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The Secretary of Defense

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coauthored by six members of the faculty of the University of Kansas, is the United States and Japan in the Western Pacific with particular attention to the cases of an American dependency, Micronesia, and the newly independent state of Papua New Guinea. The overall perspective, according to the authors, "will be to evaluate the current and future interrelationship of Micronesia and Papua New Guinea with the United States and Japan."

Within this context the authors concern themselves with a historical overview of Micronesia and Papua New Guinea; American involvement in Micronesia and of the Micronesian response; Australian involvement in Papua New Guinea and Papua New Guinean politics since independence in 1975; issues and policies in the economic development of Micronesia and Papua New Guinea; and Japanese policies in and perspectives on Micronesia and Papua New Guinea. Of these chapters, the one on the Australian-Papua New Guinean relationship is alone worth the price of admission and makes a substantial contribution to the literature of the subject. Given the significance of Canberra in the region it is surprising that Australia was not included in the title.

The thrust of the study argues for closer cooperation between Tokyo and Washington in devising aid, economic and developmental programs for Micronesia and Papua New Guinea, programs without which neither of these nations could hope to survive intact into the 21st century.

This is an important book deserving of the widest possible readership.

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Kinnard, Douglas. *The Secretary of Defense*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1980. 252pp.

The position and power of the Secretary of Defense have undergone con-

siderable change since the first secretary James Forrestal, began serving in 1947. The span of 24 years and 10 different secretaries has seen the Berlin, Cuban and Mideast crises as well as wars in Korea and Vietnam. Through it all the role of the defense secretary has evolved to meet unforeseen shortcomings and the demands of the times.

The author selected the five most significant Secretaries of Defense on which to base this book. He felt that each man and the events surrounding his term most effectively outlined the evolution of the office.

The first, Forrestal (September 1947-March 1949), was faced with the task of managing a postwar military establishment with postwar budget constraints under an untried organization. Cabinet level service secretaries and uncertainty about the roles and missions of the separate services severely compounded his problems. Despite those major stumbling blocks, Kinnard feels that Forrestal's efforts were successful.

The second man examined, Charles E. Wilson (January 1953-October 1957), is more noteworthy for what he did not do. Serving under Eisenhower, Wilson found that the President was essentially his own Secretary of Defense and performed accordingly. As a result, Eisenhower saw the need for more authority in the office and that prompted the 1958 Reorganization Act.

The provision brought about by that act paved the way for Robert McNamara (January 1961-February 1968) who felt he could adequately manage DOD under the existing legislative powers. Kinnard believes that McNamara was the first to bring the Pentagon under full civilian control. McNamara is lauded for the introduction of the Planning Programming Budget System (PPBS) but the major event examined during his service is Vietnam. Kinnard relates salient points of the Southeast Asian conflict in short

order along with McNamara's involvement. A major shortfall in Kinnard's argument is the belief that McNamara realized his lack of knowledge in military matters and subsequently allowed General Westmoreland to conduct the war in South Vietnam. That does not explain nor account for the Secretary's deep involvement in conduct of the war over North Vietnam.

The last two men discussed are Melvin Laird (January 1969-January 1973) and James Schlesinger (July 1973-November 1975). Laird is credited with an invaluable ability to work with Congress during a time when the military was suffering from all sides owing to general disenchantment with the war. His major effort was Vietnamization in an effort to allow the disengagement of U.S. forces. Schlesinger is seen as letting the Pentagon run itself while concerning the Secretary's office with developing both our strategic posture and thought.

Author Kinnard summarizes change in the defense secretary's office by drawing out three basic themes: the importance of the defense budget and the domestic scene in setting strategic policy, Presidential style and its influence on conduct of the Secretary's role, and a declining influence by senior military officers on major defense issues.

The Secretary of Defense is smoothly written and thoroughly documented. The only major drawback is the length of the book, which severely limits the depth to which many important issues can be discussed.

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Larson, Joyce E. ed. *New Foundations for Asian and Pacific Security*. New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1980. 260pp.

One necessarily approaches a product like this with mixed emotions. On the one hand, the Western Pacific and

Indian Oceans are obviously important, perhaps critical, areas for the foreseeable future—economically, diplomatically and certainly in terms of the security of the United States and its allies. Any aids to thought on this subject must therefore be welcome indeed. On the other hand, one cannot in the nature of things expect much from what is essentially a compilation of conference papers. And this is a mixed bag indeed. The opening addresses are bland to the point of uselessness. So, unfortunately, are most of the papers. The truth is that one does not need just to know what would be the good and appropriate ways for the nations of the region to adjust their relationships with one another and with the world outside. What one does most urgently need to know is what they are likely to do in this regard. This requires hardnosed analysis of their past records and current trends and stresses, based on all available documentation. And documentation is what is almost totally lacking in all but three of the papers published here.

Nor is the quality of the ideas themselves much more impressive. The paper that undoubtedly addresses itself to the most urgent and fundamental issue is Mr. Lim Joo-Jock's on "The Indochina Situation and the Superpowers in Southeast Asia." It is interesting, coherent and contains valuable perceptions. But many of Mr. Lim's assertions are debatable at best. It is by no means self-evident that the Vietnamese have "demonstrated their mastery of Soviet-style mechanized war," or that they are carrying out "expansionist policies backed by the most skillful diplomacy, as did Prussia in times past." The military catastrophes of Tet and of Giap's misbegotten three-pronged drive for Hue, Kontum and Saigon in the spring of 1972 suggest that the Vietnamese have a great deal to learn in terms of conventional military matters, and the kind of diplomacy that succeeded in gratuitously