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From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam

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Defence, these ideas continued to develop under the ministerial leadership of Duncan Sandys, Lord Thorneycroft, Denis Healey and Lord Carrington. Equally important was the appointment of a forceful military leader to the new position of Chief of the Defence Staff. In 1959, the appointment of Lord Mounthatten brought unprecedented professional qualifications as well as prestige to the position.

As Chief of the Defence Staff and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff for six years, Mounthatten was able to affect British defense organization in a revolutionary fashion. He was able to work for the closer integration of the services through unified commands under a more decisive Minister of Defence and a more powerful Chief of the Defence Staff. Not all of Mounthatten's plans came to fruition, but as Mounthatten himself noted in the Foreword to this book, "something permanent in this field of inter-service management and control had at least been achieved."

Perhaps we are too close to the events to have an entirely clear perspective on these very recent developments, but Johnson's work will undoubtedly stand until private papers and classified documents are released. As an American, Johnson has been able to stand back from the political disputes of the period, but at the same time his book is marked by two bothersome characteristics. First of all, the author makes continual reference to the American Defense Establishment in his descriptions of British developments. This is very useful in making the subject intelligible to Americans, but it may possibly overemphasize the influence that the American example had on those who were involved in the reorganization. Secondly, it appears that the author has leaned, for better or for worse, on the judgments of Lord Mounthatten. Time will tell how

impartial this approach has been, but certainly future students of the subject will be grateful for having this study which is so largely based on direct interviews and correspondence with the participants.

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Jurika, Stephen, Jr. *From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: The Memoirs of Admiral Arthur W. Radford*. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1980. 476pp.

The memoirs of any former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff deserve a careful reading; Admiral Radford's more than most, because he was Chairman when "massive retaliation" saw the light of day and he presided over the JCS decision process at the crisis over Dien Bien Phu. Admiral Radford, according to the editor of this volume, did not originally write his memoirs for publication but for scholars who might consult his papers (which are on deposit in the Hoover Institution Library). The original source material, from which this volume was distilled, covers 2,000 typed pages. The editing (and annotation) of these pages is, throughout, carefully and thoughtfully done, and the Hoover Institution and Stephen Jurika are to be congratulated on a labor well done. In one respect the title misleads a bit, inasmuch as the word "Vietnam" suggests the U.S. troop involvement era while the last part of the narrative itself, written in late 1972, ends in 1954, less than a year before Admiral Radford's death on 17 August 1973.

The memoirs are at least as interesting for their strictly naval and naval career aspects, though, as for their coverage of the national security matters. Naturally enough, the first half of the book concentrates on the earlier, naval years as Radford progressed up

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the career ladder. Graduating from the Academy in 1916, he saw active service in World War I, becoming a naval aviator in 1920. With World War II, he attained flag rank, commanding CARDIV 2 and TG38. Expecting retirement, he was next assigned to the Secretary of the Navy to head the Navy effort on "unification." For that, read: "Navy effort to survive in the mission/budget wars." A surprisingly clear and well-drawn picture of the congressional hearing process emerges from his pages, with the whole B-36 controversy also quite dispassionately recounted, detail by detail. The self-image that emerges is ultimately that of a quite sympathetic person, committed to his own cause with whole heart, but not inclined to confuse his enemies with the devil incarnate.

Despite this service advocacy (or, perhaps, initially because of it), Radford is promoted to four-stars in 1949 and made CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT and then, in 1953, is nominated by President Eisenhower to be chairman of the JCS. In between these points on his career ladder, he was present at the fateful Wake Island meeting of President Truman and General MacArthur. Of this, Admiral Radford gives some clear clues about where and how these two spoke past one another.

In the last section, intended to cover 1953-1957, the emphasis becomes politicomilitary and diplomatic. From today's perspective it seems odd how much JCS energy went into the problem of how to cope militarily with what everyone assumed was an aggressive, expansive China. Indeed, the ultimately tiresome discussions between the U.S. and French authorities over the Indochina situation always begin from that assumption. The Vietnam problem, seen initially in that context, begins its slow transfiguration in American thinking during Radford's last period in office, especially as the climax of French operations (and

imminent disaster) is reached as the noose tightens around the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu.

Scholars will appreciate the new light that Radford's papers shed on precisely how the United States reacted to that coming event. Radford quotes extensively from French General Ely's own memoirs, showing not only the complexity of the American official reaction but the stark simplicity of the French understanding of that reaction. In the very last two pages of the memoirs, Radford quotes Ike's letter to Churchill that, on the one hand shows a willingness to have the United States use force to aid the French, but insists that it must be a coalition effort. Radford comments (p. 449) that "there were some, including myself, who thought *we should intervene by ourselves if we could not get additional help*," but adds that 18 years later "I feel the President's position was the correct one." Despite Radford's personal views, his record documents his scrupulous adherence to official policy.

All in all, this is an interesting book. Now and again Radford lapses into loose generalizations, showing extreme and vintage cold war views, particularly in assuming that a harder stand should have been made somewhere, which would have then prevented the problems which followed: $A + B = C$. In contrast, where he writes of things he did himself, or had a direct hand in, his essentially workmanlike and pragmatic approach is sharply in evidence.

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Kennedy, Ludovic. *The Death of the Tirpitz*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1980. 176pp.

The German battleships of World War II offer contrasting challenges to the historians. *Bismarck*, ploughing her glory-course through starshell blaze and torpedo wake, never fails to seduce the