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Insurgency in the Modern World

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divided into five subsections dealing with assassinations (not just of high-ranking leaders but also those of lesser placed individuals for political purposes), bombings (from letter bombs to larger nonnuclear devices), hijackings (relating to prevention as well as incidents themselves), hostage incidents (kidnapping, threats, and strategies of negotiation for law enforcement personnel) and potential nuclear threats (over 250 items dealing with the safeguarding against and the dangers of the use or threatened use of nuclear material).

The next section of this book is entitled, "Terrorist and Guerrilla Philosophies," and contains citations of works from the late 19th century to contemporary times. For those seeking to understand the "why" of terrorism, these listings should be very helpful. In seeking full comprehension of terrorism, it is the rationale behind the act that differentiates this behavior from purely criminal behavior. At the end of this section (as well as all the others) will be found cross-references to other areas of the bibliography where material related but not central to a particular theme may be located. There follows a brief section, "Links of Terrorist Groups," (44 entries) dealing with cooperative efforts between and among various groups. Because many links, both material and philosophical, have shown themselves over the past years, the topic is certainly of interest. No proof of a centrally directed "terrorist international" is revealed in these works but the cooperative efforts by diverse groups is notable.

One of the largest sections of the book concerns "Terrorism by Geographic Area," and is further broken down into: North America, Latin America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Because certain countries (i.e., Ireland, Italy, Argentina and others) have seen a great deal of terrorist activity, these countries are separately set out. In addition to terrorism,

some entries dealing with civil strife and revolution can also be discovered here.

No study of terrorism would be complete without an examination of the use of violence by governments to control society. In the section, "State Terrorism," the reader will find approximately 40 citations dealing with this subject covering concentration camps, use of police, and totalitarian regimes.

Having run the gamut of works trying to come to grips with an understanding of terrorism, the author presents approximately 900 entries dealing with responses to the phenomenon. Numerous aspects from basic physical security to complicated international agreements and finally disaster responses are presented.

The final portions of the book contain entries (approximately 1,000 in all) dealing with such areas as "Media and Terrorism," "Psychological and Medical Approaches to Terrorism," "Guerrilla Warfare," "Related Studies" (causes of political violence, criminal activity and societal responses), "Events Data Research" (computerized data sets on terrorism), "Fiction" and "Bibliographies." Following these sections are two indexes, author and title, which further assist any researcher in his efforts.

The Literature of Terrorism is a very extensive and thorough work that will greatly aid those interested in researching the subject of terrorism.

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O'Neill, Bard E., et al. *Insurgency in the Modern World*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. 291pp.

Any book with the title *Insurgency in the Modern World* must be regarded as timely. Since the end of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, interest in the study of insurgency has waned although, paradoxically, "insurgency remains the principal form of conflict on our planet

today." But Secretary of State Alexander Haig's charge that the Soviet Union is supporting leftist insurgents in El Salvador and elsewhere as well as international terrorists worldwide is likely to spark renewed interest in the subject.

If so, statesmen and scholars would do well to consult this book. The contributors to and editors of this volume, recognized authorities on insurgency, state as their goal "a book that combines an analytical technique with a variety of case studies to illuminate and assess various movements engaged in political violence." Their analytical framework comprises six major interrelated variables identified by the authors as crucial to the success or failure of an insurgency movement—the government role, the environment, popular support, organization, cohesion, and external support—and four general patterns of strategic thought followed by many insurgents: the Leninist, Maoist, Cuban and urban. The framework is developed in an introductory chapter by Bard E. O'Neill, director of studies of insurgency and revolution, and of Middle East Studies, at the National War College. It is used in subsequent chapters to analyze cases in Northern Ireland (Don Mansfield), Thailand (William R. Heaton and Richard MacLeod), Guatemala (Vincente Collazo-Davila), Uruguay (James A. Miller), Iraq (Paul R. Viotti), Oman (Bard E. O'Neill), and Angola (Donald J. Alberts). The final chapter contains summary and conclusions drawn from the case studies.

Several of the conclusions the authors draw from their case studies are noteworthy and provocative. For example, they conclude that "the terrorism that urban settings facilitate and encourage has not only failed to achieve notable success but it has also alienated former supporters when unduly prolonged (e.g., Ulster and Uruguay)." When terror was applied indiscriminately, as in Uruguay and Guatemala, it often led to government counterterror or to right

wing terror squads. This illustrates the danger that government overreaction will destroy the very values threatened by the terrorists. In Uruguay, government counterterror destroyed what had previously been a democratic society.

Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the authors conclude that "the significance of external support is all too often exaggerated. Though we still believe it can be very important in Maoist-type insurgencies that have progressed to either large-scale guerrilla warfare or the mobile-conventional stage, it plays a far more modest role in most other cases." In the case of the Kurds in Iraq, the authors note, there was an over-reliance on external support from the Shah of Iran. When this support was withdrawn, the insurgency collapsed. At any rate, the authors suggest, external support can normally be offset by aid to the government.

On the other hand, Donald J. Alberts, in his study of Angola, acknowledges that the *Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola* (MPLA), the current ruling government party, has been kept in power by the willingness of Cuba and the Soviet Union to supply men, money and material, and suggests that as long as this assistance continues, *Uniao Nacional para Independencia Total de Angola* (UNITA), the party favored by the West, will be unable to defeat the MPLA. At the same time, he says that a "coalition government with the MPLA would seem the simplest solution to Angola's troubles. The MPLA has offered a coalition government, but UNITA refuses to accept until the Cubans leave and the Angolan government is completely Angolan. The MPLA, on the other hand, will not let the Cubans leave until the security threat to its existence posed by UNITA disappears. The result is political stalemate and a continuing guerrilla insurgent war." If this observation is correct, creative diplomacy might yet bring about a power-sharing arrangement

that would end this stalemate; an increase in external assistance to UNITA, by contrast, would appear likely to prolong the guerrilla war.

Space limitations preclude further discussion in this review of the many points and issues raised by these case studies. It is worth noting, however, that most of the insurgencies studied in this book have not yet ended—or at the least may break out again. The authors of these studies conclude that the nature of the government response was the single most important variable in determining the success or failure of the insurgencies. Lessons drawn from these studies may help government decision-makers to select appropriate responses to a form of conflict that is likely to be with us for a long time to come.

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Pakenham, Thomas. *The Boer War*. New York: Random House, 1979. 718pp.

"I thought it very sporting of the Boers to take on the whole British Empire," Winston Churchill wrote of the outbreak of the Boer War in October 1899. In fact, since 1896 England's policy, as orchestrated by Sir Alfred Milner, her colonial High Commissioner in Cape Town, had pressed the two neighboring Boer republics towards war. The British public greeted the war with enthusiasm, and when Gen. Sir Redvers Buller's 47,000-man relief expedition sailed from England for South Africa they worried that the Boers might already have surrendered by the time they arrived. They need not have worried. The war lasted almost 3 years, required nearly half a million British troops, and cost over 100,000 British casualties, including at least 22,000 dead. It is a chastening war to read about, especially for those who—even today—like to think about the easy use of mobile expeditionary forces in

short sharp limited wars. The Boer War demonstrated once again that war almost always brings unexpected and unwelcome results for the victor as well as for the vanquished.

Thomas Pakenham has given us a splendid new account of this last and greatest of Britain's 19th-century imperial wars. It is a long, important, and enormously readable book. Eight years in the making, it reflects impressive research in both British and Afrikaner sources. Although writing mainly from the British point of view, Pakenham treats the Boers' conduct of the war with understanding and admiration.

The author divides the war into four phases, beginning with its origins. After revealing Milner's role in provoking the war, he explains the British reverses, mainly under General Buller, in the war's opening months. In the third phase, the greatly reinforced British forces, now under Field Marshal Lord Roberts, relieved the besieged British garrisons at Kimberley, Ladysmith and Mafeking, and captured the mines, towns and main lines of communication in both Boer republics by June of 1900. Having won the decisive setpiece battles, the British thought the war virtually over. Lord Roberts returned to England, leaving his Chief of Staff, General Lord Kitchener, to mop up. But the Boer commandos (the commando was the principal Boer tactical unit, normally of 500 to 2,000 mounted men) moved into guerrilla warfare. This fourth phase of the war lasted for 2 years. It was only after the construction of some 3,700 miles of barbed wire barriers, fortified by over 8,000 blockhouses, that Kitchener's vastly superior numbers finally brought the commandos to surrender in June of 1902.

Pakenham gives superb depictions of the main personalities. While persuasively rehabilitating the military reputation of the much-maligned Buller, Pakenham is hard on Roberts and devastating