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## Defence by Ministry: The British Ministry of Defences, 1944-1974

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navy and its leaders would be Walther Hubatsch's private publication *Kaiserliche Marine: Aufgaben und Leistungen* (1975) which is far more sympathetic to the building of the fleet and its role in the war.

In spite of the lack of footnotes, historians will find the book informative and most original in Herwig's analysis of the navy's political history, particularly the role of Tirpitz and the officer corps in the development and deployment of the High Seas Fleet. Herwig's brief treatment of the German colonial empire and the navy suggests an area for further study as does the fundamental issue of German naval strategy in the period 1888-1945—*Kleinkrieg* versus *Grosskrieg*. As Herwig's study demonstrates, the Imperial Navy is in need of its Arthur J. Marder and it is to the author's credit that "*Luxury*" *Fleet* points the way towards a definitive history.

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Johnson, Franklyn A. *Defence by Ministry: The British Ministry of Defence, 1944-1974*. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1980. 234pp.

*Defence by Ministry* is a study of the development of British defense administration since World War II. The book is a sequel to the author's earlier study, *Defence by Committee* (1960), that described the earlier administrative arrangements developed under the Committee of Imperial Defence.

Dr. Johnson's study is the first general history of the Ministry of Defence. The story is one of exceptional interest because it is part of a trend experienced by many nations. The growth of military technology and its ever-increasing complexity has forced aside older methods. In the area of administration, it has created the need

to have tighter control of armed force by central governments. The vast power and range of weapons has created the need to limit the decisions that a commander in the field can make without direct consultation, in order to prevent unwanted consequences. At the same time, these developments have increased the tendency for rapid decisions under pressure in a much broader range of defense matters. This, in turn, endangers the quality of judgment and the clarity of view that can be exercised in such circumstances. The administrative answers to these serious problems have been to increase central authority, to streamline command and to develop specialized bureaucracies and support organizations. It is in this very broad context that one must view the development of the Ministry of Defence.

The story is not a simple one. It involved the tenacious grasp of tradition and the struggle for political influence that are so much a part of government reorganization. At the same time, international events played a part in the shaping of the new arrangements. The end of World War II and the cold war followed by the birth of NATO, the Suez crisis and the general decline of British military and naval influence played an important role. The personalities of key figures were also important. During the war, Churchill had managed the British war machine as both Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. He had, himself, been minister of each of the three services as well as several related departments, and he had used this personal experience as the basis for employing the service chiefs of staff, rather than the service ministers, as the instruments of command. These wartime measures were continued after the war by Clement Atlee, who had advocated defense reform in the interwar period and had served in the War Cabinet as Deputy Prime Minister. Institutionalized in the Ministry of

Defence, these ideas continued to develop under the ministerial leadership of Duncan Sandys, Lord Thorneycroft, Denis Healey and Lord Carrington. Equally important was the appointment of a forceful military leader to the new position of Chief of the Defence Staff. In 1959, the appointment of Lord Mounthatten brought unprecedented professional qualifications as well as prestige to the position.

As Chief of the Defence Staff and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff for six years, Mounthatten was able to affect British defense organization in a revolutionary fashion. He was able to work for the closer integration of the services through unified commands under a more decisive Minister of Defence and a more powerful Chief of the Defence Staff. Not all of Mounthatten's plans came to fruition, but as Mounthatten himself noted in the Foreword to this book, "something permanent in this field of inter-service management and control had at least been achieved."

Perhaps we are too close to the events to have an entirely clear perspective on these very recent developments, but Johnson's work will undoubtedly stand until private papers and classified documents are released. As an American, Johnson has been able to stand back from the political disputes of the period, but at the same time his book is marked by two bothersome characteristics. First of all, the author makes continual reference to the American Defense Establishment in his descriptions of British developments. This is very useful in making the subject intelligible to Americans, but it may possibly overemphasize the influence that the American example had on those who were involved in the reorganization. Secondly, it appears that the author has leaned, for better or for worse, on the judgments of Lord Mounthatten. Time will tell how

impartial this approach has been, but certainly future students of the subject will be grateful for having this study which is so largely based on direct interviews and correspondence with the participants.

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Jurika, Stephen, Jr. *From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: The Memoirs of Admiral Arthur W. Radford*. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1980. 476pp.

The memoirs of any former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff deserve a careful reading; Admiral Radford's more than most, because he was Chairman when "massive retaliation" saw the light of day and he presided over the JCS decision process at the crisis over Dien Bien Phu. Admiral Radford, according to the editor of this volume, did not originally write his memoirs for publication but for scholars who might consult his papers (which are on deposit in the Hoover Institution Library). The original source material, from which this volume was distilled, covers 2,000 typed pages. The editing (and annotation) of these pages is, throughout, carefully and thoughtfully done, and the Hoover Institution and Stephen Jurika are to be congratulated on a labor well done. In one respect the title misleads a bit, inasmuch as the word "Vietnam" suggests the U.S. troop involvement era while the last part of the narrative itself, written in late 1972, ends in 1954, less than a year before Admiral Radford's death on 17 August 1973.

The memoirs are at least as interesting for their strictly naval and naval career aspects, though, as for their coverage of the national security matters. Naturally enough, the first half of the book concentrates on the earlier, naval years as Radford progressed up