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## The March to the Marne

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Cable begins his study with a discussion of the principles and precedents of limited naval force. He uses the case study approach to introduce four types of limited naval force application: (1) purposeful force to change the policy or character of a foreign government; (2) definitive force to remove the cause of a dispute; (3) catalytic force which is applied in situations where a formless menace or obscure opportunity exists and where an advantage may be gained by having immediate and appropriate force available over a long period of time; and (4) expressive force where warships are used to emphasize attitudes or to provide an outlet for emotions. These categories are less important in themselves than the examples he uses to describe them in his case studies, for the case studies provide the background for his next chapter on the altered environment.

Cable's chapter on the altered environment is the meat of his revised work. In this section, he examines the critical question of whether political and technological developments have so altered the environment in which naval forces must operate as to render them archaic instruments of diplomacy which are at or near the end of their useful lives. His evidence supports his conclusion that "change, rather than decay, may thus be foreseen for gunboat diplomacy in the altered environment of the . . . eighties [and that] the political application of limited naval force will be less simple, less straightforward, probably less romantic than hitherto, but they may be even more effective."

His next two chapters, one on naval capabilities and doctrines and the other on the Soviet enigma, while interesting, are somewhat dated. Written in the late sixties, they are interesting from the perspective of the accuracy of his fore-

casts for the future. They are not particularly useful in the application of limited naval force today.

His final chapter on application is written from and for the British perspective. Given the drawdown of British naval capability in the sixties and seventies, it is not of much contemporary value to United States students. There are, however, two valuable postscripts. Appendix one is a selective chronology of gunboat diplomacy from 1919-1979. It illustrates that, while the nature of gunboat diplomacy has changed, the incidence of gunboat diplomacy has not lessened. In a second appendix, Cable examines the use of limited naval force during the decade of the seventies. This appendix develops the argument that "during the seventies, the Soviet Union replaced the United States as the power most likely to intervene beyond its direct sphere of influence."

In sum, notwithstanding the shortcomings of British focus and the two dated chapters discussed above, Cable's work presents a timely and comprehensive review of the use of limited naval force. He presents a persuasive argument, based on historical analysis, that the application of limited naval force is as important today in international relations as it has been in the past. Additionally, this work provides an excellent foundation in gunboat diplomacy for naval officers and for practitioners of politics and international relations.

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Porch, Douglas. *The March to the Marne: The French Army, 1871-1914*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 294pp. \$44.50

Professor Porch offers an interesting and effective challenge to the traditional

views of the French Army's evolution and political role from 1871 to 1914. The traditional interpretation argues that, despite cosmetic changes, after the defeat of 1871 the Army remained in the hands of the professional officers. Moreover, the officers were basically opposed to republican ideology and to the concept of the nation in arms. Dominated by a Catholic, reactionary hierarchy, the Army lived as a state within a state, frustrated all efforts at reform, and resisted new tactical and strategic ideas. Thus the catastrophic conduct of the First World War had its roots in the nature of the prewar military clique which ran the French Army as its private preserve.

Professor Porch by contrast points out that the officer corps was not nearly as Catholic, aristocratic, and reactionary as the traditional view maintains. Many officers after 1871 were in fact pro-republican, and the vast majority, whatever their private views, tried to sustain, not undermine, the regime. Cliques were as much a reflection of personal friendships and professional relationships as they were of political attitudes.

The Dreyfus case, according to the author, did indeed involve a coverup of a serious miscarriage of justice, but it did not represent an attempt to undermine republican institutions. The aftermath of the affair, however, led to a serious decline in Army morale and efficiency as the left sought to reduce the power and influence of the officer corps, which they regarded as basically hostile to the regime. The result was a sharp decline in military morale and efficiency which even the post-1911 nationalist revival was unable to repair. Officers saw their authority reduced and their prestige decline. Bureaucratic routine and political favoritism, rather than energetic preparation for battle, characterized the

Army up to the outbreak of the war. Grandmaison's famous doctrine of the offensive was not the product of careful thought but, rather, a desperate effort to overcome the Army's deficiencies by a sudden infusion of "moral force." The Army's disastrous losses in World War I can thus be attributed to the maladministration of the military system by the nation's political leaders.

Porch's arguments provide a blessed relief from the arid debates on the military question between ideologies of left and right. His approach is innovative and his evidence is used convincingly. There are, however, some alternative perspectives that he did not consider.

The Army did have its problems prior to 1914, but to a large degree they sound like the problems of any peacetime force. Routine, bureaucratization and "ticket punching" are characteristic of any peacetime force. Was the French Army any worse than any other peacetime force?

The author compares the French Army unfavorably to its German foe. The Germans, however, were also wedded to peacetime routine, their maneuvers were often a farce, and the army adhered rigidly to a simple strategic campaign plan that was seriously flawed. In the final analysis it was the French Army, not the German, that won the Battle of the Marne, indicating that the French forces might have been better than Porch implies.

On the other hand the thesis of Porch's book carries much weight. The fact that there is still room for debate is a point in the author's favor, for it indicates that his study will spark further research and discussion on an important but long neglected issue.

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