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## Inside the Iranian Revolution

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publishing lead times common to authors (and defense programs). This is not overly critical, as the book is cast toward long-range perspectives. However, as a prelude to the future, it does lack the Reagan defense budget initiatives which, if executed, will alter the distribution and magnitude of Gansler's data significantly. Additionally, the so-called "Carlucci Initiatives" directed at improving the acquisition process have co-opted several of Dr. Gansler's recommendations.

The book suffers somewhat by the very breadth of its suggested policy initiatives. While many will agree that Gansler is often right on target, a fair and natural question is, "how are these sweeping policy suggestions to be implemented?" Like many other policy makers, Gansler leaves the "how to do it" for others to determine as though this was the most minor and easiest of activities. For the suggestions offered in this book, the "how to do it" exceeds in political, technical, and managerial difficulty the identification of problems and companion remedial policy.

Nonetheless, those who study the book will increase their insight into the setting of the defense industry, along with its economic characteristics. They will also expand their understanding of the problems of industrial mobilization, along with the very special difficulties and disincentives facing second-tier defense industries. Gansler offers excellent perspectives on the aircraft and ship-building industry, along with the often overlooked impact of foreign military sales. His forecasts on these, especially those involving imputed capacity shortfalls, are, however, disputed by recent defense industry econometric data produced, among others, by Data Resources, Inc., and in congressional testimony by senior defense officials.

Dr. Gansler wraps up his analysis with a series of contrasts of other nations', including the Soviets', approach to defense economics and weapons acquisition. The author then neatly packages a comprehensive set of recommendations that will keep policy makers fully engaged.

If you are a senior policy maker, a defense industry executive, a program manager, or a student of defense economics and weapons acquisition, read this book, or at least the chapter summaries and final recommendations (but update your statistics before suggesting policy thrusts). Then put *The Defense Industry* in your library as it will prove to be a valuable reference in the future.

WILLIAM E. TURCOTTE  
Naval War College

Stempel, John D. *Inside the Iranian Revolution*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981. 336pp. \$17.50

There has been an avalanche of books since the Iranian tragedy shattered the West's complacency about the dependability of its main source of energy. Out of the mass, an exceptional volume has emerged, written by Dr. John Stempel, the articulate director of the Department of State's operations center. Stempel served from 1975 to 1979 in the US embassy in Iran and, while there, amassed a superb collection of contacts.

The author's cool and confident style takes the reader on a swift journey through the whirlpool of Iranian personalities, customs, psychology, opinions, and facts on controversial issues. He discusses vividly the Russian (czarist and Soviet) interests in Iran, the psychological profile of the Iranian male, the historical reasons for the deep Persian suspicions of both external influences and local institutions, the strains of

modernization (the "Shah-People Revolution"), the tangled political convulsions, and the final indecisiveness of the Shah.

In his analysis of the disintegrating political fabric, Stempel observes that the Shah had a personality "change caused to some degree by his cancer medicine," complicated by his belief in his own mystique. He also draws a vivid portrait of the rigid authoritarian, Ayatollah Khomeini, the Shah's "mirror image in clerical dress." Stempel observes that the fast pace of Iranian development in the 1970s, fueled by the high price of oil, accelerated the break-up. Still, without close cooperation between secular and religious opposition forces, he maintains, the Shah "would not have been overthrown."

Throughout his roller coaster ride into the heart of the Persian miasma, Stempel carefully dissects the Iranian traditions of dependence on a strong leader, the absence of viable political institutions, and what he describes as the "most striking" characteristics of the nation's politics: "insecurity, cynicism, and me-firstism." The ambivalent love-hate excesses of the revolution and its rhetoric, which resulted in the American Embassy's occupation, are placed into perspective.

Stempel points out that, rather than fleeing with the Shah in January 1979, the Chief of the Imperial Inspectorate, Hoosein Fardust, stayed behind to become a "controlling figure" in the Khomeini regime's Savak, the Savama. Stempel describes how the antimodern Khomeini uses modern communications effectively in his attempt to destroy modernization.

Middle Eastern societies are so complex that even the specialists get surprised. But surprise may be more likely if the number of specialists assigned to an embassy or MAAG is cut. Stempel also

makes a strong case for continuity of staffing. A crisis is a poor time to begin trying to develop in-depth contacts with either regime or opposition figures. Stempel's examples of how we did things include a reduction in political officers assigned over a decade from 21 to 6. A possible result? "America did not realize what was happening in Iran." But the Iranian elite did not know either. In 1977 Prime Minister Amouzegar evinced a lack of understanding of the "reactionary mullahs." Another unappreciated danger was the dynamics of the shaky alliance between the Iranian left and right, which, though divided by "demodernization" versus "social revolution and mass society," were united by their anti-Shah and anti-US emotions and policies.

Stempel's book can help us prepare for the *next* Iranian crisis. This crisis may effect many of us—on short, brutal notice. As the author puts it: "The Soviets gained tremendously when America's regional position all but collapsed." He concludes that the Soviet approach has been a low key one, opening up "excellent prospects of a Marxist regime in the future, much like that which came into power in Afghanistan in April 1978."

We cannot afford to ignore Stempel's warnings that the "Iranian revolution is not over," that the present "institutional chaos" will be followed by a new "king or commissar." If the new regime happens to take over with some "discreet foreign support" then we better start doing our homework now. Get this book. It is top of the line among the volumes I have read in two languages. Read it with care. It just might be an urgently important professional aid for you!

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