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The Almanac of the World Military Power

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direction as he enters the nether world of Operations. *The OPS Officer's Manual* is recommended reading for all Surface Warfare Officers.

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Dupuy, Trevor N., et al. *The Almanac of World Military Power*. San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1980. 418pp.

Cline, Ray S. *World Power Trends and U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. 228pp.

National power assessment is an inherently difficult task complicated by the necessity of making subjective and sometimes arbitrary value judgments. Mere rankings of a nation's military order of battle, natural resources, industrial capacity, and gross national product, while indeed important, can often be misleading in any overall assessment of that nation's national power. What is necessary is a complementary assessment of such factors as leadership, morale, national will, military efficiency, mobilization potential, etc., etc. Further complicating the task, especially from a military standpoint, is the consideration of alliances and treaties, and how effective or binding they are likely to be. Does an analyst look at composite strengths of alliance members, or should he heed the words of Charles de Gaulle when he said, "Treaties are like flowers and young girls—they last while they last"? Power assessments of states or regions then, while important, indeed critical, are inherently subjective. The accuracy of such assessments and their usefulness to national security managers and planners represent the stuff that "analysis" is all about.

The fourth edition of *The Almanac of World Military Power* is a comprehensive compilation of data on the armed forces and power potential

(as measured in geostrategic factors such as geography, population, GNP, military expenditures, iron ore production, fuel production, and electric power output) for nearly all of the world's countries—more than 150 listings. Accompanying maps, while useful for general geographical location and the location of major cities and ports, appear to be black-and-white reproductions of nontopographical, colored originals, and are of limited quality. The *Almanac* also contains regional surveys of the world in which the strategic importance, regional alliances, and recent conflicts are examined, if only in a very general sense. In fact, the authors devote only 41 pages to this section that divides the world into 10 regions, and 13 pages are maps and blank facing pages.

The hulk of the *Almanac* is devoted to the country listings, arranged alphabetically from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, without regard to alliances or geographical region. It is a valuable, single-source document of useful data—precisely what it purports to be—an almanac. The authors make no outward attempt, except in a very general sense, to assess the data; that is left to the reader. Still, the selection of sources, a treatment of "policies and posture," even the compilation of data itself represent at least an implied comparative assessment of global power relationships.

Ray S. Cline, on the other hand, in *World Power Trends and U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s*, quite clearly sets out not only to assess the power of nations in an international context but goes so far as to rank-order 77 of the world's nations in a final consolidated listing. He also prepares a regional assessment of power—11 geographical regions that he calls "politelectronic zones" that, he explains, represent the relatively static factors of geography and the consideration of the more fluid political, economic, and military factors

of today's world. Cline has developed a formula for determining perceived power, which he believes is the *decisive* factor in international relations. Perceived power, according to this formula, consists of an equation made up of certain elements of national power to which the author assigns numerical values. More precisely, perceived power (Pp) is measured in terms of an index number that derives from the sum of critical mass (C), which is population and territory, economic capability (E), and military capability (M), multiplied by the sum of strategic purpose (S) and the will to pursue national strategy (W). Thus Cline's formula for measuring the power of nations is $Pp = (C+E+M) \times (S+W)$.

Admittedly, any attempt to rank-order the world in terms of national power is bound to rest in large part on subjective and sometimes arbitrary judgment. But Cline's approach is actually to assign numerical values to those judgments and thus "quantify" the subjective as well as the objective. What's more, he uses the assigned numerical values of the most subjective elements—purpose and will—as *multipliers* in his formula, giving them an even greater importance in his overall assessment. Turkey, for example, to which Cline assigns a value rating in mass, economic, and military factors of more than twice that of Chile's (C+E+M of 36 to 19), falls 12 places *behind* Chile in total power ranking because of a much lower value rating for the multiplier factor of strategy and will (S+W of 0.5 for Turkey to 1.3 for Chile). In Cline's own words, "The coefficients listed...reflect the author's personal evaluation...and are only as good as the judgment behind the rating." One must question the judgment behind many of the ratings in *World Power Trends*. The book's value, however, is not in the ratings themselves, but rather in the framework of the author's conceptual

approach. It stimulates thinking about American defense policy and forces the reader to examine the elements of geopolitical strength systematically.

Assessing shifts in geostrategic power relationships among the nations of the world—shifts that have occurred with increasing frequency in recent years—is a formidable task. It is similar to the painting of a moving train from a stationary position. Where should one pause to dip the brush? The beginning of a new decade seems a logical place. These two books represent approaches to accomplishing that task. The optimistic hope of this reviewer is that, taken together, the entire train will get a fresh coat of paint.

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Hastings, Max. *Bomber Command*. New York: The Dial Press/James Wade, 1979. 390pp.

Few military campaigns have been subject of as much scrutiny as the strategic air offensive waged by the Royal Air Force Bomber Command and the USAAF Eighth Air Force over Europe during World War II. Fewer continue to generate the emotion between critics and supporters that that long, devastating (to all sides) affray does. Regrettably, Max Hastings' *Bomber Command* provides no new light on the subject, but is certain to intensify the heat of that ever-raging fire.

The author employs an interesting style, intermixing chapters containing accounts told from the squadron and aircrew level of actual operations with chapters discussing evolving RAF high command policy. In this respect, the book is much easier to read than its principal predecessor, Anthony Verrier's *The Bomber Offensive* (1968). This does not necessarily make *Bomber Command* the better book, however. Indeed, the book falls far short of either *Bomber Offensive* or the