

1982

Beating Moscow in the War of Ideas and Ideals

Maurice Tugwell

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

Recommended Citation

Tugwell, Maurice (1982) "Beating Moscow in the War of Ideas and Ideals," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 35 : No. 3 , Article 7.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol35/iss3/7>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

Beating Moscow in the War of Ideas and Ideals

by

Maurice Tugwell

One of the great contests of history is being fought now, in the psychological arena. In the Red Corner, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; in the Blue, the Western Alliance. Red, a hardened professional, is aggressive, inventive, and knows how to hit. Blue, a much nicer guy who never really wanted to get into the fight business, is covering up, dodging, occasionally throwing back a right hand or jabbing with his left. As the fight continues, it seems that all the damaging blows are being delivered by Red. Blue's coordination is so far gone that he even hits himself, and one fist doesn't seem to know what the other is doing.

The spectacle is distressing, particularly as there is no need for Blue to take so much punishment. His defense could easily be improved, while his attack needs a proper strategy, coordination, and a more powerful punch. Indeed, if only Blue would just go over to the offensive, even in his present condition, he would probably win because Red, for all his technique and apparent confidence, has a glass jaw.

That scenario, transformed from the fight ring to the international scene, summarizes my assessment of the ideological struggle between East and West. In the battle for men's minds, the Soviets are walking all over us. The European antinuclear, anti-American, and proneutralist movement is merely the most conspicuous current manifestation. At present, about 80 percent of the ideological fighting and casualties occur in the West. Because we refuse to accept the immediate, permanent nature of the revolutionary attack by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), especially in the ideological field, our defenses are almost nonexistent and our responses are pathetic. Yet, we have the potential and some of the means necessary to shift the front from our own backyard into the Soviet heartland. Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe, the BBC, Deutsche Welle, Deutschlandfunk, RIAS, the Voice of America, Kol Israel, Radio Marti, and other means may need better equipment and more resources, but, even as they stand, they have managed to keep about 20 percent of the ideological action on the far side of the Curtain.

Question: Is the psychological struggle all that important? Do we really have to become involved in yet another level of conflict?

Answer, to both parts: Yes.

In internal revolutionary situations, the insurgents always run rings around the regime psychologically. Read Menachem Begin's *The Revolt* to see what happened in

Palestine, or Mao Zedong, or any of the great revolutionary writers. Better still, compare America's brilliant use of propaganda in the War of Independence with her sad performance in this field in Vietnam, where the revolutionaries eventually won through an indirect psychological strategy. Competent revolutionaries appreciate that revolutionary war is essentially a struggle for allegiance in which politics, violence, and other means are subordinated to the decisive factor, which is psychological. Understanding this central role, these revolutionary leaders keep a firm grip on the development and articulation of propaganda. It is never relegated to a supporting role. When the revolutionary challenge is on an international scale, as in the East-West struggle, the psychological challenge remains central. The only way it can be met is by accepting it, elevating the subject to its proper priority, and getting into the fight. We may close the window of nuclear opportunity, improve our rapid intervention capability and strengthen our fleets and armies, but if we lose the war of ideas and ideals, we may suffer defeat with our war machine intact.

Question: What, then, should be our strategic objective: how far ought we try to go?

Answering this question leads us to the heart of Western strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, as it is bound to, since it is ideas and ideals, not politics or military hardware or economics that the East-West conflict is about. Moscow's aim is to convert the West to Marxist-Leninism, using stealth and coercion to win, and brute force to consolidate the victory. Our aim is obviously not symmetrical. The West is not seeking to impose any particular ideology on the East. Throughout our lifetimes the West has sought only to protect its own freedom of political choice, and thus has resisted the encroachment of Soviet imperialism. We have pursued policies of containment and deterrence since 1945, but many thoughtful people are now questioning their effectiveness. Fear of war, imposed in part by Soviet propaganda, but relevant nevertheless, has caused a shift towards neutralism or accommodation, which are polite terms for surrender. I believe that we need to go further than containment and deterrence: we have to pacify the Soviet Union. By this I mean permanently halting the outward thrust of ideological imperialism: making the USSR a *status quo* state. This can best be achieved—I think perhaps it can only be achieved—internally. Pressures for change must be generated within the Soviet Union and the empire.

With pacification as our eventual aim, I advocate the adoption of what the Soviets call an "optimizing strategy." This describes political initiatives which seek not one single objective but a set of graduated objectives. It is a useful technique in revolutionary struggle, enabling one to advance when the enemy is weak, fall back under pressure, be flexible, change course, but never lose sight of the final objective. Preliminary phases might include forcing the CPSU onto the defensive in the psychological struggle; reducing the war-fighting capacity of the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies; and making the Soviet leadership choose between the twin evils of reverting to cruder methods of internal control, and slowly losing control altogether.

We, like the Soviets, have to learn to deal with our adversary on two levels: traditional diplomacy, and the new style public diplomacy.¹ Naturally, State Department, Foreign Office and Quai D'Orsay officials tend to prefer the former.

Whilst respecting this view, I would like to inject the idea that they should see their role, in relation to the USSR, as that of the police negotiator who has to deal with terrorists holding hostages. Of course it is necessary to feign politeness, even some respect, since the power of the adversary is real. But, for goodness sake, let us not forget that it is the hostages we are really concerned about. It is they, and not the terrorists, whose morale we wish to boost, and whose minds we seek to meet. Therefore, important though traditional diplomacy is, in a revolutionary situation, the really vital communications have to be aimed over the heads of the adversary leadership directly to the captive audience. And, yes, this will make life more difficult for our diplomats, because their Soviet counterparts will scream blue murder when we at last start doing what they have been working at for 60 years.

Another Question: What's all this about our opponent, Red, having a glass jaw? Is he really vulnerable?

This analogy was not merely a reflection on the diminished power of Communist ideology within the bloc, although that is important. The system is inherently vulnerable to *truth*, and I will briefly refresh your memories over why that is the case.

The Soviet empire is held together by an ideology that hardly anyone believes, and by a complex, sophisticated apparatus of control which causes nearly everyone to participate in a giant pretense of believing. Lip service to the dogma is at once a meal ticket and a proof of loyalty. All public actions are measured against it and all proposals justified by it. It is the stick with which one man beats another. The dichotomy between the truth which can never be spoken and the lies that can never remain unspoken, and the moral decay and intellectual despair that it causes, provides a fertile ground for psychological action. Moreover, the failures of party rule, the corruption, inefficiency, and dogmatic methodology are obvious at present and provide the *facts* which are essential to any effective persuasion.

All revolutionary propaganda is founded upon three basic themes—the justice of the cause, hatred of the opposition, and the inevitability of victory. For international communism, the first of these—justice—has nearly worn itself out. The only places where it is still strong are outside the bloc, amongst Western and Third World Marxists. In Eastern Europe and several overseas possessions it has no appeal whatever, and Communist ideology there is dead. In the Soviet Union, the value system is still intact: people on the whole feel that socialism is morally superior to capitalism, but belief systems have taken a beating. What people see and hear consistently contradict what they are instructed to believe. Thus their attitudes are open to change. Contradictions between surface beliefs and deep-seated values can of course be turned to our advantage. We hear a good deal about a switch from Marxist-Leninist ideology to what we might term National-Leninism, a chauvinistic Russian nationalism using Leninist technique and still expounding Marxism for overseas consumption. This may be dangerous in a certain sense, but it also marks a severe reverse for Communist ideology, and thus for Party legitimacy anywhere beyond the borders of Russia herself. We can capitalize upon this trend.

The partial collapse of the first theme—the justice of the Communist cause—has had to be compensated by greater reliance on the second—hatred of the opposition.

This theme was intensified throughout the period of *détente*, because of the danger

that a thawing in interstate relations might diminish the vigor of revolutionary class warfare. The Soviet intention was that the Western public would discard its image of the Soviet enemy while in the Warsaw Pact countries the reverse process would take place. In the Soviet countries, hatred is vital to the maintenance and justification of revolutionary zeal, and it also underpins the legitimacy of Party rule. Only through a shared perception of a malevolent external threat can the massive burden of arms production, the continuation of the draft, and the commitment to overseas interventionist policies be explained. Only by the constant reiteration of spy scares, Western invasion plots or sabotage, can the Soviets justify the whole oppressive apparatus by which they maintain the Party in unchallenged power—the KGB, MVD, suppression of ethnic nationalism, total isolation from outside news, views or ideas, and their claim to unquestioning obedience. Hatred is as seminal to Marxist-Leninism as love is to Christianity.

The third essential theme is confidence in inevitable victory. Lenin's brightest idea was to steal Marx's theory of historical determinism and use it as a pseudoscientific prop for this ubiquitous revolutionary theme. Thus, while the Party replaces God as the proper focus of man's allegiance, the theory that the world is inevitably moving towards socialism, that the smart guys had better jump onto the bandwagon, and that resistance is futile, is projected as the Word of God. This is brilliant propaganda, particularly suited in its initial application to the Russians, who are a deeply moral and, in the psycho-sociological sense, a sincerely religious people. Brezhnev's "doctrine," invented in 1968 to justify the crushing of the Czech Spring, strengthens the quasi-religious belief in inevitable victory by guaranteeing that socialist gains will be consolidated violently.

There are literally hundreds of other Soviet themes, but if we can undermine legitimacy by attacking these basics, we are well on our way to success.

Question: How?

By selecting four principal ideals and projecting them so that the Soviet themes are undercut, and in the process we take control of the commanding moral heights.

Under no circumstances should we enter into an arid debate upon the international airwaves about ideology. The smug and satisfied *nomenclatura*—those who have gained power, wealth and security by mouthing the incantations—will not be moved, and the vast majority of Soviet and bloc citizens will be offended by evidence that we take seriously what they have begun to reject.

The proper technique for dealing with the "justice of the communist cause" theme is called the planted axiom. All news, discussions, and programming must advance from certain unspoken assumptions, ones that we agree by silent mutual consent to share with our audiences. These include acceptance that the Soviet and bloc leaders are self-serving, hypocritical old party-liners with no concern whatever for the welfare or safety of their peoples; that the Party clings to power against the wishes and without the support of the people; that Marxist-Leninist ideology is dead and its application a disaster; that every statement by the regime and its media outlets is a lie; that it is difficult for ordinary people to step outside the conspiracy of self-deception, but that somehow, some day, the whole rotten erection is going to come tumbling down so we had better start thinking about the future. Without being expounded or argued, these underlying beliefs affect the tone, content, and points of departure of our statements.

Ideology can also be weakened by exposing it to youth culture, which possibly has greater penetrating power than all the political creeds on earth, and to ridicule. Often in the past we have been guilty of accepting the CPSU's claims to legitimacy at their own fraudulent evaluation. When we do this, we become accomplices to Stalin's Terror, the Gulag, the Cambodian genocide, and the crushing of all human values. One day, when the chains are broken, we are going to have to account for our behavior to all those millions who have suffered under Marxist-Leninism, and I would dread to be in some so-called liberal shoes when that day dawns.

The Soviet themes of hatred and inevitable victory have to be overturned by positive themes of our own. Before proposing what these should be, let me quote John Steinbeck, who said that the ideal act of propaganda is to identify one's own cause with values which are unquestioned.² It goes without saying that we have to address each target audience in its own language. I hope it also goes without argument that we have to address them in their own psychological and sociological languages, by accepting their present fears, concerns, hopes, historical memory, and capacity for understanding as our own starting points, and then leading them, so far as possible along familiar paths they wish to follow, towards fresh interpretations, new hopes and ideals, which they themselves have chosen. It's no good discussing concepts which the audience cannot possibly comprehend, which excludes many which we take for granted.

Richard Crossman, who was General Eisenhower's chief British psychological warrior from North Africa through to victory once said, "Individualism is the first act of disloyalty to a totalitarian government, and every individual who begins to feel that he has a right to have a view is already committing an act of disloyalty."³

The Nazis confirmed this opinion by coining a warning to their own followers: "To stop to think is to start to doubt."⁴ I expect most readers are familiar with the constant, brutal, at times quite frantic efforts which the Soviets have applied to try to close down Western radio transmissions into the East. These efforts were deemed necessary because the reception by their people of objective, understanding, and nonthreatening information breaks down the thought-control mechanism and poses a threat as dangerous as if dubious and long concealed circumstances connected with their exercise of power were finally brought to light.

Whatever we say to the Soviet bloc and empire, we have to say to everyone else. In this global village, and especially in a revolutionary war, there can be no separate themes for different audiences, because the front is everywhere. Moreover, if the campaign is to succeed it must be designed for the long haul and it has to be acceptable to the whole Western alliance, including social democrats, and it has to be capable of surviving new administrations in Washington. Internally, in each of the Western democracies, the campaign must have a unifying and strengthening force, and amongst the nonaligned, it has to possess strong appeal.

I propose four main principles, or ideals: defending peace; providing for the world's needs; promoting national self-determination; and concern for the individual.

Let us begin with *Peace*. This, above all, is what the ordinary man and woman wants. In a nuclear age, many might be willing to put peace ahead of freedom. By Soviet skill and Western neglect, the USSR—the one nation on earth that prepares energetically for a war of conquest—has managed to promote itself as the champion

of world peace. So successful has this process been, that US policy, reacting presumably to what it knows to be Soviet-inspired peace-subversion, has been made to appear brutally hawkish and insensitive to mankind's desire for peace. In Europe, a Soviet peace offensive has accomplished a psychological breakthrough, largely by capitalizing on our shortsightedness.

Most successful psychological action consists of turning things on their heads, or wearing other people's clothes. In this case, we should be the side sponsoring peace academies which condemn the Marxist-Leninist concept of permanent struggle and their forecast of inevitable war between socialism and capitalism. The world should be pointing to Moscow as the culprit with their arms buildup, expansionism, domestic repression, and interventionist policy. The Peace Movement in the West should be invited to make broadcasts to the East, enlarging their membership and demonstrating their pacific as opposed to ideological commitment. Those who refused would demonstrate the latter, at some cost, if we manage things properly, to their credibility. The theme of peace should be built into almost every statement, letter, broadcast and action by Western leaders and spokesmen. NATO might invite delegations from the Warsaw Pact armies to visit, making sure that the warm welcome—or of course the refusal—received wide coverage in the East. Western diplomacy should take the initiative over peace, constantly offering talks, conferences, seminars, pacts.

The second principle, *Providing for the World's Needs*, inspires the themes of butter before guns; of agricultural efficiency based on private plots and an absence of bureaucratic interference; of the Western World heeding the needs of the undernourished; of trade and development as superior concepts to ideologies and politics. We can even talk, as they do in Poland, of ordinary working folk having control over the means of production and distribution. Our theme will avoid crass materialism and will not seek to promote our own methods over the indigenous. Within Eastern Europe it permits democratic socialism to offer itself as a proper and attractive alternative to Marxist-Leninist socialism. Welfare costs money, and the money will come from defense.

The theme should expose the wastefulness of centralized command economics, the inequities of the *nomenclatura*, the repeated failures of collective agriculture. To Cuba, it would play back that part of Fidel Castro's "History will Absolve Me" speech in which he said: "Cuba could easily provide for a population three times as great as it now has The markets should be overflowing with produce, pantries should be full, all hands should be working".⁵

The West cannot solve the problem of Third World suffering by accepting liability and giving charity. Any crusade with that intention will likely fail, giving rise to an economic Vietnam with all its guilt-ridden consequences. Clearly, the Soviets have neither the intention nor the means of helping the South. America wants to help the South to help itself, a responsible and realistic goal. Yet, in the presentation of this case and the evident reluctance to attend the Cancún meeting last fall, the United States was again pushed off the high moral ground and made to appear lacking in humanitarian concern. This is unnecessary and may prove damaging. The United States should be seen as setting the pace and the agenda, and pushing other nations away from empty rhetoric towards positive, prudent action.

Thirdly, *National Self-Determination*. Here the West supports the right of every

country to decide its own future, including, of course, those within the USSR and Eastern Europe, Afghanistan, and the others. In my view we should back off from trying to sell "democracy," "freedom," "justice," "human rights" or any of the concepts that we have found valuable at our stage of development and in our socio-economic circumstances. All else apart, these ideological wells, in Norman Podhoretz's words, have been poisoned.⁶ In unraveling the Soviet web, our primary objective is to promote nationalism above internationalism. Since this is a proven human preference anyway, we are only helping nature. Yet here again, by our stupidity, we have allowed the font of internationalism and dictatorship to pose as the champion of nationalism and freedom. As an old imperialist myself, I know from experience that the strongest moral force that worked for the ending of European colonialism was America. Historically, the United States has impeccable anti-colonial credentials. Soviet propagandists have to be congratulated for producing a climate of world opinion in which the words "America" and "imperialist" are synonymous. Their achievement is particularly remarkable when we remember that the last Third World region under European colonial rule consists of the Central Asian Republics of the USSR.⁷

Insofar as our National Self-Determination theme affects the Soviet republics, the Eastern bloc and distant possessions, we must take care not to encourage premature, doomed uprisings. But the idea of resistance can be cultivated. This is a concept which has been hibernating since 1945, but now we hear of it again from Vietnam, Afghanistan, Angola, Poland, Cambodia, Estonia. The demiofficial broadcasting stations such as RFE and RL, acting as guardians of national memories, even as national souls in exile, may have a special duty to make "resistance" a household word again, by historical and cultural programs, case studies of the great wars of independence, and, most importantly, by amplifying and playing back to huge audiences the statements, protests, views and hopes of independently minded men within the Soviet system. When Vladimir Smirnov, a close adviser to Brezhnev, branded these and other stations as "spiritual aggressors," he paid them an appropriate if unintended compliment,⁸ since what he really meant was spiritual cleansers.

Finally, *Respect for the Individual*. Here we are projecting the most unique and significant aspect of Western civilization, one that was recognized by Marx and denied by Lenin and his successors. Although the West has been guilty in its history of applying the principle selectively, of adopting double standards, the idea itself has caught people's imaginations everywhere. In our news reporting of our own societies, which we have to paint warts and all, we must always show how the individual and not the state, and certainly not a party, is what really matters. I find it strange that so little emphasis has been placed in the past on this great ideal.

Superimposing these four ideals upon the Soviet themes of hatred and inevitable victory, we can see how our genuinely peaceful and friendly approach can undermine the first, and with it the justification for war and the legitimacy of repressive Party rule. Discussion of national budget options would assist the trend away from war expenditure. The Soviets use fear of anarchy, a deep and long-standing Russian concern, to excuse their iron rule. But in a society which is failing to satisfy its citizens, and which is exposing them to grave and unnecessary danger through adventurism, this theme too can be stood on its head. We can point out,

accurately, that continued failure to respond to the public needs is leading the USSR to explosive anarchy. Reform is the only safe remedy. A growing appreciation of individualism could accelerate the process.

Soviet faith in inevitable victory will be eroded by our principle of self-determination, because resentment of and resistance to Soviet rule is incompatible with Party confidence. We do need, however, to reinforce this Western ideal with an inspiring example of national liberation. Poland went some of the way; Afghanistan must remain a costly embarrassment incapable of consolidation. But neither has broken the Brezhnev doctrine. Our theme of providing for the world's needs may help us here, by our offering trade links with some distant Soviet possession. With trade comes information.

A regime that refuses these advantages condemns itself: a regime that accepts has to choose between voluntary and involuntary change. If the leadership succeeds in severing Soviet links without abandoning Marxist-Leninism, in the Tito manner, surely the West can live with that. If the leadership becomes democratic it is certain to break with Moscow, and the result is better. If the leadership resists the will of the people, a war of national liberation may result. To be effective, such a challenge must be led by a true representative of the national interest who is not a pawn of any great power. He must be a self-starter. His movement must be essentially political, and a resort to violence is forced upon it by the regime. The people fight for the restoration of peace, to provide for the people's needs, for individual respect, and for self-determination.

Given these conditions, the West would have no option but to support the revolutionaries by diplomatic, propaganda, medical, financial, and material support—probably in that order—but not with Green Berets, French paratroops, or Royal Marines if this can be avoided. Proxy forces, however, offer a useful halfway option where the Soviet-backed regime cannot be overthrown by local rebels. The important reward is the breaking of historical determinism and the Brezhnev doctrine, and this would be a good example of economic, political, and military action being subordinated to a psychological objective. History is really on the side of those people who take their futures into their own hands. Moreover, as Andrei Amalrik has explained, periods of reform in Russian history have always followed Russian defeats.⁹

The conflict, with its casualties and costs, could be shown as having resulted from the violent nature of Marxist-Leninism and the leadership. Interventionism could be discredited and the Soviet peace movement strengthened. The indigenous nature of the uprising must be appreciated by Soviet audiences, to generate guilt and doubt, and to overcome any fears for the integrity of the bloc with their likely unifying effects. The best outcome in psychological terms might be the establishment of a nonaligned, social democratic regime, because this would neither threaten the Soviet people nor appear to be an outright victory for us. And the spectacle of democratic socialism overthrowing Marxist-Leninist socialism might inspire emulation, especially among the satellites.

The message style of our public diplomacy must be, above all, friendly and understanding. We have noted that the West is not trying to sell or force its lifestyle on others, so too much emphasis on our material achievements and better living

at the low standards available in the East is a better approach, particularly when it is shown that poor economies coexist with rigid ideology, and that improvement, on the Hungarian model, results from a freer system. Showing concern should not amount to knocking. Even when people loathe their government, they will rally around it when foreigners criticize. And if an audience has to choose between listening to its boring and discredited domestic propaganda and what sounds like foreign propaganda, usually the homespun will win. Our messages are welcome today because our credibility is strong and there is little if any propagandistic overtone. At all costs, these assets must be retained.

Our communications are bound to lack three ingredients considered essential to modern propaganda—exclusive control of all media; organization; and the capacity to command the *actions* of its audiences. Thus it is not, by any scientific examination, propaganda. Our optimizing strategy calls only for the transfer of ideas and ideals. Whether these are picked up and used by the intellectual “human rights” dissidents, by Russian “nationalists,” by such minority nationals as Ukrainians, Central Asians or Estonians, by Islamics, or—much more likely—by such broad masses as workers, peasants and soldiers, we cannot forecast. We are fertilizing and watering.

Question: Does this require another huge bureaucracy?

No. And if we made our public diplomacy bureaucratic, it would fail, just as part of it is failing now. There has to be a firebreak between the official agencies of government and the media which communicate with our Eastern audiences. Until the midseventies, the French service, ORTF, had an East European audience comparable to that of BBC and Radio Free Europe. However, the French Government, which controls ORTF, was conned or bullied by the Soviets into shutting down its news broadcasts in the so-called interests of *détente*; only cultural programs were to be transmitted from then on. But without news, ORTF quickly lost its Eastern audiences, and the French service to the bloc was discontinued.¹⁰

Meanwhile, as well we know, the Soviets intensified their ideological assault on the West, which of course they claim to be historically ordained and therefore beyond reproach. Speaking recently on NBC television,¹¹ Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn reported that, after the Voice of America began to serialize his *Gulag Archipelago*, the Kremlin protested. Instead of doubling the output on twice as many channels, State, according to Solzhenitsyn, meekly cancelled the series and forbade the very mention of the great man's name. I am sure that this is an incident from the past, and does not reflect current policy. Nevertheless, you may feel that the Voice, which is communicating with the hostages, cannot be run efficiently from the same room from which the police negotiator is trying to humor the terrorists. The broadcasting media need, of course, to be guided by and unanswerable to the governments which sponsor them, but a standoff arrangement like the Board for International Broadcasting seems necessary, with the absolute minimum of bureaucracy.

There are two components missing from our existing apparatus. Given that the central role of psychology in the East-West struggle is accepted by the top political leadership, and that it is to be given the priority it deserves, there is the question of which department or individual will do the coordinating. Psychological action, like terrorism, operates in the cracks between agencies and departments. So a president

or prime minister does need a specialist adviser, who in turn requires a small office staff. I am thinking along the lines of the office of the Ambassador for Combatting Terrorism in State. But in our case, the Adviser for International Communication, or whatever he or she is called, needs to be on the White House staff, or the equivalent in other Western capitals. Because of the unstructured nature of the work, this post is probably best filled by a coopted citizen, with a flair for communicating but more importantly, with an understanding and aptitude for *struggle*. Toughness, subtlety, a sense of history, and deep moral commitment would be essential qualities. A Madison Avenue whiz kid might be worse than useless.

The second new component needed is an Institute for Propaganda Analysis. This should be nongovernmental, possibly university-based, and certainly closely linked to specialists and schools of Soviet, East European and international studies. The Institute's roles would be first to research and analyze Soviet propaganda, thus providing government, the public and news media with accurate information. By dragging the unpopular subject of propaganda out from under the rug, enabling people to watch the methodology at work, the hostile attack would lose some of its force.

Political leaders, through the specialist adviser, would receive timely warning of the new thrusts of Soviet psychological warfare and be prepared and able to counter them. The second role would be to brainstorm our own ideas and ideals within the context of current events and come up with proposals. There would, of course, be constant liaison with the broadcast stations, State, the Agency, and so on, but the Institute would be independent and open and would not become a secretive, or covert group. The Institute would have no authority to press its proposals on anyone, but would provide political leaders, through the specialist adviser, with options and recommendations.

It is really incredible that the West has no independent center of thought dedicated to the most important aspect of modern conflict—the struggle for men's and women's minds. Excellent work is now being done by ICA—witness the Soviet Disinformation Alerts—and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office briefs are good. Neither, however, can easily free itself of its official and therefore cautious patrons. The specialist adviser and the Institute are the only organizational additions that I recommend.

I have no doubt that our broadcasting stations need newer and better equipment including television satellite capability. But what they need most is top-level understanding and, with it, the necessary moral support and funding. I am surprised that projected US funding for this activity is threatened. Britain has already made cuts. If we are serious about our duty to defend our freedom and eventually to rescue those hostages, cutbacks have to be resisted. Ideas and ideals, after all, cost nothing in fiscal terms. Projecting them is also largely a matter of political commitment. The amplifiers—radio stations and other media—cost money, but in relation to other weaponry their price is that of peanuts. The Soviets spend more on jamming our broadcasts than we allot to sustaining them. This fact, and all the other evidence of the Kremlin's fear of information justify whatever reasonable costs are necessary to enhance our programs. News of the cuts made me wonder who, in the corridors of power, has responsibility and commitment to defend the program, and that seemed to reinforce what I had already written about the need for a specialist adviser.

Last Question: If we buy all this, won't we infringe the Helsinki Final Act, UNESCO's MacBride Report, and our own liberal traditions? And won't the Soviets, with their estimated 3 billion dollar annual investment in propaganda, still beat us in the end?

The answers are no, no, no and no. But, I grant you, these are important matters.

The Final Act prohibits interference in matters of internal decision-making competence, assistance to terrorism or to subversive or other activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another participating state. Far from forbidding the free flow of information the accord was intended to facilitate this. Those who argue otherwise have succumbed to Soviet propaganda or coercion. Events in UNESCO, which illustrate dramatically the West's lack of concern, knowledge, and capability in political warfare, are worrying. However, nothing has been agreed, and nothing ever ought to be agreed, which inhibits broadcasting across borders.

Our liberal, democratic traditions could be threatened if the West indulged in full-scale propaganda, which would include state control over all media, including domestic, totalitarian organization, and control of actions by psychological manipulation. Some critics have alleged that, in World War I, George Creel's domestic propaganda approached these dimensions. We are not proposing anything of that sort. We do not have the means to use propaganda to the bloc even if we wished. To promote the ideals of peace, self-determination, succor for the needy, and respect for the individual, and to provide news and information, offends no democrat, socialist, republican, or conservative. It worries your Fascisto-Marxist, because he is on the other side. He will use subtle means of criticism and attack, but we must not have our information policy ordered from Moscow. As for the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, I have selected the same title for this group as one that existed in this country in the 1930s to study Fascist propaganda. It will be difficult to criticize the new without condemning the old, and which liberal, or Marxist even, is willing to do that?

Finally, the Soviet response. It will be fierce and determined. We saw how efficiently President Carter's human rights theme was turned round, like a grenade that is tossed back to explode in the sponsor's foxhole. Much the same has happened to Secretary Haig's terrorism theme. This was because, in both cases, the grenades were thrown without proper reconnaissance of the psychological terrain, without adequate preparations, and with no coordinated follow-through. Most of the Soviet success in Europe right now arises out of the exploitation of Western errors.

With a good think tank and a capable team-approach coordinated by the specialist adviser, we can do much better. We have to fight the hard issues, even to refurbish such poisoned concepts as democracy, freedom and anti-imperialism: this will be tough. But in the choice of my four ideals I have, for three of them, overlapped Lenin's famous slogans "Bread, Peace, and Land" and "Self-determination." Since the Soviets cannot question his sacred words, they will have grave difficulty in attacking or discrediting our ideals, and when they slander respect for the individual, they expose their true nature. The boxer with the glass jaw will react frantically when we aim our blows to that target, but he cannot escape the consequences of his vulnerability.

Another defense mechanism will be brought into play. The Soviets will activate their agents of influence and "useful fools" in the West, arm them with disinformation, and seek to undermine our will to operate in this field. Diplomatic pressures will be strong. We will be warned of dire consequences; the Peace Movement will be mobilized; the fronts will be ordered into the fray. So, one of the earliest brainstorming sessions, first in the Institute and then in Government, must plan to preempt and defeat this subversion.

The CPSU's war against our information has gone on, little reported, for years. In the midseventies the Bulgarians sent an assassin to London to murder the BBC broadcaster Georgi Markov¹² and the Poles mounted a break-in and disinformation operation in Washington to deceive the Senate.¹³ More recently, thugs of unknown origin bombed Radio Free Europe.¹⁴ But the major Soviet operations have been coercive and diplomatic, frantically seeking ways to outlaw the flow of information. We can resist. We have to. Indeed we should welcome the noise from Moscow because it proves that we are hurting. The tinkling of broken glass in our opponent's jaw will be music in our ears.

NOTES

1. See Kenneth L. Adelman, "Speaking of America: Public Diplomacy in Our Time," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1981, pp. 913-936.
2. Quoted in Michael Balfour, *Propaganda in War, 1939-1945* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 436.
3. R.H.S. Crossman, "Psychological Warfare," *The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, August 1952, p. 326.
4. Balfour, p. 422.
5. Quoted in Maurice Halperin, *The Rise and Fall of Fidel Castro* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).
6. Norman Podhoretz, "The Future Danger," *Commentary*, April 1981, p. 41.
7. See Daniel Pipes, "The Third World Peoples of Soviet Central Asia," in W. Scott Thompson, ed., *The Third World: Premises of U.S. Policy* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1978), pp. 183-203.
8. Quoted in Gerhard Wettig, *Broadcasting and Détente* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), p. 67.
9. Quoted in Michael Scammell, "A Coup, a War or a Revolution?" in *The Times* (London), 14 August 1981.
10. Wettig, p. ix.
11. In the "Tomorrow Show" on NBC television, 1 a.m. E.S.T., 27 October 1981.
12. Associated Press report, "Police Work to Unravel Mysterious Death," London, 13 September 1978.
13. Wettig, pp. 36-39.
14. See "Programmed to Influence," *Macleans*, (Toronto), 11 May 1981.

Maurice Tugwell is Director, Centre for Conflict Studies, University of New Brunswick, Canada.

