Naval War College Review

Volume 34
Number 1 *January-February*

Article 25

1981

Goodbye, Darkness: A Memoir of the Pacific War

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Recommended Citation

Falk, Stanley L. (1981) "Goodbye, Darkness: A Memoir of the Pacific War," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 34 : No. 1 , Article 25.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol34/iss1/25

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focused theory is still relevant, Liska says:

> With questionable influence on real affairs and actual strategies, but also as if weary of sterile quarrels over method and nostalgic for the excitement of the post-World War II realist-idealist debate, international relations scholars of the post-cold war era reenact—like so many medieval scholastics and early-modern scientists—the contest over rival cosmologies . . . between two types of geo-centric orders for the earthly cosmos: the traditional one, focused on the territorial state in isolation and interaction, and a revisionist one, focused on the planet earth as the shared habitat of a world community.

The last chapter, which Liska calls "Coda," and which is a paper he presented in Jerusalem, is probably the best part of the book.

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Manchester, William. *Goodbye, Darkness: A Memoir of the Pacific War.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1980. 401pp.

When I read William Manchester's biography of MacArthur, it occurred to me that his uncritical enthusiasm for the general's alleged ability to avoid heavy casualties was somehow tied to Manchester's own traumatic experience as a marine on Okinawa, where he had been severely wounded. *Goodbye, Darkness*, a personal view of the war in the Pacific, based in part on that bloody campaign, amply justifies my initial conclusion. Beyond that, moreover, it clearly shows how Manchester's earlier background provided an even stronger basis for his revulsion against the carnage and misery of war.

Manchester's forebears had fought in American wars as far back as the Revolution. His father, a World War I marine, had been badly wounded and nearly left for dead in France. Manchester himself grew up "a mild, fragile boy," avoiding violence and falling prey to bullies. Infatuated, nonetheless, with the romantic glories of war, he dreamt of valor and righteous victory even as he yearned for the structured discipline of the soldier's ranks. His father's early death in 1941 moved him deeply and led inevitably to his own decision to join the Marines in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor.

For the sensitive young recruit, service in the Marine Corps was at once the fulfillment of exotic fancies and a shocking introduction to the harshness of military life. The blurred ambivalence with which he faced his new existence reached startling clarity 2 years later on the shell-torn slopes of Okinawa's Sugar Loaf Hill. In the fighting around that bloody piece of real estate, Manchester sustained a "million-dollar wound," a bullet scratch serious enough to require evacuation but otherwise of little effect. Safe and sound in a field hospital, he went AWOL to rejoin his outfit and participate in another assault. Here he met his fate: a bursting shell that fragmented his body, burst his eardrums, tore his skull, and left him, like his father, apparently dead for nearly 4 hours before a corpsman saw a sign of life and rescued him.

Reflecting on this years later, Manchester realized that it was somewhere on Sugar Loaf Hill, "where I confronted the dark underside of battle, that passion died between me and the Marine Corps." He sensed and now resented the "evil . . . done in the name of honor . . . the tacky appeals to patriotism . . . behind the mass butchery." Having held grand illusions, he had irrevocably lost them. "My dream of war had been colorful but puerile . . . so evanescent, so ethereal, so wholly unrealistic that it deserved to be demolished."

Manchester's memoir of his life in

the Corps—especially his description of combat and men under fire—is superb: sensitive, realistic, moving. Unfortunately, it represents only about a third of his book. An unbalanced, error-marred history of the Marines' war and a sort of travelogue of the author's recent visit to the Pacific constitute the hulk of the volume. His history suffers from the same sort of exaggeration, misrepresentation, and shortsightedness that afflicted his MacArthur biography, while the account of his return to the war's arena is less impressive for the reader than it may have been for Manchester.

One must accept this in order to get at the fascinating personal material interspersed throughout the volume—and it is well worth the trouble. But it would have been a far better book if written simply as a reminiscence.

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Norton, Augustus R. and Greenberg, Martin H., eds. *Studies in Nuclear Terrorism*. Boston: G.K. Hall, 1979, 465pp.

As we enter the decade of the 1980s, the basic question relating to the threat of nuclear terrorism is no longer *if*, but rather *when* an episode of mass destruction will occur. In September 1976 a British Royal Commission admitted that potential terrorist nuclear incidents had become credible, and British security agencies have since adhered to that view. Although American governmental experts remain more skeptical, at least publicly, several best-selling novels here and abroad have stirred the popular imagination by carefully detailing acts of terrorist nuclear blackmail and the increasing likelihood of their success.

The recent revelation of an existing U.S. Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST), and its investigation of over 50 nuclear threats during the past decade, means that the U.S. Government also takes potential nuclear terrorism far more seriously than it has been so far willing to admit. Almost every contribution to this impressive volume indicates that the principal issue in potential nuclear events is one of credibility. Catastrophe theory cannot permit a single miscalculation when governments are required to think the unthinkable.

In 1978 the Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) informed the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee that terrorist nuclear incidents were indeed possible, and that the NRC was concerned about the safety of domestic nuclear installations and power plants. The National Security Council has encouraged several Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between Federal Agencies on the subject of potential terrorist activity that include a working agreement between the FBI and the Department of Energy (DOE) on nuclear threats and between DOE and the Department of Defense on incidents involving radioactive material or nuclear weapons. Expert testimony before congressional committees has dramatically demonstrated that future terrorist nuclear threats may well have operational capability.

As of this writing there are 235 nuclear power reactors located in 22 different countries that have produced approximately 100 tons of plutonium capable of making 20,000 nuclear bombs. And if this is not sufficient attraction for terrorist mischief, then what is one to say of the alleged 2,300 incidents (mainly operational error and mechanical failures) that Critical Mass, a Ralph Nader-affiliated antinuclear group, claims occurred during 1979? In such circumstances, even if the actual number of incidents is reduced by two-thirds, the potential for theft, sabotage, and destruction is not exactly minuscule.