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## Shadrin: The Spy Who Never Came Back

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It is noteworthy that the compilers of *No Hiding Place*, in their otherwise quite detailed chronology leave out the International Court's interim order of 15 December 1979 requiring both sides to refrain from steps that might exacerbate the crisis and saying that the hostages should be released immediately. While it was understood by all that Iranian politics would make it impossible for Iran to obey that order, it clearly signaled the substance of the Court's final judgment and should have colored all the subsequent American actions. The chronology also leaves out any mention of the Executive Order of 7 April 1980, which became one of the major stumbling blocks to the final settlement, mentioning only the minor amendments of ten days later as if they were the earlier Order.

The hostage crisis contains deep lessons for American military and diplomatic professionals, but *No Hiding Place* is merely an account that is both incomplete and superficial.

ALFRED P. RUBIN  
Naval War College

Hurt, Henry. *Shadrin: The Spy Who Never Came Back*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981. 301pp. \$13.95

"The double agent," declared the late Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, in his *Great True Spy Stories* (1968), "is one of the most intriguing figures in the annals of espionage." And the British counterintelligence specialist, Sir John Masterman, in the *Double-Cross System* (1972), has ticked off no less than a dozen principles that should govern their utilization. It is safe to affirm that both these authorities would have relished the present volume. Written by a roving editor of the *Reader's Digest*, it is almost wholly given over to an analysis of the

circumstances surrounding a double-agent operation.

Despite the global resources of his magazine in locating people and tracking down facts, Mr. Hurt remains not fully certain as to what, or who, caused the disappearance in Vienna at the Christmas season, 1975, of one of this country's most valued secret agents, the former Soviet naval officer Nikolai F. Artamonov (who after defection assumed the name Nicholas George Shadrin). He was the youngest man ever to command a Soviet destroyer, the highest-ranking Soviet naval person ever to defect to the United States, and, in the opinion of an intelligence officer who knew him intimately, Commander Thomas Dwyer, "one of the most valuable military defectors in U.S. history." In addition to all that, Nick Shadrin had proved himself out as a thoroughly likable human being; one, moreover, who suffered from few if any of the personality disturbances so often afflicting the turncoat in an alien land.

His motivation? Disgust with the Soviet system, a revulsion that had "Come out gradually, tiptoeing from his mind in cautious fashion," until one fine night he picked up his Polish fiancée and sailed themselves across the Baltic to Sweden, thence in due course to America. The bulk of the book discusses Shadrin's adaptation to life in his new country and the way in which his impressive knowledge was used, or misused, by the authorities in our intelligence community. His reputation there became pervasive and prominent. Suffice to say that it gained him such friends as Lieutenant General Samuel V. Wilson and Rear Admiral Rufus Taylor and that, following his vanishment from Vienna's byways, the pursuit of his case by his indomitable wife penetrated to the Oval Office of presidents Ford and

Carter. Mr. Hurt's volume lacks, unfortunately, any illustrations, carries no bibliography, and offers only an occasional bit of annotation. But there is a good index. Best of all, the narrative is unfolded clearly, the characters developed persuasively. Here is what just may become a classic in the double-agent genre. No naval officer should miss it.

CURTIS CARROLL DAVIS  
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Miller, D.M.O., Kennedy, William V., Jordan, John and Richardson, Douglas. *The Balance of Military Power: An Illustrated Assessment Comparing the Weapons and Capabilities of NATO and the Warsaw Pact*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981. 208pp. \$24.95

This volume may be the most valuable ever produced on the military balance. Written by professionals, for professionals, *The Balance of Military Power* surpasses other works of this genre because of the depth of its analysis of all facets of the balance. It provides both prose and charts that analyze the weapons systems available to both major treaty organizations, indicating strengths and weaknesses not merely in systems performance, but equally, if not more important, in the tactical and strategic concepts for their utilization. The excellent photographs that accompany the text provide the reader with a clearer understanding of the material being discussed—truly an instance where a picture is worth a thousand words.

The book is divided into four major sections dealing with the balances of "strategic," land, naval and air forces, and prefaced by an essay by Nato Secretary General Luns and a brief description of the structure of both Alliances. Each major section has an

introduction of its own, followed by discussions of the major types of systems in each force category.

The "strategic" forces section by Lt. Col. D.M.O. Miller, of the British Army, is particularly noteworthy for its graphic and textual discussion of the meaning of different measures of "strategic" capability—such as effective megatons or counter-military potential—as well as of weapons effect terminology. The extended analyses of balances that frequently are overlooked by all but strategic forces specialists are also helpful: active and passive defenses, and space systems. One wonders, however, why the section hardly mentions the D-5 missile, perhaps the most revolutionary naval "strategic" forces development since the introduction of Polaris.

The conventional forces discussion opens with a highly contentious introduction. It argues convincingly that Nato simply cannot ignore the importance of the Middle East, and indeed, East Asia, to its own security. Other propositions are less compelling: it is not at all obvious, for example, that the Marines train in cold weather for an invasion of Siberia (!) and it is simply erroneous to assert the US Navy decided to abandon conscription, when in fact it had never conscripted sailors in the first place.

Col. William Kennedy's thoughtful introduction to the land forces section includes a discussion of the reliability of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces and an excellent set of maps and tables showing who would face whom in Europe. The land forces discussion itself is notable for its breadth—rarely in the "balance literature" is one provided with as much detail on critical support elements such as engineering, reconnaissance, and surveillance equipment. On the other hand, it is surprising that there is no discussion of the US light armored