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American Sea Power in the Old World: The United States Navy in European and Near Eastern Waters, 1865-1917

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conservative bias. Having developed the need, he offers his own idea for the development of strategic doctrine. It consists of three factors: internal or domestic factors; external factors which, in the postwar years, has largely been the dyadic nuclear relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union; and technology, which he believes has played an important, and in many cases independent, role in the formulation of strategic nuclear doctrine.

Having set forth the various frameworks for analyzing strategic doctrine, Snow applies them to the concepts, stability and limitations of deterrence. This is followed with overviews of American and Soviet nuclear doctrines and capabilities. Snow next analyzes the arms-control process and concludes his study with a discussion of what he sees as the three most difficult and critical challenges of the future: (1) stemming or coping with the qualitative arms race; (2) the evolving Soviet challenge to the United States; and (3) the dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation.

While Snow's work is an excellent introduction to the formulation of nuclear strategic policy, especially for the novice, there are some weaknesses. Snow's analysis of strategic nuclear policy starts with what is, not what is desired. Any policy formulation, whether it be foreign policy or nuclear strategic policy, should first start with a definition of objectives, of what it is one wants to achieve. Instead, Snow focuses on the American-Soviet dyad and couples it with technology to formulate a strategic policy. This approach ignores the fact that it may not lead to the desired objective and that manipulation of other factors outside the U.S.-Soviet dyad may be useful. For instance, it may be more effective to redirect technological development, or to alter the international situation as Nixon did with the "China card," in order to reach a desired objective. Additionally, Snow's analysis,

which provides an excellent comparison of the deterrence-only and deterrence-plus schools of thought, does not consider the denial alternative, that is that the United States should develop and build what it thinks it needs to fight a nuclear or conventional war. While all agree that prevention of nuclear war is the primary aim of strategic policy, how this can best be accomplished is a question Snow avoids.

The last significant weakness with this study is Snow's use of dated capability and force structure data. A substantial portion of the comparative data on United States-Soviet Union military balance is from 1975-1976. Much has changed since then, especially Soviet capabilities, which detracts from the credibility of some of the arguments.

Notwithstanding these shortcomings, Snow's study presents a timely and comprehensive look at the development of U.S. nuclear strategy and should provide an excellent foundation for the current discussion about American strategic policy.

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Still, William N. Jr. *American Sea Power in the Old World: The United States Navy in European and Near Eastern Waters, 1865-1917*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. 291pp.

In the latter half of the 19th century, the U.S. Navy was little noticed in Europe, yet the history of its activities there and in the Mediterranean is an important aspect of American naval history.

William Still's study is a chronological narrative of naval operations. The book is well written and spiced with entertaining anecdotes and carefully selected quotations. The personalities of important figures are well portrayed and add much to the story. For the early years in particular, the

author has painted a valuable portrait of the social life on the European station.

The author viewed his task in a very strict sense. He has purposefully excluded the history of naval diplomacy, intelligence-gathering operations, and the activities of American observers with European navies. He has surveyed the scene from the perspective of an American naval officer serving in American vessels. He has made little attempt to probe into foreign perceptions of American naval activities. The result is a well-crafted narrative that brings to light some little known facts and personalities.

Professor Still has done an excellent job of research and he has made particularly good use of the collections in the National Archives and in the Library of Congress. Overall, he appears to have made a rational and well-organized search for materials within the United States. He should be praised for his thought to employ foreign sources. Great riches lie in wait for those who are able to master foreign source materials, but they are difficult to find and to use. In Still's case, his search for material abroad seems to have been haphazard and based on chance. Without even suggesting the problems of language and access to collections in many countries, his use of British materials, alone, seems quite odd. Certainly, Christ Church, Oxford, is a most enjoyable place to work, but it is unfortunate that the microfilms of material from the Public Record Office should have been consulted there without using original materials in other classes from that depository, located only an hour away. Surely, one could find more that bears on the subject in the rich collections of the National Maritime Museum and the British Library. In general, Still appears to have done little work in foreign language materials. One would think much use could be found in Danish, Swedish, French, Portuguese, Spanish and Italian archives.

Many readers will be disappointed that the book lacks an analytical summary that deals with some of the useful details noted in the narrative and that suggests the variety of peacetime functions for a naval force. The book would have been a much more valuable study if it had effectively analyzed the functions of the U.S. Navy within the wider context of international affairs of the day and dealt with foreign appreciation of the Navy as a guide to the effectiveness of American naval power. One also wishes that Still had included appendixes listing the flag officers and ships assigned, with their dates. As it stands, the book is a useful addition to naval history and comparable to the work that Robert Johnson has done on the Navy in the Pacific and the Far East in the same period. We need now a study of fleets in the western and south Atlantic to complete a set of narrative surveys.

William Still's study provides a basic narrative where none existed before. That, in itself, is a useful contribution, but it is a contribution with a limited value. One can find here a partial record of the past, but if we are to understand more deeply the nature and uses of naval power in the past, one can neither remove the U.S. Government's intentions and purpose in employing the Navy, separate the Navy from related functions, nor fail to know the perceptions of foreign governments in relation to the Navy's role.

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The Three Per Cent Solution and the Future of NATO. Philadelphia: The Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1981. 118pp.

The Three Per Cent Solution is the second monograph published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute in its Western Security Studies Program (then under the direction of Alexander