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## New Foundations for Asian and Pacific Security

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order along with McNamara's involvement. A major shortfall in Kinnard's argument is the belief that McNamara realized his lack of knowledge in military matters and subsequently allowed General Westmoreland to conduct the war in South Vietnam. That does not explain nor account for the Secretary's deep involvement in conduct of the war over North Vietnam.

The last two men discussed are Melvin Laird (January 1969-January 1973) and James Schlesinger (July 1973-November 1975). Laird is credited with an invaluable ability to work with Congress during a time when the military was suffering from all sides owing to general disenchantment with the war. His major effort was Vietnamization in an effort to allow the disengagement of U.S. forces. Schlesinger is seen as letting the Pentagon run itself while concerning the Secretary's office with developing both our strategic posture and thought.

Author Kinnard summarizes change in the defense secretary's office by drawing out three basic rhemes: the importance of the defense budget and the domestic scene in setting strategic policy, Presidential style and its influence on conduct of the Secretary's role, and a declining influence by senior military officers on major defense issues.

*The Secretary of Defense* is smoothly written and thoroughly documented. The only major drawback is the length of the book, which severely limits the depth to which many important issues can be discussed.

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Larson, Joyce E. ed. *New Foundations for Asian and Pacific Security*. New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1980. 260pp.

One necessarily approaches a product like this with mixed emotions. On the one hand, the Western Pacific and

Indian Oceans are obviously important, perhaps critical, areas for the foreseeable future—economically, diplomatically and certainly in terms of the security of the United States and its allies. Any aids to thought on this subject must therefore be welcome indeed. On the other hand, one cannot in the nature of things expect much from what is essentially a compilation of conference papers. And this is a mixed bag indeed. The opening addresses are bland to the point of uselessness. So, unfortunately, are most of the papers. The truth is that one does not need just to know what would be the good and appropriate ways for the nations of the region to adjust their relationships with one another and with the world outside. What one does most urgently need to know is what they are likely to do in this regard. This requires hardnosed analysis of their past records and current trends and stresses, based on all available documentation. And documentation is what is almost totally lacking in all but three of the papers published here.

Nor is the quality of the ideas themselves much more impressive. The paper that undoubtedly addresses itself to the most urgent and fundamental issue is Mr. Lim Joo-Jock's on "The Indochina Situation and the Superpowers in Southeast Asia." It is interesting, coherent and contains valuable perceptions. But many of Mr. Lim's assertions are debatable at best. It is by no means self-evident that the Vietnamese have "demonstrated their mastery of Soviet-style mechanized war," or that they are carrying out "expansionist policies backed by the most skillful diplomacy, as did Prussia in times past." The military catastrophes of Tet and of Giap's misbegotten three-pronged drive for Hue, Kontum and Saigon in the spring of 1972 suggest that the Vietnamese have a great deal to learn in terms of conventional military matters, and the kind of diplomacy that succeeded in gratuitously

## 114 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

making a mortal enemy of the PRC and in uniting the squabbling ASEAN countries in panic and hostility towards Hanoi deserves to be identified as incompetent rather than skillful. Nor does Mr. Lim seem to appreciate that contemporary Kampuchea would be one of the most hopeless places in the world from which to launch a blitzkrieg against anybody else, even for people genuinely skilled in the art of mechanized warfare. A tendency to overlook the obvious does indeed seem characteristic of most of the contributors. It is not irrelevant that the ASEAN countries have actually transacted progressively less and less trade with one another since the formation of their primarily economic grouping. Nor can one mount a serious discussion of their optimum defense policies without openly declaring that neither individually nor collectively would they stand a chance against Vietnam in battle. And how, in any case, can one discuss Asian and Pacific security at all without some reference to the actual or potential roles of India or Australia or Taiwan? Even the PRC itself gets only a couple of pages.

Two contributions do deserve honorable mention. Dr. Frank N. Trager's foreword points out succinctly and lucidly that the domino theory really did come true to a great extent, albeit largely because people believed that it was going to come true and acted accordingly, and that the practical effect of policies in Washington and Moscow over the past decade has been a massive contraction of U.S. power in the region and a correspondingly massive accretion of Soviet power. Fortunately, one can find Dr. Trager's analysis developed even more effectively and much more fully elsewhere. Gen. Masao Horei, Adm. Kenichi Kitamura and Professor Jun Tsunoda also provide very perceptive and statistically supported perspectives on Japan's role in confronting what is frankly recognized as the Soviet challenge.

The significant thing about this volume is really the manner in which it reflects the complete change that has come to discussions on regional security since the Russian intervention in Afghanistan. Regional governments are once again uncomfortably aware that their independence depends upon the restoration of the balance of power that disappeared with the Allied disengagement from Indochina. The equivocations and illusions of the seventies are dead. Pragmatic analyses of regional power realities are unapologetically in vogue again. This volume makes only a rudimentary contribution to the debate itself. But it might be welcomed as a symptom of better things to come.

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Mickolus, Edward A., comp. *The Literature of Terrorism: A Selectively Annotated Bibliography*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. 533pp.

This is a very comprehensive listing of works dealing with the interesting and popular topic of terrorism. As the author rightfully points out, "more ink than blood has been spilled as a result of terrorist attacks in the past decade," and because of this phenomenon a well-organized bibliography is welcomed.

The book is divided into 14 large sections with many smaller areas related to central themes. The first area, "General Treatments," contains over 450 entries (books and articles) dealing with definitions, history and theories. Of note is that several entries in this and other parts of the work deal with political violence similar to, yet distinct from, terrorism itself. In that regard, *The Literature of Terrorism* would be a useful tool for anyone studying the causes, nature and effects of various forms of violence in society.

The section, "Tactics of Terrorists," has approximately 600 entries and is