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PROFESSIONAL READING

“The Nimitz influence has been reduced to ‘steering the writers away from pitfalls of amateur military analysis.’ ”

by

Frank M. Snyder*

Potter, E.B. ed. *Sea Power: A Naval History*. Second edition. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1981. 419pp. \$19.95.

For a generation, midshipmen and others have been introduced to the history of naval warfare through the textbook *Sea Power: A Naval History* (1960) or its predecessor, *The United States and World Sea Power* (1955). A second edition of *Sea Power* has now been published by the Naval Institute Press.

The fourteen authors of the second edition of *Sea Power* are instructors at the US Naval Academy. Twelve of the fourteen wrote the original work—*The United States and World Sea Power*—twenty-seven years ago.

The second edition is only half as long as the first. The reduction was made by cutting in half the number of chapters on World War II and by compressing the text in each chapter to about half its former length. The editors do not disclose whether such a drastic reduction was made necessary by the economics of publishing modern textbooks or by a deemphasis at the Naval Academy of the study of naval history. Neither explanation would be a reason to cheer.

The editors claim that shortening was achieved by “tightening the style, omitting minor operations, and deleting tactical details.” The style of the second edition is indeed tighter. It reads well, but since much of the reduction seems to have resulted from the elimination of details, the question arises whether significant details have been retained or have been lost. Over half of the maps and diagrams have also been deleted. Gone, for example, are the maps that made understandable the geographic factors in the sea, land, and air actions of the Guadalcanal campaign, the “Channel Dash,” and the mining campaign of World War I. Gone, also, are the diagrams that illuminated tactics employed in the battles of the River Plate, Empress Augusta Bay,

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and Surigao Strait. The narrative, too, of these and other significant actions are now badly truncated. Making such deletions must have been painful indeed.

Some useful tactical details have been retained. Much of Arleigh Burke's explanation of his plan for the battle of Vella Gulf is included, but the revelation that his plan was based on his study of the Punic Wars and the tactics of Scipio Africanus is deleted. This fascinating testimony to the continuity of tactics over two millennia will, also, no longer be shared with readers of *Sea Power*.

In a comprehensive text on naval history, we should expect to find three great themes. The first is the discernible relationship between international affairs and naval warfare (and in some cases even the preparations for naval warfare). *Sea Power* provides the reader ample evidence of this relationship. But in view of the cuts made to tactical details, the text probably goes too far in following diplomatic and policy considerations as well as schemes of maneuver ashore.

The second great theme is that "principles of warfare" apply as well to war at sea as to war on land. The tactical application of these principles varies as the characteristics of platforms and weapons change, so that naval history is the continual evolution of tactics for twenty-five centuries. This theme was emphasized by Nimitz in his foreword to the previous edition. This edition of *Sea Power* is less consistent in pursuing and highlighting the theme. The authors often seem content to declare winners and losers, without necessarily identifying which battles were the milestones in the path of the evolution of naval tactics.

One important casualty in the reduction was a chapter entitled "Problems of the Pacific," which traced the evolution of amphibious and carrier warfare and of naval logistics. In this edition the Nimitz influence has been reduced to "steering the writers away from the pitfalls of amateur military analysis."

The third theme—one particularly appropriate in a text for midshipmen—is that advances in the art, the science, and the application of naval warfare as an instrument of national policy occur only when individuals with sufficient vision, determination, and energy apply themselves to these problems. *Sea Power* pays tribute to these gains and to some of the innovators, but (as comprehensive histories often do) mentions numerous leaders and units just because they "were there."

Surveys are always incomplete, and each is subject to some basic orientation—in this case, that of the US Navy. A few years ago, a visitor to the Turkish Naval Academy perceived that the large mosaic on the exterior of its library represented a sea battle between galleys, and asked the superintendent about it. The battle between the Turks and West, was his reply. So the visitor ventured that it must certainly then be the Battle of Lepanto. The superintendent patiently shook his head and politely pointed out, "No, Lepanto is the battle *you* study. That is the Battle of Prevesa, the battle *we* won." Indeed, Western students do study Lepanto and ignore Prevesa, and so it is in *Sea Power*.

Residents of Rhode Island will be pleased to see their sloop *Providence* mentioned in connection with the John Paul Jones' successful cruise in command of her, but they will look in vain for recognition that Rhode Island was the first of the colonies to create a navy, four months before the Continental Congress followed suit, approving a resolution to that effect proposed by Rhode Island delegates.

Sea Power makes a curious judgment about the Battle of Jutland. Declaring Jutland a British victory, although a limited one, and admitting that naval officers, for a

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quarter century, gave Jutland "most intensive study," *Sea Power* credits it with "few lessons of abiding value to teach." Anyone who expected battles in World War II to be mere variants of the tactical themes present at Jutland was generally disappointed.

Yet the battle did contain many fundamental tactical lessons, lessons about the command and control of forces in action, about formations and maneuvering, about fire control, about shortcomings in damage control, about the utility of high frequency direction finding, and about how the fighting qualities of the commanders affect the outcome.

With historical gravity, *Sea Power* declares Jutland to be "the culminating surface action," and enshrines it with Lepanto and Trafalgar as a sort of historical curiosity. Yet, surface actions have continued, as veterans of Matapan, Savo Island, Surigao Strait, and recent missile "shoot-outs" can testify. Furthermore, Jutland is the first of the "modern" battles, battles in which opposing commanders are unable to view the entire scene with their own eyes or to issue orders directly and continuously to all their forces. The uncertainties confronting Jellicoe, dependent as he was on the meager, inaccurate, and conflicting reports from Beatty and others, are not unlike the uncertainties that confronted Fletcher, Spruance, and Mitscher in the great carrier actions.

This second edition of *Sea Power* devotes its final three chapters to the period after 1945. All the material about the sixties and seventies is, of course, new. But in the absence of great naval campaigns and battles like those of World War II, the narrative seems to shift its focus to shipbuilding and diplomatic history. It is as if the authors were not content to write a "naval" history, but felt they had to cover all of the military and diplomatic history of the period. The effect is to shrink even further the limited space given to naval actions and developments.

The text contains nothing about the missile battles at sea between the Arabs and the Israelis or between the Indians and the Pakistanis, nothing about the Reorganization Act of 1958, the Unified Command Plan, or the evolution of Rules of Engagement, nothing about the use of satellites for communications or intelligence, nothing about tactical data systems or the increasing reliance on computers, nothing about the shift from active to passive sensing (particularly in acoustics), nothing about undersea surveillance systems, nothing about the implications of guided weapons, nothing about surface effect ships, nothing about the changing nature of merchant shipping generally or about the decline in the size of the US merchant marine in particular, nothing about the closures of the Suez Canal, nothing about the *de facto* changes in the width of the territorial sea or about the creation of new economic and fishery zones in international law, nothing about the USS *Liberty* or the USS *Pueblo*. In a paragraph on Nato, there is the unexpected understatement that "joint maneuvers were successively held on several occasions." The text implies that during the Cuban missile crisis all 200 US vessels took station on the quarantine line, and that all 41 Polaris submarines were named for famous Americans. It is disquieting to think that it may be twenty more years before midshipmen start to learn these things properly.

But is *Sea Power* suitable for readers other than the midshipmen for whom it was obviously written? A broad survey like the one presented in *Sea Power* is indeed valuable for the general reader because it helps make clear the scope and influence of sea power regardless of the reader's historical orientation. Even for people who

already appreciate naval history, and who have adopted certain battles as "their favorites," such a survey is useful. Although a reader may differ with the authors' emphasis and some of their conclusions, he may discover and learn to appreciate other battles, other campaigns and other applications of sea power.

If you have a copy of the first edition of *Sea Power* or of the 1955 volume, keep it for reference purposes. It is much more likely to contain the tactical details you might be looking for than does this second edition. Yet, as a survey of naval history (from the US perspective) for a reader unfamiliar with the subject, the second edition can be a valuable and readable introduction to a history rich in interest and significance.

Abrahamson, James L. *America Arms for a New Century: The Making of a Great Military Power*. New York: The Free Press, 1981. 253pp. \$17.95

James L. Abrahamson is a professor of history at the US Military Academy. In this account of the transformation of the American military establishment in the forty years prior to World War I, Professor Abrahamson has provided us with a fine work of synthesis and analysis. He has also produced a compelling reinterpretation of how the military reform movement in America achieved so many significant successes before 1917, yet collapsed completely after the First World War.

Much of the ground which Professor Abrahamson covers will be familiar to those acquainted with American military history. Briefly summarized, the US Army and Navy in the late 19th century suffered from a multitude of problems brought on by rapid technical and scientific change combined with neglect by successive administrations in Washington. Among these problems were bureaucratic anarchy and managerial incompetence, increasing technological obsolescence of weapon systems and equipment, and glacially slow promotion within both branches of the armed services. Such shortcomings were symptomatic of a concept of the armed forces' mission more suited to an 18th-century frontier

agrarian economy than to an expanding, economically powerful industrial nation on the verge of the 20th century.

Historians generally agree that the military reform movement began in the 1880s when farsighted individuals such as Maj. Gen. Emory Upton and Adm. Stephen B. Luce forced change upon an often reluctant, tradition-bound military establishment. Upton and Luce, together with their successors, men such as Gens. Leonard Wood and John J. Pershing, and Adms. Alfred Thayer Mahan, Bradley A. Fiske, and William S. Sims, are credited with fundamentally reshaping the American military establishment prior to World War I. Not only did they successfully urge modernization of the armed forces' weapon systems, from battleships to field artillery, but they also achieved major administrative and organizational triumphs. The latter included the creation of an Army general staff, the General Board of the Navy, the Joint Army-Navy Board, and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The effect of these changes was to improve procurement practices, modernize tactics, and, for the first time, provide central direction and strategic planning for the nation's armed forces.

Where historians have differed is over the motives and objectives of the reformers. Recent scholars have concluded that the military reformers were

motivated by a combination of opportunism and a desire to create a military establishment to rival those of the major European powers. They rationalized their objectives by supporting an expansive, neo-imperialist foreign policy as necessary for the survival of the United States. It is this view of the reform movement that Professor Abrahamson disputes.

He argues that the key to understanding the military reform movement lies in the national impulse to reform, known as progressivism, that swept America in the two decades prior to World War I. Abrahamson builds a convincing case that political, social, and military progressives alike shared a common set of assumptions and objectives. They all sought in their different spheres of activity to reshape American institutions to meet the demands of the modern industrial state which America had become in the generation since the Civil War. Progressive reformers found the means for promoting these changes in the new methods of scientific management, central administration, rational planning, professional education, technical expertise, and a willingness to experiment.

Abrahamson has found that the specific objectives that guided the military reform movement were largely a reflection of the painful lessons learned in the Spanish-American War of 1898. With regard to this war Abrahamson makes a telling point ignored by previous historians of the military reform movement: the armed services emerged from the conflict as divided as the public over the issues of overseas expansion and colonialism. What drew military reformers together was the conviction that a modern state must have military forces structured so as to support national policy. Furthermore, the experiences of

the war confirmed the reformers' belief that modern forces, adequately prepared and wisely employed, could act as a deterrent to potential adversaries. Strange as it may seem now, these were startlingly new, even radical, propositions at the time.

The military reformers, guided by these premises and motivated by the principles of progressivism, stressed "efficiency, organization, planning, expertise, and social engineering" in their revamping of the military establishment. In so doing, Abrahamson concludes, the reformers succeeded in giving the American armed forces in the crucial decades before World War I "a modern character, adapting both the army and navy to the changed nature of warfare and America's new world position."

Why then did the military reform movement collapse after 1917? Abrahamson offers the explanation that the postwar reformers exceeded the limits of the possible in pressing such goals as universal military training and a "navy second to none" upon an unwilling Congress. An outstanding characteristic of the reformers' pre-1917 agenda, writes Abrahamson, was its "modest" goals. In the years before World War I, military reformers couched their program in terms of defense of the Western Hemisphere, terms that found ready acceptance among most Americans. Only when the military reformers stepped beyond these boundaries, as they did in 1919, and again in 1921 in an attempt to justify large peacetime defense expenditures, did they forfeit the confidence and support of the public and Congress. They had forgotten that the need to achieve consensus is fundamental to the success of any national reform effort.

There may have been more subtle causes for the collapse of progressive

military reform, just as there are for the progressive movement as a whole. Nevertheless Professor Abrahamson has drawn a lesson well worth pondering from the earlier successes of the military reformers: "Their modest, adaptive approach, which gave full attention to both the international and domestic dimensions of military policy, established a pattern suitable for emulation by subsequent generations of military leaders."

MICHAEL K. DOYLE
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Polmar, Norman. *The American Submarine*. Annapolis, Md.: Nautical & Aviation Publishing, 1981. 172pp. \$17.95

On a cold February night in 1864, the first successful submarine attack in history was carried out by the surfaced Confederate submarine *Hunley* against the Union steam sloop *Housatonic*. Inside the 40-foot boiler-plate craft, a crew of 8 men manually turned a crank to propel the submarine towards its target. *Hunley's* "torpedo," mounted on a spar extending in front of the boat, rammed the *Housatonic* and the ensuing explosion sank both the attacker and the attacked. From that night forward, naval commanders knew that the enemy could attack not only from the four points of the compass, but below the surface of the sea as well.

The American Submarine, by Norman Polmar, provides an authoritative overview of the history, current use, and future potential of sub-surface craft. Polmar, one of America's most highly regarded defense writers, has written a profusely illustrated book which follows the growth of submarines from David Bushnell's one-man *Turtle* of 1776 to the mammoth *Ohio* of the 1980s with her crew of over 130.

One of the more interesting chapters in the book describes the contributions of

the "silent service" during World War II. As one measure of the success of US submarine warfare in the Pacific, the author notes that American submarines sank 55 percent of the total merchant tonnage and 29 percent of all warships lost by the Japanese during the war. This record was amassed by a force that comprised only 1.6 percent of the entire US Navy.

Despite the unquestionable success of submarines during the war, the fact remained that they were not true submarines, but were really specialized surface craft, submersibles, that could dip beneath the waves for what we now consider to be short periods of time. This remained true until 17 January 1955, when the age of the true submarine began with the USS *Nautilus'* report that she was "Underway on nuclear power." The *Nautilus* was the result of a program which began in the closing days of World War II. The head of the super-secret "Manhattan Project" formed a committee to investigate postwar uses for atomic energy, with nuclear ship propulsion emerging as the principal recommendation. Polmar traces the development of the "atom-powered" submarine from drawing board to building ways.

The development of the nuclear submarine was in itself a remarkable achievement, but of equal significance was the marriage of the nuclear-powered submarine and the long-range ballistic missile.

The author salutes Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Arleigh Burke and Special Projects Office head Vadm. William Raborn for leadership in developing the Polaris missile and the fleet ballistic missile submarine to carry it. In just over 5 years, the Polaris concept went from blue-prints to blue-water in what is still regarded as one of the most successful weapons procurement pro-

jects in history. Polmar details the Polaris story, and then brings the sea-based ballistic missile program up to date with his coverage of the massive *Ohio* class submarine, which, with the Trident missile, will provide the seaborne leg of the long-range nuclear weapon "triad" into the 21st century.

The public has always been fascinated by the submarine, from Captain Nemo's "Nautilus" in "Twenty-Thousand Leagues Under the Sea" to the true life adventures of men such as Captain Edward L. Beach, who commanded the USS *Triton* on her historic *submerged* circumnavigation of the earth in 1960. Norman Polmar's excellent book is filled with enough information and photographs to take away some of the mystery, but none of the glamour, of the American submarine.

JOHN E. JACKSON

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Wallin, Jeffrey D. *By Ships Alone: Churchill and the Dardanelles*. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1981. 216pp. \$12.95

For most of us, the story of the attempt on the part of the Allies to storm the Dardanelles in 1915, was a sideshow to the real action which took place in Europe. If we know anything at all of the story, it is probably the Army side of the action, popularized in a book, *Gallipoli*, by Alan Morehead, or, more recently, as told in a popular Australian film of the same name. That the action was principally a naval action, and that it failed, and that it was something of a disgrace to Winston Churchill, who was then serving as First Lord of the Admiralty, is less well known. Churchill in fact was wholly blamed for the failure and was forced to resign his position. After the disaster at the Dardanelles, his reputa-

tion and political fortunes went into decline for the next twenty-five years.

The military and political situation in 1915 which led to the decision to attempt the action at the Dardanelles is well known. After a year of stalemate in the trenches of France, it had become obvious to the Allied military planners that the war would not end quickly as had been envisioned by the helligerents in all the capitals of Europe. Thus, even given the combined efforts of the British and the French, sufficient forces simply did not exist, either in numbers of troops or in weapons and equipment, which were capable of dislodging the German armies entrenched from the lowlands to the Swiss border. Reality then was the appalling picture of years of set-piece battles back and forth over a few yards of mud. In addition, the possibility that Russia would weaken and quit (as she eventually did) seemed real enough. Linked with that was the Western fear that more German troops, freed from the eastern front, might sway the balance in France in favor of the Central Powers.

To Churchill, the Army faith in yet another offensive seemed suicidal. To him, the only solution to this dilemma was some alternative plan, completely separate from the Army notion that victory could be won in the trenches if only enough men and equipment could be amassed to break through the German front. Thus, the First Lord concentrated on some sort of innovative idea such as a flanking movement, or the creation of an alternative front.

Churchill's first plan was to formulate a combined amphibious invasion from either Borkum Island or Helgoland in the North Sea. The advantage there would have been a complete outmaneuvering of the Germans behind the western front, and a breaking of the stalemate in the trenches. The Germans

would have found themselves in a great pincer between the British in the north and the French in the west and south. Although this plan seems even now to have some merit, in 1915 it gained little support. Professor Wallin hints that the idea was too innovative and detracted from the beloved "offensive" so strongly advocated by the Army planners.

By contrast, a second Churchill plan, to force the Dardanelles, either by ships alone, or with the assistance of troops ashore, did gain support. The principal players in the decision (all of whom later denied they had supported the Churchill idea) were wartime Prime Minister Asquith, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher, and Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, who headed the War Council.

Professor Wallin's description of the machinations of these men surrounding the planning of the Dardanelles action, after the decision had been made to go ahead with Churchill's plan is distressing and at once revealing. At various times, Lord Kitchener supplied troops, then withdrew them again, and then at a critical time, ordered the loading of supplies halted. Lord Fisher put in and withdrew ships several times, all the while, like Kitchener, hedging his bet, playing off Churchill's plan against the needs of the Home Fleet. Even Asquith, after strong support initially, was capable of turning on Churchill and sacking him.

It is hardly surprising then that the action for the ships did not go well in the Dardanelles, nor that the troops ashore in Gallipoli failed in their objective, given the lack of clear-cut support from the War Council. After some initial successes in naval gunfire assaults against the Turkish forts in the Dardanelles, the Royal Navy's battleships stalled part way up the strait and then the fleet began to voice serious doubts about ever

breaking through to the Sea of Marmora. After the troops most of whom were Australians and New Zealanders, got ashore, they fought valiantly but never quite broke the Turkish defense. Soon they too were stalemated like their counterparts in Europe.

Although the description of the actions by the Navy in the strait and the Army at Gallipoli is well told by Professor Wallin, the heart of his book is not the failure of the ships and troops, but what he calls, "the failure of statesmanship." Given the potential outcome, had the action been supported wholeheartedly by the War Council, success would surely have changed the outcome of the war. Despite Churchill's best efforts to marshal support and to optimize the plan to ensure its success, he was thwarted at nearly every turn and, in a great irony, blamed for its failure. It now seems tragic indeed that politics, personality, and duplicity were more important than a sound strategy.

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Cable, James. *Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1979*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981. 266pp. \$25

This second edition of a book which first appeared in 1971 comes at a time when the United States is wrestling with the dilemmas of the structure, deployment, and use of naval forces. Its central thesis is that the political applications of limited naval force deserve attention as one of the many instruments that are sometimes available to governments seeking to secure an advantage or avert a loss in the conduct of their peacetime international relations. In this respect, Cable's work can be highly beneficial to the current dialogue about the design and use of American naval forces.

Cable begins his study with a discussion of the principles and precedents of limited naval force. He uses the case study approach to introduce four types of limited naval force application: (1) purposeful force to change the policy or character of a foreign government; (2) definitive force to remove the cause of a dispute; (3) catalytic force which is applied in situations where a formless menace or obscure opportunity exists and where an advantage may be gained by having immediate and appropriate force available over a long period of time; and (4) expressive force where warships are used to emphasize attitudes or to provide an outlet for emotions. These categories are less important in themselves than the examples he uses to describe them in his case studies, for the case studies provide the background for his next chapter on the altered environment.

Cable's chapter on the altered environment is the meat of his revised work. In this section, he examines the critical question of whether political and technological developments have so altered the environment in which naval forces must operate as to render them archaic instruments of diplomacy which are at or near the end of their useful lives. His evidence supports his conclusion that "change, rather than decay, may thus be foreseen for gunboat diplomacy in the altered environment of the . . . eighties [and that] the political application of limited naval force will be less simple, less straightforward, probably less romantic than hitherto, but they may be even more effective."

His next two chapters, one on naval capabilities and doctrines and the other on the Soviet enigma, while interesting, are somewhat dated. Written in the late sixties, they are interesting from the perspective of the accuracy of his fore-

casts for the future. They are not particularly useful in the application of limited naval force today.

His final chapter on application is written from and for the British perspective. Given the drawdown of British naval capability in the sixties and seventies, it is not of much contemporary value to United States students. There are, however, two valuable postscripts. Appendix one is a selective chronology of gunboat diplomacy from 1919-1979. It illustrates that, while the nature of gunboat diplomacy has changed, the incidence of gunboat diplomacy has not lessened. In a second appendix, Cable examines the use of limited naval force during the decade of the seventies. This appendix develops the argument that "during the seventies, the Soviet Union replaced the United States as the power most likely to intervene beyond its direct sphere of influence."

In sum, notwithstanding the shortcomings of British focus and the two dated chapters discussed above, Cable's work presents a timely and comprehensive review of the use of limited naval force. He presents a persuasive argument, based on historical analysis, that the application of limited naval force is as important today in international relations as it has been in the past. Additionally, this work provides an excellent foundation in gunboat diplomacy for naval officers and for practitioners of politics and international relations.

M.J. BARTOLOMEI
Captain, US Navy

Porch, Douglas. *The March to the Marne: The French Army, 1871-1914*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 294pp. \$44.50

Professor Porch offers an interesting and effective challenge to the traditional

views of the French Army's evolution and political role from 1871 to 1914. The traditional interpretation argues that, despite cosmetic changes, after the defeat of 1871 the Army remained in the hands of the professional officers. Moreover, the officers were basically opposed to republican ideology and to the concept of the nation in arms. Dominated by a Catholic, reactionary hierarchy, the Army lived as a state within a state, frustrated all efforts at reform, and resisted new tactical and strategic ideas. Thus the catastrophic conduct of the First World War had its roots in the nature of the prewar military clique which ran the French Army as its private preserve.

Professor Porch by contrast points out that the officer corps was not nearly as Catholic, aristocratic, and reactionary as the traditional view maintains. Many officers after 1871 were in fact pro-republican, and the vast majority, whatever their private views, tried to sustain, not undermine, the regime. Cliques were as much a reflection of personal friendships and professional relationships as they were of political attitudes.

The Dreyfus case, according to the author, did indeed involve a coverup of a serious miscarriage of justice, but it did not represent an attempt to undermine republican institutions. The aftermath of the affair, however, led to a serious decline in Army morale and efficiency as the left sought to reduce the power and influence of the officer corps, which they regarded as basically hostile to the regime. The result was a sharp decline in military morale and efficiency which even the post-1911 nationalist revival was unable to repair. Officers saw their authority reduced and their prestige decline. Bureaucratic routine and political favoritism, rather than energetic preparation for battle, characterized the

Army up to the outbreak of the war. Grandmaison's famous doctrine of the offensive was not the product of careful thought but, rather, a desperate effort to overcome the Army's deficiencies by a sudden infusion of "moral force." The Army's disastrous losses in World War I can thus be attributed to the maladministration of the military system by the nation's political leaders.

Porch's arguments provide a blessed relief from the arid debates on the military question between ideologies of left and right. His approach is innovative and his evidence is used convincingly. There are, however, some alternative perspectives that he did not consider.

The Army did have its problems prior to 1914, but to a large degree they sound like the problems of any peacetime force. Routine, bureaucratization and "ticket punching" are characteristic of any peacetime force. Was the French Army any worse than any other peacetime force?

The author compares the French Army unfavorably to its German foe. The Germans, however, were also wedded to peacetime routine, their maneuvers were often a farce, and the army adhered rigidly to a simple strategic campaign plan that was seriously flawed. In the final analysis it was the French Army, not the German, that won the Battle of the Marne, indicating that the French forces might have been better than Porch implies.

On the other hand the thesis of Porch's book carries much weight. The fact that there is still room for debate is a point in the author's favor, for it indicates that his study will spark further research and discussion on an important but long neglected issue.

STEVEN B. ROSS
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Seaton, Albert. *The Fall of Fortress Europe, 1943-1945*. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1981. 218pp. \$24.50

The common view that German defeat in World War II was the inevitable result of the great "turning point" battles of 1942 and 1943 is simplistic at best. While Stalingrad, El Alamein, North Africa, and the failure of the U-boat war did indeed destroy any possibility of total German victory, a total German defeat was by no means pre-ordained in early 1943. Hitler still controlled an enormous empire stretching from the Atlantic to the Ukraine and faced a coalition that was anything but united. That he did not turn this empire into an impregnable fortress, divide his opponents, and secure a negotiated settlement was due at least as much to German blunders as it was to Allied power and astuteness.

In *The Fall of Fortress Europe*, Col. Albert Seaton analyzes some of those blunders within the context of a narrative history of the military campaigns of 1943-45. While he deals with the Allied side and the diplomacy of the war to a limited extent, his focus is clearly German military failures—failures which he attributes to both Hitler and his generals.

Both before and during World War II, Seaton notes, these men had exhibited an uncanny ability to violate Clausewitz' famous dicta regarding the relationship between war and policy. Consistently, they underrated their opponents, ignored political and economic realities, and substituted daring and brilliant but meaningless campaign plans for appropriate and comprehensive war plans which could match ends and means. As a result, German tactical genius was wasted in situations made unwinnable by strategic and political blindness.

The German General Staff had exhibited these characteristics long before Hitler's rise to power, but he epitomized such thinking, encouraged its continuation in German military planning, and added a few new deficiencies of his own. By the spring of 1943, he had created a situation which demanded a flexible military defense, possible withdrawal from peripheral areas, total mobilization for a long war, and negotiations with at least one of his enemies to split the Allies and achieve a compromise peace. But Hitler had long before abandoned diplomacy as a viable instrument of policy and refused to face economic reality. Moreover, his "military genius," as applied to defense during the next two years, would consist of foolish and disastrous offensives like Kursk and the Ardennes, a refusal to withdraw from any area, rigid "stand fast" orders which made effective defense impossible, and consistent tactical meddling on the battlefields. The result would be the total defeat of his Thousand-Year *Reich* two and a half years after it had reached its zenith.

None of this will come as news to readers familiar with the history of World War II. Seaton's brief and unfootnoted book adds little to what is already known and available in other, more detailed works, including his own *The Russo-German War* (1971) and *Stalin as Military Commander* (1975), and the serious reader would be better off going directly to these works. For the novice interested in a brief analysis of the military aspects of the war after 1942, however, this can serve as a useful introduction. It is clearly organized, well-written, and contains numerous, easy-to-follow maps. Moreover, Seaton's focus on German defensive efforts from 1943-45 properly draws one away from the 1942 "turning point" syndrome. Equally

important and refreshing, his use of German and Russian sources and emphasis on the Eastern front constitute a healthy corrective to the Western tendency to view the Anglo-American campaigns as the key to Allied victory.

MARK A. STOLER
Naval War College

Lawrence, Hal. *A Bloody War: One Man's Memories of the Canadian Navy 1939-1945*. Annapolis: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1979. 193pp. \$17.95

A Bloody War is a fascinating personal account of World War II seen through the eyes of a man who joined the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve in the early days of 1939 and survived the war years at sea (and ashore). Beginning as an eighteen year old "snotty" assigned to the singularly unglamorous gate tender *Andree Dupre*, Hal Lawrence quickly adapted to life at sea and by war's end, had transferred to the regular navy with the rank of First Lieutenant, assigned as executive officer of HMCS *Sioux*. Although a decidedly casual and narrowly focused history of the wartime Canadian Navy, the author's carefully researched factual material adequately shores up the anecdotal sea stories of patrol duty, convoy operations, bizarre wardroom antics and memorable port calls to Halifax, New York, Scapa Flow, and even Polyarnoe. Moreover, the book captures some of the intensity of the battle for the Atlantic and the personal drama of a few of its incredibly primitive actions at sea.

The book's principal focus is convoy operations and the difficult challenge of ensuring "a safe and timely" arrival of millions of tons of fuel, grain, phosphate, ammunition, and iron ore to sustain the Allies' wartime production. In simple terms, this meant long transits in U-

boat-infested waters protected only by the escorts' limited capabilities, weather, and more than a little luck. Until late in the war, routes were being marked on an alarmingly regular basis with sunken merchant hulls.

During 1942, U-boats sank 1,160 ships, a total of nearly eight million tons. Despite the eight or so escorts that might be assigned to an 80-ship convoy, the U-boats operated with virtual impunity, positioning themselves along the convoy's intended track (determined by long-range surveillance aircraft and refined by intercepted radio signals) and taking advantage of the significant gaps in friendly air coverage from Canada, Iceland, and England. Poor weather often worked against the convoy, slowing the ships to bare steerageway from their normal cruising speeds of 8-10 knots.

Possessing limited surveillance equipment ("Huff Duff"—HF direction-finding gear—was just barely developed, shipboard radars were not introduced until 1942, and early Asdic sets were extremely limited in range and sensitivity) and a modest offensive punch (racked depth charges, 3"-5" guns, and (in some ships) thicker hull plating forward that was used for ramming), corvettes and small destroyers shepherded countless merchants across the Atlantic; there was little doubt the probability of a safe crossing in convoy was considerably higher than that of a single ship.

Lawrence's career spanned the entire spectrum of convoy operations including escorting tankers from the Southern Atlantic, the dangerous Halifax-UK run, and, following Russia's entry into the war, Scapa Flow to Murmansk. One of the most interesting actions recounted in the book occurred when the Canadian corvette *Oakville* sank the *U-94* just south of the Windward Passage. In what could

be termed very close-in ASW action, Lawrence jumped from the *Oakville's* forecandle to the deck of the surfaced submarine and "captured" the crew just before the crippled boat sank. For his "gallant and courageous action" Lawrence was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross and began a short RCN-sponsored speaking tour at the insistence of the navy's public relations branch.

As one of a series of "great war stories," *A Bloody War* delivers just that. It will never become a classic in terms of historical naval writing, for the book offers no burning tactical lessons or weighty conclusions, but its fast moving and colorful style will be appreciated by anyone who has wondered what it was really like to sail on a convoy escort during the war.

J.P. MORSE

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Carlisle, Rodney P. *Sovereignty for Sale: The Origins and Evolution of the Panamanian and Liberian Flags of Convenience*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1981. 278pp. \$19.95

Rodney Carlisle complains that the existing literature on flags of convenience contains "too much information about inconsequential contemporary detail and too little accurate explanation of crucial historical developments and institutional evolution." Even though many may feel that contemporary details are actually more important than historical antecedents, this book should be read by everyone interested in the American merchant marine. It is a thoroughly researched, fair, well-written treatment of the entire subject of foreign registry since World War I.

It was at first disturbing to find no mention at all of the major "flight from the flag" during the US Civil War. But

Carlisle is only interested in the development of the present system of flags of convenience.

Although Panama and Liberia entered the maritime registry business at different times, they shared certain characteristics that attracted American shipowners. They were poor, small (one million people each) nations with no ships of their own, and therefore no safety or labor regulations that made operating a US flagship so expensive. There were also no significant taxes to be paid, as long as profits were plowed back into ship construction abroad. Most important to the US government, which tolerated, approved, and sometimes encouraged the transfers, was the dependence of those two nations, until recently, upon the United States. This gave us the confidence that American-owned ships flying other flags were still under "effective control," and would be available to our government in case of emergency.

Carlisle demonstrates that neither Panama nor Liberia initiated flags of convenience for their own interests. American shipping interests sought them out, frequently with the encouragement and cooperation of the US government.

Sovereignty for Sale thoroughly explains the economic conditions that motivated shipowners to transfer their vessels to Panamanian or Liberian registry, and the laws, government policies, and court decisions that allowed the transfers to take place. There were sometimes conflicts within the federal government. While Congress was passing legislation to improve conditions for American crews and the National Labor Relations Board was trying to enforce these rules on US-owned but foreign-registered ships, the State Department and Maritime Administration were encouraging transfers and fighting NLRB jurisdiction

over foreign-flag vessels. In every show-down the interests of shipowners prevailed over those of the unions. The 1963 Supreme Court decision that US labor laws did not apply to American-owned, foreign-flag ships with foreign crews opened the way for the unlimited growth of flags of convenience.

The flag of Panama first came into use by American passenger ships in 1922 to avoid the prohibition laws. The Supreme Court soon ruled that American ships could serve liquor on the high seas, but in the meantime Panama, which had not encouraged the early ship transfers, decided to change its laws to attract more ships to its flag.

In the late 1930s, US neutrality laws and German U-boats made Panamanian registration advantageous to both American and European owners. The Roosevelt administration wanted to ship goods to the Allies on American ships, but this was prohibited by the Cash and Carry Act. Admiral Emory S. Land of the Maritime Administration encouraged the registration of these ships in Panama. He felt that the spirit of the neutrality laws was not violated, since an incident involving a foreign-flag ship with a foreign crew would not tend to involve the United States in war.

Then, as the United States seized foreign ships, many of them would not meet our high safety and crew quarters standards, so the government itself registered them in Panama. By 1942, over 250 ships flew Panama's flag, and the "merchant fleet of Panama" was routinely managed from Washington during the war.

The war demonstrated the economic advantages of Panamanian registry, and by 1948 its fleet had doubled. Most of the new additions were tankers, which were not eligible for a subsidy under American registry.

Liberia's maritime flag came into being in 1948. Former US Secretary of State Edward Stettinius organized a private corporation to help develop the African republic's economy. His Liberia Company (from which the International Trust Company later emerged) wrote the first maritime code for Liberia, designing it to attract American ships. Stettinius even submitted his draft code to Esso for amendment. The new system was so attractive to shipowners that by 1955 Liberia has surpassed Panama in tonnage.

Carlisle objects to the collective term, PanLibHon, though he uses it often. *Sovereignty for Sale* stresses the differences between these three flags of convenience. United Fruit's use of the Honduran flag was not a legal fiction. Those ships actually ran to Honduras and had Honduran crews.

Stettinius' Liberian code consciously offered shipowners advantages over Panamanian registry. Liberia's currency was the US dollar and its laws were written in English. The ships could be owned by any person or company, with no requirement of Liberian inspection or control. The registry was handled by a quasi-official, profit-making company headquartered in New York and controlled by the shipping interests. Panama's code, on the other hand, was administered by that country's consuls, who charged exorbitant fees for routine services because that was how they were expected to support themselves.

Major oil spills by three Liberian tankers between 1967 and 1976, and the OPEC boycott of 1973 created pressures on the flag-of-convenience system, but it survived with the acceptance of higher safety standards and compulsory liability insurance.

Carlisle is skeptical concerning "effective control" of American-owned,

foreign-flag ships by the United States. In its only test since World War II, in 1973, it failed. He points out that the relationships of Panama and Liberia with the United States have changed drastically. Our shipowners and our government have assumed all along that sovereignty was for sale for the price of a registration fee. This book concludes that ships under other flags may be profitable, but, in a crisis, will not be dependable.

ALLAN A. ARNOLD
US Merchant Marine Academy

Wood, Virginia Steele. *Live Oaking: Southern Timber for Tall Ships*. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1981. 224pp. \$21.95

It was not until after the American Civil War that the steel warship became the normal fighting instrument of navies. Until that time the ordinary warship was a creation of wood, or woods, with different kinds of timber used for different parts of the ship. For the frames the very best timber available in the western world was live oak. Live oak is durable, extremely hard, and scarce. It is found mainly on the coastal islands and low-lying shores of the Southeastern United States and the Gulf of Mexico, parts of the country drenched in heat and humidity, and home for snakes, alligators, mosquitoes, and, in the 18th and 19th centuries, debilitating diseases.

The people who went into that difficult environment to get the materials with which to build ships were the shipbuilders themselves, men from New England and other Northeastern shipyards. It was in the winter, when it was too cold at home, that they did most of their work in the South. They were assisted by slaves rented out by their local owners. How different it is today

when our shipbuilders in the North as well as in the South work in the yard year-round, and depend on strangers to provide them with the steel, aluminum, and electronic parts which they shape and assemble into ships.

During the early part of our country's independence, we resembled in some ways what we now call "Third World" countries. The major powers looked upon us as, among other things, a source of raw materials for their ships, though it was a long time before European admiralities recognized the value of live oak. But getting the wood out of forests the US Navy had reserved for its own use was not something a foreign government was likely to do overtly. Records are scarce, and the author barely hints at the likelihood of foreign covert activity on our shores. There was no question, though, as to the activities of our own citizens who, as it suited them—and it often did—took what they wanted from the unguarded naval reservations.

The Civil War demanded that the United States build hundreds of warships, nearly all of which were made chiefly of wood. But, while most of the shipyards were safely in the North, the most prized shipbuilding material of all, the live oak, was in what suddenly had become an enemy country. What the US Navy did was what we might expect to happen again if an important resource suddenly were denied it: it did without. (So, apparently, did the Confederate Navy, which made little or no use of the resource it now possessed.)

Most of the US Navy's new ships weren't particularly good, but they were good enough. They lasted long enough to fight the war, and then they quickly rotted away. But, of course, the job for which they had been built was finished and there was no more need for them. In any future war we will probably have to

design the majority of the ships we build, and perhaps the aircraft, weapons, and sensors as well, to similar criteria.

Live Oaking is a well written, interesting examination of an odd corner of American naval and maritime history. It is also an extremely attractive book. Altogether it is worth the attention of those who like ships, who like naval history, and who like good books.

FRANK UHLIG, JR.
Naval War College Review

Allison, David Kite. *New Eye for the Navy: The Origin of Radar at the Naval Research Laboratory*. Washington: Naval Research Laboratory, 1981. 228pp. \$13

D.K. Allison states that the goal of his book on the origins of radar at the Naval Research Laboratory is not to study the "things" invented through research but the "people" who did the inventing. He treats that somewhat archaic goal flexibly, however, arguing that in the history of contemporary technology the focus must be on institutions rather than individual tinkerers or isolated geniuses. Thus, the book is more the biography of a research laboratory than a study of the men who staffed it.

To be sure, Allison gives us sketches of the principal actors, but the sketches never provide real characterizations of the personalities involved or meaningful insights into their motivations. The civilian scientists and engineers are mostly midwestern farm boys devoted to public service and adept at resolving technical puzzles. The naval officers are graduates of Annapolis, dedicated to national defense and determined to maintain the perquisites of whatever office they happen to be holding at the moment. Perhaps that is a realistic picture, but if we are to discuss the "people" rather than the "things" some

effort to make the various figures distinguishable from one another would be appropriate.

The NRL itself, however, is treated with all the affectionate care that could be expected of a first-rate administrative historian. Its lineage is traced back into the nineteenth century through one of the best brief analyses of the impact of scientific technology on American industry available. The Laboratory's parentage in the creation of a scientific navy with its improved educational facilities and increased awareness of the need to modernize the fleet is carefully detailed. Thomas Edison's role as midwife to the NRL's birth after the labor pains of World War I is fully described. But Allison's real interest is one the adolescent experiences that transformed the infant Laboratory into a mature and significant member of the Navy family.

Allison's decision to concentrate on radar was a shrewd choice. Narrating its invention allows him to introduce all the popular themes expected in a history of science. It was, for instance, "accident" that led A. Hoyt Taylor and Leo C. Young, in 1924, to discover that radio beams could locate distant ships. Ironically, they almost immediately abandoned this line of research. When they returned to it, in 1934, they misdirected their search by using continuous waves. Serendipity came to the rescue, however, when research in "key clicks" and sonar led to the choice of pulse waves. Allison also discusses the problem of simultaneous discovery, which he treats in a discussion of work done by the British, RCA, and others. Finally, Allison opens a healthy historiographical dispute with earlier historians, for Allison denies the generally accepted influence of ionospheric studies on the NRL's invention of radar. These are classic themes in the history of science,

presented here on a detailed, factual level that is rarely available.

The importance of radar makes its study effective for the discussion of administrative history as well. Its invention, abandonment, and rediscovery neatly track the early life of the Laboratory, as its rapid development accounts for the NRL's survival and growth. The original Laboratory, with its four buildings, miniscule staff, and \$100,000 budget, lived a hand-to-mouth existence for a decade. Subject to external pressures over which NRL had almost no control, it fought first to survive and then to promote its unique identity.

The bureaucratic warfare throughout these years is one of the most exciting parts of Allison's story. He described with zest the NRL's gallery of defenders and enemies, such as Capt. Stanford Hooper, who haunts these pages like a dark nemesis. The axial theme of these bureaucratic struggles was the dispute over the NRL's position in the Navy. Was it to be a specialized testing facility, utterly dependent on the bureaus and artfully stifled by entrenched tradition from the start? Or, was the NRL really to be a research laboratory, where scientific studies would stimulate revolutionary progress throughout the Navy as a whole? Every weapon in the bureaucratic warrior's arsenal was used by both sides in these struggles, including appeals to public opinion and Congress and the use of subterfuge and deception.

But in the end radar carried the day, ensuring that the NRL would survive and "Engineering Research" would be part of its activities. It was radar—a true invention based on advanced technical knowledge and applicable to almost every aspect of the fleet's military operations—that established NRL's prestige and demonstrated the efficacy of "research." As war drew nearer, after

1934, it was increasingly hard to disparage the significance of radar and the program which had developed it. Naval officers would still claim that research should be carried out by industries and universities. But the arguments were no longer able to threaten either the survival of NRL or the propriety of its research orientation.

In telling this tale Allison has combined scholarship, a good understanding of technical problems, a sensitivity to the importance of people, politics and economics in technological developments, and a nice ability to organize diverse materials. He has written a fine book that recommends itself without qualification to students of history and engineering administrators.

ROBERT ARTIGIANI
US Naval Academy

Gansler, Jacques S. *The Defense Industry*.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980.
346pp. \$9.95

Gansler's book rivals in importance the scholarly series on weapons acquisition produced in the early sixties by M.J. Peck and F.M. Scherer. Like the works of Peck and Scherer, the book is certainly not light reading. The author mixes applicable economic theory with more practical treatment of the difficulties in this unique industry. From the analysis, he evolves a very comprehensive and general set of policy recommendations applying to the industry in general and to more specific segments that dominate a large share of the defense resource transformation process. His recommendations are extensive, complex and, most importantly, often interrelated. The book is richly supported by statistical data and trend information that will delight future researchers. The data, while valuable in establishing trends, is somewhat outdated, probably as a result of

publishing lead times common to authors (and defense programs). This is not overly critical, as the book is cast toward long-range perspectives. However, as a prelude to the future, it does lack the Reagan defense budget initiatives which, if executed, will alter the distribution and magnitude of Gansler's data significantly. Additionally, the so-called "Carlucci Initiatives" directed at improving the acquisition process have co-opted several of Dr. Gansler's recommendations.

The book suffers somewhat by the very breadth of its suggested policy initiatives. While many will agree that Gansler is often right on target, a fair and natural question is, "how are these sweeping policy suggestions to be implemented?" Like many other policy makers, Gansler leaves the "how to do it" for others to determine as though this was the most minor and easiest of activities. For the suggestions offered in this book, the "how to do it" exceeds in political, technical, and managerial difficulty the identification of problems and companion remedial policy.

Nonetheless, those who study the book will increase their insight into the setting of the defense industry, along with its economic characteristics. They will also expand their understanding of the problems of industrial mobilization, along with the very special difficulties and disincentives facing second-tier defense industries. Gansler offers excellent perspectives on the aircraft and ship-building industry, along with the often overlooked impact of foreign military sales. His forecasts on these, especially those involving imputed capacity shortfalls, are, however, disputed by recent defense industry econometric data produced, among others, by Data Resources, Inc., and in congressional testimony by senior defense officials.

Dr. Gansler wraps up his analysis with a series of contrasts of other nations', including the Soviets', approach to defense economics and weapons acquisition. The author then neatly packages a comprehensive set of recommendations that will keep policy makers fully engaged.

If you are a senior policy maker, a defense industry executive, a program manager, or a student of defense economics and weapons acquisition, read this book, or at least the chapter summaries and final recommendations (but update your statistics before suggesting policy thrusts). Then put *The Defense Industry* in your library as it will prove to be a valuable reference in the future.

WILLIAM E. TURCOTTE
Naval War College

Stempel, John D. *Inside the Iranian Revolution*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981. 336pp. \$17.50

There has been an avalanche of books since the Iranian tragedy shattered the West's complacency about the dependability of its main source of energy. Out of the mass, an exceptional volume has emerged, written by Dr. John Stempel, the articulate director of the Department of State's operations center. Stempel served from 1975 to 1979 in the US embassy in Iran and, while there, amassed a superb collection of contacts.

The author's cool and confident style takes the reader on a swift journey through the whirlpool of Iranian personalities, customs, psychology, opinions, and facts on controversial issues. He discusses vividly the Russian (czarist and Soviet) interests in Iran, the psychological profile of the Iranian male, the historical reasons for the deep Persian suspicions of both external influences and local institutions, the strains of

modernization (the "Shah-People Revolution"), the tangled political convulsions, and the final indecisiveness of the Shah.

In his analysis of the disintegrating political fabric, Stempel observes that the Shah had a personality "change caused to some degree by his cancer medicine," complicated by his belief in his own mystique. He also draws a vivid portrait of the rigid authoritarian, Ayatollah Khomeini, the Shah's "mirror image in clerical dress." Stempel observes that the fast pace of Iranian development in the 1970s, fueled by the high price of oil, accelerated the break-up. Still, without close cooperation between secular and religious opposition forces, he maintains, the Shah "would not have been overthrown."

Throughout his roller coaster ride into the heart of the Persian miasma, Stempel carefully dissects the Iranian traditions of dependence on a strong leader, the absence of viable political institutions, and what he describes as the "most striking" characteristics of the nation's politics: "insecurity, cynicism, and me-firstism." The ambivalent love-hate excesses of the revolution and its rhetoric, which resulted in the American Embassy's occupation, are placed into perspective.

Stempel points out that, rather than fleeing with the Shah in January 1979, the Chief of the Imperial Inspectorate, Hoosein Fardust, stayed behind to become a "controlling figure" in the Khomeini regime's Savak, the Savama. Stempel describes how the antimodern Khomeini uses modern communications effectively in his attempt to destroy modernization.

Middle Eastern societies are so complex that even the specialists get surprised. But surprise may be more likely if the number of specialists assigned to an embassy or MAAG is cut. Stempel also

makes a strong case for continuity of staffing. A crisis is a poor time to begin trying to develop in-depth contacts with either regime or opposition figures. Stempel's examples of how we did things include a reduction in political officers assigned over a decade from 21 to 6. A possible result? "America did not realize what was happening in Iran." But the Iranian elite did not know either. In 1977 Prime Minister Amouzegar evinced a lack of understanding of the "reactionary mullahs." Another unappreciated danger was the dynamics of the shaky alliance between the Iranian left and right, which, though divided by "demodernization" versus "social revolution and mass society," were united by their anti-Shah and anti-US emotions and policies.

Stempel's book can help us prepare for the *next* Iranian crisis. This crisis may effect many of us—on short, brutal notice. As the author puts it: "The Soviets gained tremendously when America's regional position all but collapsed." He concludes that the Soviet approach has been a low key one, opening up "excellent prospects of a Marxist regime in the future, much like that which came into power in Afghanistan in April 1978."

We cannot afford to ignore Stempel's warnings that the "Iranian revolution is not over," that the present "institutional chaos" will be followed by a new "king or commissar." If the new regime happens to take over with some "discreet foreign support" then we better start doing our homework now. Get this book. It is top of the line among the volumes I have read in two languages. Read it with care. It just might be an urgently important professional aid for you!

EPHRAIM E. WALLER
Midwest Agricultural Chemicals Association

McFadden, Robert D., Treaster, Joseph B., and Carroll, Maurice. *No Hiding Place*. New York: Times Books, 1981. 314pp. \$15.50

On Sunday, 17 May 1981, *The New York Times Magazine* was devoted exclusively to an account of the hostages crisis between the United States and Iran that dominated much of America's attention during the election year of 1980. Now, in *No Hiding Place*, *The New York Times* has published an amended version of the same account. It begins with a long (142 page) "inside" story based on interviews with 20 of the returned hostages, information from four others at news conferences, and accounts provided by 14 of the hostages to other news organizations. Part II is a collection of six essays interpreting aspects of the crisis. Part III contains brief profiles of the hostages and a chronology of selected significant events from the flight of the Shah and his entourage from Iran on 16 January 1979 to the freeing on 18 February 1981 of Cynthia Dwyer, an American free-lance journalist who had been imprisoned on charges of espionage in Iran independently of the hostages crisis. The style is facile and journalistic.

From a military point of view, and that of an international lawyer, the most interesting parts of this account are not the lively stories of the travail of the hostages, as absorbing as those are for their reportage of how some mature professionals reacted to imprisonment and barely tolerable emotional strain. Neither is it the recitation of the aborted rescue mission of 24 April 1980 which seems factual but lightly done, with due regard for military and diplomatic information that is probably best not yet revealed.

What is more interesting and revealing, albeit unwittingly so, is the apparent insensitivity of *The Times*

analysts and American planners as a group to the vital political and legal issues involved in the year-long crisis. Four points seem particularly enlightening.

On page 109 of *The New York Times Magazine* for 17 May one finds that "the United States was not obliged to inform friendly governments that a group of C-130s scheduled to land at out-of-the-way American bases within their countries were destined for a rescue mission in Iran." That assertion is both false as a matter of law and inept as a matter of policy. Our Turkish bases, for example, are linked with NATO, and to use them for non-NATO operations in the Middle East would come close to forcing Turkey to close them down. Whatever landing rights we might hold elsewhere in the Middle East either involve similar political complications of serious magnitude or involve overflights of Muslim states which would bring on equivalent problems. In *No Hiding Place* the sentence quoted is gone, replaced by a speculation: "But given the need for secrecy, it seems likely that they took off from a second aircraft carrier in the Arabian Sea or the Indian Ocean" (p. 216, analysis by Drew Middleton).

President Carter's decision to approve the rescue mission of April 1980 is reported to have been based on his "feeling" early in April "that he had exhausted his diplomatic and economic options" (p. 209, analysis by Terence Smith). If that was President Carter's true feeling, he was badly served by his advisers. In fact, on 7 and 17 April, he had just imposed new and stringent economic restrictions on Iran. Did he expect them to work instantly?

It was also apparent in April that the International Court of Justice was about to announce a decision in the complaint brought by the United States against

Iran. That decision was expected to be wholly favorable to the United States, as indeed it was when it finally came down on 24 May, having been delayed by the need some members of the Court apparently felt to mention the rescue mission as a disturbing, if legally irrelevant, action by the United States in disregard of a standstill Court order of 15 December 1979.

While in April it could not have been expected that Iran would be moved by that decision alone, the fact of the Court making it should certainly have been seen as opening various possibilities through the United Nations for action in support of the Court, permitting "neutral" countries to act against Iran even if their internal politics forbade them acting in favor of the United States. It would seem thus that the President was led to approve a risky action by not having been informed fully as to the range of economic and diplomatic alternatives becoming available.

There is reference to "the Iranian concern about dealing directly with 'the great Satan'" (p. 212) as the basis for the complicated arrangement finally hit on in December 1980, with Algeria serving as a negotiating buffer between the two principals. Our chief negotiator, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, acknowledged the delicacy of the Algerian concern "about their role as a mediator and their image with Iran and the third world."

It seems not to have been considered that the decision of the International Court over six months earlier triggered Iranian legal obligations not only toward the United States, but also toward the entire world community. As a result of that decision the United Nations Secretary General, or the President of the General Assembly, or some other representative of the entire world community

would have been in a position in his own right to negotiate with Iran.

Since reportedly the Iranians had decided by 1 September 1980 to release the hostages (pp. 124-125, 128-129, 210-211, 269-270), it is possible to suggest that American ingenuity in coping with Iranian sensitivity actually delayed the release of the hostages by some months; that a fuller understanding of Iranian needs and the legal and political pressures available to help Iran release the hostages without demanding a complex negotiation involving sensitive third parties would have led to a much simpler and quicker release.

The International Court is referred to in this strange way: "[S]elf-righteousness . . . fueled the rage of Americans and sent our diplomats into the World Court, and the more amorphous 'court of international opinion' in a vain attempt to isolate the Iranians by showing how just was our cause" (p. 231, analysis by Steven R. Weisman). It is inconsistent with the facts showing that our taking the case to the Court did indeed isolate Iran diplomatically (p. 211: "American officials were convinced that Rajai [the Iranian Prime Minister in New York to plead the Iranian case in October 1980 before the Security Council of the United Nations] and the leaders in Teheran were surprised and concerned by the degree of Iran's diplomatic isolation"). It also reveals that the author, and possibly the officials whose views contributed to his summary chapter, simply did not understand the processes and the role of the International Court of Justice and the United Nations in modern diplomacy. There was no appeal to an amorphous court of international opinion; self-righteous rage had nothing to do with the decision to take the case to the International Court of Justice.

It is noteworthy that the compilers of *No Hiding Place*, in their otherwise quite detailed chronology leave out the International Court's interim order of 15 December 1979 requiring both sides to refrain from steps that might exacerbate the crisis and saying that the hostages should be released immediately. While it was understood by all that Iranian politics would make it impossible for Iran to obey that order, it clearly signaled the substance of the Court's final judgment and should have colored all the subsequent American actions. The chronology also leaves out any mention of the Executive Order of 7 April 1980, which became one of the major stumbling blocks to the final settlement, mentioning only the minor amendments of ten days later as if they were the earlier Order.

The hostage crisis contains deep lessons for American military and diplomatic professionals, but *No Hiding Place* is merely an account that is both incomplete and superficial.

ALFRED P. RUBIN
Naval War College

Hurt, Henry. *Shadrin: The Spy Who Never Came Back*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981. 301pp. \$13.95

"The double agent," declared the late Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, in his *Great True Spy Stories* (1968), "is one of the most intriguing figures in the annals of espionage." And the British counterintelligence specialist, Sir John Masterman, in the *Double-Cross System* (1972), has ticked off no less than a dozen principles that should govern their utilization. It is safe to affirm that both these authorities would have relished the present volume. Written by a roving editor of the *Reader's Digest*, it is almost wholly given over to an analysis of the

circumstances surrounding a double-agent operation.

Despite the global resources of his magazine in locating people and tracking down facts, Mr. Hurt remains not fully certain as to what, or who, caused the disappearance in Vienna at the Christmas season, 1975, of one of this country's most valued secret agents, the former Soviet naval officer Nikolai F. Artamonov (who after defection assumed the name Nicholas George Shadrin). He was the youngest man ever to command a Soviet destroyer, the highest-ranking Soviet naval person ever to defect to the United States, and, in the opinion of an intelligence officer who knew him intimately, Commander Thomas Dwyer, "one of the most valuable military defectors in U.S. history." In addition to all that, Nick Shadrin had proved himself out as a thoroughly likable human being; one, moreover, who suffered from few if any of the personality disturbances so often afflicting the turncoat in an alien land.

His motivation? Disgust with the Soviet system, a revulsion that had "Come out gradually, tiptoeing from his mind in cautious fashion," until one fine night he picked up his Polish fiancée and sailed themselves across the Baltic to Sweden, thence in due course to America. The bulk of the book discusses Shadrin's adaptation to life in his new country and the way in which his impressive knowledge was used, or misused, by the authorities in our intelligence community. His reputation there became pervasive and prominent. Suffice to say that it gained him such friends as Lieutenant General Samuel V. Wilson and Rear Admiral Rufus Taylor and that, following his vanishment from Vienna's byways, the pursuit of his case by his indomitable wife penetrated to the Oval Office of presidents Ford and

Carter. Mr. Hurt's volume lacks, unfortunately, any illustrations, carries no bibliography, and offers only an occasional bit of annotation. But there is a good index. Best of all, the narrative is unfolded clearly, the characters developed persuasively. Here is what just may become a classic in the double-agent genre. No naval officer should miss it.

CURTIS CARROLL DAVIS
Lieutenant Colonel, USAR (Ret.)

Miller, D.M.O., Kennedy, William V., Jordan, John and Richardson, Douglas. *The Balance of Military Power: An Illustrated Assessment Comparing the Weapons and Capabilities of NATO and the Warsaw Pact*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981. 208pp. \$24.95

This volume may be the most valuable ever produced on the military balance. Written by professionals, for professionals, *The Balance of Military Power* surpasses other works of this genre because of the depth of its analysis of all facets of the balance. It provides both prose and charts that analyze the weapons systems available to both major treaty organizations, indicating strengths and weaknesses not merely in systems performance, but equally, if not more important, in the tactical and strategic concepts for their utilization. The excellent photographs that accompany the text provide the reader with a clearer understanding of the material being discussed—truly an instance where a picture is worth a thousand words.

The book is divided into four major sections dealing with the balances of "strategic," land, naval and air forces, and prefaced by an essay by Nato Secretary General Luns and a brief description of the structure of both Alliances. Each major section has an

introduction of its own, followed by discussions of the major types of systems in each force category.

The "strategic" forces section by Lt. Col. D.M.O. Miller, of the British Army, is particularly noteworthy for its graphic and textual discussion of the meaning of different measures of "strategic" capability—such as effective megatons or counter-military potential—as well as of weapons effect terminology. The extended analyses of balances that frequently are overlooked by all but strategic forces specialists are also helpful: active and passive defenses, and space systems. One wonders, however, why the section hardly mentions the D-5 missile, perhaps the most revolutionary naval "strategic" forces development since the introduction of Polaris.

The conventional forces discussion opens with a highly contentious introduction. It argues convincingly that Nato simply cannot ignore the importance of the Middle East, and indeed, East Asia, to its own security. Other propositions are less compelling: it is not at all obvious, for example, that the Marines train in cold weather for an invasion of Siberia (!) and it is simply erroneous to assert the US Navy decided to abandon conscription, when in fact it had never conscripted sailors in the first place.

Col. William Kennedy's thoughtful introduction to the land forces section includes a discussion of the reliability of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces and an excellent set of maps and tables showing who would face whom in Europe. The land forces discussion itself is notable for its breadth—rarely in the "balance literature" is one provided with as much detail on critical support elements such as engineering, reconnaissance, and surveillance equipment. On the other hand, it is surprising that there is no discussion of the US light armored

vehicle program and of its implications for the firepower/mobility equation, although Kennedy does provide an excellent discussion of the relative merits of tracks versus wheels for such systems.

John Jordan's discussion of naval forces attaches considerable importance to the battle of the Norwegian Sea, in which aircraft carriers would seek to strike the Kola Peninsula while Soviet forces, including *Kiev*-class carriers, would try to prevent them from doing so. This scenario has, of course, been the subject of much contention within the US Navy and outside it. Jordan's discussion of ways to assess the naval balance, of the constraints upon the Soviet fleet, and of the hardware itself, is most useful. One wishes that there had been some analysis of the Oscar class of cruise missile submarine, however, as well as of the implications of Soviet operations in the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic for a larger Nato/Pact conflict. Finally, it is surprising that Jordan virtually ignores recent arrangements for prestocking Marine equipment in Norway and says nothing about the revolutionary implications for ship-to-shore tactical mobility embodied in the Marines' new air cushioned landing craft (LCAC).

Douglas Richardson, author of the section on tactical air, will be known to many *Review* readers for his incisive articles in *Flight International*. His section is lucidly written, and is replete with technical data, more so than the naval or land forces sections. His introductory charts will be of equal utility to both novice and professional. Of even greater value is his discussion of some of the lesser known, but critical, factors in the air balance—training, airfield availability, combat experience. Some readers are likely to find his evaluation of the Aimval/Aceval trials somewhat one-sided, however, since Richardson general-

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izes results derived from very small samples.

No book of this kind and scope is flawless. It is vulnerable to the passage of time: for example, it discusses a cruise missile carrier program that has since been abandoned by the Reagan administration, but dismisses a plan for acquiring 50 C-5s that has since been adopted as DoD Policy. It is also susceptible to typographical errors—in which the book abounds; to errors of fact (for example, the S-3A is not a reconnaissance plane), and to the use of acronyms and technical terms that sometimes are not even defined in an otherwise excellent glossary. Nevertheless, anyone seeking to learn about unfamiliar systems, concepts, or indeed any aspect of the balance between the West and the Soviet bloc, would be wise to turn first to *The Balance of Military Power*.

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OASD (International Security Policy)

Jones, David R., ed. *Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual: Vol. 5, 1981*. Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1981. 329pp. \$45

Timeliness and comprehensive coverage of the topic are two prime criteria for any successful annual reference series. The International Institute for Strategic Studies' annuals, *Strategic Survey* and *The Military Balance*, offer proof enough of that proposition's validity. So does the volume at hand.

Just as its four predecessors, *SAFRA-5* is a high-quality reference work on Soviet military affairs of definite benefit to both experienced specialists and serious researchers with little or no background in this area. While placing primary focus on the major trends and events in Soviet military affairs during

1980, it also extends that coverage well into 1981 on a number of key topical issues. In that manner, then, *SAFRA-5* permits a solid measure of continuity in presenting the immediate past as background for matters of more current tone.

The major strengths of the *SAFRA* series rest with its valuable statistical overview of current Soviet military power indicators from the quantitative standpoint, and an accompanying set of qualitative analyses that examines recent trends and events among the Soviet armed forces' major components along with other politico-military activities of current interest.

This year's volume maintains that tradition and its quantitative overview in Part I also furnishes an up-to-date picture of key leaders in the Soviet and Warsaw Pact high command structures. Another Part I feature is its detailed set of tables on Soviet military assistance programs between 1955 and 1979. Drawn largely from an unclassified CIA report publicly released in October 1980, that valuable documentary data receives a wider dissemination with its appearance in *SAFRA-5*. The qualitative analyses on the Soviet armed forces contained in Part II are equally worthwhile. Most of the eleven contributors to this section are recognized Western authorities in their respective specialties and, like editor David R. Jones, have been associated with the *SAFRA* series since its inception some five years ago.

Donald C. Daniel of the Naval Postgraduate School includes coverage of the Oscar antiship and Typhoon SSBN submarine classes in his solid treatment of Soviet Navy activities during 1980, while Professor Richard T. Ackley, former assistant US naval attaché to Moscow, discusses developments in the Strategic Rocket Forces during the year following the demise of the SALT-II Treaty.

Richard Wolf replaced another Briton and *SAFRA* regular, Chris Donnelly, last year without any noticeable change in high-quality analysis of the Ground Forces that includes some detail in the current volume on the Soviet Army's combat operations in Afghanistan and recent technological advances in its combat equipment.

Besides the major force components, Part II provides analytical sections on recent activities in the USSR's space program, on its naval infantry and airborne forces, on the military implications relevant to the Sino-Soviet rivalry and the national economy, and on the continuing Soviet politico-military campaign on the African continent. Each of these also reflects high standards of scholarly research.

Even a quick glance at its contents, however, will indicate that the volume is *much* more than a mere chronological synopsis of recent events. Editor Jones also has incorporated a strong array of analytical contributions covering areas of both historical and current interest that should help insure the volume's retained value as a definitive reference even after its annual coverage is overtaken by later events. The two special surveys comprising Part IV are cases in point. British analyst Charles J. Dick furnishes a skillful assessment of Soviet chemical and biological warfare programs, including some nationally historical perspectives on its long-standing interest in that area which should prove useful in light of increased Western concern over current Soviet CB capabilities and their apparent employments in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. Similarly, Keith Dunn of the US Army War College offers an excellent treatment of contemporary Soviet power projection capabilities and limitations that examines comparative outlooks of the US

and USSR on long-range rapid deployment requirements.

Just as in his earlier topical article, which appeared in the September-October 1980 *Naval War College Review*, Dunn's analysis includes both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of strategic mobility. It addresses squarely a US national security issue that should remain prominent throughout the 1980s and well into the next decade.

The volume also offers several "think pieces" of current concern and historical interest. Professor Ken Booth, a British authority on strategic and foreign policy, should raise some eyebrows with his forthright appraisal of the current international scene and, more particularly, the great power relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Comparing current circumstances to those present just prior to the outbreaks of the two world wars, he urges that the West should adopt "a grand strategy which aims at enlightened manipulation and selective involvement, not a policy of moralizing and flip-flopping from a position of weakness and unreliability" (p. 49) to insure its survival in the difficult years ahead. In a historical vein, Canadian scholar K. Jean Coltam covers the World War II utilization of Soviet women in combat, while P.H. Vigor maintains his usual standard of scholarship with an insightful survey of Red and White forces' strategies during the Russian Civil War. Such efforts are a strongpoint in the *SAFRA* series and editor Jones deserves much credit for welcoming high-quality pieces from both recognized authorities and lesser-known experts on Soviet military affairs.

Another major *SAFRA* feature reflecting the depth and quality of its scholarship is its attention to topical bibliog-

ographies and research materials. This year, Editor Jones may have surpassed his previous efforts in that area with an insightful narrative on, and a special listing of all available copies of, the high-level, tightly restricted Soviet General Staff journal, *Voennaya Mysl* (*Military Thought*). That journal has served as an internal sounding board for the formulation of Soviet military doctrine and operational concepts within the Soviet high command from the 1930s. Since the US Government has declassified those issues covering 1964-1973, Jones also furnishes a partial author index of articles published over that period (A to G), and this project will be continued in subsequent editions.

With all of these useful ingredients in mind, it is quite possible that *SAFRA-5* ranks as the most useful annual of the entire series. If its price of \$45 appears high, one might weigh the cost against the substantial and scholarly collection of reference data on contemporary Soviet military power that Jones has managed to include within the covers of a single volume.

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A Correction

In the January-February issue of this journal the title of a book under review was given incorrectly. The book, by Benjamin B. Ferencz, a two-volume work published by Oceana Publications, Inc., of Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., is: *An International Criminal Court: A Step Toward World Peace, A Documentary History and Analysis*.
