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The Defense Industry

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presented here on a detailed, factual level that is rarely available.

The importance of radar makes its study effective for the discussion of administrative history as well. Its invention, abandonment, and rediscovery neatly track the early life of the Laboratory, as its rapid development accounts for the NRL's survival and growth. The original Laboratory, with its four buildings, miniscule staff, and $100,000 budget, lived a hand-to-mouth existence for a decade. Subject to external pressures over which NRL had almost no control, it fought first to survive and then to promote its unique identity.

The bureaucratic warfare throughout these years is one of the most exciting parts of Allison's story. He described with zest the NRL's gallery of defenders and enemies, such as Capt. Stanford Hooper, who haunts these pages like a dark nemesis. The axial theme of these bureaucratic struggles was the dispute over the NRL's position in the Navy. Was it to be a specialized testing facility, utterly dependent on the bureaus and artfully stifled by entrenched tradition from the start? Or, was the NRL really to be a research laboratory, where scientific studies would stimulate revolutionary progress throughout the Navy as a whole? Every weapon in the bureaucratic warrior's arsenal was used by both sides in these struggles, including appeals to public opinion and Congress and the use of subterfuge and deception.

But in the end radar carried the day, ensuring that the NRL would survive and "Engineering Research" would be part of its activities. It was radar—a true invention based on advanced technical knowledge and applicable to almost every aspect of the fleet's military operations—that established NRL's prestige and demonstrated the efficacy of "research." As war drew nearer, after 1934, it was increasingly hard to disparage the significance of radar and the program which had developed it. Naval officers would still claim that research should be carried out by industries and universities. But the arguments were no longer able to threaten either the survival of NRL or the propriety of its research orientation.

In telling this tale Allison has combined scholarship, a good understanding of technical problems, a sensitivity to the importance of people, politics and economics in technological developments, and a nice ability to organize diverse materials. He has written a fine book that recommends itself without qualification to students of history and engineering administrators.

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Gansler, Jacques S. *The Defense Industry*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980. 346pp. $9.95

Gansler's book rivals in importance the scholarly series on weapons acquisition produced in the early sixties by M.J. Peck and F.M. Scherer. Like the works of Peck and Scherer, the book is certainly not light reading. The author mixes applicable economic theory with more practical treatment of the difficulties in this unique industry. From the analysis, he evolves a very comprehensive and general set of policy recommendations applying to the industry in general and to more specific segments that dominate a large share of the defense resource transformation process. His recommendations are extensive, complex and, most importantly, often interrelated. The book is richly supported by statistical data and trend information that will delight future researchers. The data, while valuable in establishing trends, is somewhat outdated, probably as a result of

publishing lead times common to authors (and defense programs). This is not overly critical, as the book is cast toward long-range perspectives. However, as a prelude to the future, it does lack the Reagan defense budget initiatives which, if executed, will alter the distribution and magnitude of Gansler's data significantly. Additionally, the so-called "Carlucci Initiatives" directed at improving the acquisition process have coopted several of Dr. Gansler's recommendations.

The book suffers somewhat by the very breadth of its suggested policy initiatives. While many will agree that Gansler is often right on target, a fair and natural question is, "how are these sweeping policy suggestions to be implemented?" Like many other policy makers, Gansler leaves the "how to do it" for others to determine as though this was the most minor and easiest of activities. For the suggestions offered in this book, the "how to do it" exceeds in political, technical, and managerial difficulty the identification of problems and companion remedial policy.

Nonetheless, those who study the book will increase their insigbt into the setting of the defense industry, along with its economic characteristics. They will also expand their understanding of the problems of industrial mobilization, along with the very special difficulties and disincentives facing second-tier defense industries. Gansler offers excellent perspectives on tbe aircraft and shipbuilding industry, along with the often overlooked impact of foreign military sales. His forecasts on these, especially those involving imputed capacity shortfalls, are, however, disputed by recent defense industry econometric data produced, among others, by Data Resources, Inc., and in congressional testimony by senior defense officials.

Dr. Gansler wraps up his analysis with a series of contrasts of other nations', including the Soviets', approach to defense economics and weapons acquisition. The author then neatly packages a comprehensive set of recommendations that will keep policy makers fully engaged.

If you are a senior policy maker, a defense industry executive, a program manager, or a student of defense economics and weapons acquisition, read this book, or at least the chapter summaries and final recommendations (but update your statistics before suggesting policy thrusts). Then put *The Defense Industry* in your library as it will prove to be a valuable reference in the future.

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Stempel, John D. *Inside the Iranian Revolution*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981. 336pp. $17.50

There has been an avalanche of books since the Iranian tragedy sbattered the West's complacency about the dependability of its main source of energy. Out of the mass, an exceptional volume has emerged, written by Dr. John Stempel, the articulate director of the Department of State's operations center. Stempel served from 1975 to 1979 in the US embassy in Iran and, while there, amassed a superb collection of contacts.

The author's cool and confident style takes the reader on a swift journey through the whirlpool of Iranian personalities, customs, psychology, opinions, and facts on controversial issues. He discusses vividly the Russian (czarist and Soviet) interests in Iran, the psychological profile of the Iranian male, the historical reasons for the deep Persian suspicions of both external influences and local institutions, the strains of