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NATO has begun this decade with little change in the force postures and strategic concepts that it developed in its early years, three decades ago. World conditions, however, have not remained static. Political, military, economic conditions—all present broadened demands; all demand recognition. This paper offers some thoughts and suggestions.

STRENGTHENING THE NATO ALLIANCE: TOWARD A STRATEGY FOR THE 1980s

by
Jed Snyder

Introduction. For more than three decades, the NATO Alliance has successfully "kept the peace" in Western Europe, with the United States acting as senior partner among 15 nations united in their concern for Western security and their opposition to Soviet expansion and adventurism. These two parallel concerns had been sufficient to insure a reasonable amount of cohesion among the Allies on questions of strategy. With the dissolution of SEATO and CENTO—the need for a unified policy on questions of Western security became of even greater importance; the need for maintaining a collective deterrent posture in opposition to the considerable strength of the Warsaw Pact *should* provide the West with sufficient incentive for rational and united policies.

The Alliance is entering the 1980s with relatively the same force postures and strategic concepts with which it was formed 30 years ago. Considering the

dramatic change in the military and political picture of the world, that is a disturbing and grossly inadequate calculus with which to approach a decade that may represent a watershed period for the West.

Strategic Realities and Conventional Assumptions. The strategic assumptions under which the Alliance has been operating are no longer correct and in fact have not been correct for some time. The nuclear superiority of the United States has disappeared. Even the architect of much détente policy, Henry Kissinger, admits that we have been "depleting capital" for some time now, and that current strategic concepts will be "inadequate for the 1980s."¹

Because the credibility of NATO's deterrent posture and strategy depended largely on the overwhelming strategic nuclear superiority of the United States, it was only a matter of time before that credibility began to erode and with it a

significant measure of Western strength in meeting the Soviet challenge. Unfortunately, that grace period was shorter than we had planned for. Despite early indications of this erosion, the West did nothing to address increasing vulnerabilities. In addition, the U.S. lead in military technology was sufficient solace for many U.S. defense policymakers; we could always depend on the "state of the art" advantage to carry us through a difficult period.

Strategic Doctrine and European Security: Historical Development.

U.S. nuclear doctrine during the Eisenhower administration emphasized massive nuclear response to Soviet attack (either conventional or nuclear) against the United States or against Europe. This policy continued even after clear indications of a Soviet capability to attack the United States.² The doctrine of "massive retaliation" was reflected in NATO nuclear strategy in MC 14/2, adopted by the NATO Ministers in the 1950s. This document codified NATO's policy of early nuclear response to major Soviet aggression. The European powers were pleased with what they considered to be a U.S. guarantee to defend Europe with the U.S. central systems. It was evident early, however, that the linkage of U.S. strategic weapons to European defense was not necessarily axiomatic. The U.S. nuclear umbrella was, nevertheless, sufficient comfort to Europe during a period of overwhelming U.S. strategic superiority.

The inauguration of John Kennedy introduced a policy of flexible response with two components: (1) increased reliance on conventional forces in Europe and (2) formulation of a nuclear doctrine that provided targeting options short of massive strikes. It was an attempt to shift from the "all or none" principle. Although this flexible response strategy was first articulated in 1961, NATO did not formally recognize

it until 1967 (and only *after* France left the integrated military structure), when approval was granted for the adoption of MC 14/3.

The need for flexibility in strategic policy was a theme that Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara continually emphasized in the mid-1960s as he began to retreat from his support for Assured Destruction. As part of his campaign to introduce a range of response options into NATO planning, McNamara continued to press the Europeans to increase their conventional force contributions to NATO. Talk of "decoupling" had begun; the Europeans suspected a decrease in U.S. political resolve to link the defense of Europe with continental nuclear forces.

The desire for flexible options was tied to a higher goal—that of raising the nuclear threshold in Europe. This spurred a debate over whether or not conventional "denial" capabilities, (i.e., significantly raising the level of conventional forces) would weaken or strengthen deterrence.

In an attempt further to refine U.S. nuclear strategy, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird presented the doctrine of Strategic Sufficiency to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) during the first Nixon administration. Laird's successor, James Schlesinger, developed this doctrine further, announcing a policy of flexible response in 1974. He emphasized the necessity of insuring that nuclear conflict remain at a low level should deterrence fail. It should be noted that Schlesinger felt such a policy change did not require a restructuring of U.S. forces.³ Flexible response was of particular interest and some concern to the NATO Allies, as it emphasized the use of limited nuclear options for Western Europe. Again, European cries of "decoupling" were heard.

The announcement in August 1980 of Presidential Directive 59⁴ was the culmination of a move away from Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)

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toward flexible response. PD 59 is essentially an extension of National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 242 that outlined Secretary Schlesinger's flexible targeting doctrine. The formal announcement of this policy was made by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in an address at the U.S. Naval War College on 20 August 1980. Secretary Brown anticipated European concern as a result of this announcement and assured the NATO Allies that PD 59 would "improve the contribution of our strategic nuclear forces to deterrence across the full spectrum of threats"⁵

The Shrinking Nuclear Umbrella.

As U.S.-NATO nuclear targeting doctrine has evolved, the United States has continued to assure its European NATO Allies of the commitment of strategic forces to European defense, while the relative balance of strategic forces between the United States and the Soviet Union had changed. During the 1950s and early 1960s, the United States enjoyed a very large margin of strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. Beginning in the mid-1960s, however, the Soviets initiated a large strategic building program. As Albert Wohlstetter has shown, we significantly underestimated the rate at which the Soviet Union was adding to its strategic forces.⁶ At the same time the Soviet Union was increasing its strategic capabilities, U.S. strategic spending was decreasing.

The history of the Soviet strategic building program has been exhaustively chronicled by others and need not be repeated here. Several recent developments, however, should be mentioned:

1. The deployment of the Soviet SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19 continues at a rate of about 125 new launchers per year.⁷

2. Soviet ICBM accuracies continue to improve significantly. Reports of the 1977-78 tests of the SS-18 and SS-19 suggest that the "B Team" estimates of

1976 concerning future Soviet ICBM accuracies approaching 0.1 n.m., were accurate.⁸

3. The Soviet SSBN force continues its modernization program. The DELTA III class missiles have an extended range that allows targeting of virtually all of the Continental United States from patrols in the Barents Sea and Sea of Okhotsk.⁹

4. The Soviets are developing a fifth generation of ICBMs. There have been reports of testing of a mobile system capable of carrying 10 reentry vehicles with a CEP of less than 0.14 n.m.¹⁰

As U.S.-NATO strategy evolved, little attention was paid to the shifting strategic balance. Policy was made in a vacuum; difficult spending decisions were deferred to a time when it was hoped that the political climate in Europe and in the United States would be more sympathetic to significant increases in Alliance defense spending. Although U.S. policy planners made the connection between the growth in Soviet strategic programs and U.S. security, they discounted the effect of strategic asymmetries and European security. Europeans saw a reduction in the effectiveness of the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" simply from a comparative capability assessment. The United States interpreted this only as "political nervousness," to be listened to politely, but essentially ignored.

Now the West can no longer depend on the preponderance of American strategic nuclear power to guarantee the sanctity and security of Western Europe. As a result, threats of escalation become less credible; "tripwire" doctrines seem unrealistic. This fundamental change in the strategic situation has caused the NATO Allies to question seriously both the utility of the Alliance itself as well as their individual contributions to it. We are beginning to hear some of the same arguments advanced by Charles de Gaulle when he withdrew France from NATO's

integrated military command structure in 1966.

The answer to this remarkable and parallel set of events—a steep increase in Soviet military power and a steady decline in U.S. strategic programs—has been to emphasize arms control. The Carter administration chose to meet the Soviet challenge with offers of strategic, theater and conventional arms control, while continuing to insist that we could afford to give up a small measure of our capability if the result was an equal concession by the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union does not (and never did) share the U.S. feeling that arms control was in the interest of both parties. Clearly it felt that U.S. arms control was in its interest so long as it was a U.S. unilateral effort. It was willing to allow us to control ourselves, as the SALT process has shown. Soviet reductions are permitted only when they do not interfere with Soviet strategic programs.

Just as the Soviet Union has not shared the U.S. interest in mutual arms control, neither has it shared the fundamental assumptions attending the development of "flexible response."¹¹ A concrete example of this was the Soviet criticism of the Schlesinger doctrine, announced in 1974.¹²

A Paradox of Strategy. It has become evident during the last decade that serious divergencies exist between the United States and its European Allies on matters of NATO strategy. As noted earlier, the U.S. theater and strategic nuclear advantage has allowed the Alliance to get by on the cheap, while wielding a deterrent that was, for a time, credible. Enormous increases in Soviet nuclear force expenditures as well as a very impressive R&D program have, however, erased that superiority and with it much of the credibility of the U.S. guarantee to commit strategic forces to the defense of Western Europe.

The Europeans have become politically paralyzed by their fear that a reduced American commitment will focus the destruction on Europe, leaving the homelands of the two superpowers untouched. That fear is increased by the insistence of U.S. policymakers (and negotiators) on emphasizing to the Europeans the distinction between "strategic" and "theater" forces. This U.S. approach to NATO defense is seen as politically erroneous and insensitive, failing to recognize European concerns that dominate the thinking there. The Europeans (in particular, the Germans) have always stated that theater nuclear forces represent only one rung in the escalation ladder with direct connections to higher levels of escalation—to central strategic forces, specifically. The coupling of theater to strategic systems has always been a major theme in the European articulation of NATO strategy.

The U.S. attitude, however, is quite different in this regard. Official "U.S. Doctrine" does not consider escalation from one rung to another to be automatic. The United States has consistently favored "graduated deterrence" interrupted by "firebreaks" with deterrence at every level.

Interestingly, Soviet doctrine very closely parallels European thinking. The Soviets, like the Europeans, see the European theater as a strategic area inasmuch as NATO theater nuclear forces could be launched against Soviet territory from European soil. This capability will, of course, be significantly increased if the NATO decision of 12 December 1979, to deploy *Pershing II* and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), is implemented. Conversely, the Europeans would consider Soviet "theater" weapons such as the SS-20 to be strategic inasmuch as European territory would be directly threatened.

Another element of this paradox lies in conventional forces. It is quite possible that while European Allies plead

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for a greater U.S. conventional force commitment to Europe, the gap between Warsaw Pact and NATO forces might actually be temporarily desirable. This asymmetry (so the argument goes) might insure the commitment of U.S. strategic forces, reducing European fears of "decoupling." If the very large conventional force asymmetries in Europe were maintained the United States would find it politically very difficult to dilute its nuclear commitment.

Recognizing Political Constraints. There is a history of U.S. efforts to deal with difficult political questions by suggesting technical quick fixes. An example is the whole question of theater nuclear forces (TNF).

There has always been an ambivalence in Europe toward TNF. On the one hand, their very presence implies (to the Europeans) a blurring of the connection between the defense of Europe and the commitment of U.S. strategic systems. On the other hand, TNF tended to shift the focus away from improving the conventional force asymmetry in Europe. In addition, the United States and NATO have never developed adequate employment strategies for these forces. Part of the rationale for TNF is the control of nuclear conflict below the strategic level. But as Uwe Nerlich has written, NATO has never had a posture for controlled escalation.¹³

Theater nuclear forces (and particularly long-range systems) could bolster NATO's deterrent posture. As Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown postulated both a "selective use option" and a "general nuclear response option" for LRTNF.¹⁴ The United States must be willing to approach employment decisions from a perspective that takes account of European political concerns. Such consideration was absent during the debate and decision to deploy 464 GLCM and 108 *Pershing II* launchers in

Europe. The December 1979 decision by the NATO Ministers, if implemented, will provide long-range targeting of the Soviet Union from Western Europe. The mechanics of such a capability (political and otherwise) have not yet been seriously discussed. This is in part because of the feeling by some that these systems will never actually be deployed, owing to the state of European domestic politics. The United States should realize that any TNF modernization decision will be held hostage to the degree of stability of governing coalitions in Europe.

In addition to these domestic concerns, the very wording of the NATO decision causes some concern. The modernization decision was tied to future arms control initiatives. The Communique states that "limitations on U.S. and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems should be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT III framework in a step-by-step approach."¹⁵ Unfortunately, the Soviet counterpart theater system—the SS-20—has already been deployed in large numbers. We would be asking the Soviets to limit a MIRVed system, representing the most threatening theater weapon in the Soviet inventory.

A recent example of the lack of appreciation for the political context of nuclear weapons employment was the neutron bomb episode. The United States took the position of withholding endorsement of the enhanced radiation (ER) warhead until the European Allies had announced their support. After the announcement, the United States withdrew consideration of its deployment, seriously undermining West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's position.

SALT II. The SALT II agreement has confirmed some of Europe's worst fears about the political and military liability of the United States. Although some Europeans can point with some relief to the fact that NATO's forward-

based-systems (FBS) are not restricted by SALT, neither is the SS-20 which, as previously noted, in its MIRVed configuration represents a serious challenge to NATO's forward defense.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that the Soviet Union has deployed 160 SS-20s in Europe.¹⁶ In addition, there are reports of an increase in the SS-20s MIRVed capability from three to four warheads.¹⁷

The so-called grey area systems (of which the SS-20 is just one example) cause the Europeans a great deal of concern, particularly as we discuss limiting only NATO grey area systems.

Claims by some SALT proponents that Western Europe's leaders will be devastated if the U.S. Senate does not vote to ratify the SALT II Treaty, do not hold up under a close analysis of the immediate effects of the Treaty on European security. Generally, SALT limits the flexibility of the United States in strategic planning, directly affecting NATO's deterrent posture and increasing the potential for "self-deterrence"¹⁸

A major cause for concern in Europe is the very restrictive SALT II limitation on cruise missiles in the Protocol accompanying the SALT II Treaty (which expires at the end of 1981). Unmanned, highly accurate aerodynamic vehicles could provide the Alliance with a relatively inexpensive, yet highly effective, penetration capability. Although nonnuclear cruise missiles present one option, nuclear roles for these weapons systems might be even more attractive. Cruise missiles are more easily dispersed than aircraft and their prelaunch survivability is higher. They are also less expensive than aircraft and would free the Quick Reaction Aircraft (QRA) for conventional missions. The optimal decision would be to deploy both nuclear and nonnuclear cruise missiles to Europe.

It should be remembered that SALT I did not limit cruise missiles. This was convenient for the Soviet Union

who had already deployed them while the U.S. cruise missile was still in the development stage. As a result, there was no real interest on either side in limiting their numbers. At Vladivostok, agreement was reached on limiting *all launchers* of air launch missiles with ranges greater than 600 kilometers. Following its usual practice of capitalizing on U.S.-proposed, ambiguous, treaty language, the Soviets interpreted this restriction in the widest possible manner to include air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM). This limitation was carried through to the SALT II Protocol where, in addition, no new cruise missiles of any type with ranges greater than 600 kilometers may be deployed before 1982. This is particularly troublesome to some who view cruise missiles as an effective way of overwhelming Soviet air defenses. Cruise missiles would also be most effective on NATO's flanks, where sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) could play a major role in protecting sea lines of communication (SLOC), insuring uninterrupted transit of the Mediterranean and the Turkish Strait, for example.

Although Europeans are probably technically capable of developing cruise missiles on their own, such a divergence from the SALT theology could increase the possibility of decoupling the U.S. strategic forces from European defense. In addition, if the SALT process continues, the Soviets will most definitely attempt to extend the protocol (which limits cruise missile deployment) indefinitely.

Finally, cruise missiles represent a new technology and the Soviets have always attempted to stall the development of such technologies, reducing the state of the art advantage of the West. Allowing the Soviets to quash this advantage gives the Europeans cause for concern.

Conventional Defense: The Need for Unconventional Wisdom. With

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the shrinking of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional force capability becomes even more critical during the period of reassessment by the Alliance. Very early in the life of the Alliance, the decision was made not to match the Warsaw Pact in conventional strength in Europe, either in manpower or armaments. An effective conventional defense would require many more divisions than are now deployed in Europe, requiring considerable increases in Alliance defense budgets beyond what the Alliance now considers "politically acceptable." "Tripwire" strategies served as a convenient excuse to reduce expenditures on conventional forces.

Changes in conventional strength have two effects on the deterrent calculus: (1) shifts from the perceived change in the political-military situation, and (2) movement along a "curve of deterrence." This curve begins from a point where conventional forces are weak but deterrence is considered to be high (because of the expected "tripwire" nuclear response) to a point of stalemate where conventional forces approach an actual fighting capability (what some have referred to as "the nuclear pause") to the third point where a perceived conventional defense is achieved and deterrence is high. The shift in this curve is directly dependent on the perception of the degree of U.S. commitment at any one time. In the past the Allies have been led to believe that as they increased their conventional force contribution, the United States would unilaterally withdraw, even as Soviet conventional defense increased. This has had obvious detrimental effects on deterrence.

NATO's forces are now so thinly deployed along the central front that a sustained defense in depth is not possible. Insufficient deployment of forces (in this case) is more because of reliance on outmoded doctrines that still govern NATO force sizing decisions, than because of scarce resources. The larger

problem on the central front is the critical logistics deficit. There would be a great resupply problem in any central front conflict. Although greater pre-positioning (POMCUS) of stocks and equipment as well as enhanced airlift and sealift could significantly improve the situation, there must be a greater European commitment generally. U.S. reinforcement to Europe will be effective only if supplemented by similar levels of effort by the Europeans.

The creation of a large operational reserve is of critical importance. Only two of NATO's eight corps have significant reserve forces available.¹⁹ These reserves must be mobile to allow rapid movement to the crisis area, which *may not* be in central Europe where NATO has always focused its crisis planning (much to the detriment of the Northern and Southern Flanks).

NATO's conventional force problems do not stem entirely from resource constraints. Doctrine has not yet caught up with rapidly evolving technologies of precision that would allow more discriminating responses to aggression. The area of Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) has been looked at only in a superficial manner. NATO's much heralded Long Term Defense Program (LTDP), for example, does not include specific measures to exploit such technologies. PGMs show some of the same attributes of cruise missiles—they are highly accurate and precisely controlled. In addition, PGMs may well represent an attractive substitute for certain battlefield nuclear weapons, thus raising the nuclear threshold. This would also address European (especially West German) concerns to reduce the collateral damage effects of weapons systems generally. Although PGMs are not inexpensive, they will be cost effective if correctly employed.

The Soviets enjoy an advantage in virtually every component of conventional strength in Europe, including tactical aircraft, medium-range bombers

and surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. These asymmetries seemed to have been ignored in the much publicized Presidential Review Memorandum 10, which took a very optimistic view of NATO's conventional capabilities.²⁰ It also confirmed some of the worst fears of West Germany; that U.S. doctrine concedes the loss of a substantial amount of territory early in any conflict.

In addition to reviewing conventional force posture, NATO will have to reassess its conventional doctrine. Combat outside of Europe will affect Alliance strategy. The Yom Kippur War, for example, has led NATO to reexamine components of its conventional doctrine in light of the performance there of weapons systems in close combat situations.²¹

Finally, Soviet planning and doctrine does not make the clear distinction between nuclear and conventional combat that the United States and NATO have relied on. Soviet forces in Europe train in both nuclear and conventional (as well as chemical) environments and, in fact, Soviet military planners recognize the requirement for strong conventional forces to complement a nuclear operation in seizing territory quickly.²²

Defense Spending. Official U.S. estimates until 1975 suggested that Soviet outlays for defense equalled 6 to 8 percent of GNP. Revised estimates indicate that a more accurate figure would be 11 to 13 percent of GNP. And, in fact, it may approach 20 percent during the late 1980s.

The size of the Soviet effort (in terms of U.S. dollars required to equal it in the United States) is roughly 40 percent greater than the current U.S. defense program.²³ Soviet defense expenditures (in rubles) show an annual growth rate of from 4 to 5 percent for at least the past decade.²⁴ During this period, the Soviets have spent \$100 million more

on defense than had the United States. More specifically (and more importantly), the Soviet investment in military R&D was \$40 billion more than that of the United States.²⁵ In the area of weapons R&D, the Soviets are spending three times what the United States is and two times as much as the whole of NATO.²⁶ Annual spending for strategic forces is 250 percent greater than the U.S. effort. To appreciate the payoff of such expenditures, this Soviet investment financed four new generations of ICBMs, several new theater ballistic systems, a new manned strategic bomber, and enormous increases in conventional force levels. These funds would have been sufficient to provide the United States with virtually every major weapons program proposed during the last decade, including an entire force of B1 bombers, the full Trident submarine program, a modernized U.S. Navy and substantial improvements in NATO's conventional armaments.

It is important to note that one argument advanced by proponents of SALT is that it will result in reduced strategic spending. In fact, Soviet spending levels have increased exponentially during the SALT era. William T. Lee has recently estimated that Soviet defense outlays have nearly tripled since 1968 when serious discussion on SALT I began.²⁷

The most rapid growth in Soviet military spending occurred during two 4-year periods—1959-1963 and 1966-1970, increasing 75 percent in the first period and nearly doubling in the latter period.²⁸

By comparison, the U.S. defense budget has shown a decrease in real military expenditures. In FY 1964, for example, defense outlays were 8.29 percent of GNP, in FY 1981 they may be less than 5.3 percent.²⁹ Although the 1964 figure reflects our Vietnam commitment, it is still clear that real growth in the Soviet defense

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budget was met by a decreased commitment in the United States.

Frequently, opponents of increased defense spending have argued that its burden on the national economy is intolerable. In fact, during the post-Vietnam period, despite the increased level of international crises, the "burden" of U.S. defense expenditures on the U.S. economy has not grown, but lessened. In addition, U.S. defense procurements have dropped from a high of \$44 billion in 1968 to a low of \$17 billion (in constant dollars) in 1975.³⁰

As a result of a prolonged period of neglect, U.S. force levels across the board have declined substantially—military personnel strength, for example, has declined by more than half a million, directly effecting our ability to reinforce our conventional strength in Europe.

Alliance spending shows a similar picture. Total NATO defense expenditures (as a percentage of GNP) have fallen from 5.2 percent in 1974 to 4.3 percent in 1979.³¹

Despite the agreement by the NATO Ministers at the May 1978 summit to increase defense spending by 3 percent in real terms, it is doubtful that any of the major allies met this very modest goal in 1980. An increase of 3 percent in real terms would not even arrest the decline in Alliance capabilities. Increases of from 10 to 20 percent (\$15-30 billion) would be required to reverse the deterioration in U.S. capabilities alone.

Energy Security. Events of the last several years have highlighted, dramatically, the extent of Alliance dependence on petroleum from the Persian Gulf. This is troubling for at least two reasons; (1) the Gulf area is a turbulent zone whose internal political trends have defied prediction and which, in some cases, continue to seem insoluble, and (2) this turbulence directly effects the security of oil supply from that region.

The dependency of the Alliance on oil to fuel its industrial economies has roughly doubled from 1960 to 1976.³² As Table 1 shows, the dependency of NATO as a whole on *Persian Gulf* oil has increased significantly since the embargo of 1973-1974. This table lists separately both the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The data are shown graphically on Figures 1 and 2. Distinguishing between these two cartels is important as OPEC includes several major oil producers (Nigeria, Venezuela and Indonesia) not included in OAPEC membership.

A close evaluation of oil production and consumption figures reveals several interesting facts:

1. West Germany is the only major ally who has reduced the amount of OPEC and OAPEC oil as a percentage of its total imports. In addition, the reduction has been dramatic—from 75 percent to 55 percent in 6 years.

2. Despite the North Sea oil discovery, Great Britain has increased the percentage of OAPEC oil that it imports.

3. The Alliance as a whole has increased the percentage of Arab imports while reducing the percentage of imported non-Arab crude since the 1973 embargo. There is some evidence suggesting that this may be because of the decrease in Iranian and Venezuelan production, and a great increase in Saudi Arabian production.³³

In the case of West Germany, it appears that an increase in the amount of U.K. oil imported (from the North Sea) is a significant factor. In 1976 West Germany imported 14,000 barrels of U.K. oil per day, while in 1980 it will buy at least 300,000 barrels per day. In addition, West Germany has decreased its dependency on Saudi oil significantly. It has greatly reduced its imports of Libyan and Kuwaiti crude.³⁴

TABLE 1—CRUDE OIL IMPORTS OF SELECTED NATO COUNTRIES
(In Thousands of Barrels Per Day)

	Total Imports	From OPEC**	From OAEPC*	OAEPC % of Total Imports	OPEC % of Total Imports
United States					
Sep. 1973*	3471	2367	1066	31	68
1977	8815	5644	3175	48	85
1978	8356	5184	2957	47	81
1979	6478	5084	3046	47	78
West Germany					
Sep. 1973	2297	2182	1718	75	95
1977	1951	1743	1234	63	89
1978	1913	1615	1050	55	84
1979	2147	1733	1183	55	81
France					
Sep. 1973	2784	2555	2003	72	92
1977	2350	2158	1765	75	92
1978	2302	2091	1685	73	91
1979	2520	2271	1920	76	90
Great Britain					
Sep. 1973	1917	1754	1135	59	91
1977	1405	1134	800	57	81
1978	1318	1054	774	59	80
1979	1158	821	736	64	71
Canada					
Sep. 1973	940	896	210	22	95
1977	675	575	184	27	85
1978	621	485	164	26	78
1979	686	555	290	42	81
Italy					
Sep. 1973	2514	2273	1966	78	90
1977	2122	1768	1454	69	83
1978	2212	1839	1506	68	83
1979	2242	1908	1774	79	85
Totals					
Sep. 1973	13,903	12,027	8098	56	89
1977	15,118	13,022	8612	57	86
1978	14,722	12,268	8136	55	83
1979	15,231	12,372	8949	61	81

*OAEPC Membership: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lybia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates

**OPEC Membership (Excluding OAEPC Members): Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, Venezuela

Source: International Energy Statistical Review, National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency, -ER IESR 80012, 26 August 1980.

A similar table covering data until 1978 appears in Amos Jordan, "Energy and The Future of NATO," in Kenneth Myers, ed. *NATO: The Next 30 Years* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980).

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


Fig. 1—OPEC Dependence of Selected NATO Countries.




Fig. 2—Japanese Dependence on OPEC.

**TABLE 2—CRUDE OIL IMPORTS OF JAPAN
(In Thousands of Barrels Per Day)**

	Total Imports	From OPEC	From O.APEC	O.APEC % of Total Imports	OPEC % of Total Imports
Sep. 1973	4878	4481	2181	48	92
1977	4791	4241	2776	58	89
1978	4662	4088	2676	57	88
1979	4846	4222	3047	63	87

Source: International Energy Statistical Review. National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency, -ER IESR 60012, 26 August 1980.

A similar table covering data until 1978 appears in Amos Jordan, "Energy and The Future of NATO," in Kenneth Myers, ed., *NATO: The Next 30 Years* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980).

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Looking to Japan, Iranian oil seems to be the significant factor in its increasing the percentage of imported OAPEC oil. Iran, a non-Arab OPEC nation, was Japan's largest supplier of crude in 1973, providing Japan with 33 percent of its oil. In 1979 it was delivering less than 10 percent of Japan's imported oil.³⁵ The effect of the Iranian revolution on Iranian exports is clearly seen by comparing production figures for 1978 and 1980. In 1978, Iran was producing 5,240,000 barrels of oil per day. In May 1980, it was producing only 1,700,000 barrels per day—a 68 percent reduction.

The production level of Saudi Arabia may be the single most significant determining factor in the changing percentage of OAPEC dependency of the Alliance as a whole. In 1973 Saudi Arabia was producing 7,335,000 barrels per day. In 1979 it produced 9,250,000 barrels per day—a 26 percent increase. The size of this increase could, by itself, explain the increasing percentage of OAPEC imports to certain Alliance members.

The NATO Alliance is not only vulnerable to embargoes by producing countries, as was the case of 1973-74; the revolution in Iran was a clear example of how internal political and religious conflict can greatly affect powers outside the region. As the West was becoming more vulnerable to interruptions in oil supply, it was also becoming less capable (in a political-military sense) to affect events in the region.³⁶ Also, at the same time, the Soviet Union has greatly increased its capability to project power into the region at a rapid pace and with considerable force.³⁷

Shifting the Focus. Up until recently (and continuing in some quarters) our concern (particularly in Europe) for the security of the Persian Gulf area has been directly tied to our perceptions of the state of the "Palestinian problem." Western Europe has spoken with some consistency on this

issue, refusing to tackle seriously the question of Persian Gulf security until the Palestinian problem was resolved.

The European preoccupation with the Palestinian issue and Europe's fear of Arab economic power were both illustrated during the Venice summit meeting of the European Economic Community (EEC) in June 1980. During this conference the EEC members called for the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in any future Middle East negotiations.³⁸ The endorsement of a role for the PLO rather than one for the Palestinian people is an unmistakable signal of Europe's fear of the "Arab oil weapon." The result of that policy is the endorsement of a terrorist organization, with obviously disturbing implications.

One hopes that the Iran-Iraq conflict will shift the focus away from the Palestinian issue toward the more important security questions. There have been, however, no indications to date of a change in European attitudes.

The myopic focus on the Palestinian issue was a convenient way of deferring Alliance discussion on the Soviet threat to this region. Clearly resolution of the Palestinian issue will not reduce Soviet incentives for adventurism in the area. A firm and unified Alliance position—on protecting vital sea lines (along which pass 60 percent of the world's oil), for example—will.

Arab OPEC members can make very effective use of their "oil weapon" to mold policies of European governments regarding certain issues in the Middle East. Witness, for example, the EEC statement on the PLO. Although perhaps only implicit, threats of reduced oil exports if the EEC did not toe the line were assumed. This can only serve to blur the focus of the Alliance on the real issues of global concern. With the Iran-Iraq war and the recognition of serious interstate disputes in the area, the Palestinian problem should pale in comparison to it and the Soviet threat.

The U.S. inability to develop a sound and comprehensive energy policy despite President Carter's declaration that we faced "the moral equivalent of war," caused great concern among our allies, reducing the chances that individual Alliance members would begin to consider the problem seriously.

The remarkable parallel development referred to earlier—the great increase in Soviet power projection capabilities and the great reduction of Western military power in the region—has also caused some concern among friendly and Western-aligned states in the area. Saudi Arabia is one example. The decision to establish an AWACS orbit and additional ground radars there³⁹ is certainly a positive step, but it is also only a first step. Providing the Saudis with a long-range radar capability does signify the U.S. commitment to the security of the country and the stability of its monarchy.

Soviet Energy Futures. There has been much speculation of late on the future of Soviet energy requirements. Debate has focused on the 1977 CIA estimate that the Soviet Union will become a net oil importer during the next decade. Whether or not this will be the case, there are alternatives open to the Soviets that are not available to the Alliance. Natural gas represents a very attractive alternative to oil for the Soviet Union. Development of the northern fields in Western Siberia will (Soviet leaders hope) produce gas at a rate faster than the declining rate of crude oil production.⁴⁰ Indeed, if the Soviets are able to tap vast natural gas fields within their own borders, their much heralded energy crisis may be postponed. In addition to implications for the Soviet economy, natural gas production there has already attracted the interest of Western Europe. Large contracts are now being negotiated between the Soviet Union and Western European countries for the export of

this fuel in return for the raw materials required for its exploration and transportation. For example, Soviet exports of natural gas to France have increased from 2.5 billion c.m./year in 1976 to 4 billion c.m./year in March 1980.⁴¹ West German natural gas imports from the Soviet Union were expected to reach 10 billion c.m./year in 1980. For the purpose of comparison, it is possible that the Soviet Union's natural gas flow will equal that of the United States by late 1984.⁴²

Should this trend continue, the potential pressure that the Soviet Union could exert on Western Europe would be enormous. If the Western European economies become dependent on the Soviet Union for fuel, the debate will focus on the relative dangers of Soviet natural gas dependence vs. Persian Gulf oil dependence.

Flank Security. The generally shared assumption that an isolated Soviet attack on either of the flanks would be irrational and contrary to Soviet goals is, I think, specious. If the Soviet Union (as I believe) is interested primarily in the political dissolutions of the Alliance as opposed to a protracted central front military confrontation, then a lightning strike to seize territory on the flanks would be an attractive and relatively low-risk operation. Current NATO plans do not call for substantial reinforcement for either the Northern or Southern Flanks, inasmuch as such forces would come from the Central Region, weakening that theater. Again, this is more a function of poor planning and politically outmoded doctrine than scarce resources.

In addition, to divorce the defense of the center from that of the flanks is illogical. A Soviet hold on either of the flanks would seriously undermine NATO's position in the center, particularly if both flanks were seized simultaneously. Also, secure flanks would cause the Soviets pause in any attempt

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to attack the center, as NATO would then be able to conduct flanking attacks of its own. As Admiral Sir Peter Hill Norton, former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, has written, "there is a clear lack of a coherent NATO policy which relates the problems of the Central Region to the quite different ones of the Northern and Southern Regions"⁴³

The Northern Flank. Soviet expansion is dramatically illustrated on the Northern Flank, where the Soviet Northern Fleet has dispersed from its home base at Murmansk on the Kola Peninsula to the Barents and Norwegian Seas. It is now in position to establish a strong and threatening presence in most of the North Atlantic, north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap. The Northern Fleet is structured to emphasize airborne antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, strategic strike and long-range aerial reconnaissance.⁴⁴ Increased Northern Fleet deployments could seriously impede Allied convoy operations during any conflict on the Northern Flank.⁴⁵

Rapid reinforcement and supply have always been the central defense problems in the north. NATO could deal with this problem as long as it retained control of the string of islands and seas west of the eastern borders of NATO's northern nations. The Soviet naval expansion has, however, threatened this control; NATO's defensive positions in Norway are now *behind* Soviet maritime forces.⁴⁶

Soviet exercises have shown the ability to coordinate units from the Northern, Black Sea and Baltic Fleets and engage in combined operations of ground, sea and air forces. By extending its network of bases in the north, the Soviets could realize control over the Barents, Norwegian and North Seas. Short supply and communications lines would ease the logistics burden of such an operation. The many Soviet strategic

airfields (from which *Backfires* could be launched) in the Kola Peninsula would allow increased power projection, in addition to rapid reinforcement of its forces on the Northern Flank.

The NATO base structure in the north is thin; the security of the flank depends on the continued use of NATO bases in Iceland and Greenland. These bases provide peacetime support for ASW monitoring, intelligence and surveillance.

A situation peculiar to the Northern Flank complicates the deterrent equation in the area—the sensitivity of Denmark and Norway to the stationing of Allied troops and nuclear weapons on their territories. This attitude is so strongly held and respected by NATO that in the event of conflict, reinforcements could not be brought in without an explicit request from these two governments. As a result, reinforcements might not arrive in a timely manner. In addition, most of the forces earmarked for the Northern Flank would come from the United States, not from units already in place in Europe. The only forces in Europe theoretically capable of rapid flank reinforcement are components of the Ace Mobile Force (AMF), which is roughly evenly divided in responsibility between the Southern and Northern Flanks. This "deterrent" force, however, would not arrive early enough as any operation of that kind would not be mounted until after conflict erupts, erasing the deterrent effect of a mobile force.

The Southern Flank. NATO's Southern Region is by far the largest area in Allied Command Europe (ACE) covering almost half a million square miles, including the strategically vital eastern and central Mediterranean, as well as the three peninsular nations of Greece, Turkey and Italy.

The strategic importance of the Southern Flank extends beyond its

perimeters, being linked in geopolitical ways to the Middle East. The economic, political and military potential of the Mediterranean is certainly not lost on the Soviet Union, as evidenced by the vast increases in Soviet naval activity. In 1963, for example, there were virtually no Soviet naval vessels in the area. Today there are more than 25 surface combatants permanently deployed. This affects the ability of the U.S. 6th Fleet to support Greek and Turkish land forces. In addition, the strength of the 6th Fleet has been cut by one-half with the deployment of one of its two carrier task groups to the Arabian Sea, which may be a permanent deployment.

The Soviets have shown an impressive capability to reinforce their Mediterranean naval squadron in time of war, as illustrated during the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict when the number of Soviet naval vessels there reached nearly 100.⁴⁷

Complementing the Soviet naval buildup is land-based tactical airpower, as well as the *Backfire* bomber; both factors would seriously threaten the survival of the 6th Fleet.

Turkey is of central importance to the defense of the Southern Region; it is one of two NATO members to share a land border with the Soviet Union. Turkey controls transit through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles—one of several important constraints on Soviet naval power—and also has potential control of the vital airspace in the region. However, Turkey's importance extends beyond the flank to the Persian Gulf where its position assumes strategic importance for the defense of the vital Gulf area. Turkey's current economic and political situation is disturbing but clearly not irreversible, given continued Alliance recognition of her problems and an increased commitment to strengthen Turkey. The economic and political crisis there increases Turkey's vulnerability to pressure from the Soviet Union, which has been

increased by the collapse of the CENTO Alliance.

The 12 September coup in Turkey highlights the extent of domestic upheaval there. For some time the Turkish military leaders had warned the political leadership of the possibility of a military coup if the domestic situation did not improve. A parliamentary maneuver by the opposition Republican People's Party (RPP) to oust the Foreign Minister, Hayrettin Erkmen, succeeded.⁴⁸ In addition, the Turkish Parliament had been unable to agree on a successor to President Fahri Koruturk, whose term had expired in April. Although the ouster of Erkmen clearly precipitated the military takeover, the economic situation and the increasing political terrorism would probably have been sufficient provocation for a coup in the near future.

The leader of the six-man military junta (referred to formally as the National Security Council), Gen. Kenan Evren, has pledged to return Turkey to stability and to democratic rule. He has also affirmed his support for Turkey's very important role in the NATO Alliance.⁴⁹ The appointment of Turgut Ozal as one of two Deputy Prime Ministers, is seen as a positive sign. Ozal was the architect of economic reforms under the deposed government of Suleyman Demirel (leader of the Justice Party). He will continue to serve as Turkey's chief negotiator with foreign financial institutions, trying to attract loans and grants from such sources as the International Monetary Fund and the EEC. He has already succeeded in acquiring \$6 billion in Western loans. In addition, the Turkish inflation rate has been reduced by 30 percent since his economic austerity program was introduced.

Greece is also of great importance to the security interests of the Alliance (in addition to its political importance). There are several major airbases in Greece where U.S. tactical aircraft com-

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mitted to NATO have been based. In addition, the Port of Piraeus has served as a home port for some units of the U.S. 6th Fleet. Greek installations provide a major link in NATO's air defense network and communications systems.⁵⁰ Her ports have sheltered not only her own naval vessels, but those of her NATO partners. NATO military operations in support of the Greek Army would be essential in stopping a southward Warsaw Pact thrust into Thrace.

The return of Greece to the NATO integrated military command structure closes a large gap on NATO's South-eastern Flank. Its withdrawal in 1974 over the Turkish invasion of Cyprus accompanied a promise not to return until all Turkish troops were removed from the island. Turkish troops are still stationed on Cyprus, occupying 40 percent of the island.

The major Greek demand is a return to the "*status quo ante 1974*," meaning total Greek control of the Aegean Sea and the vital airspace there. Turkey has repeatedly vetoed the Greek reentry primarily because of this demand and it should be noted that this issue has not yet been resolved. Greece has simply agreed to return and negotiate later. Reportedly, the previous Aegean command boundaries have been eliminated⁵¹ at the suggestion of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), Gen. Bernard Rogers, who took the lead in bringing Greece back into the fold. Rogers' predecessor, Gen. Alexander Haig, had begun discussions on this issue. Other disputes, including a resolution of the continental shelf issue (and the Cyprus dispute) will have to be settled.

The external threat to the Southern Flank is clear and takes several forms:

1. *The Black Sea Exits.* Control of the Black Sea exits would allow the Soviets to reinforce their Mediterranean squadron with sufficient strength to challenge the U.S. 6th Fleet. In event of imminent threat of war on the Southern Flank, the

Turkish Strait would become one of several obvious Soviet objectives.

2. *Control of Oil.* The possibility for Soviet control or denial of Persian Gulf oil to the NATO Alliance would be catastrophic. Denial of these resources or control of both the quantity and price could collapse the economies of Western Europe and Japan who depend on the Gulf for 57.5 percent and 72 percent of their total petroleum consumption, respectively.

3. *Interdiction of the Lines of Communications.* NATO's naval lines of communications are critically important because, in time of war, the majority of war materiel to the peninsular nations of Italy, Greece and Turkey would come by sea.

4. *Fracturing the Alliance.* Any Soviet initiative in the Southern Flank may encourage the permanent withdrawal of Turkey and Greece from the Alliance. As Pierre Hassner has noted, these countries are already in a state of "semi-withdrawal."⁵²

5. *Presenting the Alliance with a "fait accompli."* The Thrace-Strait area constitutes one of the few regions in NATO where the Soviet Union might execute a lightning strike, seizing a large amount of territory before NATO is able to respond effectively. Presumably, the Soviets would face principally Greek and Turkish national forces in such a conflict, as it is questionable whether NATO could lift many reinforcements into the area on a timely basis. The assumption that an attack on the flank would come *only* as the result of an all-out attack on Europe generally must be examined. Considering the peculiar vulnerabilities of the Southern Flank, that assumption is highly questionable.

Policy Planning for the 1980s: Conclusions. Several steps should be taken to both modernize NATO doctrine and apply it to the broadened

demands that surely will surface in the 1980s.

1. *Retire the "Assured Destruction" Scenario.* The U.S. emphasis on this doctrine only serves to increase European tendencies to maximize deterrence (as they perceive it) while neglecting actual combat capabilities. The result was, however, to decrease the credibility of the deterrent. The strategy of "flexible response," though actually inflexible, served the Alliance adequately during a period when the only perceived threat to NATO was in the Central Region.

2. *Threat Perception.* Recent Soviet incursions into Southwest Asia and the Horn of Africa signal much different types of threats to the Alliance in the coming decade. NATO must broaden its perception of threat to include areas that are outside the formal treaty zone, but of critical value to the Alliance, i.e., the Persian Gulf. The Alliance must also increase the range of contingencies for which it will have to generate Alliance support. There are some fairly tangible incentives for such support, specifically, the very great reliance of NATO on Persian Gulf oil and dependency on the African Continent for strategic minerals.

3. NATO must begin to develop new responses rather than focusing solely on the time-honored Fulda Gap views. These new options should include *credible* responses where NATO is weakest, not just where it is strongest.

4. The principle of unanimity, while politically preferable, should not be the absolute rule of procedure. Individual Alliance members most directly affected by a particular contingency should develop options in concert with each other. Although this strategy may initially create fissures in the Alliance, long-term security will be the result. In the long term, deterrence will be better served as the Soviet Union will not be able to play one member against another. The more absolute unanimity

is stressed, the more likely the success of Soviet attempts to split the Alliance along lines of economic divergencies, for example. It should be remembered that the success of collective security depends in part on how effectively the concerns of the individual members are addressed. The 1966 French withdrawal from the NATO military structure is a case in point.

5. *Coupling and Uncoupling.* As already mentioned, the advent of strategic "parity" and mutual second-strike capability has reduced the value (to the Europeans) of coupling theater systems to the central systems. Flexible *strategic* response, however, would strengthen this relationship. Technology will allow selected employment options on the strategic level, while adhering to the collateral damage criteria established by the Alliance. Threats of escalation are credible only if there is a continuity of detailed options along the spectrum of responses.

6. *TNF Modernization.* While the 12 December 1979 TNF decision is a welcome event, several important issues peculiar to these systems were ignored because of either political or budgetary considerations.

NATO must be able to mobilize TNF during a crisis. Because some of these

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systems may be used early in any conflict, rapid release time is essential if these weapons are to be used to any effect. In particular, a more sensible mechanism for political consultation is of paramount importance. Even with a streamlined military release procedure, the final authorization will come from political authority. This is in contrast to Warsaw Pact procedures where such consultation is not required. As a result, the Soviets might exploit this to advance their own forces and, perhaps, preempt Alliance action. Improved Alliance measures in this area would not be provocative (as some have claimed) but, in fact, would remove a very significant element of "self deterrence."

For the above reasons, survivability of TNF becomes essential. Survivable forces would frustrate Soviet attempts to destroy these systems while the release-request sequence is in operation.

7. *Nonnuclear Weapons Technology*. As discussed earlier, increased R&D in the area of precision nonnuclear munitions would go far to bolster forward defense. Some (clearly not all) targets previously classified as nuclear may be serviced with precise high explosive nonnuclear munitions.

In sum, NATO must begin to reduce the gap between announced policy and actual capability. We have allowed that gap to widen, even as Soviet capabilities were dramatically increasing.

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