

1981

Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy

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Recommended Citation

Lautenschläger, Karl and Yager, Joseph A. (1981) "Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 34 : No. 4 , Article 26.

Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol34/iss4/26>

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M. Haig, Jr.). The Foreword to the present volume states, "That program addresses (1) the Western commitment to defense in an age of 'welfare statism' and slow economic growth, (2) the ability of the United States and its allies to coordinate their approaches to the energy challenge, and (3) the need for a coherent national strategy ranging from politics to military doctrine and weapon systems." The focus of *The Three Per Cent Solution* is on the first issue.

The adverse trends in the military balance between the Soviet Union and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO have been documented by many studies in recent years. The "Three Per Cent Solution" to the military imbalance was the May 1977 pledge of NATO members to increase their defense budgets by three per cent per annum in real terms over a 5-year period starting in 1979.

After discussing the origins of the Three Per Cent Solution, this work gives a chronology and analysis of the principal developments in this approach during the Carter administration. While there had been previous calls for greater efforts to allocate more resources to NATO's defense programs, by establishing a fixed number as the annual increment in defense spending after allowance for inflation the Three Per Cent Solution substituted "a solemn pledge" for informal budget guidance. Although the United States was the proponent of the three per cent target, initially it was the United States rather than the European allies that would have to make the greatest efforts. This was because U.S. defense budgets had been declining in real terms in the 1970s while those of the Europeans had been increasing.

Other reasons for fixing on the three per cent figure were that it was close to what was estimated as the Soviet rate of growth in defense spending, although later estimates showed higher growth

rates for the Soviet Union. Three per cent was also in line with anticipated rates of economic growth. This last point is significant because if the rate of growth of real defense spending is no greater than the rate of growth of real GNP, more defense spending is possible in absolute terms without national defense taking any greater share of GNP. Hence nations can have both more guns and more butter, avoiding painful choices.

However, after making the three per cent pledge, both the United States and the European allies experienced slower economic growth and more inflation than expected. Budgetary pressures and efforts to control inflation made it difficult for nations on either side of the Atlantic to adhere to their commitment. This led to efforts to redefine what had been promised and to disagreements among the NATO allies.

The FPRI staff finds that the Three Per Cent Solution did not give a good picture of what was really happening in NATO defense programs. The Solution's survival over time depended more on international crises and on efforts to get the SAL II treaty through the U.S. Senate. And finally three per cent real growth was insufficient to meet the Soviet threat. While no figure like "3 per cent" adequately answers the question "How much is enough?", the FPRI study concludes, "A repetition of the *process* that led to the Three Per Cent Solution, however, is an essential step." (p. 102) This book can be recommended as of value to the reader in contributing to an understanding of how a defensive alliance like NATO must grapple with the issue of setting priorities.

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Yager, Joseph A., ed. *Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. 1980. 438pp.

This book provides an excellent review of the policies and problems of 12 countries that can produce nuclear weapons in this decade if they choose to do so. It is the work of five authors including the editor. Joseph Yager discusses Japan, Taiwan, and the Republic of Korea as three individual case studies in the section on Northeast Asia. Richard Betts takes a topical approach with chapters comparing nuclear energy policies, incentives for nuclear weapons, and nuclear defense options of India, Pakistan, and Iran. Betts also wrote the separate section on South Africa with similar topic headings. William Courtney considers the nuclear programs and options of Brazil and Argentina, stressing their cooperation as well as competition. Henry Rowen and Richard Brody collaborated in writing the section on the Middle East, which considers especially Egypt, Iraq, and Libya, but stresses the interrelationships of the region and discusses other potential nuclear powers. In a final section, each of the five authors presents policy options for the United States in dealing with the individual countries he has discussed.

The theme running through the well-integrated essays of this book is that the United States cannot formulate a single policy on nonproliferation and have it be effective. In pursuing any aspect of foreign relations, it must be assumed that each country has a unique combination of constraints and incentives affecting its conduct. The field of nuclear proliferation provides obvious support for this kind of assumption.

Development of the capability to produce nuclear weapons might seem to result mainly from security concerns and the political stature that comes with the possession of nuclear weapons. Security in particular can be a major factor, but equally relevant is the quest for energy independence. In several respects a nuclear solution of energy problems brings with it the capability to

produce nuclear weapons. The authors emphasize this, although they seem to assume that the reader understands the technical reasons why.

Taking security concerns first, these studies conclude that simple acquisition of nuclear weapons will not, in many cases, address the security problem of a particular country. In the case of South Africa, the threats to security are from internal dissension and hostile but weakly armed neighbors. Nuclear weapons are not relevant to either problem. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by Argentina and Brazil, it is argued, will create intense military rivalry where there was little before.

On the other hand, nuclear weapons enhance South Korea's security from invasion. South Korea is militarily inferior to her neighbor to the north. In event of an invasion, the Republic of Korea cannot trade space for time as her capital city and a large portion of her industry lie near the northern border. Nuclear weapons are a means of forward defense, at present provided by U.S. forces deployed in the country. If the United States were to withdraw her forces, the Koreans would have strong incentives to acquire their own nuclear weapons. This is a simplification of the example, for it leaves out possible political repercussions and countermeasures that could be taken by North Korea, all of which are addressed in the book.

An equally important problem, in many cases more pressing than security concerns, is that of energy. The countries considered in this book are industrialized or developing. All have expanding energy requirements while energy costs continue to increase and supplies remain limited and insecure. Nuclear power offers an attractive source of energy for industrial and home use, particularly for countries with few natural resources. The nonnuclear weapon states can obtain technical assistance and nuclear fuel for their reactors, but they become as dependent on

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foreign sources of nuclear fuel as they are on foreign sources of petroleum. Recent reluctance of the United States to provide nuclear fuel or reprocessing services as part of its nonproliferation policy has served to emphasize to several countries their dependence on unreliable sources of support for their nuclear power industries.

Because the intent in developing nuclear power plants is to reduce just this kind of dependence, an obvious answer is to develop a self-sustaining nuclear industry. A major step in this direction is called, in the current terminology, completing the fuel cycle. Thus there are strong incentives for building or expanding nuclear power industries in the nonnuclear weapon countries. This includes those rich in petroleum resources, because the governments of these countries realize that the petroleum reserves will eventually be depleted. They want to make these reserves last as long as possible to maximize capital income and keep it steady, and they want to diversify their countries' economies as they are developed.

The problem raised for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, in basic terms, is that acquiring the range of expertise and facilities that permit an indigenous and independent nuclear power industry brings with it the capability to produce nuclear material for weapons. This is certainly not the only capability essential to the production of nuclear weapons, but it is the most difficult to develop, and once acquired, very difficult for any foreign government to influence. In sum, the quest for energy independence can readily induce a country to acquire capabilities that give it the option of producing its own nuclear weapons.

The political factors influencing a decision about whether to build nuclear weapons are even more difficult to assess. The book brings out the costs in terms of alienation and economic isola-

tion for some countries that might choose to "go nuclear." There are also domestic political constraints, as in the case of Japan. Some of the essays consider political advantages of developing weapons without acknowledging their existence. Ambiguity promotes concern on the part of one's enemies and prevents open criticism by one's friends.

The political aspect that is not covered specifically in this book, perhaps because of the case study approach, is the general political problem of denying something to many countries while permitting a few to have it. In an age of economic interdependence accompanied by tension between the developing and industrialized nations, this seems an important topic for a book on U.S. nonproliferation policy, particularly because it provides an overall framework for the problem.

This political issue is one of haves versus have-nots. It refers not only to nuclear weapons but to political stature in the world. The powers in the nuclear club want to deny all others from joining. They say that nuclear weapons are undesirable and dangerous because of their destructive potential. Yet from the Third World point of view, the nuclear powers are intent on retaining and even expanding their own stocks of weapons. On top of this apparent double standard, the governments of small countries feel that they are not taken seriously by the big powers. If a small or poor country develops nuclear weapons, it can perhaps gain in regional influence, it can demonstrate technological prowess, and the big powers will be forced to take its foreign policy seriously. There are many problems with this kind of logic, but it is widely held in the nonaligned world, and it is often ignored in U.S. policy statements on nonproliferation. As the book points out, the United States must provide respect as well as inducements if it is to

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retard the spread of nuclear weapons by its policy.

Not considered in this study are the rationale for having a policy of non-proliferation. What are the grounds for concluding that nuclear weapons are good for some countries and bad for others? Do more countries with nuclear weapons mean less stability in the world or more? These are volatile issues, but they are also fundamental questions, which are seldom considered and not given the attention they deserve in the Brookings study.

The authors argue that the complexity of each country's situation, not to mention the complexity of the technical problem, means that the United

States can have varying degrees of influence depending on the country involved. The case studies and the outline of policy choices in this book provide valuable insights into the problem of how the United States can work to curb the spread of nuclear weapons. It is useful as a compendium of recognized issues and as a contribution of new thinking on the subject. What it needs most is an introduction that outlines the general problem and provides the layman with rudimentary explanation of the technical factors.

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**Doris Baginski, Steven Maffeo
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Atlantic Council of the United States. Working Group on Security Affairs. *After Afghanistan—the Long Haul: Safeguarding Security and Independence in the Third World*. Washington: Atlantic Council of the United States; Boulder, Colo.: distributed by Westview Press, 1980. 71pp. paper \$6.00

The worldwide ramifications of Soviet military aggression in Afghanistan call for immediate measures to deter and discourage further similar activity. Among the governments of the free nations, however, the problems inherent in achieving the required consensus and coordination are formidable. This policy paper concerns itself with the future of the West and the Third World. Following an overview, it analyzes the nature of Third World instability, constructive international relations, peaceful measures for independence and security, responses to external military pressure, and the need for multilateral cooperation.