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Bomber Command

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of today's world. Cline has developed a formula for determining perceived power, which he believes is the *decisive* factor in international relations. Perceived power, according to this formula, consists of an equation made up of certain elements of national power to which the author assigns numerical values. More precisely, perceived power (Pp) is measured in terms of an index number that derives from the sum of critical mass (C), which is population and territory, economic capability (E), and military capability (M), multiplied by the sum of strategic purpose (S) and the will to pursue national strategy (W). Thus Cline's formula for measuring the power of nations is $Pp = (C+E+M) \times (S+W)$.

Admittedly, any attempt to rank-order the world in terms of national power is bound to rest in large part on subjective and sometimes arbitrary judgment. But Cline's approach is actually to assign numerical values to those judgments and thus "quantify" the subjective as well as the objective. What's more, he uses the assigned numerical values of the most subjective elements—purpose and will—as *multipliers* in his formula, giving them an even greater importance in his overall assessment. Turkey, for example, to which Cline assigns a value rating in mass, economic, and military factors of more than twice that of Chile's (C+E+M of 36 to 19), falls 12 places *behind* Chile in total power ranking because of a much lower value rating for the multiplier factor of strategy and will (S+W of 0.5 for Turkey to 1.3 for Chile). In Cline's own words, "The coefficients listed...reflect the author's personal evaluation...and are only as good as the judgment behind the rating." One must question the judgment behind many of the ratings in *World Power Trends*. The book's value, however, is not in the ratings themselves, but rather in the framework of the author's conceptual

approach. It stimulates thinking about American defense policy and forces the reader to examine the elements of geopolitical strength systematically.

Assessing shifts in geostrategic power relationships among the nations of the world—shifts that have occurred with increasing frequency in recent years—is a formidable task. It is similar to the painting of a moving train from a stationary position. Where should one pause to dip the brush? The beginning of a new decade seems a logical place. These two books represent approaches to accomplishing that task. The optimistic hope of this reviewer is that, taken together, the entire train will get a fresh coat of paint.

DALLACE L. MEEHAN

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Hastings, Max. *Bomber Command*.

New York: The Dial Press/James Wade, 1979. 390pp.

Few military campaigns have been subject of as much scrutiny as the strategic air offensive waged by the Royal Air Force Bomber Command and the USAAF Eighth Air Force over Europe during World War II. Fewer continue to generate the emotion between critics and supporters that that long, devastating (to all sides) affray does. Regrettably, Max Hastings' *Bomber Command* provides no new light on the subject, but is certain to intensify the heat of that ever-raging fire.

The author employs an interesting style, intermixing chapters containing accounts told from the squadron and aircrew level of actual operations with chapters discussing evolving RAF high command policy. In this respect, the book is much easier to read than its principal predecessor, Anthony Verrier's *The Bomber Offensive* (1968). This does not necessarily make *Bomber Command* the better book, however. Indeed, the book falls far short of either *Bomber Offensive* or the

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official British history, Noble and Frankland's *The Strategic Air Offensive*.

The difficulty with *Bomber Command* lies not only with what is said, but more with what the author has chosen not to say. He is quick off the mark to establish the book's principal premise—that the bombing campaign was ineffective, mismanaged, and immoral (read illegal). Yet in his chapter on the development of the RAF between the wars, there is no discussion of the myriad external factors that determined the capability of Bomber Command during the initial years of World War II (and that led to Bomber Command's area bombing policy). Thus there is no mention of the Ten-Year Rule, adopted by the British Cabinet in 1919 and actually carried through almost 15 years, that presumed that Great Britain would not be engaged in a European conflict for at least 10 years—and accordingly made emasculating cuts in the defense budget. There is no discussion of the internecine warfare over the remaining defense dollars between the fledgling RAF and the older services during this period of parsimony, and the detrimental effect it had on funding for operational training, research and development. Similarly, there is an absence of comment on the effect on RAF capabilities resulting from the moratorium on research, development and acquisition within the RAF that existed from 1928 to 1934 in order that Great Britain could negotiate in "good faith" with regard to a total ban on bombers at the League of Nations Disarmament Conference. Finally, the author neglects the subservience of Bomber Command development to that of Fighter Command in the years 1934 to 1939 as Great Britain prepared for war.

Thus in his criticism of Bomber Command's operational policies, while the author devotes some pages to explaining *how* that policy evolved once

hostilities began, he fails to tell *why*. He judges the wartime leaders on what he, in retrospect, believes they should have been capable of, rather than judging them on the basis of the resources and information available to them at the time of their decisions. He not only emphasizes the comments of the very few dissenters to the neglect of the general feeling at the time, but (p. 261) forces Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, leader of Bomber Command from 1942-1945, to a premature demise (Air Marshal Harris remains alive and well). His conclusions regarding the illegality of British-U.S. area bombing practices likewise are premature. The nations of the world did not agree on any rules governing bombing until 1977. While those rules prohibit area bombing "which treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city," they do not prohibit such bombing when it is done in response to complex concealment techniques by the defender, which generally was the case in the European campaign. Notwithstanding what may be considered to be a prohibition on an obsolete form of warfare, no military power, major or minor, has yet ratified these rules. Hence what author Hastings would like to appear obvious in the 1942-1945 era in fact remains unclear today.

To his credit, the author puts paid to the well-established myth that the USAAF Eighth Air Force engaged only in precision bombing (*vis-à-vis* area bombing), and places the responsibility for the destruction of Dresden where it should lay—at the feet of Winston Churchill. Neither of these conclusions is innovative, however, having been reached by others previously. His exuberance to attack the Dresden decision, however, will tax even the most patient reader, given his conclusion that Dresden was lacking in military targets.

The strategic air offensive remains controversial, and its many unanswered questions deserve consideration. *Bomber Command* fails in its approach to those issues owing to its intentional incompleteness, and in the author's failure to appreciate that a military service or command performs in wartime only to the extent the nation has permitted it to prepare in peace.

W. HAYS PARKS

Herwig, Holger H. *"Luxury" Fleet: The Imperial German Navy 1888-1918*. Winchester, Mass.: Allen and Unwin, 1980. 314pp.

Since the publication of Jonathan Steinberg's *Yesterday's Deterrent: Tirpitz and The Birth of the German Battle Fleet* in 1965, historians have used the extensive archives of the German Navy to investigate the origins and fate of the Imperial Battle Fleet and its role in both domestic and foreign policy. As a microcosm of Wilhelminian society, the *Kaiserliche Marine* represents an opportunity for scholars to study in detail those forces that contributed to the period 1888-1918 in German and world history.

Unfortunately, much of the recent research has not been translated and the general reader is largely unaware of the pioneering and controversial works by such revisionist historians as Volker Berghahn who argues that the German Fleet was directed "against Parliament and England" and was built to protect the "Prussian-German system" against democratic pressures. Nor are the writings of Wilhelm Deist, Peter-Christian Witt, Frederick Forstmeier, and other German scholars available in translation. As the author of two major contributions to German naval history, *The German Naval Forces Corps: A Social and Political History 1890-1918* (1973) and *Politics of Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning 1888-1941* (1976), Holger

Herwig is well qualified to provide the first overview of the Imperial Navy that reflects the recent scholarship "that has radically altered accepted views" of the navy.

Herwig divides *"Luxury" Fleet* into three sections with Parts I and III organized chronologically (1888-1914 and 1914-1919) and Part II topically. After outlining the roots of Germany's naval ambitions, he analyzes the Tirpitz shipbuilding program with its ultimate goal of 60 capital ships—a battle fleet that would allow the High Seas Fleet a "genuine chance" against the Royal Navy in the North Sea. In Part II, Herwig reviews the German colonial plans and the navy's personnel policies. The last section of the book deals with the tactical deployment of the fleet in World War I, the defense of the Tirpitz battle fleet strategy against proponents of *guerre de course*, and the lack of any decisive battle action in 4 years of war.

Herwig touches upon all the major "debating points" in the building of the "luxury" fleet: the German justification for a large blue-water navy; naval strategy and planning; German-English naval rivalry; the impact of the *Dreadnought*; domestic implications of fleet building; and the role of Tirpitz. The broad scope of the book, however, results in several topics receiving short shrift, most notably the issue of unrestricted submarine warfare and the naval mutinies of 1917-1918.

There is no doubt that Herwig, who is included in the ranks of the revisionists by his critics, will be faulted for his treatment of military-naval themes and technical details. There are indeed a number of errors and interpretations in this book relating to naval construction and battle reports that will annoy professional readers and some specialists but these do not detract from the overall purpose of the author—to provide a general survey for historian and lay reader alike. A useful comparison to Herwig's view of the