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Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1979

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would have found themselves in a great pincer between the British in the north and the French in the west and south. Although this plan seems even now to have some merit, in 1915 it gained little support. Professor Wallin hints that the idea was too innovative and detracted from the beloved "offensive" so strongly advocated by the Army planners.

By contrast, a second Churchill plan, to force the Dardanelles, either by ships alone, or with the assistance of troops ashore, did gain support. The principal players in the decision (all of whom later denied they had supported the Churchill idea) were wartime Prime Minister Asquith, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher, and Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, who headed the War Council.

Professor Wallin's description of the machinations of these men surrounding the planning of the Dardanelles action, after the decision had been made to go ahead with Churchill's plan is distressing and at once revealing. At various times, Lord Kitchener supplied troops, then withdrew them again, and then at a critical time, ordered the loading of supplies halted. Lord Fisher put in and withdrew ships several times, all the while, like Kitchener, hedging his bet, playing off Churchill's plan against the needs of the Home Fleet. Even Asquith, after strong support initially, was capable of turning on Churchill and sacking him.

It is hardly surprising then that the action for the ships did not go well in the Dardanelles, nor that the troops ashore in Gallipoli failed in their objective, given the lack of clear-cut support from the War Council. After some initial successes in naval gunfire assaults against the Turkish forts in the Dardanelles, the Royal Navy's battleships stalled part way up the strait and then the fleet began to voice serious doubts about ever

breaking through to the Sea of Marmora. After the troops most of whom were Australians and New Zealanders, got ashore, they fought valiantly but never quite broke the Turkish defense. Soon they too were stalemated like their counterparts in Europe.

Although the description of the actions by the Navy in the strait and the Army at Gallipoli is well told by Professor Wallin, the heart of his book is not the failure of the ships and troops, but what he calls, "the failure of statesmanship." Given the potential outcome, had the action been supported wholeheartedly by the War Council, success would surely have changed the outcome of the war. Despite Churchill's best efforts to marshal support and to optimize the plan to ensure its success, he was thwarted at nearly every turn and, in a great irony, blamed for its failure. It now seems tragic indeed that politics, personality, and duplicity were more important than a sound strategy.

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Cable, James. *Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1979*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981. 266pp. \$25

This second edition of a book which first appeared in 1971 comes at a time when the United States is wrestling with the dilemmas of the structure, deployment, and use of naval forces. Its central thesis is that the political applications of limited naval force deserve attention as one of the many instruments that are sometimes available to governments seeking to secure an advantage or avert a loss in the conduct of their peacetime international relations. In this respect, Cable's work can be highly beneficial to the current dialogue about the design and use of American naval forces.

Cable begins his study with a discussion of the principles and precedents of limited naval force. He uses the case study approach to introduce four types of limited naval force application: (1) purposeful force to change the policy or character of a foreign government; (2) definitive force to remove the cause of a dispute; (3) catalytic force which is applied in situations where a formless menace or obscure opportunity exists and where an advantage may be gained by having immediate and appropriate force available over a long period of time; and (4) expressive force where warships are used to emphasize attitudes or to provide an outlet for emotions. These categories are less important in themselves than the examples he uses to describe them in his case studies, for the case studies provide the background for his next chapter on the altered environment.

Cable's chapter on the altered environment is the meat of his revised work. In this section, he examines the critical question of whether political and technological developments have so altered the environment in which naval forces must operate as to render them archaic instruments of diplomacy which are at or near the end of their useful lives. His evidence supports his conclusion that "change, rather than decay, may thus be foreseen for gunboat diplomacy in the altered environment of the . . . eighties [and that] the political application of limited naval force will be less simple, less straightforward, probably less romantic than hitherto, but they may be even more effective."

His next two chapters, one on naval capabilities and doctrines and the other on the Soviet enigma, while interesting, are somewhat dated. Written in the late sixties, they are interesting from the perspective of the accuracy of his fore-

casts for the future. They are not particularly useful in the application of limited naval force today.

His final chapter on application is written from and for the British perspective. Given the drawdown of British naval capability in the sixties and seventies, it is not of much contemporary value to United States students. There are, however, two valuable postscripts. Appendix one is a selective chronology of gunboat diplomacy from 1919-1979. It illustrates that, while the nature of gunboat diplomacy has changed, the incidence of gunboat diplomacy has not lessened. In a second appendix, Cable examines the use of limited naval force during the decade of the seventies. This appendix develops the argument that "during the seventies, the Soviet Union replaced the United States as the power most likely to intervene beyond its direct sphere of influence."

In sum, notwithstanding the shortcomings of British focus and the two dated chapters discussed above, Cable's work presents a timely and comprehensive review of the use of limited naval force. He presents a persuasive argument, based on historical analysis, that the application of limited naval force is as important today in international relations as it has been in the past. Additionally, this work provides an excellent foundation in gunboat diplomacy for naval officers and for practitioners of politics and international relations.

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Porch, Douglas. *The March to the Marne: The French Army, 1871-1914*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 294pp. \$44.50

Professor Porch offers an interesting and effective challenge to the traditional