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## Book Reviews

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
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# PROFESSIONAL READING

## BOOK REVIEWS

Agawa, Hiroyuki. *The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy*. John Bester, transl. Tokyo and N.Y.: Kodansha International, 1979. 397pp.

This book draws a fascinating portrait of a major figure in the history of the Imperial Japanese Navy and of World War II. Yamamoto Isoroku, as a naval cadet, fought during the Russo-Japanese War. During the interwar years he climbed the administrative ladder, serving as arms limitation negotiator, head of the aeronautics department of the Navy Ministry, and as its vice minister. Assuming command of the combined fleet in September 1939, he directed Japanese naval operations until his death in April 1943. His career and character attracted the author, a former naval officer and novelist whose works have won prizes from the Emperor and from the Japan Academy. Although he first published the book more than a decade ago, this translation provides new information and fresh insights of great value to the English-language reader.

The book can be read on three different levels, each of which should interest the military professional. As biography it etches a many-sided portrait of this tiny (five feet three inches, one hundred twenty five pounds) admiral. Agawa skillfully probes episodes in Yamamoto's public and personal lives to draw out hidden truths about the man who committed

the Imperial Japanese Navy to the attack on Pear Harbor. Contrasting opposites, he shows that what appeared on the surface was far from the whole truth about Yamamoto. The admiral, although fluent in English and many times a visitor and resident in the United States, never developed close friendships with Americans. Did he, then, really understand them? Yamamoto the champion of naval aviation nonetheless clung to stereotypical visions of a massive fleet engagement—a Jutland with airpower and a war-ending decision. Is it so surprising, then, that he blundered into Midway? Yamamoto the determined bureaucrat and thoughtful tactician remained forever a gambler and nonconformist, so much so that a fellow officer labeled him "a kind of navy hoodlum." The great commander of the fleet during the struggle for Guadalcanal, it would appear, remained intellectually immobilized by his passion for his geisha mistress and brooding about the ultimate outcome of the war.

The book is valuable in a second sense for the insights it offers into the workings of the Imperial Japanese Navy as an institution. Agawa does not provide a full organizational history but instead uses detail to show how the navy was at once extraordinarily international in outlook and simultaneously strikingly parochial. He offers information about education,

ceremony, and shipboard life that demonstrates how very Western in form the Japanese Navy was. Yet he also uses Yamamoto's personal correspondence and vignettes about operations planning and command relationships that reveal how that navy differed from its non-Japanese counterparts. Agawa argues that frequent contact with the world outside Japan made Yamamoto and other senior officers strong opponents of more nationalistic, army-backed policies that risked and ultimately provoked war with the United States. Yet the careful reader will find in these pages data that support the opposite interpretation developed by Stephen Pelz in *Race to Pearl Harbor*. Nowhere else in a Western language, however, can one find more information on the organizational behavior of the Imperial Japanese Navy.

On a third level this book can be read as a case study in civil-military relations. From 1939 onward, Yamamoto confronted the military professional's classic dilemma: what to do when one's government follows "wrong" policies? Although the admiral toyed with the idea of resignation, he never resigned. He warned his prime minister against the dangers of war with the United States at the same time as he pushed plans for what became the Pearl Harbor attack. By late 1941 he was determined to "pursue unswervingly a course that is precisely opposite to my personal views." How could he do so? Agawa hints that the admiral may have fallen into the "effectiveness trap," believing that quick victories might somehow educate the Japanese Government to the need to negotiate an end to what should have been seen as a limited war against the United States. He also hints that the Emperor-centered value system of officers of Yamamoto's generation may have precluded effective opposition to war. His most valuable contribution, however, is detail that

suggests that Yamamoto slipped into what psychologists call "cognitive dissonance." The admiral coped with his failure to influence national policy and his awareness of the probable end results of war with the United States by concentrating narrowly on plans for Pearl Harbor. Successful battle against those within the navy who questioned both the strategic soundness and technical feasibility of a strike there compensated for losses elsewhere. This kind of psychological displacement enabled Yamamoto to do what in retrospect seems unthinkable: launch a war that he was certain could not be won.

Two flaws lessen the value of this excellent translation for the non-Japanese reader. It lacks maps, leaving the reader puzzled about the location of places in Japan and in the South Pacific described so minutely by the author. Secondly, someone omitted source notes from this English text. Their absence renders the book less valuable to those who would want to compare this Japanese-based account of war and diplomacy with others written from American and British sources. Nonetheless, *Reluctant Admiral* commands the attention of anyone interested in the naval profession, the Imperial Japanese Navy, or the Pacific aspects of World War II.

ROGER DINGMAN  
University of Southern California

Albion, Robert Greenhalgh. *Makers of Naval Policy 1798-1947*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980. 737pp.

Professor Albion's study of policymaking in the U.S. Navy was begun in 1948 and completed in 1950. The rough manuscript of this study, deposited in the Harvard College Library, in microfilm at the Naval War College and elsewhere, has been known to serious scholars for many years, but it is now published for the first time. The manuscript has had enormous

difficulties in reaching print. It was the first volume in a projected four-volume study to analyze critically the Navy's entire administrative experience. That project was cancelled in 1950. The tale of these misadventures need not be told here; they make a sad and unfortunate story for any piece of serious scholarship. Rowena Reed's edition of this study, culled from the remaining drafts, reconstructed chapters and author's notes shows the editor's great effort and devotion. The Naval Institute has done a great service in publishing this volume. Even 30 years after it was written, Albion's study represents the best general analysis of the policymaking mechanism as it relates to the history of the U.S. Navy between 1798 and 1947.

Unlike the earlier administrative histories of the U.S. Navy by Oscar Paulin and the Sprouts, Professor Albion's work is not a chronological narrative, but a topical analysis of the subject. The first chapter gives a bird's eye view of the chronology and sets the stage for the following chapters. Chapters 2-8 deal with a variety of subjects ranging from the selection of Secretaries of the Navy, the methods by which serving officers gave their professional advice to civilian leaders, the role of Congress and the various processes by which it affected the Navy. Among the topics dealt with under the subject of congressional affairs are the influence of congressional committees, the personalities of their chairmen as well as the tactics used by naval leaders on "the Hill." This section, in particular, is supported by seven valuable appendixes listing important naval legislation, a comparison between the annual expenditures of the Navy, the Army and the Royal Navy, the changes in appropriation procedures before and after 1922 and analyses of the membership of the naval committees in Congress.

of all the various factors and the sources of initiative in terms of internal policy for the Navy. Albion clearly shows that when a proposal is initiated, it is altered and formed in the process by which other policymakers react to the idea. The fate of any proposal is bound up in this process and the strength or persistence of the proposal's sponsor. Here we see the interplay among the offices of the President, the Secretary of the Navy and the Navy's senior officers. Beyond these factors Albion also considers the important influence of other departments, such as War, State and the Treasury, in the formulation of policy.

Two additional chapters deal with the Navy's role in the formulation of external policy. Before 1898, the Navy was too small to have much effect in this area, but thereafter it became a major policy instrument in the formulation of broad aspects of national policy toward the outside world.

The final 11 chapters of the book (Chapters 17-27) deal with the period after 1939 and the massive changes in American policymaking that occurred during and after World War II. The material in this section is very useful and provides much illuminating insight. Professor Albion had access to much classified material as well as personal contact with many of the important individuals in this period. Much of this information was used in Albion's work, *Forrestal and the Navy* (1962). More than the earlier portions of the study, however, this section must be modified by the new judgments and additional details that have come to light in recent research. Nevertheless, the overview of World War II naval policymaking is a useful one that makes direct connections with the historical experience of the Navy. For that reason, it remains a useful and important study of the basic outline of events.

In discussing the various factors involved in bureaucratic decisionmak-

Chapters 9-12 deal with the interplay

ing, Professor Albion's work presages some of the influential studies done in the 1960s and 1970s. Unlike these works, however, he does not deal in "models" and does not describe abstract forces. Albion's analysis portrays many of the ideas involved in bureaucratic policymaking by using anecdotes that emphasize men at work within the office buildings of the U.S. Navy. Albion's great narrative ability and his incisive understanding of naval affairs combine here in an extremely important study for the history of the U.S. Navy. There is no doubt that it is the work of a master craftsman.

Albion's manuscript has benefited from Rowena Reed's addition of an annotated bibliography that summarizes the main work that has been done in this field in the years since 1950. She has done much excellent work in paring the manuscript and bringing the rough drafts into publishable form. One regrets, however, that such a distinguished work must be published in a form that looks like typed pages rather than a printed book. Moreover, there are some occasional editorial oversights. There are a few unimportant matters of wording that mar the text. More seriously, however, the table that summarizes the results of congressional debates on battleships between 1886 and 1916 was "not available for publication" (p. 211). The editor should have either provided a table or altered the wording of the text so that the absence of the table was not such an obvious omission. Additionally, the editor would have been well advised to make clear the natural division of the text into two parts: 1789-1939 and 1939-1947. As it stands, only a careful reader of the volume readily perceives the division.

Despite some unimportant editorial flaws, Professor Albion's work stands, as it has for 30 years, as the year unsurpassed general analysis of the changing process by which American

leaders determined what the U.S. Navy would be and what it would do.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF  
Naval War College

Child, John. *Unequal Alliance: The Inter-American Military System, 1938-1978*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. 253pp.

John Child's book is a careful and painstaking study of the inter-American military system over a 40-year period. The author traces it from its origins and growth in World War II, its stagnation in the 1945-61 period, its resurgence in the 1960s to counter Cuban-sponsored insurgencies, and finally its decline and fragmentation since the late 1960s.

Particularly valuable in this study is the author's discussion of current Latin American politicomilitary theories and concepts. The author finds that most military rulers (even those that Americans consider to be conservative) adhere to a doctrine of national security and development. This doctrine has its roots in the Kennedy administration counterinsurgency and civic action program, Marxism, and dependency theory. This doctrine calls for the rapid economic and social development of Latin American nations along with increased ability to oppose militarily both internal and external threats under the leadership of military rule. Latin American military regimes, then, view themselves not as a conservative force, but as a progressive and sometimes even radical one. Further, military regimes envision themselves as being the sole force able to implement such a program as civilian democracies are both weak internally and too susceptible to external influence (including that of the United States).

The author also describes how there have been several consequences of the Latin American perception that the military power of the United States is on the decline. First, and most obvious, has been a greater tendency for Latin

American nations to assert their independence from U.S. foreign policy. In addition, there has arisen a greater potential for conflict within and between Latin American nations. Finally, the military in certain Latin American nations, such as Brazil and Argentina, have developed great power pretensions of their own as has been reflected both in their foreign policies and politicomilitary theories. All of these phenomena have tended to decrease the functioning and effectiveness of the inter-American military system.

There was one important point, however, that the author did not address. While he devoted much attention to the ideas and policies of the military in military-ruled nations, he said nothing about military thought in democratic ones. Especially of interest would have been a discussion of the attitudes of the military in democratic nations toward military cooperation with the United States and toward the doctrine of national security and development that military regimes espouse.

On the whole, though, this book is an excellent piece of scholarship that sheds much light on a subject that is generally paid too little attention. In the United States, the study of ideology has focused almost exclusively on communist ideology. Child demonstrates that there are other groups as well whose ideology merits attention if the United States is to understand and deal with them effectively.

MARK N. KATZ  
The Brookings Institution

Coletta, Paolo E., ed. *American Secretaries of the Navy*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1980. 2v., 1028pp.

An American Secretary of the Navy is the product of a complexity of factors.

He is appointed by and serves at the

pleasure of the President; he must be confirmed by the Senate; once in office he has to deal with the professional leaders of the service (whose aims may or may not agree with administration policy) and, until recently, with the Congress (which may or may not be in a mood to appropriate). He himself may or may not have clear ideas regarding the needs of the moment.

Over and above these abiding realities, the nature of both incumbent and office have been subject to evolutionary change. In the period before the Civil War the sources from which appointees were generally drawn shifted from the early merchants and shipowners to a predominance of party stalwarts (with an admixture of literary folk). Since the later 19th century, as command authority has diminished and problems of procurement have come to dominate, the appointment of businessmen, lawyers, and bankers (with an admixture of politicians and newspaper publishers) has been the rule. Viewing the office itself, the establishment of the Board of Navy Commissioners (1815), the bureau system (1842), the General Board (1900), the aide system (1909), and the office of the CNO (1915) gradually transformed the relations between the Secretary and his professional advisers. More recently, the coming of the Joint Chiefs, the unification of 1947, and the advent of McNamara have affected his position within the federal government.

To guide his 21 contributors to this biographical dictionary through these 2 centuries of continuity and change, the editor set the goal of an assessment of "the men and measures responsible for the administration of the Navy." That such an aim leads beyond the 60 secretaries who served between 1798 and 1972 is indicated by the first two essays on "The Revolutionary Navy" and "The Fleetless Nation." At the risk of some further violence to the title (but with some profit to the student of these

matters) it might usefully have been followed farther, to deal with important or controversial assistant secretaries (Gustavus Vasa Fox, Theodore Roosevelt) and with the most important of civilian administrators, Charles W. Goldsborough, whose service from 1798 to 1843 spanned the careers in office of 13 department heads.

Because, in their widely varying terms of service, some secretaries had wars to fight, some had crises to cope with or reforms to push through, and some found little or nothing to do, the sketches naturally vary greatly in length. Nathan Goff, whose term lasted 2 months, gets one page; David Henshaw, whose 7-month recess appointment was rejected by the Senate, gets three, as does Thomas Gilmer, whose 9 days in office were terminated by the explosion of the great gun on *Princeton*. At the other extreme come the wartime incumbents Josephus Daniels (56), Frank Knox (50), Gideon Welles (40), and John Davis Long (27). If these allocations seem generally judicious, some surprise may be occasioned by a scheme that gives Francis P. Matthews 44 pages and James Forrestal a mere 15. More generally, it may be said, the recent past seems to evoke a tendency to wordiness and irrelevance. The biographies in Volume II (since 1913) are twice as long as those in Volume I; the postunification secretaries, no longer of cabinet status, average 21 pages apiece while those important and interesting figures—Chandler, Whitney, Tracy, and Herbert—who presided over the naval revival of the 1880s and 1890s average out at a disappointing seven.

As well as in length, the essays vary widely in quality. Some hold the reader's interest; some badly need editing for style and syntax; some repeat or contradict others; in some the research seems superficial or out of date; some bibliographical notes are helpful and some are not. If there is a general

problem with this treatment of "men and measures" it is in the prevailing tone, which reflects the views of Mahan as interpreted by the Sprouts: a hankering, no matter what the state of the world or the needs of the nation, for concentrated forces maneuvering in squadrons. This somewhat old-fashioned attitude is reflected both in the recurrent themes that transcend individual essays and in the areas of administrative activity that are largely overlooked. Considerable attention is given to progress (or the lack of it) in naval architecture, and to the long-continuing efforts to establish ranks above that of captain, to organize a naval school, to provide for selection by merit, and to move toward some kind of a general staff. Contrariwise, little heed is paid such matters as the shifting patterns of peacetime deployment, the missions of the cruising squadrons, the protection of citizens abroad, the management of overseas logistics, or the development of naval communications.

In summary it may be said that as a readily available reference work *American Secretaries of the Navy* will have a certain usefulness if employed with caution with respect not only to what it contains but what it does not. Like most Naval Institute publications, these volumes are handsomely produced; they also contain an inordinate number of typographical errors.

JAMES A. FIELD, JR.  
Swarthmore College

Collins, John M. *U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities 1960-1980*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980. 645pp.

On 20 April 1963, then-Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara stated: "You cannot make decisions simply by asking yourself whether something might be nice to have. You have to make a judgment on how much is enough."

John M. Collins, the Senior Specialist in National Defense at the Library of Congress, has now published a comprehensive work that implicitly responds to the question: to wit, during the past two decades, the nation certainly hasn't done nearly "enough" on any military front. Collins' somber view of comparative trends in the U.S. and Soviet forces and capabilities will concern even the most committed advocate of disarmament.

In 419 pages of text and 226 of detailed annexes and appendixes, the author leads the reader through a 20-year litany of declining U.S. military strength *vis-à-vis* Soviet advances in almost every martial category. The nation's clear strategic and conventional superiorities in 1960 have evaporated, causing the primary mission of America's defense decisionmakers to be modified to matching "meaningful ends with measured means while minimizing risks." Starting from this premise, Collins proceeds to: first, "assess" current net assessment techniques; and, second, derive his own assessment of U.S.-U.S.S.R. interests, doctrine, trends, regional balances, issues, and options.

His introduction to net assessment processes cogently outlines the strengths and weaknesses of current comparison techniques. In a single chapter he provides the uninitiated with insight into: "inclusive" (e.g., U.S. versus U.S.S.R.), "selective" (e.g., theater nuclear), "technological" (e.g., XM-1 tank versus T-72 tank), "static" (i.e., snapshots of a period), and "dynamic" (i.e., portraying trends or predicting outcomes) assessments.

After recounting the nation's superior national security position in 1960, Collins investigates the "political, economic, military, and social impediments" that have prevented U.S. Armed Forces from improving as rapidly as their Soviet counterparts. The principal causes of the unfavorable

trend, in Collins' estimation, have been a dearth of direct threats to the United States, the diversion of Vietnam, and American economic weakness. Conversely, the Soviets have steadily increased their commitment to increased military capabilities following their 1962 humiliation in Cuba.

In assessing organizations and functions, Collins notes that Soviets "accrue important advantages from secrecy, central control, and stable assignments for political leadership as well as military professionals in top echelons." The United States benefits from efficiency and flexibility, but suffers critically in such areas as intelligence collection because of the inherent "openness" of its society. Collins expresses doubts about the validity of direct dollar-to-ruble expenditure comparisons while acknowledging that "statistics on investment versus consumption provide clues to long range priorities." He contrasts U.S.S.R. reliance on simplicity with the U.S. desire for superlative performance, compares Soviet "quantity" orientation with American "quality" desires, then concludes that "Perhaps most of all, the *potential* for superiority will prove meaningless, if we fail to compete."

In correlating strategic nuclear trends, Collins asserts that U.S. nuclear strategy is now predicated on new principles, devised to cope with the unprecedented problems introduced by the advent of mass destruction weapons. Meanwhile, Soviet theorists maintain traditional standards. He traces the U.S. course from "assured ascendancy" (in the late 1950s), through "assured destruction" (in the 1960s), to its current "assured anxiety" (in the 1970s). He then concludes that our growing vulnerability in this area has resulted in a dependence on arms control agreements, a dependence that may not be shared totally by a Soviet Union that has fewer incentives to



compromise than does the United States. The author is also extremely critical of the nation's failure to pursue strategic defense systems while noting the significant efforts the U.S.S.R. has undertaken to protect its people and production base.

On general-purpose forces, "U.S. quality at this stage can no longer compensate completely for the lack of flexibility caused by quantitative inferiority...." United States' economy of force now necessitates a defensive strategy in Western Europe and limits the options of tactical airpower. The U.S. Navy, with its "sea control" mission, is confronted by a greatly expanded Soviet Navy, which needs only to exercise "sea denial" to succeed. In fact, Collins believes, the Navy is now at a crossroads. "America's Navy is marginally capable of carrying out its mission in support of national strategy.... Serious students of naval strategy sum up the situation with one succinct statement: the future U.S. Navy faces reduced options and reinforced risks." In contrasting mobility forces, Collins finds improved Soviet capabilities on one hand, with efficient U.S. airlift but deficient sealift capabilities on the other.

Collins then delves into alliance systems and regional balances noting that unity of command and strategic initiative favor the Warsaw Pact, as does the lack of substantive growth in NATO members' military capabilities. Analysis of the Far East indicates that neither power can reasonably expect to apply decisive influence. In the Middle East, the Soviets need only act as a "spoiler" to succeed in constraining U.S. options. The Rapid Deployment Force could successfully engage minor Third World opposition but is no match for possible Soviet power in that area.

Collins concludes with the observation that despite rampant numerical imbalances favoring the Soviets in most manpower/material

comparisons, "A mirror image between U.S. and Soviet Armed Services is neither necessary nor desirable." After advocating improvements in U.S. nuclear, chemical/biological, and conventional capabilities, Collins states that "The lack of U.S. flexibility is in large part a self-inflicted wound that results from decisions promulgated over the past two decades." In his estimation, no miraculous cures seem imminent. "More money to operate, maintain, and refurbish U.S. Armed Forces may be imperative at this point, but bolstering budgets will produce fewer defense benefits than desired unless U.S. leaders stand back, survey the strategic forest instead of the tactical trees, challenge assumptions, subordinate special interests, stress proven principles, and press for practical change."

Collins' work should be a mandatory addition to the libraries of individuals interested in military history and defense decisionmaking. Well-documented and thoroughly indexed, it is a comprehensive, up-to-date reference text that will unquestionably garner accolades for its author. Authoritative and detailed, yet readable, the book is uniquely valuable in setting the stage for the changes in military balance that will take place during the 1980s.

R.J. ZLATOPER  
Commander, U.S. Navy

Couhat, Jean Labayle, ed. *Combat Fleets of the World 1980/1981*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1980. 794pp.

The third biennial English language edition of this French publication has now become available through the efforts of the U.S. Naval Institute and A.D. Baker III. It is again larger (by 142 pages) than the previous edition and contains more photographs and details than before. I found it more readable,

and better suited to reference because of changes in format and a more convenient positioning of photographs near the applicable text. Larger type setting off the ship class titles would make it still more readily useful as a reference.

In the introductory portion of *Combat Fleets* the editor states (in comparing the U.S. to the Soviet Navy) that "... a fleet that has a definite plan for its future and a firm grasp of its strategic and political responsibilities will sooner or later achieve ascendancy over one that does not." He goes on to mention "a lack of understanding of the uses of sea power" at the highest political levels but leaves the impression that the U.S. Navy does not comprehend its mission. No one who has read the works of contemporary U.S. Navy authors over the past 10 years could accept that viewpoint. The annual statements to the Congress and "CNO Report" state concisely the view of those in uniform regarding the identity of our mission and often list the wherewithal required to accomplish it.

M. Couhat criticizes the FFG-7 class for its capability. Yet, under the politics of the early seventies, that was the only design that could gain approval. He commends the Iranian DDG-993 design, but neglects to mention that it is based on the U.S. Navy's original plan for the *Spruance* class (20 DDGs and 40 DDs with a common hull design) which was reduced by Congress and the Administration to 33 DDs only. The time may come when this country must look for scapegoats to blame for its neglect of the military. That search should not start with those who have spent their careers working to maintain the all too few ships provided and pleading for more, because they had seen the enemy at first hand and knew his capability and potential.

The ship and crew I command just had such an opportunity. The timely arrival aboard of *Combat Fleets* just

prior to my ship's deploying for TEAMWORK 80 and BALTOPS provided a chance to put the volume to good use on the bridge and in CIC. Our operations with ships of nearly all the NATO navies made the unclassified data available in *Combat Fleets* extremely valuable to all watchstanders who had to be alert for rapid identification of contacts. Only the perpetual North Sea fog limited its use as this ship operated as an "Orange" unit far outnumbered by "Blue." The text came in handy for allocating tasks to our Orange allies ranging from the 30-year old German *Zerstorer 5* (an ex-*Fletcher*) and the new Dutch *Kortenaer* with her rapidly responding gas turbines. The book also helped the lookouts pick out the curious *Krivak* who was taking notes on the operations of the *Nimitz* task group and several assorted Warsaw Pact combatants who followed us through the Baltic.

*Combat Fleets* now needs to address two items before the next edition is published. First, it requires some detailed research to correct and update portions of the data provided. At least in the U.S. Navy portion, with which I am most familiar, there are some obvious errors, some typographical but many of substance. Admittedly, this is a difficult task in light of the level of detail provided and changing plans for combat suites. However, it must be done if the text is to retain credibility.

Second, *Combat Fleets'* publishers and editors should now decide whether it is to continue expansion until it approaches in size its major competitor or whether the next edition should confine itself to remaining smaller yet thorough, and thus appeal to a slightly different market. There would seem to be no need for a second *Janes'*, even at a slightly lower price. There may be more of a place for a more concise and hence readily useful reference text.

Whichever path *Combat Fleets* may choose, it should remain a fine

publication that will find a home aboard ship and in the libraries of Navy buffs worldwide. This short review cannot do justice to the enormous amount of accurate data contained in this large and well-presented reference work.

D.G. CLARK  
Commander, U.S. Navy

Deeb, Marius. *The Lebanese Civil War*. New York: Praeger, 1980. 159pp.

Gordon, David C. *Lebanon: The Fragmented Nation*. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1980. 297pp.

When confronting problems as intransigent and complex as the obscene destruction of Lebanon by parties, groups and individuals of every conceivable political stripe, one tends to be overwhelmed by the very inadequacy of our explanations for such carnage. Anyone familiar with the literature knows that only very few authorities have been able to capture adequately and objectively the web of circumstances that led to the war or the political machinations that have kept the Lebanese death dance in progress during 1975 and 1976 (and still keep it alive, albeit at an abated level). Indeed, it is rather an awesome task just to stay abreast of the shifting loyalties, alignments and relationships of the parties involved. Even those books that succeed in presenting a snapshot-in-time turn out to be keenly perishable, even in comparison to the corpus of literature on the modern Middle East which is not itself noted for durability.

Thus, approaching the two books under review, one is tempted on the one hand to expect too much, to demand success where others have failed, and on the other hand, to expect very little. Neither fulfills the grander expectation, but both manage to transcend the lesser. For very different reasons, these two books reward the reader, and while

neither one is indispensable, they offer insights and information not readily available in English.

*Lebanon* is a little book—the adjective is not demeaning—in the sense that this former American University of Beirut history professor has provided a workmanlike overview of modern Lebanon (1946-1976) that he then colors quite effectively through the judicious use of his own observations and the reproduction of entries from his personal journal interspersed throughout the book. While reading *Lebanon*, one is at first struck by its being rather pedestrian and lacking in insight, but after a time it becomes clear that Gordon's book should be judged as a personal document—almost a memoir—for what the author does best is to share the perceptions, fears and hopes of a non-Arab (with nearly a half century's experience in the Eastern Mediterranean) living in Lebanon during calamitous times. While it is of some value to read Gordon's look at the Lebanese polity, it is far more interesting to savor the vignettes and anecdotes that succeed in teaching us something about Arabs, Lebanon, the Beirut academic scene and the author. To illustrate:

Once I was interviewed by a local Arab magazine about my life in [a quarter of Beirut]. The few guarded remarks I made concerning my preference for life here, rather than in America, came out: "Professor Gordon hates America and thinks Beirut is a paradise." I objected to such a revision of what I had actually said. The interviewer's answer was: "We Arabs like to put things strongly."

[Notes from Gordon's journal, 1975, during the first stages of the civil war.] May 2: "A Bullet Dodger's Guide to Beirut" is available advising on what to say depending at whose barricade one is stopped.

.....  
 June 8: Breakfasts with an English friend on the other side of the city. The cat has just been shot by a sniper.  
 .....

[1976]

May 17: Beirut is not mentioned on the BBC and all is well!  
 5:30 p.m. the explosive crackle of machine gun fire from the street below us shatters our calm. In five minutes it is over. Only a private feud.

For those with an interest in Lebanon, this book leaves some major questions unanswered, but we finish the book with at least a fuller appreciation of the context of the problems, if not their explanation or solution.

*The Lebanese Civil War* is much narrower than *Lebanon* in its chronological focus. Deeb provides a pithy, excessively dry but useful treatment of the events of 1975 and 1976. He has identified seven phases of the war beginning with the Phalangist attack on a busload of Palestinians on 13 April 1975 that many observers point to as the incident that triggered the war, and ending with the creation of the Syrian-dominated Arab Deterrent Force in the fall of 1976. Within his chronological framework, Deeb separately treats each of the major participants: the conservative parties and organizations, the traditional Muslims, the "leftist" National Movement, the Palestine Resistance Movement, and Syria. As an initial criticism, it is unfortunate that the panoply of external actors who made their own macabre contribution to the civil war are mentioned only in passing. (This group would include Libya, Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Britain, France, and, some would suggest, especially the United States and the U.S.S.R.) But to

integrate the roles played by each of the states involved might have diminished rather than enhanced the clarity of Deeb's book. Thus, *The Lebanese Civil War* should be accepted on its author's terms, and that is as an attempt to dissect the war and its participants as a means of contributing toward a comprehensive picture.

This book turns out to be useful for two primary reasons. First, it is an essential scorecard that helps us to keep the players straight—no mean task. Second, it is a factual rendition of the events of the civil war from the various perspectives of the major participants. Deeb manages all this with commendable detachment. Indeed one has to search hard to find hints of Deeb's own sentiments and partialities—this is not a faint compliment considering the special pleading that so often characterizes writing on the Middle East.

While his choice of format inevitably leads to some repetition and retelling of events, he has managed to pack an admirable amount of data into 142 pages of text and notes. Most readers are likely to agree that Marius Deeb has provided a useful work that many who follow affairs of the Middle East will want to keep within easy reach, especially until the definitive study of the Lebanese civil war is published. Had Deeb found it possible not only to tell us what happened, but why (in the most profound sense), his book would have earned a more enduring place on the bookshelf.

Unfortunately, the "seventh phase" of the civil war did not bring down the curtain on the violence in Lebanon. Murder and maiming continue throughout the country, and the quasi-annexation of portions of southern Lebanon has led to yet additional realignments and sources for animosity. Sadly, the events chronicled by Deeb and Gordon may have precipitated the irreversible disintegration of a state

whose mention in the future may have to be couched in the past tense.

AUGUSTUS RICHARD NORTON  
Major, U.S. Army

Deutermann, Peter T. *The Ops Officer's Manual*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980, 185pp.

*The OPS Officer's Manual* is a highly readable book written for officers ordered to, or serving in, the billet of Operations Officer. The book deals successively with: The Operations Officer; Planning; Training; Stateside Operations; Deployed Operations; Reporting; Operational Emergencies; CIC; and Combat Operations.

Commander Deutermann's work is a useful reference for all Surface Warfare Officers and represents a significant contribution to meet the goal of enhanced professionalism. The principles outlined in the chapters on Planning and Reporting have wide applicability and could serve as the basis for the effective management of any department. Commanding Officers and Executive Officers will, likewise, find the book germane and, in many respects, more relevant than the department head will find it, inasmuch as some of the ideas presented can be implemented only with the concurrence of the CO or XO. The book is written in clear, straightforward style and the ideas presented are innovative, thoughtful, and thought-provoking. The strength of *The OPS Officer's Manual* is in its timelessness. Unlike some "how to" books of the genre, for example *Command at Sea*, Deutermann's work is not so specific as to be restricted by current regulations. Hence, it will not require frequent revision as rules and regulations change. Planning, preparations and a systematic, commonsense approach to routine evolutions are stressed. The author correctly assesses the key to handling Operational Emergencies to be preplanning. Those familiar with

catastrophes that result from proceeding into harm's way without well-conceived contingency plans will derive considerable satisfaction from reading the chapter here.

Training is a subject dear to the heart of all Executive Officers and Deutermann has made his chapter on training the longest in the book. One gets the distinct impression from reading the training chapter that it was written from the viewpoint of the Executive Officer, not the OPS Officer. There is certainly nothing wrong with this approach. It is always good for the OPS Officer to acquire a feel for the larger picture the XO (supposedly) possesses. The chapter is good reading and in it an alternative to the standard shipboard training system is proposed. Under Deutermann's system there is no need for semiannual, quarterly or monthly training plans, *per se*. Ultimately, however, some chronological scheduling of training is necessary. The author divides training into three categories: operational training; advancement training; and organizational training. These functional areas have separate cycles. Operational training is based on the employment cycle, while advancement training, naturally, is based on the advancement cycle. The advantage of looking at training in terms of the requirements of distinct functional areas is that it reflects reality. The training requirements of the fleet are mandated by separate and distinct agencies without regard to ship schedules and without regard to conflicts, redundancy or clear-cut goals. As a first cut, training can be viewed in functional terms. It is only aboard ships, when scheduling commences, that training becomes a system. Because chapter 8 of OPNAVINST 3120.32 is not regulatory in nature but offers "guidance" to commanders and commanding officers, it is probably only heresy, not criminal, to propose an

alternative training plan to the SORM. Deutermann's plan seems reasonable and it probably works. It would seem that thinking of training in functional terms is necessary on any ship interested in scheduling a comprehensive program. It is the first step. CDR Deutermann has formalized what is probably done on most good ships anyway, on an informal basis. Whether the reader "buys" this system or not, the chapter at least gets the fledgling operations officer thinking in the right direction. It would be best for most newly arrived OPS Officers to consider working within the framework of the system established in the SORM, rather than rocking the boat with new proposals.

There are some significant areas of training overlooked in the Training Chapter. Formal schools, particularly those that produce a skill or NEC must be properly managed. Formal school training is an essential part of the long-range training program. This is particularly true for the Operations Officer who generally has a large number of equipments that require specific NECs (Navy Enlisted Classification). The OPS Officer who does not manage his formal school requirements will find himself without a needed NEC one day and NMPC is not going to detail replacements by NEC.

The day of PQS (Personnel Qualification Standards) has arrived. In the Atlantic Fleet, at least, PQS has become an end in itself, rather than a means to an end, much as PMS (Planned Maintenance System) did years ago. The PQS system is inflexible and mandatory. It isn't a "Captain reliever," but it is a "Commodore irritator" if a ship fails a PQS inspection. CDR Deutermann specifically mentions only Surface Warfare Officer PQS. The book should have covered the entire system, if only in general terms.

*The OPS Officer's Manual* is deficient

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in the area of overhaul management. There are sufficient Operations Officers assigned as overhaul coordinators to make a chapter on ROH management relevant. Similarly, electronics maintenance and the associated area of GPETE (General Purpose Electronics Test Equipment) is totally neglected—probably with good reason in the case of GPETE. However, electronics maintenance, ultimately, is the function of the Operations department. A book on how to succeed as OPS Boss should include information on how to manage the electronic maintenance program.

Communications is an area that can be the undoing of the trusting, or unwary OPS Officer. It is also an area that can be greatly simplified by careful management and PMS. A prospective OPS Officer needs a communication survival kit and this book would have been the perfect vehicle.

Frequently at Surface Warfare School Command, as prospective Operations Officers near completion of the Department Head Curriculum and begin to run scared, instructors in the Combat Systems Division are flooded by a wave of students who want to know what Operations Officers do. For 26 weeks the students have been exposed to terminology, knobology and more isolated information than any single person can be expected to retain. The question mostly reflects a desire on the part of students to leave SWOS with a set of procedures and guidelines upon which they can rely and that are guaranteed to make them "successful" Operations Officers. Unfortunately, the set of procedures does not exist; nor will a set of procedures guarantee success anyway. CDR Deutermann recognized this by producing a worthwhile manual, broad in scope and general in nature, but one that offers the prospective Operations Officer a feel of the job and some good philosophy which, if taken aboard, will at least point the prospective OPS Boss in the right

direction as he enters the nether world of Operations. *The OPS Officer's Manual* is recommended reading for all Surface Warfare Officers.

T.S. O'KEEFE  
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Dupuy, Trevor N., et al. *The Almanac of World Military Power*. San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1980. 418pp.

Cline, Ray S. *World Power Trends and U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. 228pp.

National power assessment is an inherently difficult task complicated by the necessity of making subjective and sometimes arbitrary value judgments. Mere rankings of a nation's military order of battle, natural resources, industrial capacity, and gross national product, while indeed important, can often be misleading in any overall assessment of that nation's national power. What is necessary is a complementary assessment of such factors as leadership, morale, national will, military efficiency, mobilization potential, etc., etc. Further complicating the task, especially from a military standpoint, is the consideration of alliances and treaties, and how effective or binding they are likely to be. Does an analyst look at composite strengths of alliance members, or should he heed the words of Charles de Gaulle when he said, "Treaties are like flowers and young girls—they last while they last"? Power assessments of states or regions then, while important, indeed critical, are inherently subjective. The accuracy of such assessments and their usefulness to national security managers and planners represent the stuff that "analysis" is all about.

The fourth edition of *The Almanac of World Military Power* is a comprehensive compilation of data on the armed forces and power potential

(as measured in geostrategic factors such as geography, population, GNP, military expenditures, iron ore production, fuel production, and electric power output) for nearly all of the world's countries—more than 150 listings. Accompanying maps, while useful for general geographical location and the location of major cities and ports, appear to be black-and-white reproductions of nontopographical, colored originals, and are of limited quality. The *Almanac* also contains regional surveys of the world in which the strategic importance, regional alliances, and recent conflicts are examined, if only in a very general sense. In fact, the authors devote only 41 pages to this section that divides the world into 10 regions, and 13 pages are maps and blank facing pages.

The bulk of the *Almanac* is devoted to the country listings, arranged alphabetically from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, without regard to alliances or geographical region. It is a valuable, single-source document of useful data—precisely what it purports to be—an almanac. The authors make no outward attempt, except in a very general sense, to assess the data; that is left to the reader. Still, the selection of sources, a treatment of "policies and posture," even the compilation of data itself represent at least an implied comparative assessment of global power relationships.

Ray S. Cline, on the other hand, in *World Power Trends and U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s*, quite clearly sets out not only to assess the power of nations in an international context but goes so far as to rank-order 77 of the world's nations in a final consolidated listing. He also prepares a regional assessment of power—11 geographical regions that he calls "politelectronic zones" that, he explains, represent the relatively static factors of geography and the consideration of the more fluid political, economic, and military factors

of today's world. Cline has developed a formula for determining perceived power, which he believes is the *decisive* factor in international relations. Perceived power, according to this formula, consists of an equation made up of certain elements of national power to which the author assigns numerical values. More precisely, perceived power (Pp) is measured in terms of an index number that derives from the sum of critical mass (C), which is population and territory, economic capability (E), and military capability (M), multiplied by the sum of strategic purpose (S) and the will to pursue national strategy (W). Thus Cline's formula for measuring the power of nations is  $Pp = (C+E+M) \times (S+W)$ .

Admittedly, any attempt to rank-order the world in terms of national power is bound to rest in large part on subjective and sometimes arbitrary judgment. But Cline's approach is actually to assign numerical values to those judgments and thus "quantify" the subjective as well as the objective. What's more, he uses the assigned numerical values of the most subjective elements—purpose and will—as *multipliers* in his formula, giving them an even greater importance in his overall assessment. Turkey, for example, to which Cline assigns a value rating in mass, economic, and military factors of more than twice that of Chile's (C+E+M of 36 to 19), falls 12 places *behind* Chile in total power ranking because of a much lower value rating for the multiplier factor of strategy and will (S+W of 0.5 for Turkey to 1.3 for Chile). In Cline's own words, "The coefficients listed...reflect the author's personal evaluation...and are only as good as the judgment behind the rating." One must question the judgment behind many of the ratings in *World Power Trends*. The book's value, however, is not in the ratings themselves, but rather in the framework of the author's conceptual

approach. It stimulates thinking about American defense policy and forces the reader to examine the elements of geopolitical strength systematically.

Assessing shifts in geostrategic power relationships among the nations of the world—shifts that have occurred with increasing frequency in recent years—is a formidable task. It is similar to the painting of a moving train from a stationary position. Where should one pause to dip the brush? The beginning of a new decade seems a logical place. These two books represent approaches to accomplishing that task. The optimistic hope of this reviewer is that, taken together, the entire train will get a fresh coat of paint.

DALLACE L. MEEHAN

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force

Hastings, Max. *Bomber Command*. New York: The Dial Press/James Wade, 1979. 390pp.

Few military campaigns have been subject of as much scrutiny as the strategic air offensive waged by the Royal Air Force Bomber Command and the USAAF Eighth Air Force over Europe during World War II. Fewer continue to generate the emotion between critics and supporters that that long, devastating (to all sides) affray does. Regrettably, Max Hastings' *Bomber Command* provides no new light on the subject, but is certain to intensify the heat of that ever-raging fire.

The author employs an interesting style, intermixing chapters containing accounts told from the squadron and aircrew level of actual operations with chapters discussing evolving RAF high command policy. In this respect, the book is much easier to read than its principal predecessor, Anthony Verrier's *The Bomber Offensive* (1968). This does not necessarily make *Bomber Command* the better book, however. Indeed, the book falls far short of either *Bomber Offensive* or the



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official British history, Noble and Frankland's *The Strategic Air Offensive*.

The difficulty with *Bomber Command* lies not only with what is said, but more with what the author has chosen not to say. He is quick off the mark to establish the book's principal premise—that the bombing campaign was ineffective, mismanaged, and immoral (read illegal). Yet in his chapter on the development of the RAF between the wars, there is no discussion of the myriad external factors that determined the capability of Bomber Command during the initial years of World War II (and that led to Bomber Command's area bombing policy). Thus there is no mention of the Ten-Year Rule, adopted by the British Cabinet in 1919 and actually carried through almost 15 years, that presumed that Great Britain would not be engaged in a European conflict for at least 10 years—and accordingly made emasculating cuts in the defense budget. There is no discussion of the internecine warfare over the remaining defense dollars between the fledgling RAF and the older services during this period of parsimony, and the detrimental effect it had on funding for operational training, research and development. Similarly, there is an absence of comment on the effect on RAF capabilities resulting from the moratorium on research, development and acquisition within the RAF that existed from 1928 to 1934 in order that Great Britain could negotiate in "good faith" with regard to a total ban on bombers at the League of Nations Disarmament Conference. Finally, the author neglects the subservience of Bomber Command development to that of Fighter Command in the years 1934 to 1939 as Great Britain prepared for war.

Thus in his criticism of Bomber Command's operational policies, while the author devotes some pages to explaining *how* that policy evolved once

hostilities began, he fails to tell *why*. He judges the wartime leaders on what he, in retrospect, believes they should have been capable of, rather than judging them on the basis of the resources and information available to them at the time of their decisions. He not only emphasizes the comments of the very few dissenters to the neglect of the general feeling at the time, but (p. 261) forces Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, leader of Bomber Command from 1942-1945, to a premature demise (Air Marshal Harris remains alive and well). His conclusions regarding the illegality of British-U.S. area bombing practices likewise are premature. The nations of the world did not agree on any rules governing bombing until 1977. While those rules prohibit area bombing "which treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city," they do not prohibit such bombing when it is done in response to complex concealment techniques by the defender, which generally was the case in the European campaign. Notwithstanding what may be considered to be a prohibition on an obsolete form of warfare, no military power, major or minor, has yet ratified these rules. Hence what author Hastings would like to appear obvious in the 1942-1945 era in fact remains unclear today.

To his credit, the author puts paid to the well-established myth that the USAAF Eighth Air Force engaged only in precision bombing (*vis-à-vis* area bombing), and places the responsibility for the destruction of Dresden where it should lay—at the feet of Winston Churchill. Neither of these conclusions is innovative, however, having been reached by others previously. His exuberance to attack the Dresden decision, however, will tax even the most patient reader, given his conclusion that Dresden was lacking in military targets.

The strategic air offensive remains controversial, and its many unanswered questions deserve consideration. *Bomber Command* fails in its approach to those issues owing to its intentional incompleteness, and in the author's failure to appreciate that a military service or command performs in wartime only to the extent the nation has permitted it to prepare in peace.

W. HAYS PARKS

Herwig, Holger H. *"Luxury" Fleet: The Imperial German Navy 1888-1918*. Winchester, Mass.: Allen and Unwin, 1980. 314pp.

Since the publication of Jonathan Steinberg's *Yesterday's Deterrent: Tirpitz and The Birth of the German Battle Fleet* in 1965, historians have used the extensive archives of the German Navy to investigate the origins and fate of the Imperial Battle Fleet and its role in both domestic and foreign policy. As a microcosm of Wilhelminian society, the *Kaiserliche Marine* represents an opportunity for scholars to study in detail those forces that contributed to the period 1888-1918 in German and world history.

Unfortunately, much of the recent research has not been translated and the general reader is largely unaware of the pioneering and controversial works by such revisionist historians as Volker Berghahn who argues that the German Fleet was directed "against Parliament and England" and was built to protect the "Prussian-German system" against democratic pressures. Nor are the writings of Wilhelm Deist, Peter-Christian Witt, Frederick Forstmeier, and other German scholars available in translation. As the author of two major contributions to German naval history, *The German Naval Forces Corps: A Social and Political History 1890-1918* (1973) and *Politics of Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning 1888-1941* (1976), Holger

Herwig is well qualified to provide the first overview of the Imperial Navy that reflects the recent scholarship "that has radically altered accepted views" of the navy.

Herwig divides *"Luxury" Fleet* into three sections with Parts I and III organized chronologically (1888-1914 and 1914-1919) and Part II topically. After outlining the roots of Germany's naval ambitions, he analyzes the Tirpitz shipbuilding program with its ultimate goal of 60 capital ships—a battle fleet that would allow the High Seas Fleet a "genuine chance" against the Royal Navy in the North Sea. In Part II, Herwig reviews the German colonial plans and the navy's personnel policies. The last section of the book deals with the tactical deployment of the fleet in World War I, the defense of the Tirpitz battle fleet strategy against proponents of *guerre de course*, and the lack of any decisive battle action in 4 years of war.

Herwig touches upon all the major "debating points" in the building of the "luxury" fleet: the German justification for a large blue-water navy; naval strategy and planning; German-English naval rivalry; the impact of the *Dreadnought*; domestic implications of fleet building; and the role of Tirpitz. The broad scope of the book, however, results in several topics receiving short shrift, most notably the issue of unrestricted submarine warfare and the naval mutinies of 1917-1918.

There is no doubt that Herwig, who is included in the ranks of the revisionists by his critics, will be faulted for his treatment of military-naval themes and technical details. There are indeed a number of errors and interpretations in this book relating to naval construction and battle reports that will annoy professional readers and some specialists but these do not detract from the overall purpose of the author—to provide a general survey for historian and lay reader alike. A useful comparison to Herwig's view of the

navy and its leaders would be Walther Hubatsch's private publication *Kaiserliche Marine: Aufgaben und Leistungen* (1975) which is far more sympathetic to the building of the fleet and its role in the war.

In spite of the lack of footnotes, historians will find the book informative and most original in Herwig's analysis of the navy's political history, particularly the role of Tirpitz and the officer corps in the development and deployment of the High Seas Fleet. Herwig's brief treatment of the German colonial empire and the navy suggests an area for further study as does the fundamental issue of German naval strategy in the period 1888-1945—*Kleinkrieg* versus *Grosskrieg*. As Herwig's study demonstrates, the Imperial Navy is in need of its Arthur J. Marder and it is to the author's credit that "*Luxury*" Fleet points the way towards a definitive history.

KEITH W. BIRD  
New Hampshire Continuing Education  
Network

Johnson, Franklyn A. *Defence by Ministry: The British Ministry of Defence, 1944-1974*. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1980. 234pp.

*Defence by Ministry* is a study of the development of British defense administration since World War II. The book is a sequel to the author's earlier study, *Defence by Committee* (1960), that described the earlier administrative arrangements developed under the Committee of Imperial Defence.

Dr. Johnson's study is the first general history of the Ministry of Defence. The story is one of exceptional interest because it is part of a trend experienced by many nations. The growth of military technology and its ever-increasing complexity has forced aside older methods. In the area of administration, it has created the need

to have tighter control of armed force by central governments. The vast power and range of weapons has created the need to limit the decisions that a commander in the field can make without direct consultation, in order to prevent unwanted consequences. At the same time, these developments have increased the tendency for rapid decisions under pressure in a much broader range of defense matters. This, in turn, endangers the quality of judgment and the clarity of view that can be exercised in such circumstances. The administrative answers to these serious problems have been to increase central authority, to streamline command and to develop specialized bureaucracies and support organizations. It is in this very broad context that one must view the development of the Ministry of Defence.

The story is not a simple one. It involved the tenacious grasp of tradition and the struggle for political influence that are so much a part of government reorganization. At the same time, international events played a part in the shaping of the new arrangements. The end of World War II and the cold war followed by the birth of NATO, the Suez crisis and the general decline of British military and naval influence played an important role. The personalities of key figures were also important. During the war, Churchill had managed the British war machine as both Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. He had, himself, been minister of each of the three services as well as several related departments, and he had used this personal experience as the basis for employing the service chiefs of staff, rather than the service ministers, as the instruments of command. These wartime measures were continued after the war by Clement Atlee, who had advocated defense reform in the interwar period and had served in the War Cabinet as Deputy Prime Minister. Institutionalized in the Ministry of

Defence, these ideas continued to develop under the ministerial leadership of Duncan Sandys, Lord Thorneycroft, Denis Healey and Lord Carrington. Equally important was the appointment of a forceful military leader to the new position of Chief of the Defence Staff. In 1959, the appointment of Lord Mounthatten brought unprecedented professional qualifications as well as prestige to the position.

As Chief of the Defence Staff and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff for six years, Mounthatten was able to affect British defense organization in a revolutionary fashion. He was able to work for the closer integration of the services through unified commands under a more decisive Minister of Defence and a more powerful Chief of the Defence Staff. Not all of Mounthatten's plans came to fruition, but as Mounthatten himself noted in the Foreword to this book, "something permanent in this field of inter-service management and control had at least been achieved."

Perhaps we are too close to the events to have an entirely clear perspective on these very recent developments, but Johnson's work will undoubtedly stand until private papers and classified documents are released. As an American, Johnson has been able to stand back from the political disputes of the period, but at the same time his book is marked by two bothersome characteristics. First of all, the author makes continual reference to the American Defense Establishment in his descriptions of British developments. This is very useful in making the subject intelligible to Americans, but it may possibly overemphasize the influence that the American example had on those who were involved in the reorganization. Secondly, it appears that the author has leaned, for better or for worse, on the judgments of Lord Mounthatten. Time will tell how

impartial this approach has been, but certainly future students of the subject will be grateful for having this study which is so largely based on direct interviews and correspondence with the participants.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF  
Naval War College

Jurika, Stephen, Jr. *From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: The Memoirs of Admiral Arthur W. Radford*. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1980. 476pp.

The memoirs of any former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff deserve a careful reading; Admiral Radford's more than most, because he was Chairman when "massive retaliation" saw the light of day and he presided over the JCS decision process at the crisis over Dien Bien Phu. Admiral Radford, according to the editor of this volume, did not originally write his memoirs for publication but for scholars who might consult his papers (which are on deposit in the Hoover Institution Library). The original source material, from which this volume was distilled, covers 2,000 typed pages. The editing (and annotation) of these pages is, throughout, carefully and thoughtfully done, and the Hoover Institution and Stephen Jurika are to be congratulated on a labor well done. In one respect the title misleads a bit, inasmuch as the word "Vietnam" suggests the U.S. troop involvement era while the last part of the narrative itself, written in late 1972, ends in 1954, less than a year before Admiral Radford's death on 17 August 1973.

The memoirs are at least as interesting for their strictly naval and naval career aspects, though, as for their coverage of the national security matters. Naturally enough, the first half of the book concentrates on the earlier, naval years as Radford progressed up

the career ladder. Graduating from the Academy in 1916, he saw active service in World War I, becoming a naval aviator in 1920. With World War II, he attained flag rank, commanding CARDIV 2 and TG38. Expecting retirement, he was next assigned to the Secretary of the Navy to head the Navy effort on "unification." For that, read: "Navy effort to survive in the mission/budget wars." A surprisingly clear and well-drawn picture of the congressional hearing process emerges from his pages, with the whole B-36 controversy also quite dispassionately recounted, detail by detail. The self-image that emerges is ultimately that of a quite sympathetic person, committed to his own cause with whole heart, but not inclined to confuse his enemies with the devil incarnate.

Despite this service advocacy (or, perhaps, initially because of it), Radford is promoted to four-stars in 1949 and made CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT and then, in 1953, is nominated by President Eisenhower to be chairman of the JCS. In between these points on his career ladder, he was present at the fateful Wake Island meeting of President Truman and General MacArthur. Of this, Admiral Radford gives some clear clues about where and how these two spoke past one another.

In the last section, intended to cover 1953-1957, the emphasis becomes politicomilitary and diplomatic. From today's perspective it seems odd how much JCS energy went into the problem of how to cope militarily with what everyone assumed was an aggressive, expansive China. Indeed, the ultimately tiresome discussions between the U.S. and French authorities over the Indochina situation always begin from that assumption. The Vietnam problem, seen initially in that context, begins its slow transfiguration in American thinking during Radford's last period in office, especially as the climax of French operations (and

imminent disaster) is reached as the noose tightens around the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu.

Scholars will appreciate the new light that Radford's papers shed on precisely how the United States reacted to that coming event. Radford quotes extensively from French General Ely's own memoirs, showing not only the complexity of the American official reaction but the stark simplicity of the French understanding of that reaction. In the very last two pages of the memoirs, Radford quotes Ike's letter to Churchill that, on the one hand shows a willingness to have the United States use force to aid the French, but insists that it must be a coalition effort. Radford comments (p. 449) that "there were some, including myself, who thought *we should intervene by ourselves if we could not get additional help*," but adds that 18 years later "I feel the President's position was the correct one." Despite Radford's personal views, his record documents his scrupulous adherence to official policy.

All in all, this is an interesting book. Now and again Radford lapses into loose generalizations, showing extreme and vintage cold war views, particularly in assuming that a harder stand should have been made somewhere, which would have then prevented the problems which followed:  $A + B = C$ . In contrast, where he writes of things he did himself, or had a direct hand in, his essentially workmanlike and pragmatic approach is sharply in evidence.

FREDERICK H. HARTMANN  
Naval War College

Kennedy, Ludovic. *The Death of the Tirpitz*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1980. 176pp.

The German battleships of World War II offer contrasting challenges to the historians. *Bismarck*, ploughing her glory-course through starshell blaze and torpedo wake, never fails to seduce the

reader. Her story is a historian's delight. *Tirpitz*, however, lurking in a lairlike fiord—dangerous, elusive, waiting hungrily to feed—left behind a story of dark sorties and slow death. *Bismarck* fought a championship fight; *Tirpitz* succumbed at last to a series of assassination attempts. *Pursuit: The Chase and Sinking of the Bismarck* was a triumph of recreative history, full of the immediacy and passion of savage chase and imminent battle. The book at hand, by the same author, has none of these qualities.

Granted, it is difficult to lend the same kind of dramatic intensity to an attenuated "end game" as it is to a tension-filled chase. But there are different dramatic variations to all endeavor, and the story of *Tirpitz* is as rich and suspenseful as that of her sister. To make his chronicle of *Bismarck* crackle with excitement, first-person immediacy and authenticity, Kennedy interviewed hundreds of survivors of that episode. For *Tirpitz*, in contrast, Kennedy seems to have confined himself to a handful of well-known secondary works, blending in a few recently released ULTRA dispatches for flavor.

They are not enough. The text is limp and colorless. The ULTRA messages are interesting as a sideline notation but more suited to a focused essay on Admiralty intelligence efforts.

The "death scenes"—the valiant runs of X-6 and X-7, the *Barracuda* dives, the final *Lancaster* bomb-release—these heroic moments are never effectively evoked, as Kennedy did in *Pursuit*. Even more conspicuous in its absence is a feeling for *Tirpitz* and her crew. Perhaps Kennedy could not decide on a specific focus. Perhaps both he and his publisher merely intended to reprint the text of his BBC documentary "Target Tirpitz," along with some still photo padding.

This is a coffeetable book, like so many being published today in Britain

about the war. It would make a great pictorial introduction for a young boy. It is not, however, a vision of history. This is an unfortunate judgment but in the case of Kennedy, unavoidable. He set, after all, such high expectations.

MICHAEL VIAHOS

Liska, George. *Russia and World Order*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980. 194pp.

George Liska's new book has a central theme, as illustrated by the title. But in form it came to be a book by unring pieces produced for other occasions. The focus begins on Europe "without Gaullism" and the United States "without imperialism," then shifts to "the issues," and then to "strategy." This last section, "multiple revolutions and the two world systems," is followed by a conclusion and a "coda." The central theme focuses on diverting the Soviet Union into less of a confrontation role. Liska says that "Any U.S.-Soviet condominium in Europe going beyond a shared interest in the politico-military evolutions in the two Germanies is the least likely prospect" but, by contrast, he believes that what he calls "Soviet global outreach" has "promise" because it will "expose the Soviet Union to global learning and is likely to ease Soviet Russian complexes induced by regional confinement."

In style, the book does not make for easy reading. In compensation, there is much in the content that reflects Liska's originality of approach. And because the book is not at all rigid about the coverage of topics, comments are included on many fairly separated subjects besides the main focus.

I found the last fourth of the book, which deals with a wide range of subjects, the most interesting part, beginning with about page 150. To give a sample of both his style and approach in this section, on page 153, remarking on the argument about whether state-

focused theory is still relevant, Liska says:

With questionable influence on real affairs and actual strategies, but also as if weary of sterile quarrels over method and nostalgic for the excitement of the post-World War II realist-idealist debate, international relations scholars of the post-cold war era reenact—like so many medieval scholastics and early-modern scientists—the contest over rival cosmologies...between two types of geo-centric orders for the earthly cosmos: the traditional one, focused on the territorial state in isolation and interaction, and a revisionist one, focused on the planet earth as the shared habitat of a world community.

The last chapter, which Liska calls "Coda," and which is a paper he presented in Jerusalem, is probably the best part of the book.

FREDERICK H. HARTMANN  
Naval War College

Manchester, William. *Goodbye, Darkness: A Memoir of the Pacific War*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1980. 401pp.

When I read William Manchester's biography of MacArthur, it occurred to me that his uncritical enthusiasm for the general's alleged ability to avoid heavy casualties was somehow tied to Manchester's own traumatic experience as a marine on Okinawa, where he had been severely wounded. *Goodbye, Darkness*, a personal view of the war in the Pacific, based in part on that bloody campaign, amply justifies my initial conclusion. Beyond that, moreover, it clearly shows how Manchester's earlier background provided an even stronger basis for his revulsion against the carnage and misery of war.

Manchester's forebears had fought in American wars as far back as the Revolution. His father, a World War I

marine, had been badly wounded and nearly left for dead in France. Manchester himself grew up "a mild, fragile boy," avoiding violence and falling prey to bullies. Infatuated, nonetheless, with the romantic glories of war, he dreamt of valor and righteous victory even as he yearned for the structured discipline of the soldier's ranks. His father's early death in 1941 moved him deeply and led inevitably to his own decision to join the Marines in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor.

For the sensitive young recruit, service in the Marine Corps was at once the fulfillment of exotic fancies and a shocking introduction to the harshness of military life. The blurred ambivalence with which he faced his new existence reached startling clarity 2 years later on the shell-torn slopes of Okinawa's Sugar Loaf Hill. In the fighting around that bloody piece of real estate, Manchester sustained a "million-dollar wound," a bullet scratch serious enough to require evacuation but otherwise of little effect. Safe and sound in a field hospital, he went AWOL to rejoin his outfit and participate in another assault. Here he met his fate: a bursting shell that fragmented his body, burst his eardrums, tore his skull, and left him, like his father, apparently dead for nearly 4 hours before a corpsman saw a sign of life and rescued him.

Reflecting on this years later, Manchester realized that it was somewhere on Sugar Loaf Hill, "where I confronted the dark underside of battle, that passion died between me and the Marine Corps." He sensed and now resented the "evil...done in the name of honor...the tacky appeals to patriotism...behind the mass butchery." Having held grand illusions, he had irrevocably lost them. "My dream of war had been colorful but puerile...so evanescent, so ethereal, so wholly unrealistic that it deserved to be demolished."

Manchester's memoir of his life in

the Corps—especially his description of combat and men under fire—is superb: sensitive, realistic, moving. Unfortunately, it represents only about a third of his book. An unbalanced, error-marred history of the Matines' war and a sort of travelogue of the author's recent visit to the Pacific constitute the bulk of the volume. His history suffers from the same sort of exaggeration, misrepresentation, and shortsightedness that afflicted his MacArthur biography, while the account of his return to the war's arena is less impressive for the reader than it may have been for Manchester.

One must accept this in order to get at the fascinating personal material interspersed throughout the volume—and it is well worth the trouble. But it would have been a far better book if written simply as a reminiscence.

STANLEY I. FALK  
U.S. Army Center of Military History

Norton, Augustus R. and Greenberg, Martin H., eds. *Studies in Nuclear Terrorism*. Boston: G.K. Hall, 1979, 465pp.

As we enter the decade of the 1980s, the basic question relating to the threat of nuclear terrorism is no longer *if*, but rather *when* an episode of mass destruction will occur. In September 1976 a British Royal Commission admitted that potential terrorist nuclear incidents had become credible, and British security agencies have since adhered to that view. Although American governmental experts remain more skeptical, at least publicly, several best-selling novels here and abroad have stirred the popular imagination by carefully detailing acts of terrorist nuclear blackmail and the increasing likelihood of their success.

The recent revelation of an existing U.S. Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST), and its investigation of over 50 nuclear threats during the past decade,

means that the U.S. Government also takes potential nuclear terrorism far more seriously than it has been so far willing to admit. Almost every contribution to this impressive volume indicates that the principal issue in potential nuclear events is one of credibility. Catastrophe theory cannot permit a single miscalculation when governments are required to think the unthinkable.

In 1978 the Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) informed the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee that terrorist nuclear incidents were indeed possible, and that the NRC was concerned about the safety of domestic nuclear installations and power plants. The National Security Council has encouraged several Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between Federal Agencies on the subject of potential terrorist activity that include a working agreement between the FBI and the Department of Energy (DOE) on nuclear threats and between DOE and the Department of Defense on incidents involving radioactive material or nuclear weapons. Expert testimony before congressional committees has dramatically demonstrated that future terrorist nuclear threats may well have operational capability.

As of this writing there are 235 nuclear power reactors located in 22 different countries that have produced approximately 100 tons of plutonium capable of making 20,000 nuclear bombs. And if this is not sufficient attraction for terrorist mischief, then what is one to say of the alleged 2,300 incidents (mainly operational error and mechanical failures) that Critical Mass, a Ralph Nader-affiliated antinuclear group, claims occurred during 1979? In such circumstances, even if the actual number of incidents is reduced by two-thirds, the potential for theft, sabotage, and destruction is not exactly minuscule.



The Rand Corporation has documented several instances of uranium thefts, although customers for this illicit material have mainly been governments rather than ideological or criminal groups. Much more disturbing, when viewed in the overall context, are the appendixes provided by Norton and Greenberg that reveal 285 threats of violence made against U.S. licensed and unlicensed nuclear facilities between 1969 and 1977. Outright attacks on nuclear plants in foreign countries have already occurred, cited by a number of contributors to this fascinating volume, but thus far the damage to human life and property has been minimal. Nevertheless, as Louis René Beres warns, "the safeguarding of nuclear materials must be carried out internationally, steps must be taken to limit the spread of nuclear technology and nuclear materials throughout the world, and to tighten up international inspection safeguards."

The editors have divided their large volume into four different parts: Part I consists of articles by Roberta Wohlsterter and Thomas Schelling that attempt to relate the historical perspective of terrorist practice to future prospects for nuclear terrorism. The latter author, as well as a number of other contributors to this compendium, emphasizes problems of nuclear proliferation taking precedence over credible threats of nuclear terrorism. Part II deals with the possibilities or likelihood of the terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons. Part III is in fact a debate between those who fear the potentialities of nuclear terrorism and those who discount its probability. The microtheorists have the clear edge over the macrotheorists in the material presented. Part IV centers on coping with terrorist threats both real and imagined, and the potential consequences relating to specific policy

choices. In a well-documented introductory survey, Norton dryly concludes that "[f]or the foreseeable future... the nuclear terror problem is more likely to engage intellectuals than terrorists."

Almost every significant American expert in the fields of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation is represented in this important study, and the editors have diligently attempted to present all sides of the picture. The result is at best unsettling with the majority of authors indicating their belief that sooner or later in one form or another the threat of nuclear terrorism will become credible if not inevitable. R.W. Mengel, in the book's longest article, is skeptical about terrorists' capabilities and their desire to employ high-risk technologies of mass destruction. But he, too, admits that "[n]ew technology terrorism represents an unknown, realized threat." No expert included by the editors has shied away from zero-minus security assessments.

Analyses of terrorist theory and descriptions of terrorist practice can be found throughout this study, and not the least of the book's contributions is a wide-ranging discussion of terrorist motivations and techniques. There is more agreement among commentators than one would ordinarily suppose, and this magnifies rather than diminishes the importance of the subject matter. A need to get priorities in order, and the urgency of the task, are the dominant themes of the selections presented. And well they might be, for as the London *Economist* warned in September 1979: "The alternative, as terrorists eventually turn nuclear, is going to be to see the world blown up."

This book is must reading for anyone concerned with the preservation of world public order.

ROBERT A. FRIEDLANDER  
Ohio Northern University

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *World Armament and Disarmament*. London: Taylor and Francis Ltd., 1980. Distribution: New York: Crane & Russak. 514pp.

This is the 11th of the series by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The first few editions of the *SIPRI Yearbook* (1968/1969) showed considerable promise as an independent source of useful and reliable information and analyses on matters of defense, arms control, and disarmament. Unfortunately, although containing three excellent chapters, the *SIPRI Yearbook 1980* continues the series' more contemporary style of haphazard reporting, lazy and often faulty "analysis," and clear anti-American politics. In this regard, the problems with the *SIPRI Yearbook 1980* are so similar to those of last year's volume that much effort can be saved by referring to the review of the *SIPRI Yearbook 1979* that appeared in the March-April issue of this journal. Nonetheless, let me highlight a few key items.

Following a well-established formula, the *SIPRI Yearbook 1980* opens with an "executive summary" of current issues in defense, arms control and disarmament, which is then followed by the requisite chapters on world military expenditures, and the international arms trade. In the introduction we learn that new American strategic technologies give U.S. RVs "...a probability over 50 percent for one shot and over 90 percent for two shots" against Soviet ICBM silos. However, Soviet RVs have "...a 60 percent [single-shot] chance of destroying a U.S. Minuteman ICBM in its silo. Two warheads fired in succession give about a 90 percent success." Talk about American technological supremacy! How the United States is able to parlay a lower (than the Soviet) single-shot kill probability into a higher (than the

Soviet) two-shot kill probability is indeed amazing. The book contains a large number of such errors.

An insight into SIPRI's lazy approach to data collection and analysis can be gleaned from the chapter on military expenditures. With respect to SIPRI's estimates for Soviet military spending: "The figure...can be said to be a consequence of 'equal disbelief' of the low, flat official Soviet series and the high CIA dollar estimates."

In other words, SIPRI uses an equal weighted average. One would think that an organization that is as well funded as SIPRI could invest towards beefing up its methodological sophistication.

The chapter on arms transfers has some potentially interesting country-by-country observations to make. However, its critical tone towards Western transfers and its almost apologist attitude towards Soviet (and East European) transfers makes one question the objectivity of the chapter in general.

There is a chapter on Euro-strategic weapons. Here U.S. weapons not likely to enter service before the mid-1980s are stacked up against currently deployed (and 10-year old technology) Soviet systems. The reader is left to guess the result of the "threat analysis." Even more fascinating is SIPRI's conclusion that because the Soviets are *only* making qualitative improvements in their Euro-strategic nuclear forces, they will not present any increased military threat to the NATO nations. NATO's planned quantitative improvements, on the other hand, are dangerous and destabilizing. Yet in the introductory chapter we are told that U.S. efforts to improve the quality of its strategic forces have been dangerous and destabilizing—but not Soviet quantitative improvements to its strategic forces. You figure it out. SIPRI evidently hasn't learned what everyone else knows—the distinction between "qualitative" improvements and

"quantitative" improvements is a false dichotomy. MIRVing (alleged to be a qualitative improvement) greatly multiplies the number of deliverable warheads. Increases in delivery accuracy and system reliability (also labeled qualitative improvements) allow a nation to reduce the number of warheads aimed at a given target, thus freeing up warheads for retargeting. And, of course, doubling the number of ICBMs a country possesses (i.e., quantitative improvements) can produce the same hard-target kill capability as particular combinations of increases in warhead yields and accuracy (i.e., qualitative improvements).

Chapters 5, 6, and 7 review issues of satellite verification for arms control in general, the contents and implications of the SALT II treaty (assuming ratification), and the problems of verifying SALT II. These are informative and interesting. Chapter 6, which dissects and analyzes the SALT II agreement is particularly noteworthy, and includes a very detailed and useful subject index to the treaty. Chapter 7 is a good survey of the various techniques available for verifying SALT II, taken provision by provision.

The next chapter discusses nuclear proliferation. The problem with this discussion is that SIPRI does not seem to recognize that nuclear weapons production is possible without nuclear energy production. Thus, SIPRI's analysis of the issue in general remains superficial, narrow, and flawed. For example, SIPRI maintains that once Brazil acquires nuclear energy self-sufficiency (as the result of an energy technology agreement with West Germany) "...it will be able to

manufacture nuclear weapons." The simple fact is that Brazil has been capable of undertaking a dedicated nuclear weapons program for more than a dozen years (and for a lot less than what they're paying West Germany).

The remaining chapters cover such topics as nuclear testing, prohibitions on chemical and radiological weapons, "confidence building measures," and other goings-on in the disarmament field.

Reading the *SIPRI Yearbook 1980* leaves this reviewer with the clear impression that many of the facts, indicators, observations, and analyses are chosen (and distorted) in order to make a political statement: the United States drives the arms race while the U.S.S.R. reacts justifiably. Consider the following observation:

The number of nuclear explosions conducted by the USA and the USSR in 1979 was nearly 40 percent higher than in 1975. [page 332]

In fact, by SIPRI's own data (page 364) *U.S. tests have decreased by 6 percent* (16 in 1975 to 15 in 1979) while *Soviet tests have increased 87 percent* (from 15 to 28)! This, of course, does yield an average 40 percent increase—but it gives a completely misleading impression. With the exceptions of chapters 5, 6, and 7, what isn't biased is merely poor.

The *SIPRI Yearbook 1980* sells for \$49.50. This is approximately 1½ barrels of crude oil at OPEC prices. Buy oil—it's a better investment.

STEPHEN S. MEYER  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology