td>14 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augusta Victoria</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20 &quot;</td>
<td>22 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18 &quot;</td>
<td>47 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S. Columbia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23 &quot;</td>
<td>49 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When the orders for the *Columbia* to make this long sea-trial were issued, the antagonists of speed as a factor in naval warfare were happy, for they believed her incapable of maintaining a high speed for any considerable time and confidently expected her failure to furnish the final argument against the policy of building war vessels in which steam is given predominant space. Even the friends of her type, knowing the disadvantages under which she labored from lack of engineering personnel, were very modest in predicting the result. The two men most directly interested in her success—Engineer-in-Chief Melville, and Mr. Charles H. Cramp, her builder—did not anticipate a better record than eight days in crossing, and this estimate of time was about the average of the range established by betting men, for the sporting fraternity seized upon the event and pools were sold on it in many cities. Very few and very sanguine were those who expected to see her in New York before Saturday afternoon or Sunday morning.

Friday, August 2, was eagerly looked forward to, for it was expected that the incoming mail steamers that day would have passed the *Columbia* and would bring tidings of her progress. When, therefore, the news was flashed to New York early that morning that the *Columbia* was off Fire Island there was much surprise and doubt, but the latter was quickly dispelled by the great white cruiser herself as she rushed into New York Bay and moved majestically up the North River, being cheered as she passed by thousands of people assembled at the Battery and on the piers, and answering with hoarse blasts of her steam-whistle the congratulatory screams of innumerable river-craft. The Hamburg-American liner *Augusta Victoria* followed the *Columbia* out of the English Channel five hours behind her, with the boasted intention of beating her to New York. She did not see the *Columbia* on the voyage and her people were so confident they had passed her in the night and left her far astern that when they arrived at the New York quarantine station at noon, Friday, the bluff German captain shouted derisively, “Where is that white whirlwind now?” The answer was a bitter disappointment to him and rudely disillusioned his passengers; for it said the *Columbia* had passed up the harbor hours before.
"Absolute War will not occur."

THE ESSENTIAL CLAUSEWITZ

by

B.M. Simpson III

Clausewitz' major work, On War, is long, involved, murky, and overpowering. Nevertheless, it is the most thorough and comprehensive book on the phenomenon of war in world literature. While there are many fine analytical histories that describe wars, their causes and their effects, no one has published another book that explains in a philosophical and analytical manner the phenomenon of war as a whole. On War is an unfinished work, published by Frau Clausewitz after her husband's death. Only Chapter 1 of Book I satisfied the author. It was written in a style common to the early 19th century, using the Hegelian method of first stating and developing a thesis and then an antithesis. Finally, the writer produces a synthesis. Unless the reader is aware of what Clausewitz is doing, it may seem that he is contradicting himself.

Clausewitz' theory of war was confirmed by the Napoleonic wars, not deduced from them. To read Clausewitz as an explanation of the European wars from 1792-1815 leads to conclusions that Clausewitz never intended, notably that he placed his emphasis on specific wars. On the contrary, he used specific wars to illustrate his thesis that concerned war as a whole. In short Clausewitz' work is not an adjunct to Napoleonic warfare.

Clausewitz attaches great importance to theory. The function of theory is a systematic elucidation or analysis. Indeed, this is the meaning of the Greek root theoria. The purpose of theory is to order knowledge and to provide a reference point, or philosophical sea buoy, from which additional investigation can take its departure.

He writes out no prescriptions: He does not attempt to tell us what plans will work and what will not. Rather, in descriptive fashion he presents his theory as an analytical investigation that leads to knowledge and to a thorough familiarity with the subject, military history.¹

Clausewitz establishes criteria that his descriptive theory must fulfill:²

1. Investigation of the subjects that constitute war.
2. Identification and separation of those elements that at first seem to be interwoven.

3. Explanation of the character or the properties of the means by which war is conducted, and their probable effects.

4. Identification of the object of war.

5. Application of critical investigation to the entire subject of war.

What is most important is that theory fulfill its descriptive function as a guide to the man who studies war, "...so that it lights up the whole road for him, facilitates his progress, educates his judgment, and shields him from error."

Once this descriptive function of theory has been applied to a given subject or set of circumstances, anyone else may find the matter understandable without having to go through and organize the material himself. At this point, Clausewitz makes his famous statement about theory, that "It should educate the mind of the future leader in war, or rather guide him in his self-instruction, but not accompany him to the battlefield."4

Sir Julian Corbett makes the same point in the first few pages of Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. He uses the study of seamanship as an illustration. Certainly, someone who has read the authorities on ship handling cannot by that fact alone be considered a competent ship handler, but he will have an understanding of the forces affecting the ship. Clausewitz and Corbett agree that theory is indispensable to educate the mind so that it will be better able to deal with each situation on its merits as it arises.

His theory of Absolute War serves as Clausewitz' reference point. Yet he says war is a result of "possibilities, probabilities, good fortune and bad, in which rigorous logical deduction often gets lost." Clausewitz is not contradicting himself.

Absolute War is pure war, untainted by the facts of life. The important thing about studying or examining specific wars is how and why they differ from the abstraction of Absolute War. By giving a reference point that is easily identifiable and that can be kept clearly in mind, a possibly bewildering kaleidoscopic series of events and facts can be reduced to some sort of order. They can be understood by reference to Absolute War, by a determination of how and why they differ from Absolute War. Thus, the theoretical abstraction, Absolute War, serves the function of theory by bringing some form of order out of what otherwise might be chaos.

In the opening passages of On War Clausewitz defines war as "an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfill our will."5 He disparages those who think that an opponent can be disarmed and overcome without causing great bloodshed. Clausewitz says this is an error that must be extirpated, because in such a dangerous thing as war, "the errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are the worst."6 It is absurd, he says, to introduce into the philosophy of war a principle of moderation. "War is an act of violence pushed to its utmost bonds."7 In war there is a dynamic effect that arises from the efforts of each side to increase the violence. This leads to extremes that Clausewitz calls reciprocal actions. There are three of them.8

The first arises from the spirit of escalation in which each side attempts to use a greater degree of violence or force than the other side.

The second reciprocal action arises from the fact that so long as we have not defeated the enemy, the possibility exists that he will defeat us. Therefore, he must be utterly defeated.

The third reciprocal action results from the efforts and expenditures of resources that each side applies to the war.
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Even though Clausewitz has described war as an abstraction, these reciprocal actions produce a dynamic interaction between the combatants. The result logically leads to extremes, for when "reasoning in the abstract, the mind cannot stop short of an extreme, because it has to deal with an extreme, with a conflict of forces left to themselves, and obeying no other but their own inner laws."10

The abstraction, Absolute War, will take place only if the following conditions are met:11

1. If war is an isolated act, which arises suddenly, and is in no way connected with the history of the combatant states.
2. If it is limited to a single solution.
3. If it contains within itself a perfect, final, categorical, unequivocal solution from which there is no appeal.

After setting forth these conditions necessary to Absolute War, conditions which do not occur. Clausewitz tells us that everything takes a different shape when we pass from abstractions to reality.12

The reason the conditions necessary to Absolute War do not occur in reality is that any given war has its origin in a very specific and particular political situation. The political object sought by the antagonists will determine the character of the war. Clausewitz puts it, ". . . the political object as the original motive of the war will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and also the amount of effort to be made."13 Thus, the political object—whatever it may be and however it may be defined—becomes the object of the war. The result is that as the political object diminishes or increases, the military action will also diminish or increase proportionately.

The political object removes war from the realm of abstraction and places it squarely in the real world of real people and real events. If the three conditions for absolute war were met, then, Clausewitz concludes, a given war would be a "perfect, unrestrained and absolute expression of force" and policy makers would step aside to let the war run its self-contained course.14 However, as these three conditions cannot be met, Absolute War will not occur and policy makers cannot stand aside. A purely military solution, whatever that may be, cannot be sought.

Because war has political origins and because it is fought for political purposes, politics, or policy, should predominate. "Policy, therefore, is interwoven with the whole action of War, and must exercise a continuous influence upon it, as far as the nature of the forces liberated by it will permit."15 Hence, military forces must be able to produce a desired and identifiable political effect. Otherwise, their creation would be pointless and their employment senseless.

Because war is the means to gain a political object, those who conduct it must always be aware of the object for which it is waged. They must conceive and plan war to achieve the object that policy makers have established.

By examining the political situations out of which wars have arisen, it is possible to explain why wars differ from each other and how each differs from Absolute War.

It is certainly reasonable to expect that under different circumstances with the antagonists having different motives, wars can be expected to differ significantly both from one another and from Absolute War. Clausewitz emphasizes this point: "Now, the first, the grandest and most decisive act of judgment which the Statesman and General exercises is rightly to understand in this respect the war in which he engages, not to take it for something or to wish to make of it something which by the nature of its relations it is impossible for it to be."16 The Statesman must constantly clarify the object of the war as it
proceeds and the General must insist that the Statesman do so.

This is no idle chatter. For example, in the period 1963 to 1968 it would have made a significant difference in what we did in Vietnam if we had viewed the struggle in that country as a civil war, as outside aggression, or as containment of communism. Did we go to war in Vietnam to build a viable national state? To contain Red China? To pacify the countryside? To destroy North Vietnam? To preserve the power balance in Southeast Asia? Or to reassure our European allies? It is a matter of historical record that a large segment of the American public did not understand what we were trying to do, let alone what the problem was. As The Pentagon Papers show, neither did the Defense Department. One can also look at World War I, a classic example of military action getting out of hand and producing results extraordinarily disproportionate to the issues at hand.

When war breaks out, politics do not cease. Clausewitz puts it this way, "Does the cessation of diplomatic notes stop the political relations between different Nations and Governments? Is not war merely another kind of writing and language for political thoughts? It has certainly a grammar of its own, but its logic is not peculiar to itself." 17

After establishing the primacy of policy, Clausewitz adds some qualifications. The first is that the Statesman must know what the General can accomplish on the battlefield. The Statesman must also know what will be the result or effect of the General's "victory" on the battlefield. The second qualification is a negative form of the first: the Statesman must not make demands on war that war cannot fulfill. The role of the military advisor is to tell his civilian bosses what war can and cannot achieve. This is a very difficult determination to make, but it is of crucial importance. Obviously, if those who form policy know the instrument they have chosen to use (that is, war), then they will not make demands on it that it cannot fulfill. After all, "... the Art of War in its highest point of view is policy, but, no doubt, a policy which fights battles instead of writing notes." 18

Herbert Rosinski described the relationship between policy and war as being neither simple nor capable of exact formulation.

"The right of the political point of view and political leadership to predominate is unquestionable. This unquestionable predominance is itself qualified only by the purely military requirements and capabilities. The problem is thus not that of the simple subordination of military action to political direction, but of a reciprocal relationship between policy and war. This reciprocal relationship between policy and war, political and military leadership and political considerations and military rationale is, however, unequal. The two sides of it, although mutually interacting upon each other, do not, so to speak, stand on the same plane. The superior position of the political leadership is unquestionable. It is not put into doubt by any qualifications by military requirements in any concrete case. The relationship between policy and war might thus be compared with the equally unequal reciprocal relationship between the parent and his child. There is one factor which makes the significance of war with respect to policy greater than that of the child vis-a-vis his parent. War is a matter of life and death for the community engaged in it. The calculations with respect to military capabilities and strategic decisions are, therefore, liable to lead to incomparably graver consequences than in almost any other field. Even if errors are discovered, they are not generally capable of being corrected in time. Thus, the claims of the military leadership in this fundamentally unequal relationship should be heard. They should be taken seriously and should not be over-ridden.
by the predominant political leadership, except for absolutely compelling reasons."

Confusion can arise when we think about Clausewitz' declaration that the framers of policy use war to achieve their political goals or objectives. Surely politics seeks goals other than simply subjecting the enemy to our own will. So what is the object of war?

As we have seen, when dealing with the concept of Absolute War, Clausewitz states that the outcome of war in pure black and white terms. One side wins. The other side loses completely. Because war is an act of violence carried to an extreme, the losing side naturally has its military forces destroyed.

However, when he leaves the realm of abstraction and enters into the real world, Clausewitz points out that frequently, if not always, peace comes without either side being destroyed: destruction of the enemy forces is "rarely attained in practice and is not a condition necessary to peace."

It is true that causing the enemy to submit to our will, that is, disarming him, can lead, and may very well lead directly, to the attainment of the political objective. Though the two are not equivalent or synonymous, attainment of the political objective may be possible only by first disarming the enemy.

Though the immediate military objective is "destruction of the enemy's military power," Clausewitz explains that this means the foe must be "reduced to such a state as not to be able to prosecute the war." Being unable to prosecute the war is a much broader category than simply having military forces destroyed, as we saw in Vietnam.

There can be many reasons a state might not be able to prosecute a war, even though its military organization is still intact. For example, there may be a lack of will to fight; the civilian base may be threatened or severely damaged; or a blockade may have starved the homefront into surrender. These were some of the conditions prevailing in Germany in 1918.

There are three reasons that destruction of the enemy's force is not necessary and seldom happens.

Acceptability. The discrepancy between the object of war in the abstract and the return of peace in reality is explained in terms of the value of the political object to the antagonists. This value determines "the measure of sacrifices by which it is to be purchased." Clausewitz observes that "As soon as the required outlay becomes so great that the political object is no longer equal in value, the object must be given up and peace will be the result." For anyone familiar with the Military Staff Study, this is a classic statement of the test of Acceptability: what is the object worth to me?

Probabilities. In considering the dynamics of war, Clausewitz cautions us that we must always free ourselves from the "strict law of logical necessity and seek aid from the calculation of probabilities." A combatant's original political views and objectives may change substantially, "just because they are determined by results and probable events," as we have seen. The Korean war is a classic example of how political objectives can change from repelling the aggression, to seizing the entire peninsula, to accepting a cease-fire roughly at the 38th parallel.

Resolve. In some situations the object can be achieved without any fighting, providing a sufficient resolve to fight is demonstrated. Clausewitz offers this as the explanation of how a whole campaign can be carried out energetically without the battle playing a notable part in it. This, of course, is what we frequently find in 18th-century warfare. The reasons for this kind of war lie in the realms of politics, psychology, and will, in the criterion of acceptability (rulers simply were not willing to pay a higher price); and, possibly, in Clausewitz' own terms for the equivalent of
the destruction of the enemy’s forces reducing them to such a state as to be unable to prosecute the war.

With these points Clausewitz explains or justifies why in reality wars usually end without the loser being utterly destroyed.

Though Clausewitz lacks a capstone to his otherwise elegant, insightful and perceptive analysis, we should remember that the cholera germ deprived him of the opportunity to complete his work.

As we have seen, the nub of the problem is construing the phrase that Clausewitz uses for the object in war. That phrase is "reducing (the enemy) to such a state as not to be able to prosecute the war." This states a negative condition.

The problem can be solved fairly easily if, instead, we use the concept of control. In other words, the object of war is to exercise control over the enemy. This is a positive concept. What is to be controlled, and the degree and form of control, decisions that will have to be resolved by both the Statesman and the General within the framework of the relationship between policy and war.

Obviously, control must have a purpose. And whatever that may be, inevitably there will be an effect produced on the enemy and in the political relationships of the two warring states. In short, control must be instituted to achieve a specific effect.

Here is the very essence of strategic thinking. A strategic concept is a verbal statement resulting from an analysis of what constitutes control, what must be controlled, the nature of the control, how much is necessary, when it is to start, how long it is to last, and its natural and probable consequences.

The makers of policy must identify and specify what effects are desired. They then must determine which instrument to use to achieve these effects. One instrument, diplomacy and economic activities are others. But whatever the means selected, it is obviously capable of achieving some effects and unable to achieve others. The selection of which means to use to achieve which effects is an extraordinarily serious and difficult question. This is why, in the relationship between the Statesman and the General, the considerations of policy must predominate, but it is also the reason why the claim of the military must be taken seriously. If the makers of policy desire a certain effect, they must make sure that by war they can establish control over some area or situation, and that such control will produce the desired effect, that is, achieve the ultimate object of the war. Such a determination must be made before military forces are employed.

There is one other important aspect to Clausewitz’ theory of war: the identification of the component parts or, branches, of war.

If fighting consisted of only a single act, there would be no need for analysis. But fighting consists of a number of acts, which are battles. Thus, fighting gives rise to two essentially different activities. The first is the conduct of each battle. The second is the combination of these individual battles in such a manner that the object of the war is pursued. Clausewitz labels the first activity tactics and the second strategy. He clearly distinguishes the one from the other.

Tactics is "the theory of the use of military forces in battle." Strategy is "the theory of the use of battles for the objects of war."

But fighting is not the only activity connected with the conduct of war. Fighting forces must be created and maintained. Under this function Clausewitz specifically includes subsistence, care of the sick, the supply and repair of arms and equipment. In short, that which today we call logistics. Having identified the three major branches of the art of war: strategy, tactics, and
logistics, he alludes to their interrela-
tionship, but he does not pursue the point.*

This trinity of strategy, tactics, and
logistics is justified on the basis of
descriptive theory, the purpose of which is "to clear up conceptions and ideas,
which have been jumbled together, and,
we may say, entangled and confused." 19
Semantic clarity requires these concepts
be used precisely and accurately. That is,
everyone must know what everyone else
is talking about in order to communi-
cate.

Clausewitz warns skeptics and
doubters: "He to whom all this is
nothing, must either repudiate all theo-
retical consideration, or his under-
standing has not as yet been gained by
the confused and perplexing ideas rest-
ing on no fixed point of view, leading to
no satisfactory result, sometimes dull,
sometimes fantastic, sometimes flot-
ing in vague generalities, which we are
often obliged to hear and read in the
conduct of War, owing to the spirit of
scientific investigation having hitherto
been little directed to these subjects." 20

It is obvious that Clausewitz saw war
as anything but sterile or abstract.
Rather, he makes the point that the
moral forces are "amongst the most
important subject in war." 21

Human beings supply the spirit that
animates war and makes it a dynamic,
living phenomenon. Today we refer to
these moral forces as morale. Good
morale can mean the difference be-
tween success or failure on the battle-
field.

There are three chief moral powers:
the Talents of the Commander, the
Military Virtue of the Army, and Na-
tional Feeling. 22

Of all the human qualities that can
affect the conduct of a war, perhaps the
rarest one is a good general, a person
whose qualities include energy, firm-
ness, staunchness, strength of mind, and
character. When these qualities are
melded into a harmonious association
they are called military genius. The
ability to inspire the troops and to rouse
them into action by the sole means of
the will of the Commander is the charac-
teristic that makes him stand above the
masses and continue to be their mas-
ter. 23

In addition to these qualities of leader-
ship, the General must have "an inti-
mate knowledge of State policy in its
higher relations." 24

Certainly these are not ordinary quali-
ties. "What is here required from the
higher powers of the mind is a sense of
unity, and a judgement raised to such a
compass as to give the mind an extra-
ordinary faculty of vision which in its
range allows and sets aside a thousand
dim notions which an ordinary under-
standing could only bring to light with
great effort, and over which it would
exhaust itself." 25 With standards and
criteria such as these, it is a wonder
that we have ever had any first-rate
generals.

Clausewitz advises us to look for
"searching, rather than inventive
minds, comprehensive rather than such
as have a special bent, cool rather than
fiery heads." Men with these qualifica-
tions are those in whom we should
repose our trust and confidence in time
of war. 26

Clausewitz has given us the tools to
raise such questions about any war, past,
present, or conceivable, as:
What are the political situations that
would give rise to the war?
What would be the character of the
war?
What would be the objectives of the
belligerents?
Are their war plans designed to
achieve those objectives?

*See Henry E. Eccles, Military Concepts and
Philosophy (New Brunswick: Rutgers University
Press, 1965) for the best discussion in English of
the interrelationship of strategy, tactics, and logis-
tics. No military education can be complete with-
out a familiarity with this remarkable book.

Publisher: Naval War College, 1982
Author(s): Naval War College Review
In the course of the war are the objectives of the belligerents likely to change? If so, how?
In their prosecution of the war, in what areas and situations will the belligerents seek to control? What means will they use?
Would success in achieving such control result in attainment of their objectives?
Is there a harmonious relationship among strategy, tactics, and logistics?
If not, what is likely to go wrong?

**The Essential Clausewitz**

Only by asking the right questions about war can we hope to learn anything about it. We must have a descriptive theory of war before we can ask the right questions. Clausewitz has given us such a theory.

**BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY**

B.M. Simpson III, who taught Clausewitz when he was on the Naval War College faculty, practises law in Newport. He is a former editor of this journal.

**NOTES**


2. Ibid., p. 191.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 102.
8. Ibid., pp. 103.
9. Ibid., pp. 103-105.
10. Ibid., p. 105.
11. Ibid., p. 106.
12. Ibid., pp. 103-106.
15. Ibid., p. 119.
16. Ibid., p. 121.
20. Ibid., p. 124.
22. Ibid., p. 125.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., p. 126.
26. Ibid., p. 152.

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IN MY VIEW...

Vietnam and the Absence of Strategy

Sir:

Almost immediately after their stunning successes in World War II our country's military leaders began a process which in twenty years was to play a big part in drawing down upon the United States the disaster and humiliation of the Vietnamese War.

This was the surrender of military intellectual leadership to the civilian scholars and systems analysts. It stemmed from three primary causes: the military leaders' preoccupation with their struggles over service unification, the creation and shaping of the Department of Defense, and the controversies centering on the B-36 bomber; their preoccupation with nuclear weaponry; and their growing contempt for the study of military theory, particularly of logistics. The process of the resulting civilian domination was made clear by the relief of Admiral George Anderson from the office of CNO in 1963 and the FFX decisions of the same period.

In this process first the military lost control of their language, then of their organization, and finally, of their operations. Intellectual honesty and rigor were smothered under an avalanche of esoteric jargon and meaningless calculations, while the critical calculations and relationships were largely ignored by civilians and military alike.

One observer, Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., recently put it this way: "Instead of concentrating attention on military strategy which had become unfashionable after World War II (and to many, irrelevant in the nuclear era), there was an increased emphasis on technical, managerial, and bureaucratic concerns."

One result of all this was that, when Vietnam became an issue that required major decisions, at no time did anyone in authority make a rigorous estimate of the situation—an estimate that would have started with an analysis of the objectives. In consequence, as Colonel Summers says, "the confusion over objectives... had a devastating effect on our ability to conduct the war."

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2 Ibid., p. 66.
Summers points out while the United States, violating the precepts of Clausewitz, got into trouble, the North Vietnamese, who adhered to Clausewitz, won.

No one can expect to understand strategy merely by reading and quoting from Clausewitz, Mahan, and suchlike. What it takes is deep thought plus the ability to appreciate the influences of the physical aspects of warfare—geography, time, distance, and capabilities—to attain an intuitive understanding of the whole problem.

The essence of strategy lies in an authoritative combination of: the objective, i.e., the effect desired; the means, i.e., power derived from resources; and the scheme or plan to use the means to achieve the effect desired.

But, if a man cannot make an intuitive evaluation of the relationship of key objectives, tactical and logistical resources, and time, he is still not a strategist. What he is is a mere speculator.

While Clausewitz should be studied, no one should think that he is the final authority. What he did was to provide us with a splendid base from which to develop our own ideas.

Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, U.S. Navy (Retired)

"Why Most Have Failed" (cont'd)

Sir:

F.J. West, Jr., writing in the March-April 1981 issue of the Naval War College Review, "Secretaries of Defense; Why Most Have Failed" has ignored a critical aspect of the Defense "problem." That aspect (which determines to a large degree the focus of the Secretary's efforts) is the environment in which he operates.

Washington, D.C. today is more known for the military "expertise" that lies outside of the Pentagon than that which resides within it! The exponential growth in Congressional staffs coupled with an increased willingness to exercise Congress' oversight prerogative has placed OSD management into a fishbowl. In addition, the fiscal pressures and controllability of DOD expenditures has led to increased attention and "micro-management" on the part of OMB. Faced with these adversaries (who because of political or budgetary time perspectives focused on short-term "fixes") the Secretary of Defense had little choice but to meet the attack by focusing on the management of the Department.

This focus on management was of course perceived by the services as micro-management on the part of OSD. Yet on many occasions when the political appointees confined themselves to making "policy" the services appeared to act to thwart those policies. This resulted in some few cases because of a fundamental disagreement with the policy but more often was simply a classic example of bureaucratic inertia. In any event the end result was often an intensified focus on management to insure that policies were followed.

Add to this mixture a manager's natural urge to focus on something tangible and the outcome was assured. Thus it is not too surprising that...
Secretaries of Defense concentrated on internal management in the past and continue to do so today.

These observations are based on service on the Air Staff, as Military Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Special Assistant to the Director, Office of Management & Budget.

Sincerely,

Lt. Col. Paul D. Murphy, USAF

Bring the Army Home? Cut Back the Fleet?

Sir:

Dr. Keith A. Dunn's article, "Strategy, the Soviet Union and the 1980s," (Sept-Oct 1981) omits two major areas of consideration that seem likely to influence U.S. strategy in the 1980s:

1) The U.S. economy. Let's face it, there is just not enough money in the till to finance anything like the range of "options" Doctor Dunn describes. Somehow there must be a drastic reduction—in the order of at least 30-40 billion dollars—in the Defense budget. Presidential Counselor Edwin Meese III indicated recently that the buildup to a 600-ship Navy is the one part of the Defense budget that will not be sacrificed. If that is to be the case, and if we are to obtain the "flexibility" Doctor Dunn seeks, the monetary saving we need can come only from the large U.S. subsidy now provided to Europe. At least as concerns Europe, Doctor Dunn hits close to the mark when he suggests we might want to move our overseas land forces back into reserve positions. That, however, would not achieve the large-scale savings that must be obtained. Given two or three years' notice, our allies in Europe could easily make up the five divisions we maintain there. By withdrawing and deactivating those divisions we would make a considerable start toward balancing the Federal budget, an objective every bit as important as regaining strategic "flexibility."

2) The emergence of the Pacific Basin as an area of U.S. interest at least coequal with Europe. Dr. William T. Tow's superbly researched article in the same issue amply illustrates the shift in the world's political and economic center of gravity toward the Pacific and Asia. The evidence at hand, however, suggests that Doctor Tow is too optimistic about getting Western European U.S. allies involved in Pacific and Asian power politics. And that is all the more reason why the United States must regain "flexibility"—better stated as "freedom of maneuver"—if it is to protect its worldwide interests. In short, we must persuade our European partners that the U.S. resources now tied down in Europe could be used more profitably elsewhere, to the benefit of Europe as well as ourselves.

Beyond these omissions, I find it difficult to understand Doctor Dunn's seeming equation of U.S. and Soviet motives and actions in the Third World. Doctor Dunn asks, "Is covert manipulation of Third World domestic politics acceptable for the United States but not for the Soviet Union?" The question,
it seems to me, should be put in quite a different way: "Should the Soviet Union be permitted to gain a stranglehold on the non-Communist world by subverting weak governments and independence movements controlling vital resources; or should the United States and its allies intervene to whatever extent is necessary to maintain the free flow of ideas and goods, for the benefit of the Soviet peoples as well as ourselves?"

When read in sequence these two articles are an important contribution to the reexamination of U.S. strategy that is now taking place.

Colonel William V. Kennedy, U.S. Army Reserve

Sir:

I am confused by Mr. Kennedy's remarks. On one hand, he seems to want the United States to deactivate current divisions deployed in Europe. On the other hand, he says that "we must persuade our European partners that U.S. resources now tied down in Europe could be used more profitably elsewhere, to the benefit of Europe as well as ourselves." Does Mr. Kennedy mean the same divisions which he recommends deactivating should be moved to the Far East? The likely reality is that divisions deactivated in Europe would be lost to the force structure and not available for redeployment elsewhere. This is precisely why I suggest pulling US divisions off the front lines in Europe and Asia but not bringing them back to the United States.

Mr. Kennedy focuses his remarks upon divisions in Europe. I also said that US forces in Korea should possibly be pulled off line. If Mr. Kennedy believes that the United States needs to obtain "flexibility" or more "freedom of maneuver," why should US forces in the Pacific be treated differently than those in Europe?

Finally, I am not sure how Mr. Kennedy arrives at the figure of $30-40 billion which must be eliminated from the defense budget. It is clear that the removal of 4-5 US Army divisions from the force structure will not result in a budget reduction anywhere near $30-40 billion. If you are going to reduce the defense budget by that amount, major curbs in high expense programs such as B-1, strategic C3I, M-X, and the 600-ship navy will have to occur. Moreover, I do not accept that my "options" are not economically achievable in the coming decade. Remember, I suggest pursuing arms control and SALT. Primarily, I favor this for reasons of strategy, but successful strategic nuclear arms negotiations will obviously result in some monetary savings. With the exception of enhanced security assistance, the other options would result in virtually no increases to the defense budget.

I think Mr. Kennedy needs to reread the section on options from my article. Closer reading should indicate that I am not suggesting the types of things that Mr. Kennedy implies in his letter.

Keith A. Dunn
"Proof, in its way, that we have been living in an intellectually dark age."

by

Robert B. Bathurst


There has come to be something of an Aberystwyth School of Soviet Strategic studies. The University College of Wales is the home of some very active thinkers in the field. Two, John Baylis and Gerald Segal, are both the editors and authors of a long introduction to the present volume. In addition, two of the contributors, Ken Boorh and Michael McCwire, are present or former scholars there. The other writers included are well known in the field. They have been intellectual pace-setters for years. There are no surprises here.

It would be useful to be able to say in what way the Aberystwyth School is distinguished from others or in what direction it is tending. Presumably this volume should give a clue, but if it does, it is well hidden. The editors say that the reason for the book is that it sought “to combine the most important arguments from both sides [here they mean the right and the left, the hawks and the doves] presenting a broad analysis of the key features of Soviet strategy.” They have tried to accomplish this task by selecting seven essays, almost establishment essays, for republication. The essays are divided into headings (which seem to me to overreach their content) and the whole 250 pages, together with the introduction, constitutes what is being called “Soviet Strategy.”

One must ask who comprises the intended audience for this book. The answer is not obvious to this reader. As the authors are already widely read and their positions are well known, the value of collecting a few articles from the seventies is not immediately apparent. There is not enough work in this book to treat any one aspect of Soviet strategy or any one author adequately. Two of the articles were published first in 1973. The most recently published, Michael McCwire’s, is dated 1980 but it recapitulates (albeit in a very useful form) the results of his thought of three decades.

Perhaps the value the editors had in mind was to bring these useful articles together, unless, as I have begun to fear, they had some notion that their
choices provide a definitive statement about the left and the right of the strategic debate. It can be stated confidently that if that is the intent of the book, then, for all of the excellence of the writers it collects, it is a failure.

The blame for that failure, however, is not entirely that of the editors. If they had read with care the work of their colleague, Ken Booth, on ethnocentrism, they might have suspected that they were trapped in a mirror image. In fact, they give evidence in a footnote at the end of their essay that they suspect as much. After fruitlessly trying to separate writers and concepts, they finally admit that "we...use the terms hawks and doves...as a symbol of positions that in reality tend to be more complex." There are better symbols.

Dividing educated writers on Soviet strategy who are widely published in English into hawks and doves is a largely hopeless task. The debate about "strategic" war conducted, especially in the United States, in the 60s and 70s, was a kind of hermetically sealed, one-dimensional rumination, conducted largely by academics who knew little enough about war and almost nothing about men, and who talked to each other (with the press and government eavesdropping), frequently without any reference whatsoever to what the Soviets either thought, said, or did.

The results were, of course, bizarre. The world still waits for the genius who can put that phase of our "thought" in a cultural and ideological perspective. In any case, the authors collected in this volume do not fit into the hawk/dove bifurcation which the editors attempted. Neither do they fit into the criticism of one-dimensionality which I suggested. But their essays were written against that background and they argue with the concepts of that period more than with the much more subtle arguments which are beginning to appear today.

The introduction by the two Aberystwyth scholars and editors, being the most contemporary piece in the book, should have set a rather more interesting intellectual framework for the articles they selected than, in fact, it did. Perhaps they, wanting to write about the whole of Soviet strategy, tackled too much, or perhaps they succumbed too easily to the pattern of trying to fit every concept into some dichotomy or other, such as hawks and doves. Had they attempted less they might have achieved more, but when, barely on page 15, they say that they have "set the general background to Soviet strategy," we have the right to voice the exasperation such a casual sweep through politics and culture engenders. Our confidence in their perception is not enhanced by the comment that "despite the change in Soviet and American leadership in the last twenty years, little has changed in Soviet strategy." The syntax poses enormous problems, but the calculations pose even more. The last twenty years takes us back to Cuba and how can one say that much has not changed since then?

What might be much more accurate to say, if one feels that this assertion should be defended, is that the West has changed its strategy very little, but the rise of the Soviet Navy, as Michael McGwire quite weightily argues in this volume, testifies to enormous changes on the Soviet side.

There is a very sensible article by Robert Arnett which argues with those who say that the Soviets claim they could survive a nuclear war with fewer losses than during World War II. As this whole discussion takes place in that one-dimensional world I referred to, it is difficult to disagree with Arnett, but also difficult to feel that anything has been really clarified.

The selection from Ken Booth's work about the Soviets' use of the military in foreign policy is from a period before he worked so brilliantly on the role of
ethnocentrism in these debates. As it is, this fleeting taste of a much larger work does not seem to me to be very satisfying.

Benjamin Lambeth gives a very good lesson on how to think about Soviet military doctrine until the end of the article when he asserts that, under stress the Soviets might do anything, including throwing out the whole book of doctrine. I suppose in some sense that is true, but it does not allow us to drop the problem, forsooth. We must ask questions about stress and patterns of reaction in conditions of stress. After all, stress is part of the human condition. Because we suffer from it, we don't suddenly change into baboons.

Dennis Ross rethinks Soviet strategic policy in what we can recognize as the government position, though stated interestingly. Much of what he says is so ethnocentrically accepted that it will appear self-evident. The idea that Soviet strategic doctrine is grounded in traditionally military concerns while ours, having been taken over by the academics, is something else, sounds right, but probably isn't. What as a nation our analysts seem unable to comprehend is the many facetedness of Soviet military strategy, its political, cultural and ethnic ramifications. Nor do they seem to understand that our own military are just as much a product of our system as are the academics. Both tend to choose, eventually, a big bomb as a solution to the confusing strategic problems which they do not have either time or patience to understand thoroughly.

Included is an important piece of Raymond Garthoff's on SALT I which has been revised in the light of SALT II and the subsequent disaffection. There can be no doubt that the SALT negotiations and decisions were among the most important events of the second half of the twentieth century, for they will be thought to have seriously influenced the record of peace or war of this century. And indeed, the historical spectacle was dazzling. The men who held the key to the world's atomization were separated by only three feet of wooden table. As Raymond Garthoff was one of the people looking at the whites of their eyes, and as the truth about SALT has not been fully established, we must go back and back to try to understand the clash of ideas that took place during those negotiations.

Hannes Adomeit's seminal work on Soviet risk-taking is, of course, one of the most important studies of Soviet political behavior. He demonstrates in a systems analysis kind of way what historians have been saying for centuries, that Russians are risk avoiders. (It is only fair to add that historians say the risk-avoidance is a function of traditional Russian poverty. Industrialization is obviously changing that.) In any case, along with Nathan Leites' "Operational Code of the Politburo," it should be included in all collections of this sort, when there is no excluding principle of selection.

And finally, there is Michael McGwire's widely published article on the rationale for the development of Soviet seapower. For those who have followed the development of Michael's thesis over the years, this article contains little that is conceptually new, but as the fruit of thirty years of observing the Soviet Navy, it is, of course, significant.

For those who have not read these articles elsewhere, this collection is valuable and convenient. For those who have, it is interesting for it is a sampling of a decade of thought on strategic questions, proof, in its way, that we have been living in an intellectually dark age.

"Some day I hope the Navy will have officers who will understand odd officers with odd talents." So said Ruth Masters Rickover in 1958 on one of the rare occasions she allowed herself to be interviewed by the press. Polmar and Allen in their rather lengthy and detailed biography describe Admiral Rickover's oddities of character and actions as well as his peculiar talents to get things done. As noted in the subtitle, it deals with a very controversial man with an undeniable genius.

Admiral Rickover, born in Poland, served almost 60 years on active duty after his commissioning in 1922. Until 1937, he served as a line officer in four-piper destroyers, battleships, and submarines. He was XO of the S-48 for two years and had a brief stint of 2½ months in command of a minesweep in the Asiatic Fleet. After his initial tour as an EDO at the Cavite Navy Yard, Rickover served almost his entire ED career at the seat of government, Washington, D.C., in the Navy Department and, since 1949, concurrently in the AEC (Department of Energy). He served actively fifteen years as a line officer and almost 45 years as an EDO.

For professional Navy people age 45 and beyond—active and retired—there is little in this book about Rickover that has not been recorded before. This is not surprising, given Rickover's recognition as a most skillful public relations practitioner and his outstanding political acumen. Admiral Rickover has written 6 books, made more than 65 major speeches on various subjects since 1955, and has more than 1 million words of official testimony recorded in the Congress of the United States. The authors, however, have made a solid contribution to Rickover lore. They have done a thorough job of research in the printed medium, in oral history, in extensive interviews or correspondence with more than 200 persons in the Navy, the Navy Reactor Branch, DOE, and the civilian power and shipbuilding industries on the subject of Admiral Rickover and nuclear power. The chapter notes, bibliography, acknowledgements, and index should be most useful to others interested in the Rickover phenomenon.

Under Rickover—the zealous, tyrannical, autocratic driver of both Navy and industry and godchild of solons on the Hill—*Nautilus*, the world's first nuclear-powered ship, was completed and operating in 1954. By 1960, fifteen nuclear submarines were in commission; by 1967, the Polaris program's 41 SSBNs were completed; and by 1981, a total of 128 nuclear powered combat ships was operating. Over a quarter of the ships of the Navy are nuclear powered. Rickover's influence on today's Navy has been monumental—both materially and psychologically.

Admiral Rickover's material accomplishments have been widely acclaimed over the past quarter century—he is named in the dictionaries as being responsible for the development of the atomic submarine. Even so, there are those who have vociferously challenged his methods, if not his technical leadership—e.g., Rear Adms. J. James, A. Mumma, R. Moore; former chiefs/deputy chiefs, Bureau of Ships. Referring to Rickover, Capt. Dick Lanning (first CO of Seawolf SSN) has suggested that "When a revolution succeeds, he should be given five years then shot, or otherwise removed." Rickover's personal control of all government or industry-sponsored R&D in nuclear power was virtually unlimited—any such research that had been initiated but not sponsored by Rickover was stopped, abruptly.

The psychological impact of Rickover on the Navy is probably more profound but not so readily apparent. The authors suggest that we have two Navies—one,
the traditional Navy; and two, the nuclear, or Rickover Navy. And it appears that the nuclear Navy is very much in the ascendancy, both materially and personnel-wise. The authors say that Rickover hated the Navy, its institutions, its traditions. About 1951, he sees about changing the system, and he succeeded. The Navy saw the reactor as a mechanism in the evolution from sail to improved propulsion; what counted was the warship, not the machinery that moved it. Rickover saw his machinery as the centerpiece of the ship, if not the whole Navy. In the nuclear Navy, weapons and the many associated equipment needed to fight a ship are definitely secondary to the propulsion plant.

The book is the story of a very controversial, a very self-serving, a brilliant manipulator of people, a zealous visionary, a bitter man—truly, an odd officer with odd talents whose impact on the Navy for over a quarter century has been uncanny. Rickover’s ultimate effect on the Navy lies in the future. The Nucs of the Navy have no fear but many old-timers, in and out of the Navy, are deeply concerned about the fighting capabilities that a latter-day Machiavelli has wrought.

ELI REICH
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)


The revision of William Livezey’s excellent work, first published in 1947, is timely and worthy of consideration by all students of the use and influence of sea power. His intent was to meet a definite need for appraisal of Mahan’s ideas, a correlation of them with the climate in which they took shape and an estimate of their influence upon the course of events. The original work did fulfill this purpose and was well received by historians and navalists. Neither an unabashed hymnal for Mahan, as the Puleston biography, nor abrasively critical as Seager, Professor Livezey of the University of Oklahoma provides a scholarly, readable interpretation of the “influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan on American Sea Power.” His thesis was that Mahan’s primary value and role was as an advocate and annunciator of America’s place in the world, a world of competition and force provided by a mighty fleet of capital ships, remains unchanged in this revised edition.

Livezey examines Mahan, the period in which he wrote, and his influence on the men and nation-states of his era. The industrial revolution, creation of world markets, colonialism, and expansion were all forces that required a framework for nation-states use. Mahan’s conversion to imperialism and the need for “colonies, commerce and bases” were the trinity of necessary factors in his argument for the United States to become a great power. History “proved” that nations possessing sea power would be the great powers. The biology theories of Darwin were transferred to the arena of society where competition for a “disproportionate” amount of the world’s resources was the “natural” order. Men and nations were destined to compete, competition fostered conflict, and conflict which was “justified” would resolve in the favor of those nations that were sea powers.

The somewhat circular argument of commerce, a merchant marine, and the resultant requirement for a large navy of capital ships to defend them, was the central theme espoused and defended by Mahan in his thirty-year writing career. Livezey’s treatment of Mahan’s theory of naval warfare is particularly sound, bringing an order to the rules and principles which are scattered, randomly, throughout Mahan’s voluminous writings. The final chapter, Chapter 15, is new and looks at the concepts of...
"command of the sea," nuclear technology, and a world vastly different from that which Mahan or anyone could have envisioned in 1914.

Livezey, writing in the aftermath of World War II, originally concluded that the doctrines of conflict and force propounded by Mahan were no longer sound as a basis for international action. "The atomic age has shown conclusively that the only guarantee of civilization is a society of nations." He assessed Mahan's doctrines of naval warfare as applicable, though modified by the tremendous impact of the carrier, submarine, and land-based aircraft, and concluded "there is little to justify the belief that naval strategy as enunciated by Mahan will be basically altered."

Writing again in 1980, he significantly revises his original conclusion: "It seems safe to conclude that the impact of technology . . . has so altered naval warfare from the days of Mahan that the erstwhile dean of naval strategy . . . is no longer the leading authority in current naval strategic thinking." He bases this argument on the concept of command of the sea, claiming that as overall command is no longer attainable, local sea control and denial are the more useful and obtainable objectives. With this view I must disagree and argue that though more difficult and at much greater risk and cost, a nation which by geographic and economic circumstances is dependent on the sea must, ultimately, be able to command the sea or, in the final analysis, lose its position of world leadership.

Overall, Professor Livezey's final chapter provides us with an update of U.S. and, to a lesser degree, Soviet thought on the use of navies and sea power. His carefully documented and annotated pages show thorough study of the authors who write and study the international scene, evaluate the use and importance of sea power and attempt to predict its importance for the future. No serious student of military history and the influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan on U.S. naval thought past and present should be without this study.

T.A. FITZGERALD
Captain, U.S. Navy


As the author of the superb book, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (1976), Paul Kennedy is no stranger to readers of this journal. Kennedy is, without a doubt, one of the world's most highly regarded historians and one of the leading, if not the leading expert on the subject of Anglo-German relations. Thus, the publication of The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, which is the fruit of more than ten years of concentrated research, is a major event.

The title notwithstanding, this is a book about the origins of World War I. Ultimately, Kennedy wants to determine why Britain and Germany went to war against each other in 1914. There are two well-known explanations with which Kennedy wrestles, each of which points to Germany as the bête noire and interestingly, each of which has the same root cause. The first is the domestic structure or primacy of domestic politics argument. Industrialization came late to Germany; and when it arrived with all its fury, it turned what had been an agrarian society on its head. Unlike the British case, modernization was not a gradual process in Germany. This wholesale disruption led to significant domestic instability, which ultimately manifested itself in an adventurous foreign policy. The outbreak of the war can be best explained by focusing on the domestic sources of conflict. Since the appearance
of Fritz Fischer's *Germany's Aims in the First World War* in 1961, the primacy of domestic politics explanation has been the more influential of the two explanations. (It should be noted that there are important differences among the members of this school of thought.)

The second explanation is the balance of power or primacy of foreign policy argument. Again, at the root of the matter is the industrial revolution. As a consequence of differences in the timing and the nature of the industrialization process in Britain and Germany, there was a significant change in the balance of power between these two countries during the period from 1860-1914. Britain was clearly the dominant European power in the mid-19th century. By 1914, Germany had the military might (which, for Kennedy, is largely synonymous with economic strength) to challenge Britain. Germany, like France under Napoleon and others before that, then set out to gain a position in the international system that was commensurate with her strength. In other words, World War I was a classic struggle for European hegemony.

No historian would deny that there are elements of truth in both of these explanations. The central question, however, is, which is the more important one? Forced to choose between them, Kennedy opts for the balance of power argument. He writes, "The decisive elements in the Anglo-German relationship, and the causes of the rising antagonism, are to be found . . . in the cold world of *Macht*politik, in the perception of clashes of interest between the two nations." What makes this book so important is that this conclusion challenges the primacy of domestic politics argument which has held the high ground for the past two decades. Forced to choose between Ranke and Marx, Kennedy chooses Ranke.

Although Kennedy adheres to the balance of power argument, he gives considerable credence to the arguments of Fritz Fischer and his disciples—an indication of the great influence these historians have had. One of the real strengths of this book is that Kennedy has tried, as much as possible, to synthesize the primacy of foreign policy and primacy of domestic politics explanations. Thus, his book covers virtually every aspect of Anglo-German relations. In the end, however, he recognized that it would be necessary to choose between these explanations.

It is not Kennedy's choice which is troubling, but how he made that choice. There is no weighing of the two arguments, no explanation as to why one is more important than the other. One wants to know: what criteria did he use to judge the validity of each argument? If one is going to choose between competing explanations as Kennedy did, and moreover, if one is going to challenge the prevailing wisdom on a subject, then it is necessary to explain why your argument is more persuasive than the other one. Kennedy does not do this. Instead, he simply states, after a detailed exploration of virtually every aspect of the Anglo-German rivalry, that balance of power considerations are of primary importance. The reader is left waiting for the other shoe to drop.

As an encyclopedia of the many aspects of the Anglo-German rivalry, this book is a *tour de force*. One comes away from it with a thorough understanding of all the dimensions of the problem. For this reason, as well as the fact that the central conclusion is a revisionist one (at least at this juncture), the book is very important. However, because of its important shortcoming in dealing with the issue of ultimate causes, it does not measure up to what one expects from an author of Kennedy's stature.

By the mid-1930s, Britain was faced with the prospect of conflict in three separate theaters against three different opponents: Japan in the Far East; Italy in the Mediterranean and Germany on the European continent. Britain unfortunately did not have the necessary resources for dealing with all three contingencies simultaneously. Consequently, in allocating her scarce resources, she was involved in a constant juggling act. This excellent book, which is based on a careful examination of the official records of the period as well as numerous collections of private papers, graphically details the policies pursued in the Far East as the aging British Empire tried to check a rising Japan.

It was the Japanese who first interrupted the relative calm of the interwar period with their invasion of Manchuria (1931). At the time, the British were committed to sending immediately the Main Fleet to Singapore. And throughout the 1930s, as the German and Italian threats emerged, Britain still maintained its commitment to sending a fleet to contest the Japanese. However, as Haggie shows, this was a hollow promise by the end of the 1930s. Certainly, the decision in the first part of 1938 not to build a two-ocean navy removed any chance of sending a fleet to the Far East. Finally, in 1939, with a European war on the horizon, British planners decided to concentrate on launching an offensive in the Mediterranean. There would be no fleet for the Far East.

Those first years of the European war (1939-1941) were filled with disasters for the British. Nor surprisingly, the Japanese took full advantage of Britain's weakness. The British searched in vain for a way to check the Japanese. Mainly, they sought to ally themselves with the United States. This was actually a constant theme in British grand strategy throughout the 1930s. However, the Americans refused to commit themselves to any form of meaningful alliance. Although Haggie does not explicitly criticize American policy, his description of that policy leaves little doubt that he believes it was foolhardy. The dénouement of this sad tale came in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, when the Japanese sank the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse*, and then captured Singapore. This was "the greatest single disaster to British arms since Yorktown."

Although Haggie is well aware of the formidable, if not impossible, task that British policymakers faced in the late 1930s and early 1940s as they sought to devise a deterrent strategy for the Far East, he is also sharply critical of British thinking in these years. For example, he argues that although the British recognized that Japan was a threat, they consistently underestimated Japanese military prowess. Equally important, the British failed to recognize that naval forces alone would not be able to deal with the Japanese threat. They were tied to "an obsolete maritime strategy." The rise of air power after World War I, coupled with the mobility of land armies in the industrial age, meant that Britain would have to send large-scale ground forces and air forces as well as naval forces to deal with the Japanese. Of course, since Britain did not even have the resources to send a formidable naval force to the Pacific, one cannot help but wonder whether it would have made much difference if Britain had recognized the need to send greater numbers of air force and army units. By 1939, Britain's strategic needs were so much greater than her available resources that it was inevitable that she would suffer some egregious losses in the war. Imaginative strategic thinking might have helped somewhat, but in the end, as Haggie makes clear, Britain just did not...
have the economic strength and the manpower necessary to oppose Italy, Japan and Germany.

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After Arthur Marder died on Christmas Day, 1980, the Times of London wrote that he was "a supreme naval historian" who was "one of the greatest exponents of British naval history of the Edwardian and Georgian eras." This posthumous volume (the only one we shall see of a projected two) confirms that tribute. Marder's relentless research, fair-mindedness and happy way with words all shine in this book. Although the bibliography was to be in the second volume, there are plentiful references to sources in the footnotes.

Marder's subtitle is "Strategic Illusions, 1936-41," but he shows clearly that the real illusion began in 1922 with the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 and its replacement with the innocuous (misspelled in the text, a sure sign that Professor Marder had not lived to shepherd his book past the printer's wolves) Four Power Treaty. "We have traded whisky for water," moaned one Japanese admiral, who also may have been having fun with the new American prohibition amendment. Under that treaty and the concomitant 3:5:3 battleship limitation Britain and the United States had ceded strategic superiority in the Western Pacific to Japan. Yet they both refused to adjust their political goals accordingly. By 1936, the threat of Hitler's Germany forced Britain to make such an adjustment; the United States never did so until Pearl Harbor changed the political map of Asia. As late as November 1941, the State Department was resisting successfully "on political grounds" the Navy's request to remove the Marines from Shanghai and Peking.

Marder moves from his strategic appraisal to his main theme, the two navies. Here the contrasts are fascinating. Japanese officers who spent decades slanging their superiors to their faces with impunity (true, all were in their cups) are company men to the last, while the Royal Navy types, Dartmouth-tied and stiff-upper-lipped, cheerfully blackguard their comrades. Marder notes that this difference plus the destruction of much Japanese archival material has made his analysis of the two organizations hard to balance. But it is the mark of the historian that he has achieved a balance, while never losing that sharp eye for the telling personal foible which also enlivened the five volumes of From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow.

The last third of Marder's work is titled "The Saga of Force Z," that ill-fated mini-task force that the Royal Navy was forced to use instead of sending the "main fleet to Singapore." Here Marder's control of his materials recalls his handling of Jutland in the third volume of his main work. The men and materiel are compared; the battle is well-charted and well-described; the summing up judicious and fair, although there is an ambiguous mention that the crew of the Prince of Wales was "a mixed one, mostly 'hostilities only,' and the latter could be difficult."

In concentrating on Admiral Phillips and his two capital ships, Marder does not scant the larger picture. Churchill really believed a few big ships alone could make a difference; he had never forgiven those who had allowed the Goeben to escape nor forgotten his own role in sending capital ships on the successful hunting of von Spee. Churchill had cited the roles of the Bismarck...
and *Tirpitz* in tying down the Royal Navy as justification for Force Z. Did Churchill also have in mind the possibility of getting more American support at Singapore by offering an earnest of his own? Marder does not pursue the line of some critics that the disaster could have been avoided had British planes bound for Singapore not been diverted to the USSR. That Singapore was at the very least a reflection of a strategic choice dictated by reality.

One comment (from both British and Japanese sources) that might bother sensitive American readers is that Force Z at least died in a try at the enemy, not running away from him as did the U.S. Asiatic Fleet. Had Professor Marder lived to do the second volume, he surely would have reported that the Asiatic Fleet's lamentable performance was due not only to inferior numbers, poor torpedoes, and the loss of air support at Clark Field, but also because of British insistence that the U.S. cruisers and destroyers be used for escorting convoys to Singapore rather than in offensive action.

One closes this volume with the melancholy reflection of Gibbon (which Marder himself had once quoted) on finishing *Decline and Fall*: "... I had taken my everlasting leave of an old and agreeable companion...."

J.K. HOLLOWAY
Naval War College


Although he was on active duty during World War II as a full admiral, today only a few naval officers could identify Admiral Thomas C. Hart without first reading this particularly good biography. Hart is of interest to us today primarily because he was commander of the United States Asiatic Fleet from 1940 until early 1942.

When Hart relieved Admiral Harry E. Yarnell in 1940 the Asiatic Fleet was not an impressive naval force. It consisted of only 2 cruisers, 13 destroyers, 12 submarines, a few auxiliaries, and the 4th Marine Regiment. It possessed no tactical aircraft. The United States wanted a four-star officer to command it so that this country's representative in the many discussions that animated the international community in China would be equal, if not senior, to the officers of the other navies on the scene.

At that time the Japanese were attempting to consolidate their position in China by eliminating the British, French, and American presences there. The Europeans were preoccupied and weakened by their reverses in Europe and the United States had only begun to rearm. The United States and Japan were on a collision course that ended at Pearl Harbor.

Under these circumstances Hart's principal task as a naval diplomat was to conduct a presence mission in the classic sense: show the flag and exert what influence he could. Using firmness, patience and tact coupled with "common" sense, that rarest of all commodities, Hart wrung as much advantages for his country as was humanly possible from very difficult circumstances. Those who today so glibly talk of presence missions would do well to consult this biography.

In addition to a crumbling and increasingly dangerous situation in China, Hart had to deal with the British and the Dutch to coordinate some form of common action against the Japanese threat to Southeast Asia. Since Washington was neither willing nor able to make the necessary political commitment, Hart found himself in an almost impossible position.

When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, Hart was as surprised as anyone else that they attacked where they did. But he and the Asiatic Fleet were ready for war. Hart's preparations stand in stark contrast to those of General Douglas MacArthur who allowed the
U.S. Army Air Forces to be caught on the ground and destroyed. Thanks to this avoidable blunder the Japanese gained air superiority over the Philippines in one stroke. Then it was only a matter of time before they triumphed.

The absence of air defense anywhere, even over their base, meant that the surface ships could not attack the Japanese successfully. The only remaining naval weapon was the submarine. Soon Hart and his 29 submarine commanders (the number of submarines had risen during his tenure) learned to their dismay, that they were armed with torpedoes so defective as to be useless. Thus the Asiatic Fleet was robbed of all its weapons.

There was little that Hart could do. His common sense and his professional judgment dictated a withdrawal of his forces from the Philippines, rather than wasting them in action doomed to failure against the Japanese. Reluctantly, he ordered his forces to retire to the south. He and his small staff left in a submarine and under the keels of the conquering Japanese fleet proceeded to Java. MacArthur complained to Washington that the navy had deserted him.

When he arrived in Java Hart found to his surprise that he had been appointed the naval commander of a new allied command for Southeast Asia. His tenure in that position was brief, marked as it was by continuing reverses at the hands of superior Japanese forces, by Dutch intrigue to have their own admiral appointed to his position, and by MacArthur's malicious complaints to Washington. Finally, after much complicated maneuvering in Java, London, and Washington, Hart was asked to request his relief.

Leutze properly devotes the major portion of his fascinating and well-written biography to this short but extremely important period in Hart's life. He sets the stage for these complicated events and he tells of the great difficulties Hart had in receiving adequate support and direction from Washington. There is a fascinating account of his relations with General MacArthur, then his military junior. The relations were not good. MacArthur's petulance, his arrogance, and his blindness to military and naval realities are revealed for all to see. How Hart dealt with MacArthur is a lesson in wisdom and forbearance.

When Hart returned home he did not retire. He served on the General Board and he conducted an extensive inquiry into the disaster at Pearl Harbor. Finally, when he retired from active duty he served for two years as United States Senator from Connecticut. He was blessed with a happy old age and died in 1971 at the age of 94.

The task of a biographer is not only to tell the story of his subject's life against the background of his time, but also to explain and to describe the man. In this respect Leutze has done an admirable job. Hart kept a personal diary in which he recorded the events of his life and his innermost thoughts. Leutze's keen insights tell us the kind of man Hart was and his historian's discipline prevents him from descending the slippery slope of psycho-history. The result is a vivid and compelling picture of a man and his times. It is also a model of what biography can and should be.

B. MITCHELL SIMPSON III
Newport, Rhode Island


Desmond Ball has produced a carefully documented and well-written study of the strategic missile program of the Kennedy administration. He demonstrates that this buildup was not, as is commonly assumed, a response to the "missile gap" because Kennedy and his advisors no longer believed in the existence of such a gap at the time they
made their arms decisions. Nor, Ball argues, was the massive build-up a reflection of strategic doctrine as it went far beyond what Kennedy and McNamara thought necessary for deterrence. Rather, it was the outgrowth of political pressures upon the new administration, some of which Kennedy had created himself.

During the presidential campaign Kennedy had hammered away at the alleged weakness of the American strategic arsenal and had repeatedly stated his intention of supporting a variety of weapon programs to restore clear-cut American superiority. According to Ball, these promises, while they aroused public expectations did not account for the primary source of pressure upon the administration. This came instead from within the government, from the Air Force and Navy, both of which were intent on committing the President to buying as many missiles or submarines as possible. Air Force requests for the Minuteman, for example, ranged from between 3,000 and 10,000. The Navy, which toyed with the idea of a fleet of 100 Polaris SSBNs, pushed for 45; their calculation of the force levels required to achieve finite deterrence ignored completely the existence of the Air Force and its contribution to the American deterrent.

Both services used whatever political clout they had to lobby both the administration and the Congress for their respective programs and succeeded, Ball argues, in committing the administration to a much higher level of strategic forces than it had wished for. In this regard, Ball sees the lobbying efforts of defense contractors, certain to profit from expanded production of missiles and submarines, as another effective pressure upon the administration.

Ball believes, with good reason, that the Kennedy experience has gained contemporary relevance. Whereas the Soviet Union has followed an evolutionary path to strategic force development, improving its forces by means of a series of small modifications, the United States has proceeded by fewer but larger generational leaps. The Trident and the MX missile, regardless of the ultimate mode of deployment for the latter, represent another such leap. What level of forces will be deployed?

According to Ball, there is a tendency for existing numbers to assume sanctity and for systems to be replaced on a one-for-one basis regardless of the qualitative differences between them or the changing nature of American strategic requirements. His purpose in writing is to demonstrate the extent to which the Kennedy-McNamara strategic decisions—the source of today’s numbers—were both hasty and the product of political compromise. By doing so Ball hopes to prod strategists and policymakers into taking a more open look at force requirements and presumably to opt for lower force levels.

Ball’s analysis is sound if unlikely to find a receptive audience in the current administration. Like Kennedy, Reagan has come to power pledged to build up American forces to compensate for our alleged inferiority. To date his strategic decisions appear to be at least as influenced by bureaucratic in-fighting as those of Kennedy were. The Reagan administration is likely to bequeath to us a strategic arsenal that goes a long way toward meeting the “wish lists” of the services and defense contractors. Like the forces Kennedy built, they may bear only a marginal relationship to any coherent conception of real strategic needs.

RICHARD NED LEBOW
Johns Hopkins University, Bologna Center


This is another of Greenwood’s highly specialized publications, in this...
case mainly of interest to those involved in retrospective analysis of the Second Indochina War.

In his preface Colonel Henderson develops the contrast between the People's Liberation Army (PLA), which endured, and the U.S. Army, which the author feels did not. The contrast shortly brings the author into a critique of Crisis in Command previously reviewed in this journal. He is highly critical and powerful in his comments on that work, but his commentary, however cogent, is really a digression.

The central question Henderson seeks to answer is why the PLA soldiers fought so well in view of the hardships they endured, including the tremendous firepower that was arrayed against them. His approach is to examine factors of motivation and control of the individual PLA soldier in the context of the relationships between the fighting men and the Communist party organization. He places particular emphasis on the importance of small groups of soldiers (the primary group, i.e., a three-man cell) and what makes them cohesive. All the data he examines comes from the period 1965-67.

Colonel Henderson concludes that soldiers' attitudes were shaped by three important forces: party organization and ideology, cadre leaders, and the primary groups. The cadre leader, who was the conduit between party and fighter in instilling homogenous values within the primary groups, was the key to success.

Henderson's general source of data is interviews conducted by RAND which sought to develop information on PLA organization and why it fought so effectively. He has added appendices which describe the nature and limitations of the interviews and he includes a questionnaire—though, as the author points out, the interviews were open-ended.

Henderson has succeeded in producing a very interesting and well done monograph. Though it is aimed at the specialist on Vietnam, it has value to those interested in examining the motivation and control, and hence staying power, of insurgents elsewhere than Vietnam.

DOUGLAS KINNARD
University of Vermont


Anderson and Hathaway have contributed significantly to the cold war literature. Moreover, their books transcend the years in question to offer practical insights into alliance politics. And the backdrop of their topic is the not untimely problem of how a superpower responds to an accelerated decline in relative power. Political analyses of the early postwar years generally suggest that the world slid easily into a situation where there were only two actors on the international stage. American writings have been especially parochial in reducing these years to a bipolar confrontation while overlooking the complexities of Atlantic relations. The physical metaphor of the United States "filling the vacuum" left by a bankrupt and demoralized Britain has been a retreat from explanation. Both authors tell a far more complicated story.

From 1944 until 1947 Britain saw itself as in many ways more of a world power than either Russia or the United States. Its armed forces in a global ring of bases were better deployed than America's. Its fleet was so superior to

*For another view of Terry Anderson's book see the review article by Richard A. Best, Jr., in the November-December 1981 issue, pp. 97-99.
Russia's activities even in early 1947 the
Admiralty could think seriously about
selling Moscow an aircraft carrier.
British development of jet aircraft led
the world, while atomic research and an
apparently durable Commonwealth
added to these sources of power. Britain
had no intention of joining what its
wars of time ambassador to Washington
called the "mendicant queue" of ex-
husted European powers. Each author
examines the ensuing tension as an
ascendant America encroached on
regions and responsibilities that the
British economy could no longer under-
write. Although Britain had the
trappings of what in 1944 was called a
superpower, its economic capacities
could no longer match its commitments.
London was not prepared to acknowledge
the extent of this shortfall.

Like Britain before, the United States
encouraged global political, territorial,
and especially trade relations that suited
its own security and economic interests.
Each country used its power to promote
a convenient framework of world order.
Anderson and Hathaway both describe
how Britain was persuaded and some-
times forced to accept the U.S. vision of
the postwar world. Now that many
observers see a decline in U.S. power
and a crumbling of the postwar struc-
ture, the British experience may be of
pragmatic as well as purely intellectual
interest to Americans.

Hathaway's work is clearly the more
innovative of the two. Although both
authors use the same U.S. and recently
available British sources, Hathaway
avoids the dry narration that can charac-
terize traditional diplomatic histories.
In greater detail than Anderson, he
contrasts the styles as well as the world
views of Washington and Whitehall.
Ambiguities always bedevil coalition
politics. But what made U.S./British
relations especially difficult was the
natural assumption that the same
language and democratic values meant
parallel national interests. This was
rarely the case. In those areas where
interests overlapped, the putative allies
proceeded carefully while casting side-
long glances at each other.

What makes Hathaway's book
superior is that he illuminates the
cultural and bureaucratic origins of the
U.S. and British misunderstandings.
Neither country was a monolith. There
were intense internal debates. Percep-
tions and expectations clashed between
left and right and between globalists
and pragmatists. Washington wrestled
with alternative images of its postwar
role while London scrambled amongst
the constraints of a severely diminished
economy. U.S. and British interpreta-
tions of the nature of the international
balance of power did not coincide until
mid-1947. Moscow, for its part, was
torn between its ideological faith in the
inevitable growth of Anglo-American
antagonism and its assertions of a
threatening capitalist bloc. Finally, the
Soviets themselves ensured the develop-
ment of previously elusive common
interests between Washington and
London.

Despite a more comprehensive title,
Anderson gives no further attention
than does Hathaway as to how Anglo-
American diplomacy was conditioned
by the relations of each with the Soviet
Union. An interesting point that both
authors neglect concerns the contra-
dictory positions between military and
civil government officials in both
Britain and the United States. Unlike
the United States, the Foreign Office
soon after the war subordinated the
military's role in foreign policy formula-
tion. Although British diplomats were
more confrontational in dealing with
the Soviets through 1946 than were
their American counterparts, the situ-
tion was exactly the reverse between
the two militaries. The intra-governmental
disputes only added to the international
confusion that both authors document.

It would have been fascinating for these
authors to have continued through 1948
by which time the political landscape had cleared.

U.S. preeminence in Western diplomacy was guaranteed after three years of self-doubt and delay by the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, which led to the overshadowing of British interests in Europe and the Middle East, not to mention the Far East. But thirty-five years later, the United States finds itself exhibiting the well-known symptoms of decline: rampant inflation, chronic balance of payments difficulties, high taxation, and exposed positions abroad. It is no longer the arbiter of international trade, money, and investment. Some critics argue that accepting strategic parity with the Soviet Union, losing control over the world petroleum industry, and conceding regional dominance to local powers all indicate a great power in retreat. Hathaway and, as an adjunct, Anderson present the most relevant test case of a government's eroding ability to play an international role long taken for granted.

Because of the early days of confusion in the 1973 war, the Arabs on both fronts gaining strategic and tactical surprise and the unanticipated "lack-lustre" performance of the IDF in those early days on the Suez front, journalists and political-military analysts everywhere began searching for scapegoats. I expected Bren's book to penetrate some of the myths created in the search and to illuminate some of the confusion: the death of the tank, the intelligence failure, the Agnatat Commission, unity of command problems, and the Bar-Lev Line. Bren does not disappoint.

Additionally, I waited for Bren's book because the Suez campaign has more to tell us ultimately than does the war in the Golan. The battle for the Golan Heights was a personal struggle of epic proportions between individual tank crews and small units and leaders against a tenacious and ultimately unlucky Syrian attack. Chaim Herzog has written the epic poem celebrating the Golan struggle—quite literally a "Gunfight at the OK Coral." Herzog has less to say about the Suez front in that his "war story" does not illuminate the confusion surrounding certain operational issues. Bren's book presents the operational view of an operational commander who is also a master tactician. Herzog's War of Atonement is a dramatic elegy; Bren's book is a passionate analysis. Bren's book does not fail my anticipation here either.

In the course of detailing the day-by-day combat activities of his own division, General Adan manages to cast an objective eye, to the point of self-criticism at times, across the entire spectrum of military and political concern, from strategy through front operations to the small unit tactics of combined arms formations. General Adan was in the middle of the bickering commanders: Sharon, Gonen, Tal, Elazar, Bar-Lev, and Dayan—an unfortunate sideshow that seems endemic to high commands. Adan tells this story as

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Harvard University


The wars of modern Israel in general and the Yom Kippur War in particular have spawned any number of books purporting to articulate for a large and apparently interested audience the lessons of modern combat. Given an understandable bias on the part of this writer—after all, Israel has won all of their wars at the tactical and operational levels (the strategic decision is not yet)—most of the best of these books have come from Israel. Almost all of Israel's combat and political commanders have written memoirs at one time or another, but it is Bren's "book" that I have waited for so impatiently.
I expected him to tell it; while he may have some personal ax to grind, he is not a politician and at no time does the reader detect any unseemly motivations in his side of this story.

Adan shows telling how the antics of General Sharon, using his political clout to get his way, subverted the entire Southern Command of General Gonen and nearly dislocated the Command’s efforts early in the campaign. Even BarLev was unable to completely control Sharon. The resulting lack of unity of command was very costly at times. It is in this recognition that the reader also senses that the small unit cohesion so characteristic of the IDF, so lovingly shown in Chaim Herzog’s work, held sway. General Adan also is at pains to show that Israel and the world ought never question the abilities of Israeli soldiers and tactical commanders even as it is sobered by the brilliance and sometimes excesses of the high command.

General Adan casts an equally searching eye at operational and tactical issues. He discusses the vulnerability of the main battle tank (very expensive) to the precision antitank missile (relatively inexpensive). While not minimizing this vulnerability, Adan suggests how the problem is overcome, that is, how it is lived with. In presenting the operations and tactics of the breakthrough, Adan gives the lie to the whole issue, showing what tanks are for—overrunning the intermediate air defense networks, logistics lines of communication, and command and control networks. Even the most resolute rankers will admit the weaknesses of armor against equally resolute dug-in infantry with the wherewithal to defeat individual tanks. Armored and mechanized forces ought to be used to drive deep into vulnerable rear areas of enemy formations, dislocating the enemy’s tactical and operational plan, not assaulting dug-in infantry.

Another issue, dealt with provocatively if not in detail, has to do with mechanized formations in urban areas. Adan’s armored foray into Suez City was a disaster—at least for the tank battalion that went in. But Adan’s hindsight and “lessons learned” will not strike a particularly resonant chord among our infantry tacticians. Adan agrees that tanks alone do not operate well in cities. He argues, however, that dismounted light infantry are not dazzling either. Rather, as he puts it, his most effective force was mechanized infantry, mounted and firing in all directions from their fighting vehicles—a slightly spruced up version of our current mechanized infantry carrier, the M113.

Since urban warfare will be very characteristic of any war undertaken by NATO in Europe, we need very carefully examine General Adan’s experience and assertions born in this experience.

Of necessity, only snapshots can be presented here; I have given you some. General Adan also discusses training, combat engineers—the Suez crossing and countermine warfare, Israeli style, have infatuated any number of our own generals—reconstitution, and, most importantly, unit cohesion. The war on the Suez Front is more characteristic of armored warfare than the slugfest on the Golan; General Adan presents this war patiently, with an eye to operational lessons learned. Our business must be to come to grips with these lessons and adapt them to the war that we must prepare to fight.

MICHAEL S. LANCASTER
Major, U.S. Army


Janice Stein, author of eight of the ten chapters of this volume, evaluates the substance and process of Israeli decision making on the eve of the Six Day War.
Her analysis, detailed, perceptive, and methodologically sophisticated, represents a significant theoretical and policy contribution to the fields of foreign policy and international relations.

Her theoretical contribution consists in the first place of a lucid exposition of three major paradigms of decision making: the analytic (rational actor), the cybernetic and the cognitive. She describes and evaluates critically the different rules of search, revision, evaluation, and choice that characterize each of these approaches. She then synthesizes a number of different paths to decision by combining and recombining elements of the several approaches. This is based on the assumption that complex decisions are often made by complex means. Stein's analysis of these multiple decision paths breaks new ground by stipulating some of the conditions likely to be associated with the use of different decision making procedures at different stages of the decision making process.

The second part of the book examines Israeli decision making in 1967 in the light of the theoretical framework described above. Stein finds that the Israeli decision making process was relatively open and flexible and on the whole closest to the analytic paradigm. The crisis accentuated the deliberate style of Levi Eshkol's leadership and allowed free wheeling debate within a collective decision-making context. Because dissent was permitted, even encouraged, evaluation of alternatives was more effective than it otherwise would have been as competing arguments were aired and new information pertinent to them actively solicited. Parochial loyalties, political compromises, and crisis-induced stress played little observable role in the decision making.

The principal obstacle to higher quality decision making was an ambiguous definition of Israel's security problem and an imprecise application of the strategic concepts relevant to it. In defining and developing cæsæs bellii in the years between 1956 and 1967, Israeli policymakers had paid insufficient attention to the ways in which their various vital interests were interrelated. Nor had they distinguished effectively among different kinds of challenges and the responses most appropriate to them. According to Stein, these critical areas of incompleteness were responsible for competing problem diagnoses, divergent estimates of Egyptian intentions, and general policy confusion.

At one point in the crisis Israel's policymakers were actually "trapped" by the poor quality of their strategic logic. Nasser's announcement of a blockade of the Strait of Tiran threatened to cut off maritime traffic to Israel's port of Eilat. On a more fundamental level it could have been interpreted as a failure of deterrence; Nasser challenged Israel because he doubted her leaders' resolve to go to war in defense of their commitment to innocent passage through the Strait of Tiran. Israeli policymakers at first failed to conceptualize these threats separately and to decide whether the blockade itself or their own apparent lack of credibility constituted the more serious security problem. They also failed to recognize that the two problems called for quite different remedies.

Reopening the Strait with American assistance would have overcome the economic threat posed by the blockade but would have done nothing to restore Israeli credibility. It might actually have been expected to undermine it further by demonstrating Israeli dependence on what the Western powers were willing to do or allow. But because the Israeli cabinet had not distinguished between the two threats they were initially attracted to the American idea of a Western Flotilla reopening the Strait. This would commit Israel to quiescence so long as the American scheme appeared to have any chance of success.
Fortunately for Israeli leaders, who had become increasingly alarmed by the rapid Egyptian military buildup in the Sinai, the American initiative failed and they regained their freedom of action.

The policy lesson of 1967 is clear: confusion and illogic in defining and applying concepts of national security can lead to disaster. I did so for Israel in 1973, an assertion Stein convincingly documents in another publication, for that country's last-minute success in battles it had been unready to fight was many times more capable than it might otherwise have been. If Israeli policymakers were confused in 1967 they were and are a paragon of purpose and consistency in comparison to their recent and present American counterparts. Given the demonstrated consequences of strategic confusion, Washington would be well advised to devote less attention to hardware and more to fathoming the purpose and implications of the commitments in defense of which that hardware might have to be used.

RICHARD NED LEBOW
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Alvin J. Cottrell has produced an authoritative survey of the Gulf region. This comprehensive study is a storehouse of background information on the Gulf that selectively will be of interest to students, scholars, and government officials alike. It does not attempt to keep pace with the rapid changes in the area. Most chapters do not cover events since 1978, and some perhaps dwell too much on earlier times. Nevertheless, it is a significant research tool and a handy reference work for those wishing to learn more about the intricacies of the Gulf context.

The book is divided into four parts of varying length and includes twelve appendices. The four parts deal with history; economics and urban development; culture: religion, language, and literature; and arts and society. C. Edmund Bosworth contributes an article on the nomenclature of the Gulf, in which he examines the various names given to the Gulf in history, but leaves the contemporary political controversy between Arab and Persian advocates to "a subsequent chapter on the modern political and diplomatic history of the Gulf."

The first part of the book focuses on history and geography, with separate chapters on political geography, military affairs, and international organizations. The excellent chapter by Ralph H. Magnus provides a comprehensive background of the Gulf states' experience in international organizations that is especially useful in placing the emerging Gulf Cooperation Council in proper perspective.

The second part deals with economics and urban development, focusing primarily on oil and urbanization. The research is thorough, but dated by the rapidity of change in the area. It is still interesting and valuable as a historical reference.

Culture is the subject of the third part, with chapters on religion and law, languages, and Arabic and Persian literature. The insights into the Gulf society to be gained from reading these chapters would be greatly advantageous to students.

The final part of the work is entitled "Arts and Society in the Persian Gulf." While it does include art, architecture, and of course, carpentry, it also sheds light on vital pieces of the political puzzle. The chapters dealing with social change, the tribes of the Gulf, and
competing ideologies are especially important.

The twelve appendixes prepared by Kimbriel Mitchell and staff add an
cryptic dimension to the work and by themselves resemble a short reference book. The many statistics presented in the appendixes, apart from the
tables, are not footnoted, but
selected bibliographies are provided for each appendix.

The Persian Gulf States: A General Survey is an important compendium of information on the Gulf that will be of interest to anyone attempting to understand the factors and forces at play in this volatile area.

CHARLES G. MACDONALD
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The suppression of the Paris commune, the final act of the Franco-Prussian war, marked the birth of the revolutionary myth that, to protect their
narrow class interests, the French bourgeoisie crushed the democratic proletariat. Class warfare coupled with the traditional rivalry between Paris and the provinces led to open warfare and violent repression in the spring of 1871.

Robert Tombs has examined the war against Paris and indicates that the issues were in fact far more complex than those described by adherents of both the left and right.

Tombs demonstrates that the Versailles Army was not simply a reactionary force composed of remnants of the defeated Imperial Army. Rather, it
was a fragile amalgamation of units raised by the Provisional Government of National Defense, volunteers, and returned prisoners of war. Moreover, the commune's forces were no revolutionary vanguard, while the Parisian Army was in fact much weaker than its
numbers would indicate. Relatively few

battalions were willing to resist the Versailles regime.

Troops of the national government were not in fact anxious to fight the commune. One reason that Thiers and his generals laid siege to Paris instead of
launching an immediate attack was the fear that the soldiers would refuse to do battle with fellow Frenchmen.

The conquest of Paris was relatively inexpensive. The vast majority of the casualties were caused by the repression after the campaign. Tombs explains this by pointing to the facts that a number of reactionary generals sought to destroy Parisian radicalism and the government was willing to permit them almost unlimited freedom of action. The Versailles Army, though not enthusiastic, was a disciplined force willing to follow the lead of its commanders. Vindictiveness of the few, not the willingness of the majority, led to the final massacres.

The results of the repression were at best ironic. Reactionaries were discredited for their mindless brutality. Moderates lost credit for their failure to control their forces, and the left gained a myth that had little to do with reality.

Tombs does not explore the wider ramifications of the Civil War. Was the commune the last gasp of the Jacobin left? Was it the start of the proletarian revolutionary myth? These and other questions remain unanswered. On the other hand the author does provide an excellent study of the problems involved in restoring the authority of the new regime in exceptionally difficult circumstances. Having been defeated in a foreign war and with German armies still on French soil, the unstable new regime had to restore internal order. The price was high, but the result was the ultimate creation of a republic that was to be the most enduring French regime since the end of the Napoleonic wars.

For good reason, the law of the sea is of growing concern to many nations. Traditional concepts of the law are no longer adequate as they apply to the ever-expanding and legitimate concerns of all nations. Human survival itself may depend on the wise and equitable use of the seas' resources.

Mr. Gold, both a master mariner and a professor of law, shows that maritime law became divided into "private" and "public" areas in the early 19th century. Private laws were influenced by shipowners and dealt with commercial rules regarding carriage of cargoes, seamen's rights, insurance, and salvage. Public laws continued to be concerned with territorial rights, state jurisdiction on the high seas, coastal and international fisheries, and the rules pertaining to naval warfare. The divergence of private and public maritime law was noted by Maître Louis Franck, president of the Comité Maritime International at the first conference of this organization at Brussels in 1897. This meeting was convened primarily to unify and to codify existing regulations in the private sector. The desirability of bringing the two areas of regulation closer together was noted by Mr. Franck but no further action in this regard was undertaken by the C.M.I.

The establishment of the United Nations and the growing influence of newly independent nations collectively grouped with other less-developed countries have brought wide recognition of the need for appropriate maritime laws combining the private and public areas. Attempts to bring together these two major streams of maritime law have taken place in meetings of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. During the first gathering, UNCLOS I, in 1958, primary attention was focused upon the public law and the seas as a resource for food, minerals and energy. Discussions at UNCLOS II centered upon the same topics but with little further progress towards regulations which might be acceptable to all nations represented. The use of the seas for transportation was scarcely mentioned. During UNCLOS III, in 1973, the involvement of marine transportation was recognized, not for the purpose of carriage of cargo but because of the impact of ship-generated pollution and its effect upon the sea as a food resource. Broader consideration of transportation issues may be expected from future conferences.

Maritime transport and laws relating to the carriage of cargoes have received increasing attention at meetings of the United Nations Conferences on Trade and Development. The less-developed countries have been vocal in this arena, and Mr. Gold's book helps the reader understand their point of view. They appear to want to force private marine transportation to come under stricter international regulation and to bring about cargo-sharing or other means of obtaining financial benefit from the private carriage of goods to and from their shores.

Mr. Gold states, "Like everything else in the late twentieth century, the uses of the ocean will be complicated and fraught with conflict in search for greater equity for the widely differing interests of people in a very unevenly divided world." This is an appropriate summation of the challenges facing the decision-makers in all areas of marine transportation.

The book combines a comprehensive history of maritime law and public policy in a highly readable volume of great relevance to the problems of the 80s. The completeness of coverage is evident from the headings of various chapters such as: The Evolution of Marine Transport, The Creation of Maritime Power, and the International-
This edition again reveals the *Yearbook*’s value as a detailed and incisive reference work. While its purchase price of $35.00 appears high, its combination of high-quality analysis and extensive coverage makes the *Yearbook* a worthwhile investment.

With its country-by-country profiles of communist party organizations, both those in and those out of power, the *Yearbook* series consistently has permitted a broad appreciation of the unity and diversity of Marxism-Leninism as a global political movement over the past two decades. The 1981 edition is no exception. Its coverage for 1980 and early 1981 serves as an excellent prelude to the present. The introductory overview by editor Richard F. Staar, who since has joined the Reagan administration in a key diplomatic assignment, bears witness to that sense of currency. Probably it could stand on its own merits as a solid survey of major crosscurrents and events in the communist world that bear watching for the future. That air of timeliness is also readily apparent in the section on communist front organizations and the comprehensive bibliography of recent publications on communist affairs. For its substantive analysis and timeliness, then, the *Yearbook* is perhaps matched only by the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ annuals, *The Military Balance* and *Strategic Survey*.

In general, the national profiles on communist parties are high-quality contributions by recognized experts in their respective specialty areas. Students of Asian affairs, for example, will readily recognize the familiar bylines of Justus M. van der Kroef (Indonesia), Douglas Pike (Vietnam), Arthur J. Dommen (Laos) and Peter A. Poole (Cambodia). Likewise, those familiar with Latin America, the Middle East, or Eastern Europe will find contributions by such authorities as Robert J. Alexander (Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil), William Ratliff (Guyana and Jamaica),
Bernard Reich (Egypt), Nicholas C. Pano (Albania), and Jan de Weydenhal (Poland), all of whom possess considerable literary bona fides as major Western authorities in their given areas of concentration. Some of the lengthier assessments, like R. Judson Mitchell's coverage of the USSR/CPSU and Stephen Uhalley's examination of the PRC/CPC, are solid efforts which could have been published individually.

The 1981 Yearbook is also enhanced by the annual estimate of communist party strengths across the globe. Since the demise of the official Department of State publication, World Strength of Communist Party Organizations, during the mid-1970s détente period, the Yearbook has become the sole source for such data. Over recent years, added coverage on the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Treaty Organization has also increased the Yearbook's value. Aurel Braun's treatment of these two key instruments of Soviet control over its East European neighbors in this edition provides excellent background for recent events. The biographic section, if brief, also is unique for its treatments of communist leaders. This edition includes biographies of former Polish CP leader Stanislaw Kania and the heir apparent to North Korean leadership, Kim Chong-il (who also happens to be Kim Il-sung's eldest son).

Regardless of twists and turns in the international scene, and within the communist movement itself, the 1981 Yearbook maintains the reputation of its predecessors as a valuable research aid for specialists and interested general readers alike. For both it helps them to make informed judgments on probable patterns of change and continuity in communist affairs during the rest of the 1980s.

JOSEPH E. THACH, JR.  
Office of the Assistant  
Secretary of Defense  
for Public Affairs


Any book which is endorsed by Averell Harriman, Cyrus Vance and Ann Landers should immediately arouse interest, if not caution, and Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreements Without Giving In, by Roger Fisher and William Ury is no exception. In 163 pages, the authors present a recipe for reaching agreement useful in negotiations ranging from intrafamily disputes to the Arab-Israeli conflict and arms control.

According to Fisher and Ury, the most basic sources of failure in negotiations are misunderstanding, misperception, and the emotions or personalities of the individual negotiators. Anchored firmly in the social-psychological school of bargaining, they assert that "Ultimately . . ., conflict lies not in objective reality, but in people's heads." To them, the main obstacles to the resolution of the Mideast conflict are "powerful emotions," and the Vietnam war is attributed to Lyndon Johnson's perception that the Vietcong and the governments of North Vietnam, the U.S.S.R. and China were a single and united entity.

On the basis of these diagnoses, a cure is prescribed. To limit emotional obstacles, negotiators should "separate the people from the problem," and attempt to discuss interests, principles and merits, rather than negotiating positions, threats, and personalities. Efforts to develop mutual trust, build a working relationship, and emphasize the common task of devising an agreement acceptable to both sides ought to be the focus of bargaining.

If one's negotiating partners are inflexible, stubborn and refuse to play by Fisher and Ury's rules, they propose another approach; the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA).
Rather than clinging to a negotiating position and risking failure, each side should consider the alternatives to an agreement. If the results of no agreement are worse than an agreement based on a fallback position, a rational negotiator should make concessions.

Unfortunately, as lawyers, they are more concerned with the normative than the behavioral; they describe the world as it should be, and not as it is. This problem is reflected most clearly in their references to international disputes and negotiations. Taking a purely "idealistic" view of international relations, according to which all disputes are the result of misunderstandings and misperception, they have no place for force or power. For example, they claim that in 1970, Egypt suddenly agreed to a cease-fire during the War of Attrition with Israel after an unnamed American lawyer had shown Nasser that the options available to Golda Meir were limited. (One presumes that Nasser was not capable of such an assessment without such assistance.) Fisher and Ury totally ignore the factors which other analysts consider of importance, such as Israeli deep bombing raids, and American "carrots."

Similarly, while there may appear to be external "objective standards" to which all parties to a dispute can subscribe in order to reach agreement, in practice, such standards are hard to find. In international disputes, Fisher and Ury suggest that "moral standards, tradition, and reciprocity" provide such "objective criteria." One need only recall the problems which arose over the issue of "self-determination" after WWI and to look at the difficulties in defining reciprocity in the context of arms control to realize the limitations of this approach.

The absence of a historical perspective also leads the authors to "reinvent the wheel." For example, they propose that a single text should serve as the basis for negotiations and agreement would result from the convergence of successive iterations. Despite claims that the Harvard Negotiation Project, headed by Fisher and Ury, invented the "one-text" procedure used in the Camp David negotiations, this process has been used many times before. The 1965 Partial Test Ban Treaty and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty resulted from single texts that had been presented long before agreement, and this technique was employed by Henry Kissinger during his Mideast shuttles. The problem is in getting the parties to find enough common ground to get to a single working text. From there, it's easy.

However, this is not to say that process is irrelevant to negotiation. On the contrary, process would appear to play an important role, but prior to prescribing, it would be useful to analyze the impacts of process, communication and other variables. Such an analysis may reveal that direct negotiations and attempts to create specific texts for agreements, (which are considered essential by lawyers), may be inappropriate for some issues in international relations, and that tacit and indirect processes may be preferable. This is particularly important when the parties to negotiation are complex collective entities, such as states, and not the unitary actors assumed by the authors. This complexity introduces constraints on the negotiating process. For example, no consideration of U.S. policy in SALT would be complete without discussion of the roles of the DOD, JCS, State Department, the Senate, and domestic politics. Unfortunately, there is no room for these factors in the framework adopted in this book.

Fundamentally, this analysis is flawed by a failure to distinguish between simple coordination and negotiation. In cases in which common interests can be realized without cost, the problem is coordination, not negotiation. Coordination is required when both sides can
satisfied with a "creative" solution. For example, Fisher and Ury cite the example of American aid to help the Israelis replace the bases they are giving up in the Sinai. The precise nature of the agreement must be worked out, but the relative costs and benefits for each side are clear. However, in a negotiating process, the costs and benefits must be determined. Where there are many ways of meeting common interests, and the costs and benefits depend on the precise terms of agreement, each side will try to get the best possible deal. For example, in arms control, stability can be gained through many paths, but any particular combination leads to a different distribution of costs and benefits. If either side accepts more than the minimum constraints on itself necessary to get an agreement, it would be needlessly sacrificing its own national security, (i.e., giving in). In their analysis, however, Fisher and Ury have not told us how to determine the best possible deal, and one is left without an alternative to the traditional pulling and hauling. In other words, they have told us neither how to "get to yes" nor how to "avoid giving in."

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In 1943 there was published in occupied Brussels, under the editorship of Marcel Delcenre, a volume entitled General Collection of the Laws and Customs of War. It was in four languages (French, Flemish, German, and English) in four parallel columns and constituted a major tour de force considering the circumstances of its publication. In addition, it represented the first major attempt to reproduce in one volume all of the multilateral international agreements on the law of war which had been negotiated up to that time.

In 1973 Dietrich Schindler and Jiri Toman published their The Laws of Armed Conflicts. ("War" had become an unmentionable word and the euphemism "armed conflict" had replaced it in the lexicon of many writers on the subject.) Apart from a large number of typographical errors, mostly in the Table of Contents (necessitating the issuance by the publishers of an errata sheet) and a rather strange omission which will be mentioned later in this review, it was an important and extremely useful updating of the 1943 Delcenre volume (by then, long out of print). It included not only all of the multilateral agreements "which are in force; which have not (or not yet) entered into force; which are no longer in force," but also a number of other relevant documents having their origin in such bodies as the United Nations General Assembly, the International Law Commission, the Institute of International Law, etc.

Now Schindler and Toman have published their "Second revised and completed edition," an invaluable substitute for the original one. Typographical mistakes have been eliminated; and an excellent paper has been used with the result that a larger compendium, with several hundred more pages, is considerably thinner than its predecessor. In addition to including all of the 72 documents which appeared in the first edition, the second edition contains seven new documents: one under the rubric "Methods and Means of Warfare"; five dealing with the protection of victims of war; and one dealing with United Nations forces. For the convenience of the researcher, the Table of Contents, which presents the documents in functional groupings, is followed by a "List of Reproduced Documents in Chronological Order."
While this reviewer cannot speak too highly of the volume and cannot envision anyone concerned with the law of war neglecting to have a copy readily available when doing any work in that area, there are two rather glaring omissions, one of which was undoubtedly intentional, and the other of which may have been, so. Both editions omit the 1907 Hague Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities (26 Stat. 2259). Was this because the editors believed that in view of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, this convention was no longer relevant? But their “Explanatory Notes,” quoted above, state that the collection includes “all multilateral conventions,” even those “which are no longer in force.” Certainly, even if the Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities is no longer in force, a conclusion with which this reviewer would not agree, it deserves a place in the history of the law of war. And if it was the United Nations Charter which has caused this omission by outlawing war, what is the relevance both of the book and of the numerous agreements on the subject of the conduct of war which have been drafted during the past several decades, a number under the aegis of the United Nations itself?

In 1975 there was signed at Washington, London, and Moscow a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and on Their Destruction (26 UST 583). While it is true that this may have been considered by the editors to be an “arms control” agreement rather than one restricting certain specific means of warfare, actually it is merely more extensive in its prohibitory provisions than the other documents relating to chemical and bacteriological warfare, nuclear warfare, etc.; and certainly, anyone researching the field of legal restrictions on the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons in the time of war would be deemed extremely remiss if he or she failed to mention this very important convention which already has approximately 90 States as parties.

On the whole, the two omissions mentioned above cannot be considered as materially reducing the requirement that this volume be on the library shelves of any serious student of the law of war.

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In light of the seemingly exponential increase in writings on Soviet military affairs over the past decade, bibliographies on this topic may be depressing to reminders that one has not kept up with the literary “state of the art” now available to Western researchers in the field. In the case of Myron J. Smith’s volume on Soviet aerospace forces, however, one might justifiably be overcome by a gigantic guilt complex and immediately launch into an intensive reading program.


Equal superlatives apply to the work at hand both for the vast array of English-language sources that Smith has arranged within an easy-to-reference organizational format, and for its timely relevance to the substantial development of Soviet military power and the commensurate expansion of politico-military activities to distant regions in recent years. Encompassing some 3,250 sources, including transla-
tions of Russian military writings and little-known research materials. Smith's volume well may rival most larger Western library indices with its thorough topical survey.

From an organizational standpoint, it is quite possible that the title greatly understates the full scope and thrusts of the data contained therein. Besides a wide array of source entries on the Soviet Air and Strategic Rocket Forces as suggested in the title, Smith's work also treats the USSR's Ministry of Defense and the vast military economic structure that supports it, aerospace weaponry and related support technologies, aerospace implications for arms control issues and the Soviet-American strategic competition, and the employment of aviation and missile forces in the USSR's quest for influence and power in distant areas.

Two further sections underline a major strength of the bibliography, its emphasis on historical development, with a considerable collection of source entries on the Soviet Air Force during the Second World War and on its postwar development to date. The latter also traces the origins and expansion of the National Air Defense Forces (PVO-Strany) and the Strategic Rocket Forces since the 1950s as full-fledged components of the Soviet armed forces. Smith also begins each of the seven sections with a descriptive introduction that serves as worthwhile background for specialist and generalist alike, particularly with respect to the clarification of complex organizational structures and technological data.

To be sure, the work is much more a reference guide than a mere bibliography. Besides the valuable and extensive set of source entries it also includes a detailed four-decade chronology of key events, as well as several authoritative appendices of definite pertinence to the topics of Soviet aerospace forces and air power. One of these provides biographical data on those figures, both past and present, who raised Soviet aviation to its current powerful status.

Another appendix furnishes excellent military organizational charts covering the Ministry of Defense and its key firepower components, while still a third offers an exhaustive list of English-language Western and Soviet journals that have addressed the topics at hand on either a full-time or occasional basis. Those without fluency in Russian might take heart from this listing since it includes a considerable number of Soviet-published entries and Western translation series, like those of the U.S. Department of Commerce Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), which minimize our deficiencies in foreign languages in the pursuit of effective and detailed research.

From start to finish, then, this work stands as a fully professional effort to provide an authoritative reference guide on Soviet air and missile forces. Beginning with the insightful foreword, with its overview of Soviet airpower trends from the Bolshevik Revolution onwards, by Dr. Kenneth Whiting of the Air Force's Air University, it bears all the earmarks of a virile and enduring research tool of definite value to scholars and military professionals. Endorsing Professor Bathurst's previous suggestion on the Soviet Navy guide, one hopes that Smith will make some further provision periodically to update the work to accommodate both later events and the resultant analysis such matters will surely receive.

JOSEPH E. THACH, JR.
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs


Few scholarly occupations are so needed and so neglected as that of the
bibliographer. When, therefore, one is presented with such a masterful work as this under review, it is difficult to restrain the superlatives. Fortunately, there is no need to. It is a beautiful work, fulfilling a very great need, accomplished with great intelligence, taste, and judgment.

If one had to choose, he probably would rank the Second World War as the major political event of the twentieth century. One would think, that being the case, that its major participants would have arrived at some consensus about it. Nothing is further from the truth. The Soviets—left, right, and center—have consistently seen that war as largely their war, one in which the United States played a subordinate, safe, and un taxing role. For the entire Soviet nation, it remains a central preoccupation, a demonic focus of their intellectual energies, long after the West, certainly the United States, seems to have lost interest in it.

The Soviet fixation on the Second World War vastly influences its politics now, its military preparedness, the morale of its armed forces, the expectations of its people, its assessment of the West and of foreigners, and countless critical aspects of political life. Therefore, it is simply dangerous for us to be ignorant of the war the Soviets are doing on that war and foolish of us to ignore the vast amount of information available to us about how Soviets fight.

John Erickson, the foremost historian of the Soviet military in the West, has written an informative introduction, emphasizing the value of this bibliography for all of us. As one who has agonized through the avalanche of material pouring from the Soviet press for the postwar years, he must also be foremost in gratitude that thirty-five years of work in this vast field has been catalogued so brilliantly.

And not only is it catalogued! Mr. Parrish has also annotated many of the entries with erudition and discrimination. For example, in his necessarily brief entry on the most important Soviet book up to now on the beginning days of the war, Alexander Nekrich’s *June 22, 1941*, Mr. Parrish compares it to General Grigorenko’s book, refers to the English translation, refers to Soviet criticism of Nekrich and refers to a relevant article by John Erickson. Now that is bibliography at its best!

Michael Parrish wisely did not discuss the controversy in Moscow that ensued after Nekrich’s book was published and which led to his expulsion from the Soviet Union. That controversy, however, underscores an important fact of Soviet historiography, indeed of all Soviet publishing. Professor Nekrich came to the conclusion that the Soviet military organization was not prepared for the Nazi onslaught, that Stalin was guilty of miscalculation and of disastrous leadership. He wrote that, however, when the “thaw” was over, when the period of relative relaxation of censorship had ended, when the cult of Stalin was making a comeback, and when (which is almost always) the military was not to be criticized. Professor Nekrich found himself an outcast from all his professional association, unemployed, and therefore a candidate for a charge of patriotism.

This peculiar characteristic of Soviet publishing, that some things can be said at one time and not at another, makes Michael Parrish’s work simply invaluable. To peek in at the truth, we must be prepared to read not just the work of historians, but also memoirs by prominent writers, reports from correspondents, perhaps even fiction. After all, half of all that is published in some years in the Soviet Union is war literature.

For those interested in the navy, there is a section devoted to the maritime aspects of the Second World War with 238 listings. The entries include all that I have known and used and many more besides. Parrish’s wealth of information seems here, too, inexhaustible.
For example, he tells you that a book called *The Ocean in Flame* [my translation] is about the heroism of the Transport Fleet of the Far East during the war years. Other entries lead you to books which discuss the role of the navy in the Battle of Stalingrad, the analog in modern Soviet mythology for the Battle of Troy.

In the section "Military Art, Tactics and Weapons," there are references, invaluable for the modern tactician, to the Soviet experience of fighting under different conditions of climate and terrain, of partisan problems, of leadership and morale. This section would be a reasonably efficient guide to works illuminating the Russian way of war.

The works referred to are, of course, primarily in Russian, which presents some difficulties for many readers; however, by now, there is a vast amount of translated material available in various Washington archives, material which is difficult to use precisely because there are few good bibliographies. Now with this bibliography, some of that material will become more accessible, even to the non-Russian reader.

Finally, it is a delight to say that it is beautifully and accurately printed, without the transliteration and typographical errors that mar so much of the work in this field. One does not have to waste time, as so often happens, trying to guess what the original Cyrillic must have been.

For Michael Parrish, a resounding three cheers!

ROBERT B. BATHURST
Harvard University

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**RECENT BOOKS**

**Selected Accessions of the Naval War College Library**

Annotated by

*Doris Baginski, Steven Maffeo*

*Mary Ann Varoutson and Jane Viti*


Students of American military history will be interested in this probe into the effects of the Progressive Era (1880-1920) on the transformation and modernization of our country's armed forces. Abrahamson describes how the United States, which was a minor military force at the end of the 19th century, had become a great military power by the end of the Great War. He explores the reform efforts of such military greats as Generals Sherman, Schofield, Pershing, and Wood; and Admirals Porter, Luce, Dewey, and Fiske. The book assesses the military's awareness of trends that were reshaping both domestic conditions and the world order, and the likely effect of those transformations on America's military institutions and policies.


The political mechanisms underlying war and the political requirements for arms control are examined separately in this study to assess the impact of...
achievable arms control on the likelihood of war. The results of this analysis are then used to define a new agenda for arms control. This new agenda calls for international organization reform, new kinds of expert groups, and new forms of international military consultation. Writing to stimulate further dialogue and critical analyses, Barton (professor of law at Stanford University and a member of the Stanford Arms Control Group) has striven to develop his thesis carefully and accurately.


The fear of aerial bombardment in interwar Britain was unprecedented and unique. Bialer focuses on the fear itself, and attempts to discover the extent to which it was shared by those responsible for shaping national policy. The study indicates that the fear of a "knock-out blow" from air attack played a crucial part in the early debates on rearmament and resulted, during 1934 and 1935, in decisions to base rearmament largely on the air arm. Bialer presents evidence which he maintains has been previously overlooked. In addition, he suggests a new perspective which he feels will provide a better understanding of British defense and foreign policy during the 1930s.


On 18 December 1944 the United States Third Fleet battled a devastating typhoon in the Philippine Sea which resulted in the loss of 790 men, 3 destroyers, and 146 aircraft. This unprecedented naval disaster was the subject of intensive secret inquiries, the results of which were released only in 1978. Captain Ray Calhoun, commanding officer of one of the *Farragut* class destroyers which survived, provides a detailed account of the disaster and the events which raised questions about destroyer stability and command responsibility.


The Y Service was a branch of the Royal Air Force involved in signal intelligence during the Second World War. This is a personal narrative about the technical achievements and accomplishments of the Y Service and of the people whose work provided invaluable information about the intentions of the enemy. The author, then known as "Mike" Morris, was one of the first women linguists in the Women's Auxiliary Air Force. She recounts her experiences with secret signals work and its effect upon the outcome of the war.


This book is derived in part from the recollections of several hundred eyewitnesses and in part from records and archive repositories in the United States and Great Britain. Richard Collier recounts the dramatic events that preceded the attack on Pearl Harbor with fresh perspective. In-depth background information coupled with the author's stimulating narrative style result in an exciting reconstruction of the chain of events that eventually involved the United States in the war.

For over a hundred years, man has sought ways of using flying for purposes of war. Examples showing the logical steps forward in the evolution of military aircraft are described or illustrated in this work, beginning with the use of balloons during the siege of Paris in 1870 and ending with the McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle. Numerous detailed photographs are interspersed throughout the text which also contains drawings, charts, and graphs.


The author, utilizing insights gained as the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of South Africa's defense position, and reviews the evolution of the South African Defense Force (SADF). He examines the relationship between the threats, perceptions, and responses of the white political/defense establishment and its opponents. He further analyzes South Africa's drive toward self-sufficiency, which has been mandated by arms embargoes, severed military ties, threats of oil sanctions, and diplomatic ostracism. Finally, Crocker scrutinizes South African nuclear options and estimates the country's vulnerability to external forces.


In June 1940 Hitler's empire in Europe appeared invincible; only Britain still defied him. Mussolini, convinced that Germany would conquer England, joined Hitler expecting an easy victory and a sizable share of the spoils, particularly in Africa. The Italians had strong military forces throughout the Mediterranean area, but Mussolini was so sure of German victory he ordered his armies in East Africa not to take the offensive. This was the situation that faced General Wavell, British Commander in Chief in the Middle East and East Africa, when war was declared on 10 June. Using this background, Crosskill relates how all the massive Italian forces were totally eliminated by November 1941 in the little-known East African campaign which ranged over 2,000 miles.


Divine's thesis is that Eisenhower was "skillful and active" in directing foreign policy and that he demonstrated commendable restraint in defusing crises and avoiding hasty military action during his term of office. To support this revisionist stance, the author concentrates on several critical periods in the Eisenhower administration, ranging from his efforts to end the Korean war to his handling of the U-2 incident. A sympathetic portrayal of Eisenhower's contribution to American foreign policy results. Since the newly declassified documents on the Eisenhower presidency were not consulted and the expansion of the CIA's role during these years was not considered, this study is primarily based on secondary sources.
Two senior fellows at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution scrutinize the strategic importance of the sub-Saharan region to Western security interests. In both this study and a companion study on the Middle East and North Africa, an outline of the area’s history is presented which assesses its strategic value; major economic and political problems are analyzed; and critical crisis spots are examined in detail. The authors conclude by presenting a number of specific policy recommendations for the U.S. government. American national interests are considered central to the discussion, which sets the sub-Saharan region within the wider context of world politics and superpower competition.

The largest sub-Saharan conflict in the history of Africa, the Ethiopian-Somali war of 1977-1978 is considered worthy of interest because of the fluid alliance behavior it provoked, the roles played by the superpowers in the controversy, and the debate sparked by USSR aggressiveness and U.S. passivity. Viewed as a “situation in which influences from all levels of analysis interact,” the conflict is dissected to determine the local and international influences and the potential linkages between them which contributed to the outbreak, conduct, and termination of the war. Both the dynamics of this conflict and the nature of the foreign policy changes and intervention which accompanied it are major themes under consideration.

This book tells the story of British blockade efforts against the Germans during the two great wars of the 20th century. Special squadrons of warships were employed to cut off seaborne trade first to Imperial, and, later, Nazi Germany. British losses were heavy, because the blockaders daily faced U-boats, mines, surface warships, and, in World War II, air attacks. They never faltered, however, and, as a result, the blockade constituted an important strategic weapon of war.

The problem of finding numerical answers to the question “how little is enough?” has proved as intractable as answering the related question “how much is enough?” This study, produced by the National Strategy Information Center, assesses the potential results of bilaterally reducing the levels of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces. It attempts to establish guidelines for negotiations toward lower bilateral strategic arms levels while taking into account multiple political and military factors. Hoebel stresses that relative U.S. military power must be restored and maintained for the cohesion of U.S. alliances and the security of both the nation and the West; in addition, he maintains that large reductions in strategic forces must await the development of new verifiability, however elusive.

To give "whatever credit is due to the Spanish soldiers and sailors" who manned the Spanish Armada, Howarth's text offers a closer look than usual at the Spanish side of the story. Relying heavily on letters and other original documents found in Spain's royal archives, this account recreates the experiences of the 30,000 men who sailed north to meet the English forces. It demonstrates the bravery and tenacity shown by many of the Spanish seamen and their leaders, as well as the role poor planning and defective strategy and tactics played in Spain's defeat.


In this sequel to *China and Japan, 1949-1980,* the quadrangular relations between China, Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union in Northeast Asia are viewed in historical perspective. Political, cultural, strategic, and economic aspects of postwar Soviet-Japanese relations are scrutinized; and various Japanese options for dealing with changing world alignments are explored. Reprints of over a hundred documents and articles drawn from Japanese, Soviet, and Western sources comprise nearly half the book.


The author, a professor of political science at Saitama University, suggests that "economic growthmanship" soon will fail Japan as a satisfying national goal. Some new motivation will have to rekindle cohesive national effort. A "renewed sense of national honor" may likely emerge, inherently including a self-sufficient national defense capability. However, since pacifism is deeply ingrained in the national psyche, only a significant external threat will prompt Japanese movement in this direction. An international crisis, seriously threatening national security, may produce a shock similar to the Pearl Harbor attack that galvanized isolationist America into cohesive global action. Kataoka feels that such a catalyst will not only change Japanese defense strategy, it will change the domestic political order as well.

Klepak, Hal P. *Spain: NATO or Neutrality?* Kingston, Ontario: Queen's University Centre for International Relations, 1980. 224pp. paper $15.00

Throughout the 1950-1970 period, increasing Spanish ties with the West undermined claims to cold war neutrality; however, while NATO leaned toward admission, the European Economic Community (EEC) was not enthusiastic about Spanish membership. This paper, by a strategic analyst affiliated with Queen's University and the National Defence Headquarters (Ottawa), examines the implications of Spanish entry into NATO from the perspectives of both the alliance and Spain. In the NATO context, Klepak studies the politico-military advantages and disadvantages for the alliance. From the Spanish perspective, he elaborates on the countervailing domestic factors involved with the decision.
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"Will the mistakes of the 1930s—and the 1970s—be repeated in the 1980s?" Though not exactly parallel, it is suggested that during the period between the world wars and during the SALT II negotiations, the United States and its allies subscribed to the erroneous view that weakness in armed strength does not mean weakness in diplomacy. This series of essays takes a close look at SALT II, examining its effect on national security during the late 1970s and its potential impact on the strategic decisions of the 1980s. Writing before the SALT II treaty was completed, Lehman, Secretary of the Navy, and Weiss, a national security consultant, were active participants in the SALT II debates.


Lendvai, formerly a senior journalist in his native Hungary, currently covers Eastern European affairs for The Financial Times of London. In this book he analyzes the theory and practice of journalism in the communist system. He studies both the philosophy and the daily workings of an industry whose primary concern is the interests of party and government. Through specific examples, Lendvai shows how the various systems in the Soviet Union, its satellites, and Yugoslavia deal with the news. He describes policies of each country toward the indigenous press, radio, and television; the influx of "unfriendly" and "sensationalist" news broadcasts from the West; and communist methodology for presenting the "truth" to the world at large.


If Germany had carried out Operation Sea Lion in July of 1940, Macksey suggests that an invasion of Britain might well have succeeded at that time. England's defense situation had become seriously jeopardized by the catastrophic defeats of her continental allies, and the United States had not yet begun to furnish substantial aid to the Allied forces. This fictionalized account of the operation employs many specific details supplied by plans actually in existence during the war. Macksey, a retired British major, is the author of a number of serious histories, as well as studies on tank warfare, military fighting vehicles, and tactics.


The author, the first Western television correspondent to interview American prisoners in Hanoi, presents a history of the Vietnam war covering both French and American involvement. In an attempt to compile firsthand testimony of those who planned and fought the war, the book incorporates extensive interviews contributed by Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter Peter Arnett. In addition to many combatants, the interviews include practically every major political and military participant. Generals, policy advisors, heads of state, and diplomats of all sides provide their views; overlapping versions of the same events give an interestingly balanced perspective. Maclean's analysis, while endeavoring to apportion neither praise nor blame, particularly focuses on America's Vietnam policy and its present-day implications.

A former senior editor for *Time* utilizes previously untapped sources to reconstruct this historical episode in great detail. The book analyzes the Suez Crisis of 1956. This incident saw Great Britain, France, and Israel unite in an attempt to overthrow the Egyptian government of Gamal Abdel Nasser for political and economic reasons. It also found the United States unaware of the situation until 24 hours prior to the 6 November attack. Ultimately, it prompted President Dwight D. Eisenhower to face down his previous wartime allies. Neff views the crisis as marking the end of Britain and France as colonial giants and the beginning, almost by default, of the United States as the superpower arbiter in the Middle East.


On 4 July 1976, Israeli raiders rescued 103 Jewish hostages from Uganda’s Entebbe Airport. Ironically, the only member of that force to be killed was its leader, Lt. Col. Jonathan Netanyahu. This work is a collection of his private correspondence, written from age 17 until just a few days prior to Entebbe. In the book’s introduction, Herman Wouk testifies that “... Netanyahu’s changing ideas and shifting moods over thirteen years, these impressionistic glints and glimpses of him in training, in battle, and in brief peaceful interludes of study, comprise a true and brilliant portrait of a hero; the only wholly convincing one that I know of, in a contemporary literature of anti-heroes. This is what a twentieth-century hero is really like.”


This is the eighth volume in a series entitled Studies of Negro Employment. It was sponsored in part by the Office of Naval Research. The study concerns itself with the racial policies of the Navy and Marine Corps in the recruitment, training, promotion, and retention of minorities. The emphasis is on a comparison of Navy and Marine Corps practices and policies with those of private industry. The authors conclude that the services’ progress toward equal opportunity has been excellent, but that both could profit from greater emulation of private industry’s policies and programs.


During the confusion of the November 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Iran, several Americans were able to flee from the compound. This is an account of the Canadian diplomats and their rescue operation that initially saved six of these people from capture and then, later, provided a means of escape from the country. In addition to presenting the details of the less well-known Canadian involvement, the book incorporates background and overview into the larger, more familiar, account of the events. The authors, both journalists, have attempted a dramatic style, while at the same time methodically placing the details and the participants in proper order and relationship. Pelletier is the Washington bureau chief for *La Presse* and Adams is a former Washington correspondent for the *Montreal Star.*

Wargaming as a hobby has recently enjoyed a remarkable increase in popularity. This book is concerned with the war game played with miniature figures, a more familiar board game. Here, one deals with model soldiers, sculptured terrain, and rules appropriate to the time period. Bruce Quarrie, editor and dedicated enthusiast, begins by explaining the origins and basic principles of wargaming. The remainder of the book is divided into chapters, each dealing with the specific weapons and tactics of different periods. Terrain, weather conditions, weapon effectiveness, and the element of chance are all important considerations in reproducing the warfare of a given historical period.


Translated from the original 1975 German edition, this massive and authoritative history provides a definitive account of German submarine technical progress and development. It does not cover operational history. While logically concentrating primarily on vessels of the two world wars, Rössler’s study initially reaches back to 15th-century experimentation in Nuremberg. It concludes with the modern submarines of the German Federal Navy. Rössler presents a solid technical review and analysis of each submarine type—from concept to completed vessel to subsequent modification. The book is lavishly illustrated with over 400 photographs, line-drawings, charts, graphs, and tables.


On 25 March 1944 Dwight D. Eisenhower met, at the Air Ministry in London, with those major military figures in Britain concerned with the air war against Germany. At issue was the deployment of the massive Allied bomber forces in the period preceding and immediately following D-day. The choice laid before Eisenhower was simple: a systematic assault on the railroad marshalling yards and repair facilities of northwestern Europe, or a systematic attack on German oil production. Eisenhower opted for the former; however, implementation of that decision was not simple. Substantial modifications continued down to V-E Day as a grueling struggle developed among his subordinates. Rostow utilizes a quantity of previously unpublished material in this account of a still-debated pivotal decision.


This is the story of how the United States acquired and attempted to pacify the Philippine Islands at the turn of the century. The Philippine Insurrection began in 1899, shortly after Spain ceded the islands to the United States as spoils of victory in the Spanish-American War. Filipino insurgents, who had expected to gain independence, turned against the United States.
Hostilities continued even after the capture of their leader, Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo in 1901. The author vividly portrays this little-known episode in America's military and diplomatic history.


Defined as a "structural phenomenon, inherent in the peculiarities of Russian historical development in modern times and intensified by the rapid economic development of the Soviet period," Soviet dissent is explored in terms of its sociological and psychological origins. A comparison of the development of dissent in tsarist Russia and in the post-Stalin era is made, based largely on fictional literature and memoirs. Written primarily for the nonspecialist, the book also includes a comprehensive bibliography of English-language sources, which covers dissident activities during the last 200 years.


Although the United States has fought five wars in East Asia since 1898, most Americans have displayed little understanding of East Asian cultures and little knowledge of the reasons underlying American involvement there. The main objective here is to provide a readable, reliable, and up-to-date book which explains the extraordinary multicultural complexity of American-East Asian relations to the general reader. The authors employ a triple focus: a focus on each culture in and of itself and a focus on their effects on each other. Attention is also given to the American foreign policy process and the future of U.S.-East Asian relations. Each of the authors has lived and worked in the Orient, and all three teach and write extensively about the American experience in the Far East.


This volume (No. 26) is one in a series on World War II initiated by the editors of Time-Life Books. It involves the collaboration of several authors and photographers whose work alternates between historical narrative and picture essays on Japan's involvement in the war. The picture-magazine type format chronicles the prewar expansion of Japan, moves on to the Japanese victories of 1942, and concludes with a short analysis of the situation after the struggle at Leyte Gulf. Included is cultural, economic, and political background information on Japan from 1912 to 1945.


Isaiah Berlin was the principal author of the British Embassy's weekly reports to London on political events and opinion during World War II. The purpose of the Weekly Political Summaries, as they came to be called, was to provide information about changing attitudes and opinions in the United States on issues considered of importance to Anglo-American relations. The dispatches range over such topics as Lend-Lease, isolationism and Pacific Firstism; American attitudes toward British imperial policies; American policy on oil,
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foreign trade, and postwar plans; and—a recurrent theme—the shifting moods and power conflicts in wartime Washington. This volume is thus an invaluable source of information on Anglo-American relations during World War II and a detailed contemporary account of the American scene during the period.

Wesson, Robert W. The United States and Brazil: Limits of Influence. New York: Praeger, 1981. 180pp. $21.95

This study analyzes Brazil's growth into independent nationhood and the somewhat laggard American adaptation to her rising self-will. It suggests how U.S. influence might be exerted or curtailed to secure long-term solid relations. Wesson focuses on U.S. relations with the post-1964 government, summarizing the development of the close relationships between the two countries, and outlining their drift apart during the 1950s and early 1960s. Since 1967 Brazil has increasingly gone her own way. In a detailed discussion, the author identifies major controversies concerning Brazilian nuclear energy plans and human rights.


Based upon interviews with over one hundred West European observers, this paper examines the implications of the SALT process for European security. Several different perspectives are employed: arms control theory, West European perceptions and interests, Soviet behavior, and U.S. interests and responsibilities. Although the main emphasis concerns the "divergent political perceptions and interests of the allies in NATO," a number of suggestions regarding specific arms control issues as well as an overall approach to weapons reductions are included. The credibility of the U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee and the functions of long-range theater nuclear forces are considered critical to the security of Western Europe.
Conference on Military Failure

The United States Army War College, the United States Army Center of Military History, and the United States Army Military History Institute will sponsor an International Symposium on the subject of

The Impact of Unsuccessful Military Campaigns on Military Institutions, 1860-1980

to be held at the United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 1-4 August 1982. This symposium immediately follows the colloquium of the International Commission on Military History in Washington, D.C. Transportation will be provided between Washington and Carlisle Barracks.

Separate sessions are planned for the following subdivisions of the theme:

The Nineteenth Century
The Far East and Suez
Europe: 1918-1942
Vietnam

Requests for registration materials and other communications regarding the symposium should be sent to:

Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Shrader
1982 Symposium Coordinator
US Army Military History Institute
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania USA 17013