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World Armament and Disarmament

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Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *World Armament and Disarmament*. London: Taylor and Francis Ltd., 1980. Distribution: New York: Crane & Russak. 514pp.

This is the 11th of the series by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The first few editions of the *SIPRI Yearbook* (1968/1969) showed considerable promise as an independent source of useful and reliable information and analyses on matters of defense, arms control, and disarmament. Unfortunately, although containing three excellent chapters, the *SIPRI Yearbook 1980* continues the series' more contemporary style of haphazard reporting, lazy and often faulty "analysis," and clear anti-American politics. In this regard, the problems with the *SIPRI Yearbook 1980* are so similar to those of last year's volume that much effort can be saved by referring to the review of the *SIPRI Yearbook 1979* that appeared in the March-April issue of this journal. Nonetheless, let me highlight a few key items.

Following a well-established formula, the *SIPRI Yearbook 1980* opens with an "executive summary" of current issues in defense, arms control and disarmament, which is then followed by the requisite chapters on world military expenditures, and the international arms trade. In the introduction we learn that new American strategic technologies give U.S. RVs "...a probability over 50 percent for one shot and over 90 percent for two shots" against Soviet ICBM silos. However, Soviet RVs have "...a 60 percent [single-shot] chance of destroying a U.S. Minuteman ICBM in its silo. Two warheads fired in succession give about a 90 percent success." Talk about American technological supremacy! How the United States is able to parlay a lower (than the Soviet) single-shot kill probability into a higher (than the

Soviet) two-shot kill probability is indeed amazing. The book contains a large number of such errors.

An insight into SIPRI's lazy approach to data collection and analysis can be gleaned from the chapter on military expenditures. With respect to SIPRI's estimates for Soviet military spending: "The figure...can be said to be a consequence of 'equal disbelief' of the low, flat official Soviet series and the high CIA dollar estimates."

In other words, SIPRI uses an equal weighted average. One would think that an organization that is as well funded as SIPRI could invest towards beefing up its methodological sophistication.

The chapter on arms transfers has some potentially interesting country-by-country observations to make. However, its critical tone towards Western transfers and its almost apologist attitude towards Soviet (and East European) transfers makes one question the objectivity of the chapter in general.

There is a chapter on Euro-strategic weapons. Here U.S. weapons not likely to enter service before the mid-1980s are stacked up against currently deployed (and 10-year old technology) Soviet systems. The reader is left to guess the result of the "threat analysis." Even more fascinating is SIPRI's conclusion that because the Soviets are *only* making qualitative improvements in their Euro-strategic nuclear forces, they will not present any increased military threat to the NATO nations. NATO's planned quantitative improvements, on the other hand, are dangerous and destabilizing. Yet in the introductory chapter we are told that U.S. efforts to improve the quality of its strategic forces have been dangerous and destabilizing—but not Soviet quantitative improvements to its strategic forces. You figure it out. SIPRI evidently hasn't learned what everyone else knows—the distinction between "qualitative" improvements and

"quantitative" improvements is a false dichotomy. MIRVing (alleged to be a qualitative improvement) greatly multiplies the number of deliverable warheads. Increases in delivery accuracy and system reliability (also labeled qualitative improvements) allow a nation to reduce the number of warheads aimed at a given target, thus freeing up warheads for retargeting. And, of course, doubling the number of ICBMs a country possesses (i.e., quantitative improvements) can produce the same hard-target kill capability as particular combinations of increases in warhead yields and accuracy (i.e., qualitative improvements).

Chapters 5, 6, and 7 review issues of satellite verification for arms control in general, the contents and implications of the SALT II treaty (assuming ratification), and the problems of verifying SALT II. These are informative and interesting. Chapter 6, which dissects and analyzes the SALT II agreement is particularly noteworthy, and includes a very detailed and useful subject index to the treaty. Chapter 7 is a good survey of the various techniques available for verifying SALT II, taken provision by provision.

The next chapter discusses nuclear proliferation. The problem with this discussion is that SIPRI does not seem to recognize that nuclear weapons production is possible without nuclear energy production. Thus, SIPRI's analysis of the issue in general remains superficial, narrow, and flawed. For example, SIPRI maintains that once Brazil acquires nuclear energy self-sufficiency (as the result of an energy technology agreement with West Germany) "...it will be able to

manufacture nuclear weapons." The simple fact is that Brazil has been capable of undertaking a dedicated nuclear weapons program for more than a dozen years (and for a lot less than what they're paying West Germany).

The remaining chapters cover such topics as nuclear testing, prohibitions on chemical and radiological weapons, "confidence building measures," and other goings-on in the disarmament field.

Reading the *SIPRI Yearbook 1980* leaves this reviewer with the clear impression that many of the facts, indicators, observations, and analyses are chosen (and distorted) in order to make a political statement: the United States drives the arms race while the U.S.S.R. reacts justifiably. Consider the following observation:

The number of nuclear explosions conducted by the USA and the USSR in 1979 was nearly 40 percent higher than in 1975. [page 332]

In fact, by SIPRI's own data (page 364) *U.S. tests have decreased by 6 percent* (16 in 1975 to 15 in 1979) while *Soviet tests have increased 87 percent* (from 15 to 28)! This, of course, does yield an average 40 percent increase—but it gives a completely misleading impression. With the exceptions of chapters 5, 6, and 7, what isn't biased is merely poor.

The *SIPRI Yearbook 1980* sells for \$49.50. This is approximately 1½ barrels of crude oil at OPEC prices. Buy oil—it's a better investment.

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